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A.

BANKRUPTCY

Tools-of-the-Trade Exemption

To permit debtors to continue their trades or professions in the
event of bankruptcy, Maryland law allows debtors to claim certain
work-related property as exempt from execution on a judgment.' In
In re Taylor 2 the Court of Appeals considered what types of property
are "tools of the trade" and thus qualify for the exemption.3 Specifically, the court was asked whether "large, mobile farm implements
and vehicles" qualified as "exempt property within section 11504(b)(1) of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article." 4 The court determined that farm implements and vehicles may
be exempt property under the Maryland tools-of-the-trade exemption if found by the trier of fact to be "reasonably necessary" for the
practice of the debtor's trade or profession.'
In a proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Maryland, Robert and Joyce Taylor sought to exempt
equipment used in their respective trades.6 Robert Taylor, a selfemployed grain farmer,7 wanted to protect from execution approximately $44,500 in farming equipment.8 Joyce Taylor, self-employed
as a home decorator,9 attempted to exempt seventy-three percent of
the 1985 Dodge Caravan she used in her business.'" The bankruptcy trustee objected to these exemptions, and the bankruptcy
court sustained the objections on the ground that the Maryland legislature did not intend to exempt "such large and expensive items"
as tools of the trade.1 ' The Taylors appealed to the United States
1. MD.CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1 1-504(b)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (tools-ofthe-trade exemption).
2. 312 Md. 58, 537 A.2d 1179 (1988).
3. Id. at 61, 537 A.2d at 1180. The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland certified this question to the Court of Appeals pursuant to MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-601 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
4. 312 Md. at 61, 537 A.2d at 1180.
5. Id. at 71-72, 537 A.2d at 1185-86.
6. Id. at 62-63, 537 A.2d at 1181.
7. Id. at 61, 537 A.2d at 1181.
8. Id. at 62, 537 A.2d at 1181. The equipment included a combine, a grain head,
two diesel tractors, a trailer, a tanker, and a header wagon. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 63, 537 A.2d at 1181. Joyce Taylor averred that she used the van for business purposes only 73% of the time. Id.
11. Id. at 60, 537 A.2d at 1180.
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District Court for the District of Maryland, 2 which certified the
question to the Maryland Court of Appeals.'" The Court of Appeals
disagreed with the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the tools-ofthe-trade exemption and concluded that the Taylors might be entitled to claim the farm implements and vehicles as exempt property
under the statute.14
In reviewing the legislative history of the tools-of-the-trade exemption, the court noted that the General Assembly first displayed
its goal to protect debtors' property in the Constitution of 1851." s
The constitution "specified that the property be of a 'reasonable
amount' but 'not exceeding in value the sum of five hundred dollars.' "16 In 1976 the legislature amended the constitution by deleting the five hundred dollar limitation, retaining the phrase
"reasonable amount" as the only restriction.' 7
To determine the legislative intent of the tools-of-the-trade exemption, the court traced its history from the Maryland Acts of
1861.18 The exemption generally remained unchanged'" until 1973
when the legislature repealed the existing tools-of-the-trade exemption and incorporated it in section 11-504 of the new comprehensive
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.2 ° In the process of this
recodification, the tools-of-the-trade exemption was substantively
amended.2 ' Since 1973 the legislature has twice redesignated the
12. Id.
13. Id. at 60-61, 537 A.2d at 1180.
14. Id. at 71, 537 A.2d at 1186.
15. Id. at 64, 537 A.2d at 1182. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 39 (1851, amended 1976).
16. 312 Md. at 64, 537 A.2d at 1182.
17. Id. The court reasoned that this deletion was primarily because "the dollar of
1851 was not the same as the dollar of 1976." Id. at 64-65, 537 A.2d at 1184. See MD.
CONST. art. III. § 44.

18. Act of May 8, 1861, ch. 7, § 4, 1861 Md. Laws. The Act provided that "all wearing apparel, books, and the tools of mechanics" were exempt from execution, except for
"any books or tools kept for sale." Id.
19. 312 Md. at 65, 537 A.2d at 1182-83. In 1884 the Act of May 8, 1861, ch. 7, § 4.
1861 Md. Laws, was repealed and reenacted to read:
[Alll wearing apparel, mechanical text books and books of professional men,
tools of mechanics, and all tools or other mechanical instruments or appliances
moved or worked by the hand or foot, necessary to the practice of any trade or
profession, and used in the practice thereof, shall be exempt from execution
Act of Apr. 8, 1884, ch. 504, 1884 Md. Laws 672, 673.
20. Act of Aug. 22, 1973, ch. 2, § I, 1973 Md. Laws 7. The Act recodified MD. ANN.
CODE art. 83, § 11 (1969), at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § l1-504(a)(3) (1974).
The tools-of-the-trade exemption subsequently was redesignated as MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § I1-504(a)(1) (1980), and can now be found at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § I1-504(b)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
21. 312 Md. at 67, 537 A.2d at 1183. The relevant part of the former tools-of-the-
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subsection with only a minor alteration to its wording." The legislature has not amended the tools-of-the-trade exemption since
1981,. although it has amended other subsections of section 11504.25
The court reasoned that the 1973 legislature eliminated the
phrase "moved or worked by the hand or foot" from the subsection
to modernize it and expand its scope. 24 In particular, the court believed that modernization was necessary to grant equitable relief to
debtors employed in agriculture.2 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that "expensive tools, instruments and appliances" could be
considered reasonably necessary to continue a professional practice
or trade after the completion of bankruptcy proceedings. 2 6
The court noted that the legislature did not attach a monetary
amount to the tools-of-the-trade exemption.2 7 "The legislature was
content to abide by the general limitation of a 'reasonable amount'
designated by the Constitution. '2' Nor did the legislature identify
specific items that a debtor could claim as exempt. Instead, it
trade exemption was amended to read as follows: "Wearing apparel, books, tools, instruments, or appliances necessary for the practice of any trade or profession." MD.
CTs. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § I 1-504(a)(1) (1974) (deleting the language "moved or
worked by the hand or foot").
22. 312 Md. at 65-66, 537 A.2d at 1183. See supra note 20. In 1980 the legislature
redesignated the tools-of-the-trade exemption (formerly § (a)(3)) as § (a)(l), "with no
change in the language." 312 Md. at 65, 537 A.2d at 1183. In 1981 the legislature
redesignated § (a)(l) as § (b)(l) and added the word "lease" to the exceptions contained within the statute. Id. at 65-66, 537 A.2d at 1183.
23. 312 Md. at 66, 537 A.2d at 1183. See Act of May 8, 1984, ch. 255, 1984 Md. Laws
743 (amending MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(f) (1980 & Supp. 1983) to

raise exemption to $2500); Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 554, 1983 Md. Laws 1762 (amending MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(b)(5) (1980 & Supp. 1982) to include
both cash and property); Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 175, 1983 Md. Laws 811 (repealing
MD. CTs. &JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 11-504(f)(2) (1980 & Supp. 1982) which required
debtor to "show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has attempted to negotiate
a repayment schedule with his creditors"); Act ofJune 1, 1982, ch. 703, 1982 Md. Laws
3744 (modifying items exempt from execution on the judgment); Act of May 17, 1977,
ch. 356, 1977 Md. Laws 2105 (providing that exemption of certain property and money
from execution did not apply to wage attachments); Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 383, 1976
Md. Laws 1013 (increasing certain dollar ceiling relating to bankruptcy exemptions); Act
of Apr. 22, 1975, ch. 430, 1975 Md. Laws 2357 (providing that exemption of certain
property and money from execution on judgment may not be waived); Act of Apr. 30,
1974, ch. 316, 1974 Md. Laws 1377 (changing the value of certain property exempt from
execution and seizure).
24. 312 Md. at 68, 537 A.2d at 1184.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 69, 537 A.2d at 1184.
27. Id. at 70, 537 A.2d at 1185. The dollar amount limitation was deleted in 1976.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28. 312 Md. at 70, 537 A.2d at 1185.
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merely required that these items be "reasonably necessary for the practice of the debtor's trade or profession." 2 9 The court interpreted
these actions as expressing a legislative intent to permit the courts
to determine which items can be exempt from execution without any
statutory boundaries.s °
In answering the certified question, the court concluded that
the district court could permit the Taylors to exempt any or all of
the farm equipment and machines as tools of the trade. 3 ' The court
did not find this equipment exempt per se, but stated that the trier
of fact should make this determination after considering the particular circumstances and with due regard to accomplishing the objec32
tives of the statute.
The Taylor court expanded the tools-of-the-trade exemption to
include a substantial percentage of the capital assets which normally
would be disbursed in bankruptcy proceedings to satisfy a farmer's
debts.3 3 Through its new interpretation of recodified statutes, 4 the
court has injured creditors, and in the long run, the farmers
themselves."5
Before this case, the Maryland courts considered recodification
as a means of clarifying existing statutes unless another purpose was
noted by the statutory revisor.3 6 Adopting a different view of
29. Id. at 71, 537 A.2d at 1185 (emphasis in original). The legislature also chose not
to limit these exempt items further by size, number, weight, or any other characteristics.
The Court of Appeals first grappled with this apparent lapse of legislative specificity in
Muhr v. Pinover, 67 Md. 480, 10 A. 289 (1887). In addressing the 1861 Act's exemption
of "property real or personal," Act of May 8, 1861, ch. 7, § 2, 1861 Md. Laws, the Muhr
court wrote that "lt]he object of the law was to prevent a debtor from being stripped of
all his property, and it ought to be liberally construed." 67 Md. App. at 487, 10 A. at
293. The court similarly noted this liberal construction in Darby v. Rouse, 75 Md. 26,
28, 22 A. I 110, 1110 (1891) (considering whether exemption was properly allowed); see
also Fowler v. Gray, 99 Md. 594, 599, 58 A. 444, 446 (1904) (discussing when a party is
entitled to an exemption in a bankruptcy sale). See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 1 1-504(b)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
30. 312 Md. at 66, 537 A.2d at 1183.
31. Id. at 71, 537 A.2d at 1186.
32. Id. at 71-72, 537 A.2d at 1186. The court believed the objective of the tools
exemption was to permit the debtor to continue a career and afford the opportunity to
earn a fair living. This objective "do[es] not reach beyond making it possible for him to
start from scratch by not stripping him of all his property and tools of his trade or profession." Id. at 71, 537 A.2d at 1185.
33. Id. at 75, 537 A.2d at 1187 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
34. Id.

35. See In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1987). The Patterson court noted that
farmers would be hurt in the long run because creditors would be less likely to make
loans to them and this would, in turn, raise the cost of credit for the farmers. Id. at 1142.
36. 312 Md. at 73, 537 A.2d at 1187 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). See In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576-77, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983) (recodification is
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recodification, the Taylor court concluded that the recodification of
the tools-of-the-trade subsection was for the purpose of modernizing it and "satisfy[ing] the constitutional mandate. ' " The court's
new interpretation of the recodification process has allowed it to expand the exemption to include large and expensive tools and
machinery. 3"
Although currently there are no statutory or constitutional restrictions on the value of the Maryland tools-of-the-trade exemption, it is improbable, as Judge McAuliffe suggested in his dissent,
that the legislature intended to permit farmers to claim as exempt
more than forty thousand dollars worth of farm vehicles and equipment."9 Although the court has punished creditors by exempting
property which could be sold to satisfy the farmers' debts, the farmers ultimately will suffer through increased credit costs. 4 0
While the court expanded the tools-of-the-trade exemption, it
failed to establish a bright line test for determining what items are
exempt. 4 ' Instead,' it conferred that responsibility on the trier of
fact. 4 2 It now falls to the lower courts to make a case-by-case determination of what tools are reasonably necessary for a debtor to continue a trade or profession.

presumed to be for clarification and ordinarily will not be interpreted as an attempt to
change the meaning of the statute); Consumer Protection Div. v. Consumer Publishing
Co., 304 Md. 731, 768, 501 A.2d 48, 67 (1985) (same).
37. 312 Md. at 68, 537 A.2d at 1184. The court interpreted the constitutional mandate as attaching only the "reasonable amount" limitation to the tools-of-the-trade exemption. Id. at 64, 537 A.2d at 1182.
38. The court remarked that in 1973 the legislative revisor did not comment on the
change in wording of the tools-of-the-trade exemption. Id. at 67, 537 A.2d at 1184.
Drawing "guidance more from what he did not say than from what he did say," the court
reasoned that "the General Assembly intended that the new subsection have a significantly different import" from the old statute. Id. at 67-68, 537 A.2d at 1184.
39. Id. at 75, 537 A.2d at 1188 (McAuliffeJ., dissenting). Judge McAuliffe further
stated that the purpose of the tools-of-the-trade exemption is "to enable an artisan to
retain tools of modest value so he is not forced out of his trade." Id.
40. See Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine
of Geographic Uniformity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22 (1983). The author noted that the amount
of credit available in an area is dependent on the risks that creditors perceive in that
area. When the credit risks are high, the amount of available financing is low because
the creditors are apprehensive about recouping their loans. Id. at 30-31. This argument
was recently set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In
re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140, 1142 (7th Cir. 1987).
41. 312 Md. at 71-72, 537 A.2d at 1186.
42. Id. at 72, 537 A.2d at 1186.
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Statute of Limitationsfor Fraudulent Conveyances

In Dixon v. Bennett45 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
bankruptcy trustee's failure to avoid fraudulent transfers within the
federal statutory period4 4 did not bar an unsecured creditor from
instituting a "state cause of action against the transferee of property
fraudulently conveyed by the debtor" if the .applicable state statute
of limitations has not expired.4 5 The court imposed liability on the
transferee who had received fraudulently conveyed property even
though the bankruptcy court had discharged the transferor/debtor
from liability in the bankruptcy proceedings. 4 6 Additionally, the
court held that one may not invoke the accountant-client privilege
"to avoid producing documents, prepared in the contemplation of
47
fraud and in which the accountant allegedly participated.1
Phyllis Dixon, an unsecured creditor of Richard B. Rice, initiated this lawsuit as the assignee of Campanelli, Inc. (Campanelli).
Campanelli owned a one-half interest in Wincamp Partnership
(Wincamp), whose general partners were Rice; W. Dudley Dixon,
the trustee; and William E. Dixon.4 8 Campanelli assigned all of its
interest in Wincamp to two of Wincamp's general partners, Rice and
W. Dudley Dixon. Wincamp's general partners agreed to indemnify
Campanelli for any claims arising from Wincamp. 49 When Wincamp collapsed, Campanelli was obligated to disburse over
$450,000.50 As a result of the indemnity agreement, Wincamp's
general partners were liable to Campanelli for its losses. 5
In October 1982 Rice filed a petition for relief in the bankruptcy court under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code. 2 In November 1982 the bankruptcy court appointed a permanent trustee to the bankrupt estate, and in March 1983, Rice was
43. 72 Md. App. 620, 531 A.2d 1318 (1987), cert.
denied, 311 Md. 557, 536 A.2d 664
(1988).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (certain actions or proceedings may
not be commenced after the earlier of either two years after the appointment of a
trustee, or the time the case is closed or dismissed).
45. 72 Md. App. at 624, 531 A.2d at 1320.
46. Id. at 637, 531 A.2d at 1327.
47. Id. at 624, 531 A.2d at 1320. For the accountant-client privilege statute, see MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-110 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
48. 72 Md. App. at 622, 531 A.2d at 1319. Phyllis Dixon is William E. Dixon's wife
and the stepmother of W. Dudley Dixon. Id. at 622 n.I, 531 A.2d at 1319 n.1.
49. Id. at 622, 531 A.2d at 1319.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 623, 531 A.2d at 1319. See I I U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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discharged
from bankruptcy.5"
Following this discharge,
Campanelli assigned its claim against Wincamp's general partners
to Phyllis Dixon. Neither Campanelli nor Phyllis Dixon had filed a
claim as an unsecured creditor against Rice's bankrupt estate.After November 198455 Phyllis Dixon filed suit under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (MUFCA) 56 claiming that
Rice had fraudulently conveyed assets to Craig A. Bennett, CBZ
Construction and Management Company (CBZ), and A.A. Utility
Operations Company (Utility) in an attempt to avoid his creditors.5 7
Bennett, CBZ, and Utility moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the bankruptcy trustee had an exclusive right to file suit
against Rice for alleged fraudulent conveyances. 58 In granting the
motion, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County held that Phyllis
Dixon's state law claim was barred because the bankruptcy trustee
was the only person who had the right to avoid Rice's
conveyances.59
During discovery, the circuit court initially granted Phyllis
Dixon's motion to compel Bennett, Rice's accountant, to produce
particular documents but later granted Bennett a protective order
based on the accountant-client privilege.6" The court found that a
majority of the documents requested were privileged because Bennett had, directly or indirectly, used them in performing his accounting duties.6 '
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Phyllis Dixon con53. 72 Md. App. at 623, 531 A.2d at 1319.
54. Id., 531 A.2d at 1319-20.
55. Id., 531 A.2d at 1320. This date is important because it was two years after the
court appointed a trustee to Rice's bankrupt estate. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, the trustee would be barred from bringing suit against Rice by the federal twoyear statute of limitations. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982 &Supp. IV 1986). Phyllis Dixon
could still bring suit, however, under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(MUFCA), Mo. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-204 to -207 (1983 & Supp. 1988), which is
governed by a three-year statute of limitations, MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5101 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
56. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -214 (1983 & Supp. 1988). Specifically,
she filed under MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 15-204 to -207 (1983 & Supp. 1988). See
72 Md. App. at 623, 531 A.2d at 1320.
57. 72 Md. App. at 623, 531 A.2d at 1320. Remedies under MUFCA include setting
aside transfers to certain persons. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-209, -210 (1983 &
Supp. 1988).
58. 72 Md. App. at 623, 531 A.2d at 1320.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 623-24, 531 A.2d at 1320 (construing MD. CTS. &JUD. PROc. CODE ANN.
§ 9-110 (1984 & Supp. 1988)).
61. 72 Md. App. at 624, 531 A.2d at 1320. Without a court reporter present, the
court reviewed the documents via four in camera hearings. id. at 643, 531 A.2d at 1329.
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tested both the circuit court's grant of summary judgment and the
protective order.6 2 Dixon advanced two arguments to refute the circuit court's decisions. First, she asserted that the trustee's failure to
avoid the fraudulent transfers within the federal statutory period of
two years did not preclude her, "an unsecured creditor, whose applicable state limitations ha[d] not expired, from subsequently
bringing a state cause of action against the transferee of property
fraudulently conveyed by the debtor. ' 6 3 Second, she argued "that
the accountant-client privilege does not protect documents either
created by or disseminated to third parties or documents prepared
in anticipation of a fraudulent scheme in which the accountant participated as a principal."6' The Court of Special Appeals agreed
with Dixon's arguments and overturned the lower court's rulings on
both motions.6 5
In finding that an unsecured creditor could file an action under
MUFCA, the court first noted that Rice, the debtor, retained an equitable interest in the property he fraudulently conveyed. 6 6 Thus,
the trustee retained the right to sue 67 to reclaim the fraudulently
transferred property, but only for a specific statutory period.6" Because the trustee failed to bring action before November 15, 1984,69
he was precluded thereafter from suing to recover this property for
the bankrupt estate. The court held, however, that Dixon was not
barred from bringing suit simply because the trustee was barred.70
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. Id. at 643, 531 A.2d at
1329.
66. Id. at 625, 531 A.2d at 1321. See In re Mortgageamerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266,
1275 (5th Cir. 1983) (transferor retained equitable interest in property fraudulently conveyed so as to permit creditors to attach and execute a judgment on the property).
Under § 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, an estate, consisting of the
debtor's legal and equitable interests in property, is created when the debtor files a
petition in bankruptcy. See II U.S.C. § 54 1(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
67. See Mortgageamerica, 714 F.2d at 1275 (bankruptcy trustee possesses exclusive
right to sue to recover fraudulently transferred property because right to sue is a legal or
equitable interest of the bankrupt estate).
68. I1 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (suit may not be commenced after
the earlier of either two years after the appointment of a trustee or the time the case is
closed or dismissed). The bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid any fraudulent
transfers of the debtor's interest in property occurring within one year of the date of the
debtor's filing for bankruptcy. Id. § 548(a).
69. 72 Md. App. at 626, 531 A.2d at 1321. November 15, 1984, was two years after
the trustee had been appointed to Rice's estate. Id.
70. Id.
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The court traced the history of the trustee's statute of limitations and noted that prior to the Chandler Act of 19387' an unsecured creditor was barred from bringing action against the debtor
or the trustee.7 2 The Chandler Act of 1938 extended the period for
which the trustee could file suit if the applicable state statute provided for a longer period."
The court noted that section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 7 grants the trustee exclusive avoidance powers for a
limited period and only for certain enumerated actions under the
Act. 7 ' Dixon's action against Rice was not directly affected by this
statute because her MUFCA claim was governed by Maryland law.
The Bankruptcy Code prohibited Dixon from filing suit
"against fraudulent transferees after the debtor file[d] a bankruptcy
petition and until the trustee's cause of action expire[d]." 7 6 The
Bankruptcy Code precludes such suits in order to provide for an
organized liquidation of the debtor's assets that treats all creditors
impartially.17 While section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly
releases the discharged debtor from personal liability on past debts,
it has no effect on the liability of other entities and their property. 78
The court reasoned that section 524 -only prevented Dixon from suing Rice, the discharged debtor, and would not bar her from filing
71. Id. at 629, 531 A.2d at 1322. Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat.
840 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Subsection 1I (e) of the Chandler Act provided for the trustee's statutory period to be as long
as the period provided for an unsecured creditor. The Act had the effect of eliminating
the closing of the estate as a time factor in bringing suit against the debtor's estate. 72
Md. App. at 629, 531 A.2d at 1323.
72. 72 Md. App. at 627-28, 531 A.2d at 1322.
73. Id. at 629, 531 A.2d at 1322-23. See Banister v. Solomon, 126 F.2d 740, 742-43
(2d Cir. 1942) (interpreting § I1 (e) of the Chandler Act to permit a trustee to bring suit
after the two-year federal statutory period if the applicable state statute of limitations
has not expired).
74. 1I U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
75. 72 Md. App. at 630, 531 A.2d at 1323. Section 546 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 is only applicable to §§ 544, 547, 548, and 553 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act. I I U.S.C. § 546 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See In re Britton, 66 Bankr. 572 (E.D.
Mich. 1986), where the court held that § 546 of the Bankruptcy Code only establishes a
statute of limitations for the trustee and not for debtors. Id. at 575. The court also held
that only those actions which are contained in the avoidance powers of the trustee are
barred by this statutory period. Id.
76. 72 Md. App. at 632, 531 A.2d at 1324.
77. Id. at 634-35, 531 A.2d at 1325.
78. !1U.S.C. § 524(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Kathy B. Enters., Inc. v. United
States, 779 F.2d 1413, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing Internal Revenue Service to
maintain an action against transferee of property fraudulently conveyed despite debtor's
discharge).
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suit against the transferees of Rice's property.79 The court's holding is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's goals because it permits an unsecured creditor to bring suit only after the trustee has
completed the orderly liquidation of the debtor's estate and thus
does not interfere with the equitable treatment of all creditors.8 0
The court also concluded that the accountant-client privilege
statute"' does not protect accountants from producing documents
when the client or accountant "may be involved in the perpetration
of a fraud.""2 Confronted for the first time with the applicability of
the fraud exception to the accountant-client privilege, the court followed the federal courts' reasoning for limiting the attorney-client
privilege in similar circumstances. 8" The court stated that the "privilege is by statute subject to the exceptions affecting 'the criminal
laws of the State or the bankruptcy laws.' 84 In that regard, the5
8
privilege is unlike the practically absolute attorney-client privilege,
the priest-penitent privilege,8" and the doctor-patient privilege. 87
For Dixon to overcome the accountant-client privilege, she had to
produce sufficient evidence to establish that the accountant gave advice to the client in the requested documents for the purpose of promoting fraudulent activity. Then the burden of production would
79. 72 Md. App. at 637-38, 531 A.2d at 1327. Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code
only discharges the personal liability of the debtor and acts as an injunction against a
creditor's actions to impose personal liability on the debtor. See II U.S.C. § 524 (a)(2)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
80. 72 Md. App. at 634-35, 531 A.2d at 1325.
81. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-110 (1984 & Supp. 1988). Maryland is
only one of a few states that have adopted an accountant-client privilege statute. 72 Md.
App. at 640, 531 A.2d at 1328.
82. 72 Md. App. at 642, 531 A.2d at 1329. The present case is stronger because
Dixon alleged the accountant was actively involved in the fraudulent activities. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 516, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987) (the purpose of a statute should be "determined in the light of the statute's context").
83. 72 Md. App. at 639-40, 531 A.2d at 1327-28. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
I, 14-15 (1933) (finding that attorney-client privilege "takes flight" when the information is for the purpose of perpetrating fraud); In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum.
731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) (attorney-client privilege does not protect communications when client seeking advice to promote a fraudulent or unlawful goal); United
States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding attorney-client privilege
does not protect communications when information sought to promote fraudulent
scheme).
84. 72 Md. App. at 640-41,531 A.2d at 1328; MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9110(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988) ("This [accountant-client] privilege does not affect the
criminal laws of the State or the bankruptcy laws.").
85. MD. CTS. &JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-108 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
86. Id. § 9-111.
87. Id. § 9-109(b).
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shift to the accountant to rebut this prima facie case."8 Because the
lower court failed to determine whether Dixon had made a prima
facie showing, the court remanded the case to the lower court.8 9
The Dixon court correctly interpreted section 546(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code as precluding unsecured creditors from bringing
suit only from the period after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition
until the trustee's right to bring suit has expired.90 The court's holding permits an unsecured creditor to bring suit against a transferee
of fraudulently conveyed property without interfering with the orderly liquidation of the debtor's property. The court's decision followed the natural expansion of section 546(a) to protect creditors
from fraudulent transfers by allowing them to bring suit after the
bankruptcy trustee has discharged the debtor.9 The court appropriately interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to deprive such transferees of any advantage over unsecured creditors, thus increasing
creditors' opportunities to recover outstanding debts. By strictly interpreting section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court properly
held that a discharge releases only the debtor and has no effect on
third parties.9 2
In evaluating the accountant-client privilege statute, the court
generally followed the federal courts' decisions on the attorney-client privilege.9" The court properly held that communications to
further fraudulent activity should not be protected by the privilege.
88. 72 Md. App. at 642, 531 A.2d at 1329.
89. Id. at 643, 531 A.2d at 1329. The court applied Maryland Rule 1085 which prevents the court from deciding "any point or question which does not plainly appear by
the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court." MD. R. 1085. The court
was unable to review the record because the lower court did not permit the court reporter to be present at the in camera proceedings. Regardless of the circuit court's ruling

on the accountant-client privilege, the court noted that the lack of any record of the in
camera review proceedings was sufficient grounds to remand the case. 72 Md. App. at
643, 531 A.2d at 1329.
90. 72 Md. App. at 635, 531 A.2d at 1325.
91. See, e.g., Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), permitting trustee to bring
suit after two-year period had expired if an applicable state statute had not expired). See
also Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 11(e), 30 Stat. 544 (1899) (barring suits only
when final decree approved trustee account and trustee was discharged); Bankruptcy Act
of 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 517 (1868) (forever barring all suits not brought within
two-year period).
92. 72 Md. App. at 637, 531 A.2d at 1327.
93. See cases cited supra note 83. See generally Comment, Internal Revenue Service Accessibility to Auditors' Tax Accrual Ivorkpapers, 72 GEO. L.J. 1211, 1218 (1984) (noting that an
accountant may give advice to a client but the accountant's "first allegiance is to the
public"). But see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (noting that federal

courts do not recognize an accountant-client privilege).
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The court also borrowed the federal courts' procedure which requires the party requesting the documents to present a prima facie
case of fraudulent activity.9 4 Even though the court was not required to address this issue, 95 it seized the opportunity to limit the
accountant-client privilege. With this decision, the creditor is more
likely to obtain access to accounting records to support allegations
of fraudulent conveyances.
JOHN CULLEN POULTON

94. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (attorney-client privilege is negated by prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact); United States v.
Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1984) (to overcome the attorney-client privilege
one "must merely make a prima facie showing that the legal advice has been obtained in
furtherance of an illegal or fraudulent activity").
95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

II.
A..

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Circuit Court In Banc Review

In Montgomery County v. McNeece' the Court of Appeals affirmed
the constitutionality of the provisions of Maryland Rule 2-551 for
preserving issues for, and noticing, circuit court in banc review. 2
The court's decision had three effects. First, it resolved a question
of the Court of Appeals' own jurisdictional power. Second, it reaffirmed the longstanding principle that the decision of an in banc
circuit court is final only as to the party requesting the in banc review. 3 Third, and most significantly, it established the constitutionality of the provision in rule 2-551 that permits a notice for in banc
review to be filed within the time specified in the rule,4 rather than
the previous time requirement set forth in the Maryland
1. 311 Md. 194, 533 A.2d 671 (1987).
2. MD. R. 2-551(a) provides:
(a) Generally.-When review by a court in banc is permitted by the Maryland Constitution, a party may have a judgment or determination of any point
or question reviewed by a court in banc by filing a notice for in banc review.
Issues are reserved for in banc review by making an objection in the manner set
forth in Rules 2-517 [for evidence at trial] and 2-520 [for jury instructions].
Id.
3. 311 Md. at 197, 533 A.2d at 672. This principle originates in article IV of the
Maryland Constitution, which provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe decision of the said Court in banc shall be the effective decision . . . as
against the party, at whose motion said points, or questions were reserved; but
such decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal, or writ of error to
the adverse party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which appeal, or writ of
error to the Court of Appeals may be allowed by Law.
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22. The principle is also embodied in the Courts &Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 12-301, which sets forth specific exceptions to the general
right of appeal,
does not permit an appeal from the decision of the judges of a circuit court
sitting in banc pursuant to Article IV, § 22 of the Constitution, if the party
seeking to appeal is the party who moved to have the point or question reserved for consideration of the court in banc.
MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 12-302 (1984).

4. The rule provides:
(b) Timefor Filing.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the notice for in banc review shall be filed within ten days after entry of judgment.
When a timely motion is filed pursuant to Rule 2-532 [Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict], 2-533 [Motion for New Trial], or 2-534 [Motion
to Alter or Amend a Judgment--Court Decision], the notice for in banc review
shall be filed within ten days after entry of an order denying a motion pursuant
to Rule 2-533 or disposing of a motion pursuant to Rule 2-532 or 2-534.
MD. R. 2-551 (b).
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Constitution.5
At issue in McNeece was the Montgomery County Fire Department's failure to award firefighter John McNeece an increase in salary upon his promotion to sergeant.6 McNeece unsuccessfully
sought administrative relief before the Montgomery County Fire
and Rescue Commission (the Commission) and the Montgomery
County Merit System Protection Board.' Having exhausted his administrative remedies, he appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which reversed the administrative finding and
directed the Commission to award McNeece an increase in salary.'
Montgomery County filed a notice for circuit court in banc review,
and McNeece countered with a motion to dismiss.9 The circuit court
in banc held that compliance with rule 2-551 did not satisfy the state
constitutional requirements for noting an in banc appeal."° Finding
that Montgomery County had failed to reserve its points or questions for consideration by the court in banc in accordance with article IV, section 22 of the Maryland Constitution,"1 the court granted
2
McNeece's motion to dismiss.'
Montgomery County appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals.' 3 That court dismissed the action 4 and cited as authority
rule 1035(b)(1) " and Board of Medical Examiners v. Steward. 16 Mont5. 311 Md. at 207, 533 A.2d at 677. The Maryland Constitution requires:
[wihere any Term is held, or trial conducted by less than the whole number of
said Circuit Judges, upon the decision or determination of any point, or question, by the Court, it shall be competent to the party, against whom the ruling
or decision is made, upon motion, to have the point, or question reserved for
the consideration of the three Judges of the Circuit, who shall constitute a court
in banc for such purpose; and the motion for such reservation shall be entered
of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made; ... and the
decision of the said Court in banc shall be the effective decision . . . as against
the party, at whose motion said points, or questions were reserved; but such
decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal, or writ of error to the
adverse party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which appeal, or writ of error
to the Court of Appeals may be allowed by Law ....
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 22. The Court of Appeals has interpreted § 22 as requiring a
party to file for in banc review on the day of trial. Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122. 124, 3
A. 285, 285 (1886).
6. 311 Md. at 195-96, 533 A.2d at 671.
7. Id. at 196, 533 A.2d at 671-72.
8. Id., 533 A.2d at 672.
9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id. For the pertinent text of MD.CONST. art. IV, § 22, see supra note 5.
12. 311 Md. at 196, 533 A.2d at 672.
13. 1d.
14. Id. The Court of Special Appeals opinion is unreported.
15. MD.R. 1035(b)(1) provides that "[on motion filed by any party, an appeal may
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gomery County then petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari,
which the court granted to consider two significant questions: (1)
whether the Court of Special Appeals' ruling to dismiss Montgomery County's appeal was correct, and (2) whether the circuit court's
dismissal of the in banc appeal was warranted under current Maryland law.' 7
Article IV, section 22 of the Maryland Constitution, createsfor the losing party at trial-an alternative to appeal to a higher
court or to a review by an in banc circuit court.II The history of the
law applying in banc review began in 1886 with Costigin v. Bond.' 9 In
Costigin several exceptions were taken at trial concerning the court's
rulings on proposed jury instructions. 20 The jury found for the
2
plaintiffs and the defendant appealed to the circuit court in banc. '
The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss, 2 holding that
article IV, section 22 of the Maryland Constitution created a right of
appeal to the circuit court in banc in lieu of an appeal to a higher
court for any party in the action.2 3 The decision of the in banc
court, however, was to be conclusive against the party exercising the
right.2 ' All other dissatisfied litigants retain the option of subsebe dismissed . .. [when] . .. the appeal is not allowed by law or by Rule 1009 [order

denying motion to dismiss not appealable]." Id.
16. 207 Md. 108, 113 A.2d 426 (1955). In Steward the Court of Appeals held that a
circuit court in banc can decide it has no jurisdiction in a particular case and that such a
decision shall be final and unappealable. Id. at 110-12, 113 A.2d at 427.
17. 311 Md. at 196, 533 A.2d at 672.,
18. For the text of § 22, see supra note 5. The option for in banc review, as originally
proposed and incorporated as part of the 1867 Constitution, reads today almost as it did
when first adopted. Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 396, 404 A.2d 1027,
1029 (1978). The reason for its inclusion appears to have been "a response to a fear of
the framers of the Constitution ...that the distance to Annapolis and the concomitant
delay and expense incident to prosecuting an appeal in the Court of Appeals would
discourage or preclude many litigants from seeking justice by means of appellate review." Id. See aLso Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329, 333 (1869) (noting that
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City "[was] ... a court in bane, where parties can have
questions of law deliberately considered by at least three judges, without the delay and
expense of an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and where they can have the benefit of such review in
many important cases where an appeal will not lie." (emphasis added)).

19. 65 Md. 122, 3 A. 285 (1886).
20. Id. at 122, 3 A. at 285.
21. Id. at 123, 3 A. at 285.
22. Id.
23. Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 124, 3 A. 285, 285 (1886).
24. Id. Section 22, however, provides the nonmoving party the option of subsequent
appeal. MD. CoNsT. art. IV, § 22. For the pertinent text of § 22, see supra note 5. See
also Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 420-21, 404 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1979) (decision of in
banc circuit court immediately reviewable by Court of Special Appeals upon nonmoving
party's notice of appeal).
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quent appeal to a higher court. 5 This principle consistently has
been applied in cases following Costigin26 and is followed in
McNeece.27
The McNeece court based its jurisdictional authority to grant certiorari on article IV, section 14 of the Maryland Constitution 28 and
section 12-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 9
Although the court recognized that this case differed from typical
appeals because of its prior consideration by the circuit court in
banc, s° the Court of Appeals concluded that this difference was insufficient to remove the case from its jurisdiction under the broad
coverage of section 12-201.
Three judges, while concurring that
25. Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 399, 404 A.2d 1027, 1029 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Id. at 399, 404 A.2d at 1029 (decision of in banc circuit court conclusive
against party exercising right of in banc review). Accord Buck v. Folkers, 269 Md. 185,
186, 304 A.2d 826, 827 (1973); State Roads Comm'n v. Smith, 244 Md. 537, 544, 168
A.2d 705, 707 (1961); Tyler v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 213 Md. 37, 41, 131
A.2d 247, 249 (1957); Board of Medical Examiners v. Steward, 207 Md. 108, 112, 113
A.2d 426, 427 (1955).
27. 311 Md. at 207, 533 A.2d at 677. The significance of the principle in McNeece lies
primarily in the court's application of the principle to find jurisdiction to decide the
merits of the dismissed appeal.
28. Id. at 196, 533 A.2d at 672. Section 14 provides that "[tihe jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State and such as now is or
may hereafter be prescribed by law." MD.CONST. art. IV, § 14.
29. 311 Md. at 197, 533 A.2d at 672. Section 12-201 states in pertinent part that "in
any case or proceedings pending in or decided by the Court of Special Appeals upon
appeal from a Circuit Court ....

any party, including the State may file in the Court of

Appeals a petition for certiorari to review the case or proceeding."

Mo. CTS. & JUD.

PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (1984).

30. 311 Md. at 197, 533 A.2d at 672. The circuit court in banc has been considered
a separate appellate tribunal not only because it provides a substitution for an appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals, but also because the in banc court acts only as an appellate
tribunal, not as a reconsidering trial court. Its decisions, therefore, are reviewable as
final appellate judgments. Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 427, 404 A.2d 1040, 1042
(1979).
31. 311 Md. at 197, 533 A.2d at 672. This decision arguably conflicts with the constitutional provisions of § 22 and with rule 2-551(g), which make a decision of the in
banc circuit court final as to the party seeking the in banc review. See supra note 3. Given
Montgomery County's lack of a further appellate right, it is questionable that the court
should have elected to exercise jurisdiction. The court's stated reason for doing so was
to "resolve a matter of substantial importance ... [and] . . . in the public interest,"

namely, the constitutionality of rule 2-551. 311 Md. at 200-01, 533 A.2d at 674. Judge
Eldridge declared, however, that "in dispensing its view on Rule 2-551, the majority
ignores the prudential limitations on the doctrine it invokes." 311 Md. at 209, 533 A.2d
at 678 (Eldridge, J., concurring in the result only). He also declared that the majority's
exercise of jurisdiction is in conflict with the established policy of commenting on the
merits of a dismissed appeal only in extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 209-10, 533
A.2d at 678-79. To grant certiorari to an appeal that is not only unauthorized but in
direct contradiction with the law is, in Judge Eldridge's opinion, "in derogation of the
constitutional limitation upon [the court's] jurisdiction." Id. at 211, 533 A.2d at 679.
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the Court of Special Appeals properly dismissed the appeal, nevertheless disagreed, inter alia, with the Court of Appeals' assumption
of jurisdiction. 3"
The significance of McNeece, however, is not in the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction, but rather in the majority's finding that
rule 2-551 is consistent with constitutional requirement. Rule 2-551
modifies section 22 by eliminating the need for excepting to decisions concerning points or questions at the time of trial in order to
preserve the right to in banc review. 33 In McNeece the in banc circuit
court determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear Montgomery County's appeal because, while Montgomery County had complied with rule 2-551, it had not met the requirements mandated by
section 22."
At common law, parties were required to make contemporane35
ous exceptions in order to preserve questions for appellate review.
As the Court of Appeals noted, however, the modern use of court
stenographers has ended the need for contemporaneous exceptions." In 1945 the Court of Appeals adopted Court of Appeals
Rule 17"7 which abrogated the "unnecessary and outmoded formalities" of contemporaneous exceptions."8 This rule was later incorporated into rule 2-522, and in 1984 became part of rule 2-517.-"
The disparity between rule 2-517 and the rule for circuit court in
banc review caused confusion among attorneys. 40 As a result, in
1984 rule 2-551 was adopted so that circuit court rules would paral32. 311 Md. at 209, 533 A.2d at 678 (Eldridge, J., concurring in the result only).
Judges Smith and Couch shared Judge Eldridge's view. Id. at 217, 533 A.2d at 682.
33. Id. at 205, 533 A.2d at 676. For the pertinent text of rule 2-551(b), see supra note

4.
34. 311 Md. at 201, 533 A.2d at 678.
35. Id. at 203, 533 A.2d at 675. See Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 348 (1885) (disallowing exceptions after the term of court at which trial took place unless made upon an
order for extension of time or by consent of all parties).
36. 311 Md. at 204, 533 A.2d at 676.
37. Former rule 17 provided:
Formal exceptions to the rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary;
but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is
sufficient that a party at the time of the ruling or order of the court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made,
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
MD. CT. APP. R. 17 (now codified in MD. R. 2-517), quoted in 311 Md. at 204, 533 A.2d at
676.
38. Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 6, 8, 209 A.2d 776, 779, 781 (1965).
39. 311 Md. at 204, 533 A.2d at 676.
40 Id
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lel Court of Special Appeals procedure. 4
For its authority to alter the constitutional requirements of arti42
cle IV, section 22, the court relied on the language in that section
and in article IV, section 18." The court reasoned that if the substantive right of in banc review is not impaired, the timing of reservations and notices is procedural and within the permissible power
of the court to determine.4 4 The court's rationale for its authority to
make procedural changes as needed is sound. The change in the
law that the McNeece court recognized as constitutionally permissible
simplifies the process of circuit court in banc review, making this
method of appeal advantageous for both the litigants and the court,
and creates greater consistency between the Court of Appeals rules
and those of the lower courts.
B.

Lex Loci Contractus Rule

In Kramer v. Bally's Park Place4 5 the Court of Appeals held that
Maryland courts will enforce a gambling contract made in a state
where the type of gambling engaged in is lawful and the contract is
enforceable, even though the type of gambling may be illegal in the
State of Maryland. 4 6 In so holding, the court expanded the application of the principle of lex loci contractus4 7 to include gambling contracts when determining which jurisdiction's law controls the
enforceability and effect of a contract. The court rejected argu4 1. Id. at 205, 533 A.2d at 676.
42. Id. at 206, 533 A.2d at 677. Section 22 states in pertinent part that "this Section
shall be subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law." MD. CONST. art.
IV, § 22.
43. 311 Md. at 206, 533 A.2d at 677. Section 18 states that the Court of Appeals has
the authority to "adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in
and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State," and
that the rules so adapted "shall have the force of law .... " MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a).
44. 311 Md. at 207, 533 A.2d at 676. See also Maryland Community Developers, Inc.
v. State Roads Comm'n, 261 Md. 205, 214, 274 A.2d 641, 645 (1971) (upholding as
matter of court administration rule requiring jury trial in eminent domain proceedings
unless parties submit written request for bench trial); Heuston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 14, 215 A.2d 192, 194 (1965) (upholding court rule requiring written request for jury trial); Thompson v. Giordano, 16 Md. App. 264, 271, 295
A.2d 881, 885 (1972) (upholding court rule requiring written request for jury trial).
45. 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988).
46. Id. at 398, 535 A.2d at 471.
47. The principle of tex loci contractus requires courts in the forum state to apply the
substantive law of the place of contracting when determining the validity and construction of a contract. Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 660, 332 A.2d 651,659 (1975). For
application of the principle in Maryland, see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
The lex loci contractus principle is the approach taken by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws:
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ments that Maryland has a sufficiently strong public policy against
gambling debts to justify disregarding -the lex loci contractus
principle.4 8
At issue in Kramer was the enforceability in Maryland of a gambling debt Kramer owed to Bally's Park Place (Bally), a casino in
Atlantic City, New Jersey.49 Bally alleged that while in Atlantic City,
Kramer wrote a $5000 check drawn upon a Maryland bank and payable to Bally. 5" The check was dishonored and Bally eventually
brought suit in a Maryland court 5 ' to recover from Kramer on, inter
alia, the underlying contract and debt. 2 The trial court, after a
hearing, granted Bally's motion for summary judgment and entered
judgment in favor of Bally for $5000 plus interest.5 3 Kramer appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but before that court considered the case the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari.5 4 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment.5 5
Law Governing Validity of Contract. The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise with respect to
(a) capacity to make the contract;
(b) the necessary form, if any, in which the promise must be made;
(c) the. mutual assent or consideration, if any, required to make a promise
binding;
(d) any other requirements for making a promise binding;
(e) fraud, illegality, or any other circumstances which make a promise
void or voidable;
(f) ... the nature and extent of the duty for the performance of which a
party becomes bound;
(g) the time when and the place where the promise is by its terms to be
performed;
(h) the absolute or conditional character of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
For a brief explanation of the application of this principle, see infra note 82.
48. 311 Md. at 396, 535 A.2d at 470.
49. Id. at 388, 535 A.2d at 466.
50. Id.
51. Id. Bally originally sued Kramer in NewJersey to recover on the debt. The New
Jersey trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of Bally for $6,350. Id.
52. Id In the alternative, Bally sought to enforce the New Jersey default judgment
against Kramer. Id.
53. Id. at 389, 535 A.2d at 467. It is unclear from the Court of Appeals opinion
whether the trial judge granted Bally's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of
the New Jersey judgment or on the underlying contract and debt. See id. (stating only
that the court granted the motion). The Court of Appeals quickly noted that as
Kramer's affidavit opposing summary judgment had raised factual issues about the validity of the default judgment, "the grant of summary judgment can be sustained only on
the underlying contract action .
Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 398, 535 A.2d at 471. The court affirmed the summary judgment based on
the underlying contract and debt. See supra note 53.
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The court first noted that the established position of the Maryland courts in deciding questions of the validity and construction of
contracts, was to follow the doctrine of lex loci contractus-to look to
the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made.5 6 The court
explained, however, that lex loci contractus will not be applied in some
circumstances, 57 one of which is when the provision is against Maryland public policy. 58 This exception to the conflict of laws rule,
which the court has recognized consistently,5 9 is the primary focus
of Kramer.
The Court of Appeals recently reviewed the public policy exception to the lex loci contractus principle in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G. C.
Zarnas & Co. ,6 a construction indemnification suit. Zarnas involved a
Pennsylvania contract in which Zarnas agreed to indemnify Bethlehem Steel against liability for damages solely resulting from Bethlehem Steel's negligence. 6 ' The agreement was legal under
Pennsylvania common law, 62 but "no Pennsylvania statute expressly
created a right to so contract." ' 63 The Maryland General Assembly,
however, had expressly stated that in Maryland such provisions were
"void and unenforceable" and "against public policy."'
The court
56. 311 Md. at 390, 535 A.2d at 467; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co.,
304 Md. 183, 188, 498 A.2d 605, 607 (1985); Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 660. 332

A.2d 651, 659 (1975); Dakin v. Pomeroy, 9 Gill 1, 6 (Md. 1850).
57. 311 Md. at 390, 535 A.2d at 467.
58. Id. The principle was stated early in Maryland. See, e.g., Trasher v. Everhart, 3 G.
&J. 234, 244 (1831) (Maryland courts "will always look to the lex loci to give construction
to an instrument, and will impart to it validity, according to those laws, unless it would
be dangerous, against public policy, or of immoral tendency to enforce it.").
59. Zarnas, 304 Md. at 188-89, 498 A.2d at 608. Maryland cases have considered
public policy in a variety of contexts when applying the lex loci contractus principle. See,
e.g., Traylor, 273 Md. at 660, 332 A.2d at 659 (public policy in contract for sale of realty);
Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 143, 163 A. 810, 815 (1933) (public policy in mechanics' lien law); Pleasanton v. Johnson, 91 Md. 673, 675, 47 A. 1025, 1025 (1900) (public
policy in statute regarding mortgages on personal property); Moore v. Title & Trust
Co., 82 Md. 288, 290, 33 A. 641, 642 (1896) (assignment for benefit of creditors not
contrary to Maryland public policy); B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287, 322 (1868)
(recognizing the exception as to violation of good morals or repugnancy to show Maryland law or policy); DeSobry v. DeLaistre, 2 H. &J. 191, 228 (Md. 1806) (recognizing
the exception and citing contract for prostitution as example).
60. 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985). For an overview of the Zarnas case, see SurveyV
of Developments in Maryland Law, 1985-86-Civil Procedure, 46 Mo. L. REv. 586, 609 (1987).

61. Zarnas, 304 Md. at 185, 498 A.2d at 606.
62. Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 425 Pa. 166, 173 n.5, 228 A.2d at 656,
660 n.5 (1967).
63. Zarnas, 304 Md. at 191, 498 A.2d at 609.
64. Id. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608. MD. CTS, &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-305 (1984)
provides:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with or
collateral to, a contract or agreement relating to the construction, alteration,
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held that "the General Assembly's explicit determination of public
policy [was] sufficient
t6' override the lex loci contractus
65
principle.
In so holding, however, the Zarnas court cited the principle that
for a Maryland court to hold another state's law unenforceable,
"there must be a strong public policy against its enforcement in
Maryland."16 6 The mere fact that a Maryland law is different from
the law of another jurisdiction is not sufficient to67 overcome the lex
loci contractus principle on public policy grounds.
After reviewing the public policy exception to the lex loci contractus principle, the Kramer court examined the pertinent judicial opinions and statutes concerning the enforceability of gambling
contracts and debts to determine whether public policy was so
strongly opposed to gambling or gambling debts that it would override the lex loci contractus principle. 6 8 It was uncontested that if New
Jersey law applied, Bally could recover on the gambling contract. 69
The court found that the Maryland statute relating to the enforcement of gambling debts or contracts provides a civil remedy to
a gambler to recover lost money.7 ° In early cases, the courts applied
article 27, section 243, literally, therefore absolving all gambling
debts."' This application of section 243 changed in 1967 with Bender
repair, or maintenance of a building... purporting to indemnify the promisee
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to any person . . .
caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee or indemnitee,
his agents or employees, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.
Id.
65. Zarnas, 304 Md. at 190, 498 A.2d at 608 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 189, 499 A.2d at 608.
67. Id.
68. 311 Md. at 392-96, 535 A.2d at 468-70. For a review of the cases and statutes the
court examined, see infra notes 71-76.
69. 311 Md. at 390, 535 A.2d at 467. The casino gambling activity Kramer had engaged in was legal in New Jersey. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-190 (West 1988). Under
§ 5:12-101, casinos are permitted to accept checks for gambling. Id. § 5:12-101. That
section also establishes the manner in which dishonored checks may be collected. Id.
70. 311 Md. at 393, 535 A.2d at 469. The statute provides that "[a]ny person who
may lose money at a gaming table may recover back the same as if it were a common
debt, and shall be a competent witness to prove the sum he lost .... " MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 243 (1987). The statute specifically excludes a civil remedy to enforce the
recovery of gambling winnings. Id.
71. See, e.g., LaFontaine v. Wilson, 185 Md. 673, 684, 45 A.2d 729, 734 (1946) (applying precursor to present section and holding plaintiff whose gambling losses were of
embezzled funds could recover those losses regardless of faulty title); Emerson v. Townsend, 73 Md. 224, 227, 20 A. 984, 985 (1890) (applying the English statute of 9 Anne,
ch. 14 (1710), and holding promissory note for $395 completely void when five dollars
of its consideration constituted money loaned for gambling purposes).
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v. Arundel Arena, Inc.,72 which held that section 243 was "unavailable
73
to one who gambles . . . at a licensed gambling establishment.

The Kramer court interpreted Bender as standing for the proposition
that "Maryland public policy concerning the enforceability of gambling debts and contracts depends on whether the type of gambling
engaged in is legal or illegal."71 4 The court also noted that, unlike
the statutory statement that was determinative in Zarnas,7 5 the General Assembly did not state that the activity addressed in section 243
76
was against public policy.
The court found further evidence that Maryland public policy
was not in opposition to gambling or gambling debts in the fact that
several forms of gambling are legal in Maryland and, therefore,
many gambling debts are enforceable under Maryland law. 7 7 The
court concluded that "[i]n light of the Bender holding, and the extent
of legal gambling in Maryland, [it could not] conclude that there
[was] a sufficiently strong Maryland public policy against gambling
debts that would justify disregarding the lex loci contractus principle."' 78 In sum, Maryland joined many other states in enforcing
gambling debts incurred in a foreign jurisdiction where the gambling is legal and the debt enforceable.7 9
The court's analysis of the conflict of laws rule, that the lex loci
contractus principle does not apply to a contract that is against Mary-

land public policy, closely followed existing Maryland law. 8 ° The
72. 248 Md. 181, 236 A.2d 7 (1967). In Bender members of an Anne Arundel County
civic group sought to recover money lost at commercial bingo games and coin-operated
gambling devices licensed by the Anne Arundel County Commissioners under enabling
statutes of the General Assembly. Id. at 184, 236 A.2d at 8-9.
73. Id. at 189, 236 A.2d at 1I.
74. 311 Md. at 394, 535 A.2d at 469.
75. For the language of the statute, see supra note 64.
76. 311 Md. at 394-95, 535 A.2d at 469-70. See also Cates v. State, 21 Md. App. 363,
371, 320 A.2d 75, 80 (1974) (noting that the public policy expressed in § 243 is not to
help one who loses at gambling, but to discourage illegal gambling by forcing the winner to give up the gain).
77. 311 Md. at 395, 535 A.2d at 470. Bingo and other gambling games are authorized by MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 255A-261D (1987 & Supp. 1988). The state constitution permits Maryland to operate a lottery. See MD. CONST. art. III,
§ 36. Wagering on
licensed horse racing is also permitted in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78B, §§ I28 (1980 & Supps. 1987 & 1988).
78. 311 Md. at 396, 535 A.2d at 470.
79. See, e.g., Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland, 63 N.J. 301, 309, 307 A.2d 85, 89 (1973);
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 17, 203 N.E.2d 210, 214, 254
N.Y.S.2d 527, 533 (1964); Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 427-28 (Tex. 1967).
80. The Kramer court adopted the analysis of the public policy exception to the lex loci
contractus rule that had been discussed and applied in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C.
Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 189-91, 498 A.2d 605, 607-09 (1985), and Traylor v.
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court emphasized that a strong Maryland public policy against an
activity is necessary before the courts may disregard the lex loci contractus principle when deciding the enforceability of a foreign contract arising from that activity. 8 '
The Court of Appeals has thus expanded the lex loci contractus
principle to insure the recovery of gambling debts incurred in a foreign jurisdiction. In so doing, the court has implied a continuing
adherence to traditional conflict of laws analysis,8 2 albeit one that is
tempered by a willingness to consider modern policy concerns. An,
attorney in Maryland attempting to avoid enforcement of an out-ofstate gambling contract will have to prove that the type of gambling
was illegal in the state where the activity took place, or that the state
where the contract was entered into will not enforce such gambling
contracts.
C.

Trial by Jury

In Higgins v. Barnes"3 the Court of Appeals held that a defendant
has a right to a jury trial on the legal issues of a counterclaim even
when the counterclaim is raised in an action whose historical nature
is equitable.8 4 In so holding, the court took a major step towards
defining the scope of trial by jury permitted under the revised Maryland Rules of Procedure, 5 which merged law and equity in 1984.86
Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 660, 332 A.2d 651, 659 (1975). 311 Md. at 390-92, 535 A.2d at
467-68. For further discussion of the conflict of laws rule, see H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 91, at 259 (3d ed. 1949).
81. 311 Md. at 396, 535 A.2d at 470.
82. Traditional conflict of laws analysis follows the vested rights theory of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws. W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT
OF LAws 134 (1984). Under this theory, the task of the forum court deciding a matter
that arose, or vested, in a foreign place was to determine the place, then to mechanically
apply the laws of that place to enforce the litigant's right. Id. at 132. For the choice of
law rules of the First Restatement, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, at §§ 119-428. For the
text of the Restatement section setting forth the lex loci contractus principle, see supra note
47. Modem approaches to conflict of laws analysis are less concerned with arbitrary
jurisdiction selecting and emphasize content or policy. W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS,
supra, at 110.
83. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987).
84. Id. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733. The court made two other findings relevant to contract law. First, a contract containing an incorrect price due to a mistake by the drafting
attorney was not ambiguous and could not be corrected by parol evidence. Id. at 537.
530 A.2d at 726. Second, the base figure included in a contract to exchange lots necessarily reflected the parties' understanding of the difference in value of the lots, and precluded the defendant from recovering additional credit representing the difference in
value. Id. at 540, 530 A.2d at 727-28.
85. The Court of Appeals revised the rules of pleading of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure in 1984 in an effort to "simplify procedure and facilitate the ability of the
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The court relied on the federal example, dating from 1938 when law
and equity were merged in the federal courts,8 7 and "jealously" protected the right to trial by jury for Maryland litigants.8 8 In so doing,
the court may have restricted the "historical scope of equity."18 9
At issue in Higgins was a contract for the exchange of real estate
entered into by James and Rebecca Barnes and Maude Higgins.
Under the contract, the Barneses agreed to transfer two unimproved lots to Higgins and to erect a structure on one of the lots in
return for Higgins's promise to transfer one improved lot to the
Barneses.9 0 In addition, Higgins agreed to give the Barneses a
mortgage to secure an amount Higgins would owe at settlement. 9 '
Matters proceeded smoothly under the contract 92 until Higgins refused to execute a mortgage, "claiming she was entitled to a credit
because of alleged construction deficiencies." 9 3
The Barneses brought suit in the circuit court for specific performance of the contract or, in the alternative, for damages. 9 4 Higgins answered the complaint and counterclaimed for damages
allegedly incurred as a result of the construction deficiencies. 95
court and the parties to reach the issues of litigation and dispose of them promptly and
fairly." P. NIEMEYER & L. RICHARDS, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 121 (1984).
86. MD. R. 2-301. Rule 2-301 provides: "There shall be one form of action known
as 'civil action.' " Id. Prior to the merger created by the revised rule, circuit court civil
suits were required to be filed either as cases at law or actions in equity. 310 Md. at 540,
530 A.2d at 728. See infra notes 106-1i and accompanying text.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 provides: "There shall be one form of action to be known as
'civil action.' " Id. MD. R. 2-301, see supra note 86, was patterned after this federal rule.
P. NIEMEYER & L. RICHARDS, supra note 85, at 123.
88. 310 Md. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 23 provides in

relevant part: "The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the
several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of
five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably preserved." Id.
89. Bourne & Lynch, Merger of Law and Equity Under the Revised M'aryland Rules: Does It
Threaten Trial By Juy?, 14 U.- BALT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984). This has been the result in the

federal system. Id. For a discussion of the effects the merger of law and equity has had
in the federal system, see id. at 10-29.
90. 310 Md. at 534, 530 A.2d at 725. The structure that the Barneses agreed to
build was to serve as a residence for Higgins and as a protective care facility for four
adults. Id.
91. Id. at 534-35, 530 A.2d at 725.
92. The Barneses built the structure, the parties exchanged the lots, and Higgins
took up residence. Id. at 535, 530 A.2d at 725.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court noted that technically Higgins did not have to file a counterclaim
to raise the issue of breach of contract by the Barneses, since this was a matter "inexorably intertwined with the determination of the Barneses' claim" that Higgins could have
raised in the answer. Id. at 535 n.l, 530 A.2d at 725 n.I.
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Higgins also filed a demand for a jury trial,9 6 to which the Barneses
countered with a motion to strike. 97 The circuit court granted the
motion to strike the demand for jury trial, holding that "the merger
of law and equity accomplished by the rules change had no effect on
the right to a jury trial." 9 8
At a bench trial, the trial judge determined that the Barneses
were entitled to specific performance of the contract and ordered
Higgins to deliver the mortgage to the Barneses, less an amount for
damages resulting from the construction deficiencies.9 9 While the
appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of
Appeals issued certiorari to review, inter alia, the trial court's refusal
00
to conduct a jury trial on the legal claims.
The Court of Appeals was primarily concerned with determining the impact that rule 2-301,'0' which abolished the separation of
law and equity, should have upon the availability of trial by jury
when legal and equitable claims appear in the same action.' 0 2 The
court noted that other states that had merged law and equity had
taken a variety of approaches, including a strict protection of the
right of trial by jury;10 3 a preference for allowing a judge to "determine all issues in any case involving a legitimate equitable claim";' 0 4
or a middle ground of making "the right to ajury trial depend upon
whether the issues are predominantly legal or predominantly equi96. Rule 2-325 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Demand.-Any party may elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of
right by a jury by filing a demand therefor in writing ....
(e) Effect of Election-When trial by jury has been elected by any party, the
action, including all claims whether asserted by counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim, as to all parties, and as to all issues triable of right by way of a
jury, shall be designated upon the docket as a jury trial.
MD. R. 2-325.
97. 310 Md. at 536, 530 A.2d at 726. The Barneses argued that a specific performance action was historically an equitable one, and that "once equitable jurisdiction attached" there could be no right to a jury trial. Id. Their alternate argument was for
separate trials. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id. The trial court found that the Barneses were entitled to delivery of the mortgage in the amount agreed upon in the contract minus $6000 for damages due to construction deficiencies. Id. Higgins's counterclaim had asked for $120,000 in damages
for construction deficiencies. Id. at 535, 530 A.2d at 725.
100. Id. at 536, 530 A.2d at 726. The court also ruled on two contract issues. See supra
note 84.
101. See supra note 86.
102. 310 Md. at 541, 530 A.2d at 728.

103. Id.
104. Id.
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table in nature."' 0 5
Prior to the revision of rule 2-301, civil actions were required to
be filed as either law or equity actions. ' 0 6 Generally, jury trials were
guaranteed in actions filed in law, and denied in cases filed in equity."0 7 The division of law and equity was designed to act as a
".guarantor of the right to trial by jury."' 0 8 In Maryland, however,
"this division never really served as an absolute protection."'" 9 The
equitable "clean-up" doctrine allowed an equity court to decide almost all issues that legitimately came before the court, "whether the
issues were historically legal or equitable in nature."' "0 This led to
an expansion of equity jurisdiction and infringed upon the right to a
jury trial."' The law changed little until the revision of the Maryland Rules.
Revised rule 2-301, under which parties may join legal and equitable claims in the same action, contained the potential for creating a situation where some of the claims are triable by a jury and
some are not. 12 As a result, it became necessary for "trial judges to
determine whether a right to jury trial attach[ed] to any part of such
cases and whether to fix the order of trial of the legal and equitable
issues so as to preserve the availability of jury adjudication of legal
issues."''
In Higgins the court set out the guidelines that trial
judges should follow in making such determinations.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728. For a discussion of the relationship between equity
and the right of trial by jury in Maryland, see Bourne & Lynch, supra note 89, at 29-44.
107. 310 Md. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728. The right to trial by jury in civil cases applies
only to actions at law. Chase v. Winans, 59 Md. 475, 479 (1883). There is no right to
trial by jury in equity cases. Id. The Higgins court noted that exceptions have been made
over time. 310 Md. at 540, 530 A.2d at 728. An example is § 12-118(c) of the HealthGeneral Article, whereby the legislature provided for jury determination of an equity
petition for release from commitment following a successful criminal plea of insanity.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(c) (Supp. 1988). Occasionally a court of law
exercises traditional equitable powers, such as when an injunction is issued following
determination of issues by a jury. 310 Md. at 540 n.2, 530 A.2d at 728 n.2.
108. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 89, at 29. The right of trial by jury is protected by
article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ME). CONST. DECL. or RTS. art. 23. For
the pertinent text of article 23, see supra note 88.
109. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 89, at 29.
110. 310 Md. at 540-41, 530 A.2d at 728.
Ill. Id. See generally Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in 1larvland, 39 MD. L. REv. 427
(1980).
112. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 89, at 3.
113. Id. at 3-4. The advisory committee note to rule 2-301 provides: "The effect of
this Rule is to eliminate distinctions between law and equity for purposes of pleadings,
parties, court sittings, and dockets. It does not affect the right to jury trial." MD. R. 2301 advisory committee's note. The order in which the legal and equitable issues are
tried is important because a factual determination by a judge on equitable issues "be-
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In evaluating Higgins's appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that
the Maryland and' federal rules abolishing the separation of law and
equity contained essentially identical language,'4 and that the
Maryland rule was "derived from" the federal rule." t 5 For this reason, the court examined" ,6 and adopted the federal approach in de7
termining the scope of the right to trial by jury."
The court found that in the federal system, the characterization
of an action as one at law or in equity does not determine the entitlement to trial by jury."'I If a counterclaim "presents a legal claim
historically accorded the right to jury trial and raises factual issues in
common with the plaintiff's equitable claim, the defendant is
ordinarily entitled to a jury determination of those factual legal issues."' 1 9 The Supreme Court has held that "only under the most
imperative circumstances . . .can the right to a jury trial of legal
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims," and
it could not anticipate such imperative circumstances.' 20 The
Supreme Court has further noted that this strong protection of the
right to jury trial of the legal issues applies whether the trial judge
characterizes "the legal issues presented as 'incidental' to equitable
12 1
issues or not."'

The Higgins court dismissed alternatives to the federal approach
as unprotective of the right to jury trial.' 22 The court found that the
essentially legal test, under which a jury trial is granted or denied
based on whether the entire action is characterized as essentially
comes the law of the case for the jury and might therefore impinge on the jury trial
right." P. NIEMEYER & L. RIcHARDS, supra note 85, at 125.
114. 310 Md. at 543, 530 A.2d at 729. See supra notes 86-87.
115. 310 Md. at 543, 530 A.2d at 729; P. NIEMEVER & L. RICHARDS, supra note 85, at
123.
116. 310 Md. at 543-46, 530 A.2d at 729-31.
117. Id. at 546, 530 A.2d at 731.
118. Id. at 547, 530 A.2d at 731. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959), a suit similar to the one before the Court of Appeals in Higgins, the Supreme
Court first addressed the threat to jury trials posed by the merged system. Id. at 501. In
Beacon the Court held that even if the case were one that traditionally would have been
tried in equity, the presence of legal issues in the counterclaim could entitle the defendant to a jury trial on those issues. Id. at 506.
119. 310 Md. at 547, 530 A.2d at 731. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
479 (1962) (holding that defendant had right to jury trial where plaintiffs alleged breach
of contract and sought injunctions to restrain defendant from future use of trademark);
Myers v. United States Dist. Court, 620 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a
defendant alleging breach of contract was entitled to a jury trial on that issue, notwithstanding that the counterclaim ultimately sought equitable relief).
120. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 510-11.
121. Daity Queen, 369 U.S. at 473 (footnote omitted).
122. 310 Md. at 548-49, 530 A.2d at 732.
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legal or essentially equitable, was too uncertain for litigants in planning actions.2' An alternative that determined "the applicability of
the jury trial right based on the nature of the first claim asserted"
was rejected because it enabled the plaintiff to choose unfairly
whether a jury trial would occur.' 24 Finally, the court rejected the
waiver theory, under which a defendant who files a legal counterclaim in an equity action is deemed to have waived a right to jury
trial, stating that this alternative created "an impermissible 'catch
22' situation" for a defendant.' 2 The court explained that although
Maryland has no counterpart to the federal rule on compulsory
counterclaims,' 26 Maryland's broad definition of res judicata would
have the same effect on defendants as the federal rule would if the
waiver theory was applied.' 27 That effect would be to deprive a defendant of his or her right to ajury trial regardless of what course is
chosen. For example, if the defendant counterclaims on legal
grounds, he or she waives the right to a jury trial; if the defendant
does not counterclaim, the principle of res judicata will likely pre28
clude the defendant from asserting the claim in a separate action.'
The Court of Appeals then applied the federal approach 2 9 and
held that a defendant may not be denied the right to a jury trial on
the legal issues raised by a counterclaim "simply because that counterclaim is raised in an equitable action. '"'3 Higgins was entitled to
a jury trial on the issues raised by the breach of contract counterclaim and those issues should be tried first.'' Thereafter, the trial
123. Id. at 548, 530 A.2d at 732. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 89, at 17-20.
124. 310 Md. at 548, 530 A.2d at 732.
125. Id.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
Id. at 13(a).
127. 310 Md. at 548-49, 530 A.2d at 732. In Maryland "a plaintiff must assert all
claims arising out of a particular transaction against a particular defendant or be barred
from asserting them later." Alvey v. Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 390, 171 A.2d 92, 94 (1961).
128. 310 Md. at 548-49, 530 A.2d at 732.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 118-121.
130. 310 Md. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733.
131. Id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 734. The court's rationale for this ordering under the
Higgins facts was that
[tihe [trial] court could not enter a final judgment for specific performance
without first determining the amount of the mortgage it would order Higgins to
deliver, and could not determine that amount without first deciding Higgins'

582

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:566

judge should resolve the remaining equitable issues and enter an
appropriate judgment. 3 The trial court's judgment would thereby
"reflect an adjustment in accordance with the finding of thejury....
giving full effect to Higgins' right to a jury trial."'"3
The court significantly has affected existing law .by adopting the
federal approach for determining the substantive and procedural aspects of a trial by jury in merged civil actions. Higgins's "jealous"
protection of the jury trial right on historically legal issues and
claims likely will lead to an expansion of that right and to a contraction of the historical scope of equity. 3 4 In a system of merged legal
and equitable claims, however, this shifting of the traditional bal-

ance may be necessary. In addition, the court's guidelines for trial
procedure when a case contains both jury and nonjury issues, while
anticipated before Higgins,'I" have now been made certain. Litigants
can rest assured that a judge will not "decide a whole case without a
jury any time there is any basis for equitable relief," a result that
protects the constitutional right to trial by jury. 3 6 The "clean-up"
powers exercised by equity courts in the past will thus be replaced
by jury determinations of all legal issues. In addition, Maryland's
revised rules are likely to present yet unencountered issues related
to mixed legal and equitable claims that the courts must decide -how
to handle. Higgins suggests that the Maryland courts likely will look
to the federal system for guidance. Judging by the federal experience, the response will be to expand further the scope of the jury
trial right.'3 7
JILL LESLEY REYNOLDS
WILLIAM SINGLE, IV

right to recoupment, if any, flowing from Barnes' failure to construct the building in accordance with the contract.
Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. For a further discussion, see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
135. See Bourne & Lynch, supra note 89, at 125, 129 (finding federal case law persuasive authority on the issue and predicting that the Court of Appeals would follow the
federal example).
136. Id. at 47.
137. Id. at 28.

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

Maryland Constitution

1. Separation of Powers.-In Department of Transportation v.
Armacost' the Court of Appeals declared that the Maryland legislature's delegation of authority to the Motor Vehicle Administration
(MVA) for the purpose of implementing Maryland's Vehicle Emission Inspection Program (VEIP)2 did not violate the separation of
powers provision of article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.'
In so holding, the court refused to' recognize a renewal of the delegation doctrine in Maryland 4 and found that by enacting VEIP, the
legislature intended to follow the mandates of the federal Clean Air
Act (the Act). 5
In 1970 Congress enacted the Act 6 to protect public health by
improving the Nation's air quality. The Act provides a framework
for cooperation between federal, state, regional, and local entities7
and authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to divide the Nation into "air quality control regions," to create national ambient air quality standards,9 and to establish rules and
regulations for attaining those standards.'" The Act also requires
each state to create a state implementation plan (SIP),' subject to
EPA approval, explaining how each state intends to achieve the na1. 311 Md. 64, 532 A.2d 1056 (1987). The court granted certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 71-72, 532 A.2d at 1059. The suit was
brought by the County Commissioners of Carroll County, in their individual and official
capacities, the town of Mt. Airy, its mayor, and a resident of Carroll County. Id. at 70,
532 A.2d at 1059. In an earlier decision, Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md.
392, 474 A.2d 191 (1984), the court held that including Carroll County in the Vehicle
Emission Inspection Program (VEIP) did not violate substantive due process. Id. at 42223, 474 A.2d at 206-07. For further discussion concerning the 1984 decision, see infra
note 28.
2. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 23-201 to -209 (Supp. 1988).
3. 311 Md. at 82-85, 532 A.2d at 1065-66. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 8 states
"[t]hat the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of

one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." Id.
4. 311 Md. at 82, 532 A.2d 1065.
5. Id.

6. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1982)).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4) (1982).
8. Id. § 7407(c).
9. Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A).

10. Id.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
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tional air quality standards by 1975."2
Congress amended the Act to extend SIP submission dates for
states with nonattainment areas until December 31, 1987.13 To receive an extension; a state had to establish a specific schedule for
implementing a vehicle emissions control inspection and maintenance program.' 4 A noncompliant state risks losing both federal
6
highway funds 5 and sewage treatment plant construction grants.'
Two of Maryland's air quality control regions, the Metropolitan
Baltimore Intrastate Air Quality Control Region and the Maryland
portion of the National Capital Interstate Air Quality Control Region, " failed to meet the ozone and carbon monoxide standards by
the deadline.'" Each requested an extension.' 9 As a result, Maryland's VEIP was enacted in 1979.20
In particular, the VEIP required the MVA to publish "proposed
rules and regulations providing, to the extent required by federal
law, for the establishment of an emissions inspection program ...
no later than December 31, 1982. '' 2' To assist in establishing the
proposed rules, the MVA was required to conduct public hearings.2
Further, once the proposed rules and regulations were drafted, the
MVA was required to submit them to each house of the legislature.23
The VEIP specified that the inspection program would be
mandatory for all motor vehicles in the State "not otherwise ex12. Id.
13. Id. § 7502(a)(2). Further, the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act (the Act)
extended the state implementation plan (SIP) submission date to January 1, 1979, for
states with nonattainment areas, i.e., regions that had failed to meet air quality standards

by 1975. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(c), 91 Stat. 750, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-190,
§ 14(b)(4), 91 Stat. 1405. National air quality standards were to be attained no later

than December 31, 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (1982). States unable to achieve national standards by 1982 for photochemical oxidants and carbon monoxide could request an extension until December 31, 1987. Id. at (2).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(ll)(B) (1982).

15. Id. § 7506(a).
16. Id. § 7616(b).
17. The Metropolitan Baltimore Intrastate Air Quality Control Region is comprised
of Baltimore City and Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, Harford, and Howard Counties. 311 Md. at 67, 532 A.2d at 1057. The Maryland portion of the National Capital
Interstate Air Quality Control Region is comprised of Prince George's and Montgomery
Counties. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 421, 1979 Md. Laws 1222 (codified as amended at MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 23-201 to -209 (Supp. 1988)).
21. Id. § 23-202(a) (1987).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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empted"-2 4 and that unless another mechanism was enacted, "the
proposed rules and regulations . . . shall take effect. " 25 The VEIP
was amended in the ensuing four legislative sessions and in 1985.26
Armacost arose from a 1984 challenge of the legislation.2 7 After
finding that the VEIP did not violate a host of constitutional doctrines, 8 the Court of Appeals vacated an interlocutory injunction
and remanded the case to the circuit court.2 9 On remand, the
county officials argued that the VEIP violated the separation of powers article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. °
A corollary to the separation of powers doctrine is the nondele-

24. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 23-202(a) (1987).
25. Id. Amendments could be made by a joint resolution of the General Assembly.
Id.
26. 311 Md. at 69, 532 A.2d at 1058. See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 725, 1980
Md. Laws 2518 (start of mandatory VEIP extended to after December 31, 1982; inspection fee increased; waivers included for failed vehicles that incur specified repair costs);
Act ofJune 1, 1982, ch. 492, 1982 Md. Laws 3106 (extended deadline to after June 30,
1983); Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 312, 1983 Md. Laws 1078 (start-up postponed until after
December 31, 1983); Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 517, 1983 Md. Laws 1624 (allowing the
Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) to issue hardship waivers).
27. See Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191 (1984). See
also supra note 1.
28. The 1984 Armacost court held that the VEIP's tailpipe tests did not constitute a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 299 Md. at 406, 474
A.2d at 198; that the inclusion of Carroll County and the exclusion of other rural counties from the Metropolitan Baltimore Intrastate Air Quality Control Region did not violate equal protection, id. at 408-10, 474 A.2d at 199-200; that exempting certain classes
of vehicles from the VEIP did not violate the equal protection clause, id. at 411, 474
A.2d at 201; that the VEIP provided adequate safeguards for procedural due process, id.
at 420, 474 A.2d at 205; that the suspension or revocation of vehicle registration under
the VEIP was not a taking in violation of either the state or the federal constitution, id. at
421, 474 A.2d at 206; that Carroll County's inclusion in the VEIP was not a violation of
substantive due process, id. at 422, 474 A.2d at 206; and that the MVA has implicit authority to amend regulations implementing the inspection program, id. at 423-24, 474
A.2d at 207. See Survey of Developments in :1aryland Law, 1983-84-Constitutional Law, 44
MD. L. REV. 376, 393 (1985).

29. 299 Md. at 424, 474 A.2d at 207.
30. 311 Md. at 76, 532 A.2d at 1062. For the text of MD. CONST. DECL

OF RTS. art.

8,

see supra note 3.

Separation of powers is a theory of government where the various powers of the
sovereign are distributed among distinct governmental entities. Thus, the legislature
enacts the law, the executive carries out the law, and the judiciary interprets and enforces the law. This is done out of a fear of despotism if too much power is concentrated
in one governmental body. R. ROTUNDAJ. NOWAK &J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 3.12, at 249-52 (1986). See generally J. FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1986); W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS (1967). See also L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 7-15 (1978).
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gation of powers doctrine."' Under the rule of nondelegation, Congress may not delegate all or part .of its constitutional authority to
another governmental body. 2 The county officials argued that the
VEIP was an unconstitutional delegation of power because the legislature failed to provide sufficient guidelines to limit exercise of administrative discretion. 3 Although the officials admitted that the
court could allow the. legislature flexibility for regulation related to
public health, 4 they asserted that because the legislature could establish specific standards without unnecessarily hampering the administration of the VEIP, specific standards were required.3 5
The circuit court held that two sections of the VEIP statute constituted an unlawful delegation of power from the legislature to an
administrative agency in violation of article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 6 The court said the Transportation Article, section 23-202, provided insufficient guidance to the MVA because it
merely directed the MVA to publish rules and regulations to the extent required by federal law and to establish an inspection system
within Maryland. 7 The court also said that while section 23-207
requires the rules and regulations adopted by the MVA to be consistent with federal law, the statute did not set forth adequate guidelines to enable an arm of the executive branch "to determine what
persons, vehicles, and geographic areas should be included in the
program."3 " An execut',e agency cannot make laws. Thus, when
the MVA exempted all but the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan
region from the reach of the statute, the MVA "restricted the Act
being administered and, in doing so, legislated."3 9
The Court of Appeals reversed.4" Rejecting the argument that
the delegation doctrine "has been infused with renewed vitality in
31. S. BARBER, THE CONSTrrTriON AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER

11 (1975).
32. Id. The doctrine's origin is the subject ofdebate. For example, it may have been
a product of the common law of agency, an invention of the courts, and a corollary of
the idea of due process of law. Id. It also has been described as a "constitutional commitment to the legislature as the repository of popular trust" or a rule of republican
governments "to overcome the precipitancy and incompetence of popular assemblies."
Id. at 11-12.
33. 311 Md. at 76. 532 A.2d at 1062.
34. Id. at 73-75, 532 A.2d at 1060-61.

35.
36.
37.
38.
1988).
39.
40.

Id. at 76, 532 A.2d at 1062.
Id. at 71, 532 A.2d at 1059.
Id. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 23-202 (Supp. 1988).
311 Md. at 71, 532 A.2d at 1059. See MD. TRANSP. CODE
311 Md. at 71, 532 A.2d at 1059.
Id. at 85, 532 A.2d at 1066.

ANN.

§ 23-207 (Supp.
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recent years," 4 the court reviewed the history of the doctrine in the
43
federal sector. 2 Noting that, except for the depression era cases,
the Supreme Court has never invalidated congressional grants of
legislative authority to the executive branch, the court explicitly rejected the cases upon which the county officials relied in arguing for
a stricter application of the separation of powers doctrine on the
grounds that they were not decided upon delegation doctrine principles.4 4 Lastly, the court held that in enacting the VEIP the legislature clearly decided to comport with the federal environmental
policy and not to risk losing federal grant programs.4 5
The court's decision withstands scrutiny. That is, the federal
cases upon which the county officials relied were not decided on
separation of powers grounds.4 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
not invalidated a statute on delegation grounds since the 1930s.1'
Congress has frequently granted broad, vaguely defined powers to
independent agencies and the Court has consistently upheld these

41. Id. at 77, 532 A.2d at 1062.
42. Id. at 77-82, 532 A.2d at 1062-65.
43. Id. at 78-79, 532 A.2d at 1062-63. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935), the Court determined that § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), which authorized the president to prohibit the interstate shipment of hot oil (oil
produced or withdrawn from storage contrary to state law), was unconstitutional because it provided no criteria for the President in deciding when to prohibit the shipments. Id. at 431-32. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), the Court invalidated the NIRA because authority was delegated to the President
without appropriate standards to approve codes of fair competition upon application by
trade or industrial associations. Id. at 537-42.
44. 311 Md. at 81, 532 A.2d at 1064. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), where
the Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
"[T]he critical constitutional questions presented here go not to the basic power of Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation that Congress has
enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously discriminates against
nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment."
Id. at 13-14. See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959
(1983) (holding that provision of Immigration and Nationality Act authorizing one
branch of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate decisions of executive branch was unconstitutional because action was legislative and both houses must act to pass legislation). Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(invalidating Bankruptcy Act's grant of article III jurisdiction to the Bankruptcy Court's
nonarticle III judges). Most recently in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the
Court held that the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings), under which powers were vested in the Comptroller General, was unconstitutional because Congress can play no role in executing laws. Id. at 736.
45. 311 Md. at 82-83, 532 A.2d at 1065.
46. See supra note 44. Deciding these cases on other grounds, the Court never
reached the question of separation of powers. 311 Md. at 82-83, 532 A.2d at 1065.
47. 311 Md. at 78-80, 532 A.2d at 1062-64.
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congressional delegations.4" Further, the -county officials argued
that the VEIP violated the Maryland, not the federal, doctrine. A
renewed delegation doctrine at the federal level-possibly persuasive to Maryland's highest court in construing Maryland's fundamental law-clearly is not controlling.
Although the Maryland Constitution does not permit the
merger of the three branches of state government, a reasonable
amount of elasticity is necessary in construing legislation enacted to
meet the demands of modern government.4 9 By passing the VEIP,
the legislature clearly intended to comply with the federal Act and
not risk losing federal funds.50 Hence, the legislature gave adequate
guidance to the MVA to apply the facts in particular cases, especially
in a statute designed to regulate public health. 5 '
The opinion has put to rest the claim for a renewal of the delegation doctrine. At least for now, the delegation doctrine continues
to be a dead letter of constitutional law. 5 2
2. Retired State Judicial Pension Benefits.-In Hargrove v. Board of
Trustees of the Maryland Retirement System 5 the Court of Appeals held
48. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168 (1968) (Federal Trade Commission has authority to regulate Community Antenna Television); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 580-83 (1963) (Secretary of Interior has authority to
regulate waters of Colorado River); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 774-75
(1948) (Renegotiation Act does not violate delegation doctrine); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944) (standards set by Emergency Price Control Act for fixing of
maximum prices sufficiently definite); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (Federal Power Commission has authority over ratemaking).
49. Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md.
211, 220, 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975) ("the separation of powers concept may constitutionally encompass a sensible degree of elasticity and should not be applied with doctrinaire rigor"). See also County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding
Corp., 270 Md. 403, 436, 312 A.2d 225, 243 (1973) (doctrine of separation of powers
does not itself inhibit delegation to administrative agency); Maryland Coal & Realty Co.
v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 640, 69 A.2d 471, 476 (1949) (right to exercise the
police power may be delegated by legislature to administrative agency); Mason v. State,
12 Md. App. 655, 676, 280 A.2d 753, 766 (1971) (prevailing view of delegation doctrine
is toward greater liberality in permitting grants of discretion to administrative officials in
order to facilitate the complexities of modern government). See generally Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law in Maoyland, 2 MD. L. REV. 185, 188 (1938).
50. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 23-202(a), -207(a) (Supp. 1988). Department of
Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 402, 474 A.2d 191, 196 (1984) (annual loss to State
of sewage treatment and federal highway construction grants conservatively estimated at
$123 million).
51. 311 Md..at 83, 532 A.2d at 1065 ("VEIP is a measure designed to protect the
public health and the widest latitude must be given in such circumstances to delegations
of legislative authority to administrative agencies.").
52. S. BARBER, supra note 31, at 6.

53. 310 Md. 406, 529 A.2d 1372 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 753 (1988).
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that article 73B, section 56(c)(1) of the judicial pension plan, 54
which requires the reduction or suspension of pension benefits for
retired state judges who accept further state or federal employment
after retirement, is subject to review under the rational basis test
56
55
and does not violate the equal protection or due process clauses
of either the state or federal constitutions. 57 In so holding, the
court approved the statute's application to a former state judge who
accepted appointment to the federal bench and consequently received none of the state pension benefits to which he was otherwise
eligible.5
The offset section of the judicial pension plan provides that the
pension of a retired state judge who accepts employment compensation from municipal, county, state, or federal funds will be reduced
to the extent that the compensation from employment plus the judicial pension exceeds the current salary of an active state judge at the
same level as the retiree.5 9 The statute reduces the full state pen54. The judicial pension plan provides in pertinent part:
[A] retired judge eligible for benefits under this subtitle may accept employment in which all or part of the compensation for the employment comes from
municipal, county, State, or federal funds, if he immediately notifies the board
of trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of his intention to accept the
employment and specifies the compensation to be received for the employment. The annual retirement allowance receivable by the former judge plus
the annual compensation for the position may not exceed in amount the compensation upon which the retirement allowance is based. During any period in
which the total of the annual retirement allowance and the annual compensation for the position in fact exceeds the compensation upon which the retirement allowance is based, the retirement allowance shall be reduced by that
amount necessary to bring the former judge's total compensation within the
limit specified in this subsection. If a retired judge accepts employment in accordance with this subsection and is subsequently awarded retirement benefits
as a result of that employment, his retirement benefits under this subtitle shall
be reduced in the amount of the retirement benefits resulting from the subsequent employment.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 56(c)(1) (1988).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ., . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Mo. CoNsT. art. XXIV ("That no man
ought be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.").
56. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § i. See also MD. CONST. art. XXIV.
due process of law ....
57. 310 Md. at 427, 529 A.2d at 1382.
58. See id.
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 56(c)(1) (1988). Retired judges are the only class of
state government retirees whose pensions are offset upon accepting post-retirement federal employment. 310 Md. at 414, 529 A.2d at 1376. The court found that the judicial
pension plan's variance from the other state retirement plans did not need justification.
Id. at 424-25, 529 A.2d at 1381.

590

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:583

sion benefit until a judge ultimately retires from public service.
When Judge Hargrove was appointed to the People's Court of
Baltimore City in 1962, a retired state judge could not receive ajudicial pension while holding a salaried position with municipal,
county, state, or federal government. 6 ' Hargrove was appointed in
1968 to the Municipal Court of Baltimore City6 2 and in 1974 to the
Supreme-Bench of Baltimore City, redesignated in 1983 as the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.6"
Judge Hargrove retired from the circuit court in 1984 and accepted an appointment to the federal bench as a judge for the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland.' When
Judge Hargrove retired from state service, he immediately qualified
for an annual pension based upon his contribution to the plan, but
application of the statute's pension formula resulted in a complete
offset so that Judge Hargrove would not receive state pension benefits while serving on the federal bench.6 5
The Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts sought an
opinion from the Maryland Attorney General concerning Judge
Hargrove's rights under the judicial pension plan. 6 6 The Attorney
General determined that the plan applied to Judge Hargrove and
that the reduction in benefits did not deprive him of due process or
equal protection of the laws.6 7 Judge Hargrove filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The
court rejected Judge Hargrove's due process and equal protection
contentions and granted summary judgment for the trustees of the
plan. 6" Judge Hargrove appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
but before briefing and argument, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of certiorari to address the issues presented.69
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 56(c)(1) (1988). The statute also provides that if a

retired judge receives retirement benefits as a result of the subsequent public employment, "his retirement benefits under this subtitle shall bereduced in the amount of the
retirement benefits resulting from the subsequent employment." Id. Interestingly, and

in conflict with the language of the statute, the court stated that upon ultimate retirement from public service, a retired judge will receive both the full state pension and any
federal pension to which the retired judge is entitled. 310 Md. at 427, 529 A.2d at 1382.
61. 310 Md. at 411 n.3, 529 A.2d at 1374 n.3.

62. Id. at 411,529 A.2d at 1374. In 1971 the Municipal Court of Baltimore City was
incorporated into the District Court of Maryland. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 412, 529 A.2d at 1374-75.
66. Id., 529 A.2d at 1375.
67. See 69 Op. Att'y Gen. 260, 270 (1984).
68. 310 Md. at 414, 529 A.2d at 1375-76.

69. Id., 529 A.2d at 1376.
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The Court of Appeals held that the statutory reduction or suspension of a judge's pension benefits upon continued public em-

ployment after retirement did not violate state or federal equal
protection or due process guarantees. 70 Because the statute did not
prohibit continued public employment and therefore did not infringe upon a judge's right to pursue an occupation, the court ruled
that the rational relationship test-not strict or heightened scrutiny-was the appropriate standard of judicial review. 7 ' The court
also held that the State's authorization of different pension benefits
for judicial and nonjudicial state retirees did not violate the equal
protection clause under the state or federal constitutions.72
In holding that article 73B, section 56(c)(1), does not violate
due process, the court applied the principle that a statute will not
violate due process unless the act "is shown to be arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable.- 7 3 Such a statute is constitutionally valid "if
there are any considerations relating to the public welfare by which
it can be supported." 7475 The court held that section 56(c)(1) is not
invalid under this test.

70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MD. CONsr. art. XXIV. The court, relying on Attorney
Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981), explained that while the
equal protection concept embodied in article XXIV is independent of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause, Supreme Court decisions on the fourteenth
amendment are practically direct authorities. 310 Md. at 416, 529 A.2d at 1376-77.
71. 310 Md. at 416-24, 529 A.2d at 1377-81. Strict scrutiny is the top tier of review
and is used when classifications are based upon suspect criteria (race, national origin,
ancestry) or infringe upon fundamental rights (first amendment rights, right to vote). A
heightened scrutiny analysis is appropriate when classifications impact upon sensitive,
rather than suspect, criteria (gender, illegitimacy) or infringe important personal rights
of the individual, rather than fundamental rights. The bottom tier of review is the rational basis test which affords a deferential review of legislative classifications, particularly in the sphere of economic regulations. Id.
72. Id. at 424-25, 529 A.2d at 1381.
73. Id. at 427, 529 A.2d at 1382. See also Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v.
Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 455, 348 A.2d 856, 860 (1975) (holding that county
rent control law was valid exercise of State's police power and did not violate due process because it was not unreasonable or arbitrary).
74. lWestchester llest, 276 Md. at 455, 348 A.2d at 860.
75. 310 Md. at 427, 529 A.2d at 1382. The court held that the rationale supporting
the statute's compliance with the equal protection clause under the rational basis test
likewise supports the statute's compliance with the due process clause. Id. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has held that when a federal statute is valid under the equal protection
clause, it is also valid under the due process clause. See United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 n.8 (1980).
Applying rational basis principles to due process cases is consistent with Maryland
precedent. See, e.g., Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 591-97, 510 A.2d 573, 579-82 (1986)
(rational basis test applied to uphold statute precluding appellate courts from reviewing
sufficiency of evidence to support criminal conviction in jury trial); Governor '. Exxon
Corp., 279 Md. 410, 423-29, 370 A.2d 1102, 1110-13 (1977) (divestiture statute was
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In determining that the rational basis test applied to the equal
protection challenge, the court primarily relied upon the reasoning
in Attorney General v. Waldron."6 In Waldron the Court of Appeals applied heightened scrutiny and held that a statute prohibiting retired
judges from practicing law violates the equal protection clause."
The Hargrove court noted that because the statute in Waldron "flatly
denies one the right to engage in the practice of the profession for
which he is otherwise qualified," 7 8 an important personal right is
involved and heightened scrutiny of the legislation is required. 9 In
contrast, section 56(c)(1) does not forbid the pursuit of one's chosen occupation or infringe upon any similar personal right; it merely
regulates the amount of pension benefits received by a judge who
chooses to continue public service at the federal level. 8 0 In light of
this distinction, the deferential rational basis test applied to section
56(c)(1)."' Thus, Hargrove did not deny that the right to choose an
occupation is an important personal right, but held only that a regulatory statute which conditions the amount of benefits a retiree receives on certain contingencies does not infringe upon that right.8 2
The court applied the principle that under the rational basis
test, a statutory classification is presumed constitutional and is invalid only if the classification lacks a reasonable basis or is purely arbitrary.8 3 The court ruled that the judicial pension plan survived
application of the rational basis test because the offset provisions
were reasonably related to the possible legislative goal of encouragvalid exercise of police power and did not violate due process clause because such statutes will not be held void if they can be supported by considerations of public welfare);
Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 235-38, 335 A.2d 679, 683-84 (1975)
(ordinance requiring deposit on beer and soda containers did not violate due process
because statutes carry strong presumption of constitutionality and will not be struck
down if public welfare considerations support it).
76. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
77. Id. at 716, 426 A.2d at 947. Although the WValdron court labeled the statute as
falling under a rational basis review, the court differentiated between minimal rational
basis review typically accorded purely economic regulations, and that type of review accorded statutes impinging upon important private rights. Thus, the court engaged in
the latter form of rational basis review and actually adopted a "heightened scrutiny" of
the statutory classification and whether that classification had a real and substantial relation to the statute's purpose. Id. at 717-29, 426 A.2d at 948-54.
78. Id. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
79. 310 Md. at 419-20, 529 A.2d at 1378-79. See l4aldron, 289 Md. at 718, 426 A.2d
at 948 (the right to engage in a chosen calling has long been recognized as enjoying a
preferred status).
80. 310 Md. at 421-22, 529 A.2d at 1379-80.
81. Id. at 422, 529 A.2d at 1380.
82. Id. at 421-22, 529 A.2d at 1379-80.
83. Id. at 422-23, 529 A.2d at 1380.
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ing judges to remain on the state bench. 84 Furthermore, because
Judge Hargrove had not shown that the classification totally lacked a
rational basis, the court held that the statute must pass constitu86
tional muster.8 5 In so holding, the court extended Clark v. Tawes,
which held that variances among different pension systems for state
employees need not be justified by the State because the matter is
one of legislative discretion.8 7 The Hargrove court also cited other
state and federal decisions where the rational basis test was applied
to uphold retirement benefit statutes challenged under equal pro88
tection principles.
84. Id. at 424-27, 529 A.2d at 1380-82. Presumably, the court believed that Judge
Hargrove's criticisms of the possible legislative goals behind the statute had merit. Indeed, the court was "unable to say that § 56(c)(1) ... has utterly no reasonable relation
to the possible legislative goal of encouraging judges to remain on the state bench
rather than accept federal employment." Id. at 424, 529 A.2d at 1380-81. The dissent
asserted that the statute's financial disincentive to serve on federal courts harmfully impacts the public because those persons most qualified to fill important judicial offices
may be deterred from doing so. Id. at 432-33, 529 A.2d at 1384-85. Interestingly, the
majority maintained that § 56(c)(1) could not logically be a financial deterrent discouraging state judges from accepting federal judgeships:
Whenever federal judicial salaries are greater than the salaries of Maryland
judges .. . a state judge will benefit financially by accepting an appointment to
the federal bench. But, in the event that the General Assembly were to raise
state judges' salaries to a level greater than that in the federal judiciary, there
would be no financial disincentive for a state judge ... to retire and accept a
federal judicial appointment ....
[T]he former state judge's pension benefits
would only be offset to the extent that his federal salary plus his pension benefits would exceed the compensation on which his pension benefits are based-a
state judge's salary.
Id. at 426, 529 A.2d at 1382.
The dissent compared the impact on the available pool ofjudicial candidates to the
ballot access cases that were held unconstitutional because the filing fee requirements
restricted candidate access to the ballot. The dissent conceded that judges are not
elected officials and that the statutory classification under § 56(c)(1) would not warrant
strict scrutiny as would a classification affecting the available pool of candidates for
elected offices. Nevertheless, the dissent believed the analogy between the ballot access
cases and § 56(c)(1) triggers at least a heightened or careful scrutiny. Id. at 433, 529
A.2d at 1385 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 423-24, 529 A.2d at 1380-81.
86. 187 Md. 195, 49 A.2d 463 (1946).
87. Id. at 200-01, 49 A.2d at 465-66.
88. 310 Md. at 424-25, 529 A.2d at 1381. For cases applying the rational basis test
to uphold the challenged statute, see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 177-78 (1980) (rational basis test applied to uphold validity of federal statute
eliminating windfall benefits of railroad employees with less than 10 years employment
but allowing retired employees to continue receiving windfall benefits); Jackson
Firefighters Ass'n Local 87 v. City ofJackson, 736 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1984) (rational
basis test applied to uphold validity of disparate treatment under municipal retirement
plans); In re Marriage of Alarcon, 149 Cal. App. 3d 544, 555-56, 196 Cal. Rptr. 887, 89394 (1983) (rational basis test applied to equal protection challenge of statute reducing
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The court's equal protection analysis is consistent with both
Maryland precedent"9 and federal decisions 0 which have deferred
to the legislature and applied the rational basis test when scrutinizing statutes affecting social and economic concerns. In addition,
Hargrove conforms to Maryland 9" and other state and federal deciearly retirement benefits of a state judge by amount of salary earned on appointment to
the federal bench); Allen v. State, 100 Nev. 130, 136-37, 676 P.2d 792, 796 (1984) (rational basis test applied to uphold statute that raises benefits for future but not current
retirees); Reiser v. Pension Comm'n of Employment Retirement Sys., 147 N.J. Super.
168, 181, 370 A.2d 902, 909 (1976) (rational basis test applied to uphold validity of
pension statute excluding widows benefits to those widows who were more than 15 years
younger than deceased employee if employee had worked for county of designated population); Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local No. 882 v. Department of
Retirement Sys., 92 Wash. 2d 415, 422-24, 598 P.2d 379, 383-84 (1979), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 1040 (1980) (rational basis test applied to determine validity of statute excluding port police from law enforcement officers' retirement system).
89. Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 607, 510 A.2d 583, 588 (1986) (equal protection challenge to statute requiring holder of public office to be registered voter required
rational basis analysis); Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 594-97, 510 A.2d 573, 581-82
(1986) (rational basis test applied to uphold statute precluding appellate courts from
reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support criminal conviction in jury trial); State v.
Wyand, 304 Md. 721, 727-28, 501 A.2d 43, 46-48 (1985) (statute exempting certain
organizations from gaming laws is subject to rational basis test and does not violate
equal protection); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 642, 458
A.2d 758, 789-90 (1983) (rational basis test applied to uphold validity of State's financing of public elementary and secondary schools which primarily are funded by state and
local tax revenues which results in higher spending per pupil in wealthier districts); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410,438-40, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118-19 (1977) (retail gasoline store divestiture statute operates in economic sphere and does not violate equal
protection if classification has rational basis); Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md.
230, 241, 335 A.2d 679, 686 (1975) (ordinance requiring deposit on beer and soda containers but not other beverage containers does not violate equal protection as classification has rational basis).
90. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432. 440 (1985) (equal
protection clause allows statewide latitude when social or economic legislation is at issue); Fritz, 449 U.S. at 175 (when social or economic legislation is challenged on equal
protection grounds, appropriate standard ofjudicial review for classification is rational
basis; if classification has some reasonable basis it does not offend Constitution even
though classification may result in some inequality); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 486-87 (1970) (Maryland maximum grant regulation in welfare program had reasonable basis and was constitutionally valid under equal protection clause); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (Maryland statutes prohibiting sale of certain
commodities on Sunday satisfied equal protection strictures because classification reasonably served State's objective).
91. Baker v. Baltimore County, 487 F. Supp. 461, 475 (D. Md. 1980) (county legislation changing retirement benefits for policemen entering service after certain date was
reasonable and constitutionally valid); Mazor v. State Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355,
364-66, 369 A.2d 82, 88-90 (1976) (legislature may constitutionally authorize setoff of
workers' compensation award when public employee receives pension benefits); Clark v.
Tawes, 187 Md. 195, 200-01, 49 A.2d 463, 465-66 (1946) (statute classifying judges
eligible for pensions by granting pensions only to elected judges and denying pensions
to appointed judges is matter within discretion of legislature).
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sions"2 which have upheld statutes that provide pension offsets and
disparate retirement benefits to public employees.
Notably, Hargrove retreats from Waldron's efforts to develop and
extend heightened scrutiny-the intermediate judicial review for
equal protection cases. In Waldron the court applied "heightened
scrutiny," a standard of review consonant with the importance of
the personal right affected.9" Although current section 56(c)(1)
does not prohibit the right to pursue a chosen career, Maryland has
recognized that judicial pensions are a form of deferred compensation and not a substitute earnings plan, 9 4 and that section 56(c)(1)
substantially affects the right to receive a fully earned pension.9 5 By
applying the deferential rational basis test, distinctions such as these
are practically ignored as long as the State offers any possible justification.9 6 Thus, Hargrove signifies a possible return to the rigid twotiered analysis-strict scrutiny and rational basis-under which statutes are subject either to "minimum scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact" 9 7 or to strict scrutiny. 8 Indeed, Hargrove's reliance on
the distinction between a statute prohibiting the right to pursue a
chosen calling and a statute conditioning the amount of benefits received upon whether that right is enjoyed suggests that legislatures
may enact classifications affecting personal rights, not deserving of
strict scrutiny but warranting more than a perfunctory review, and
yet avoid heightened scrutiny if the statute includes insular words of
condition and excludes words of prohibition.
The Supreme Court also has shown reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases, as evidenced in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.9 9 There, the Court analyzed a statute which discriminated against the mentally retarded under a rational basis approach and found the statute unconstitutional as
applied to the mentally retarded.'
If Maryland also adheres to a
two-tiered equal protection analysis and avoids heightened scrutiny,
the rational basis standard may evolve into a stricter form of review.
92. See cases cited supra note 88.
93. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714-22, 426 A.2d 929, 946-50 (1981).
94. Id. at 722-23, 426 A.2d at 950-51. See also 310 Md. at 430-31, 529 A.2d at 1384
(McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
95. I1'aldron, 289 Md. at 722-23, 426 A.2d at 950-51.
96. 310 Md. at 423, 529 A.2d at 1380.
97. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Forvard: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).

98. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 708, 426 A.2d 929, 942 (1981).
99. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See generally Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step in
Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L. REV. 163 (1986).

100. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
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United States Constitution

In Bachur v. Democratic National Party o' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
Democratic Party's delegate selection rule requiring voters to allocate votes according to the gender of candidates for delegates to the
party's national convention. 0 2 In so holding, the court rejected a
voter's contention that his fundamental right to vote' ° s had been
infringed, and also reversed the federal district court's finding that
the case was justiciable and that the delegate selection rule violated
the Constitution's equal protection clause' 0 4 and the individual's
fundamental right to vote.105
At issue was rule 6C of the Delegate Selection Rules for the
1984 Democratic National Convention which requires each state
delegate selection plan to provide for equal division between male
and female delegates and alternates.'" 6 The Rule is part of the
Democratic Party's efforts to increase the number of women delegates at national conventions, an effort which more closely reflects
the proportion of women as a whole registered as Democratic
voters. 0 7"
As implemented in Maryland, the Rule required registered
Democrats to allocate their primary votes for delegates to the 1984
Democratic National Convention to an equal number of men and
women.' 0 8 Candidates were listed on the ballot by sex, and voters
were allowed to vote for the total number of delegates and alternates allocated to their congressional district.'0 9 Although Nicholas
Bachur, a registered Democrat, refused to disclose either the particular presidential candidate or delegates he would have supported
but for the Rule, he claimed that he was injured because he could
not vote for the eight candidates allocated to his district, based on
whatever criteria, aside from gender, that he considered appropri-

101. 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), rev'g 666 F. Supp. 763 (D. Md. 1987).
102. Id. at 843.
103. U.S. CONST. amends. XV, § 1, XXVI, § 1.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. 836 F.2d at 840, 843.
106. Id. at 838. "State Delegation Selection Plans shall provide for equal division between delegate men and delegate women and alternate men and alternate women in the
convention delegation." Bachu', 666 F. Supp. at 767. This provision is also referred to
as the "Equal Division Rule." Id.
107. 836 F.2d at 838.

108. Id. at 839.
109. Id. See also 666 F. Supp. at 768.
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ate. ' 0 Consequently, Bachur sued the Democratic National Party
and other defendants, alleging that rule 6C violated the equal pro-.
tection clause and his fundamental right to vote."'
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
held that Bachur had standing to assert claims that the Rule violated
his rights to vote and to equal protection, as the injury alleged was
"traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct.""' 2 The
court also held that the case was justiciable and that Bachur had
standing to raise the equal protection challenge on behalf of the delegates." 3 On the merits, the court ruled that Bachur's fundamental
right to vote had been violated because the vote for a delegate is an
"integral step" in the election process deserving constitutional protection' 4 and the State could not offer a compelling interest sufficient to overcome the infringement." 5 The equal protection rights
of delegates had been violated, the court held, because the gender
classification on the ballot was not substantially related to a sufficiently important interest." 6 Finally, the court determined that the
Rule did not violate Bachur's equal protection rights because he was
treated no differently than any other voter."7 The district court enjoined the defendants from implementing rule 6C or any rule requiring voters to allocate their votes for the candidates for delegates
on the basis of sex, and awarded Bachur attorney's fees and one
dollar in damages."'
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit
ruled that although Bachur had standing,' '9 it was unnecessary to
decide whether Bachur could sue on behalf of the candidates running for delegate "because unquestionably Bachur has standing to
raise whatever rights he possesses and that is enough to present us
with the merits of this controversy."' 2 °
110. 836 F.2d at 839. For each of the national presidential candidates, except
LaRouche and McGovern, there were at least four female and four male candidates for
delegate pledged to that contender. Id.
I 11. Id. at 838. Other defendants included the Democratic National Committee, the
Maryland State Democratic Party, and the Administrator of the Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws. 666 F. Supp. at 766. 769.
112. 666 F. Supp. at 770 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
113. Id. at 771-72.
114. Id. at 782-83.
115. Id. at 783-85.
116. Id. at 786.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 836 F.2d at 840.
120. Id.
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Turning to the question ofjusticiability, 2 ' the court ruled that
rule 6C's restriction was not justiciable because Bachur's challenge
lacked merit."' First, the court examined the justiciability issue by
analyzing a series of Supreme Court decisions 2 3 recognizing that a
political party's first amendment associational rights outweigh various state interests.' 24 These decisions involved state statutes which
conflicted with a party's delegate selection process or a party's efforts to broaden its electoral base. 1 2 5 In each decision, the Court
balanced state interests against the party's first amendment right of
association and found that the party's rights prevailed.' 26 The
Bachur court extended this logic by weighing the party's right of association against the voter's constitutional right to vote.' 2 7 To effect
this balancing test, the court measured the extent of the fundamen121. Id. at 841. Justiciability is the determination of whether questions presented in a
dispute are suitable for judicial review. 666 F. Supp. at 778. Historically,judicial intervention into the deliberative processes of a national political convention have been approached with caution and restraint because of their essentially political nature. See
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972) (judicial review of actions challenging the Credentials Committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention stayed in light of availability of Democratic National Convention as forum for review). Indeed,justiciability of
political questions is characterized by the courts' refusal to become eniangled in disputes because it is perceived that "certain matters are better resolved by the political
process than by judicial review." 666 F. Supp. at 778.
122. 836 F.2d at 841.
123. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 210-11
(1986) (Connecticut statute requiring closed primaries impermissibly interfered with
Republican Party's first amendment right to define its associational boundaries); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ix rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-26
(1981) (State of Wisconsin could not compel Democratic Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way violative of the party's rules); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975)
(State's legitimate interests in protecting electoral process not compelling enough to
warrant primacy of Illinois state law in fixing qualifications of convention delegates when
state law conflicted with national political party's rules).
124. 836 F.2d at 841-43.
125. See cases cited supra note 123.
126. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 (holding that Connecticut's compelling interests in
protecting integrity of two-party system and responsibility of party government are insubstantial as applied to national party); Democratic Part"., 450 U.S. at 125-26 (holding
that Wisconsin's interest in manner in which its elections are conducted did not justify
its intrusion into associational freedom of members of national party); Cousins, 419 U.S.
at 491 (holding that Illinois's interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process
was not compelling in context of selection of delegates to national party convention).
127. 836 F.2d at 842-43. In particular, the court primarily relied upon the Tashjian
decision which upheld a party's affirmative action efforts to broaden its base in contravention of a state statute requiring closed primaries. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214-17. The
affirmative action efforts displayed themselves through a party rule which permitted voters not affiliated with any political party to vote in Republican primaries. Id. at 212. The
Bachur court saw "no principled difference between opening a primary election to unaffiliated voters and a gender limitation on eligible candidates as a means to broaden public participation in party affairs." 836 F.2d at 843.
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tal right to vote and concluded that Bachur's vote for delegates is
several steps removed from a vote for an actual candidate for public
office. 12 As the restrictions placed on Bachur's participation in the
primary process did not abridge his fundamental right to vote,' 2 9 his
right to vote challenge lacked merit.'
Second, the court reviewed the principle that a case lacking in
merits is nonjusticiable by discussing the decision in Ripon Society v.
National Republican Party.'' In Ripon the court passed over the issue
of justiciability to decide the merits of a constitutional challenge to
the representational scheme provided by the delegate allocation
formula adopted by the National Republican Party for its 1976 convention.'" The Ripon court noted the close relationship of the justiciability issue to "the merits of the constitutional claim."' 3 3 The
Bachur court relied on this "close relationship" language to reason
that, in order to determine whether the gender voting restriction
was amenable to judicial intervention, it is necessary to first determine whether Bachur's fundamental right to vote had been infringed. 3 4 Because Bachur's free exercise of franchise was not
128. 836 F.2d at 841-42. The court recognized that the right to vote in elections for
national office is a fundamental right, which also includes any preliminary election integrally related to elections for national office. Id. at 841. The court stated that convention delegates nominate candidates and indeed, for practical purposes, delegates
"'constitute the National Party." Id. The court found, however, that the vote for delegates is several steps removed from the vote for an actual candidate because several
party rules and procedures stand between the individual voter and the nomination of a
candidate, "so that the will of the majority of the electorate expressing a presidential
preference and the selection of delegates may be only partially translated into the actual
nomination." Id. at 842. The court stated that the "right to participate in a popular
primary election does not foreclose party limits on the effective weight of his participation, or mandate that the popular ballot is to be wholly determinative of the outcome of
the nomination process." Id.
129. Id. at 843.
130. Id. at 841, 843. For a discussion of justiciability, see supra note 121.
131. 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
132. d. at 578 n.28. Ripon involved nine individual voters' and the Ripon Society's
constitutional challenge under the equal protection clause to a formula that allocated
delegates to the 1976 Republican Party Convention according to the states' electoral
college votes, and awarded proportional and uniform victory bonuses to states voting
for the Republican candidate in the last presidential election. d. at 570-7 1. Voters and
the Ripon Society claimed that the Constitution guaranteed representation at a national
convention on a "one man, one vote" basis. Id. at 578. Under the merits, the court held
that "the Equal Protection Clause, assuming it is applicable, does not require the representation in presidential nominating conventions of some defined constituency on a one
person, one vote basis ... " id. at 586-87. Interestingly, the Ripon court assumed that
the conduct of a national political convention may be subject to the equal protection
clause. Id.
133. Id. at 578.
134. 836 F.2d at 840-41.
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infringed, the court "declined] to intervene in the internal structure of either the State Party or National Party."' 3'
Because the court found the case nonjusticiable, it only answered the question of whether a party may constitutionally restrict
a voter's primary participation by requiring the voter to vote for an
equal number of male and female candidates for delegate.' 3 6 The
court relied on Ripon to hold that the merits and justiciability of a
case are interwoven.' 3 7 Yet, the court in Ripon left undecided the
issue of justiciability 31 and decided the constitutional challenge on
the merits.' 39 Conversely, Bachur decided the case was not justiciable, thereby failing to reach the merits of the equal protection
40
claim. 1
Bachur's reliance upon Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,' 4 ' Cousins v. Wigoda,' 4 2 and Democratic Party of the United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollettet4 3 to determine the extent of a party's constitutional rights is questionable. Those cases involved state regula-4
tory conflicts with a party's constitutional rights of association.
They did not involve a constitutional challenge to a party's rule. 4 5
In those cases the Supreme Court merely balanced a state's right to
regulate the electoral process against a political party's first amendment right of association when party rules conflicted with state
rules.' 4 6 Thus, the court in Bachur relied heavily on three cases with
147
limited relevance to the facts in the case before it.
More disturbing, however, is that the court-having reasoned
that the case was nonjusticiable-failed to address the equal protec135. Id. at 841.
136. Id. at 840-41.
137. Id. The court noted that these issues cannot be treated as separate and distinct.

Id.
138. Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en

banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
139. Id. at 577-78.
140. 836 F.2d at 843.
141. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).

142. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
143. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
144. See supra note 123.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See 666 F. Supp. at 780-8 1. The reluctance of the court in Bachur to intervene in
intraparty disputes, however, is consistent with precedent. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S.

1, 4 (1972). See.666 F. Supp. at 778-8 1.The reluctance to intervene is mirrored by the
fact that the Supreme Court has declined to rule on the question of whether decisions

made by a major political party relative to the selection of delegates for a national convention should be subject to judicial review. ld. at 778. There is authority, however,
recognizing that any allocation formula found to constitute invidious discrimination on
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tion challenge to rule 6C. In essence, the court examined only one
of Bachur's constitutional challenges and finding that claim to lack
merit, labeled the case nonjusticiable.' 4 8 By intertwining the issues
of merits and justiciability, the court avoided deciding the merits of
the equal protection challenge on behalf of the delegates.' 49
While Bachur may provide authority for upholding a party's
means of accomplishing its agenda, the court's failure to decide the
merits of the equal protection claim is unfortunate. Indeed, because
the court avoided deciding the merits of the equal protection claim
on behalf of the delegates, the opinion provides little guidance as to
the constitutional limits of a party's means to shape its membership
and goals, and in particular, its affirmative action efforts.
KIMBERLY ANNE HALE

THOMAS M. MESSANA

the basis of race could be redressed by the courts. See O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 4 n.I; Georgia
v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1278 n.13 (1971).
The district court found that the question of whether decisions made by a major
political party relative to the selection of delegates for a national convention is one appropriate for judicial review. 666 F. Supp. at 778. That is, the court analyzed various
decisions involving party delegate disputes and reasoned that the particular facts and
circumstances presented by this case must deem the constitutional challenge justiciable.
Id. at 778-81.
148. 836 F.2d at 843.
149. Id.

IV.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Criminal Procedure

1. Right to Counsel-In Fowikes v. State' the Court of Appeals
held that a defendant's unmeritorious request to discharge counsel,
when no replacement existed, may constitute a waiver of the right to
counsel if the defendant acts knowingly and intelligently. 2 In so
holding, the court announced that Maryland Rule 4-215(e), 3
promulgated in 1984, was sound and did not infringe upon the right
to counsel 4 under the sixth amendment 5 or under article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 6 The court also ruled that any aspects of the State v. Renshaw7 opinion inconsistent with the Fowikes
decision are disapproved. 8
Defendant Jeffrey Fowlkes, who was represented by an assistant
public defender, was charged with unlawful possession of narcotics
paraphernalia. 9 As his attorney argued a motion in limine, Fowlkes
interrupted, arguing that his attorney did riot have "the true evidence."'"
The judge instructed Fowlkes to address the court
through his attorney, but Fowlkes answered that he wanted a new
attorney, although he had not yet selected one." Another assistant
public defender then joined his attorney and the trial judge announced a recess, advising Fowlkes to decide whether he wished to
be represented by the second public defender. The judge warned
1. 311 Md. 586, 536 A.2d 1149 (1988), affg 67 Md. App. 102, 506 A.2d 660 (1986).
2. Id. at 606, 536 A.2d at 1159.
3. Primarily at issue was the Rule's provision that "[ilf the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the
defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not
have new counsel." MD. R. 4-215(e).
4. 311 Md. at 604, 536 A.2d at 1158.
5. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
6. Article 21 states: "(11n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be
allowed counsel." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21.
7. 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975). The court in Renshaw held that a request for
different counsel on the morning of trial was not a waiver of the sixth amendment right
to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 271, 347 A.2d at 225.
8. 311 Md. at 604, 536 A.2d at 1158.
9. Id. at 590, 536 A.2d at 1151.
10. Id. at 591, 536 A.2d at 1152. The assistant public defender moved to suppress
evidence recovered from the defendant's sock. Fowlkes claimed the money had been
elsewhere. Id. at 591 n.4, 536 A.2d at 1152 n.4.
11. Id. at 591, 536 A.2d at 1152.
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Fowlkes that if he declined, "you are going to have'to represent
2
yourself, because we are going to try this case today."'
When the proceedings resumed, Fowlkes refused to be represented by either of the two assistant public defenders."3 The trial
judge, relying on the Maryland Rules, held that Fowlkes had a right
to discharge his attorney. The judge added, however, that he had
the duty to determine whether Fowlkes's reason for discharging the
attorney was meritorious.' 4 When Fowlkes continued to refuse to
be represented by the public defenders, the judge determined that
his reason for discharge of counsel was not meritorious."5 Through
a series of questions, the assistant state's attorney determined that
Fowikes was waiving his right to counsel voluntarily. " After
Fowlkes dismissed the public defenders, the proceedings continued
and the trial court found Fowlkes guilty.' 7
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the verdict, holding that
Fowikes had waived counsel in accordance with rule 4-215(e).'"
The Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that Fowlkes effectively
had waived his right to counsel in accordance with rule 4-215(e).' 9
Although this decision abrogated the ruling enunciated in State v.
Renshaw,2 0 the court found that rule 4-215(e) satisfied the constitutional mandate for waiving the right to counsel. 2
The Court of Appeals examined the relationship between criminal defendants' right to counsel and their independent and concurrent right to represent themselves.22 The court found that the
12. Id. at 592, 536 A.2d at 1152-53.
13. Id., 536 A.2d at 1153.
14. Id. at 593, 536 A.2d at 1153. See MD. R. 4-215(e).
15. Id. at 594, 536 A.2d at 1153. The trial judge determined that the public defender had sufficient time to prepare the case and was prepared for trial. The attorney's
failure to produce one witness actually was due to an incorrect address supplied by
Fowlkes. Id. at 593-94, 536 A.2d at 1153. Further, Fowlkes had had over six months to
retain the private counsel of his choice. Id. at 595, 536 A.2d at 1154.
16. Id. at 595-97, 536 A.2d at 1154-55. The court's opinion included extensive transcripts of the trial in which the assistant state's attorney questioned Fowlkes to verify
that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, had never received psychiatric
treatment, and understood his right to counsel. Id.
17. Id. at 598, 536 A.2d at 1155. Fowlkes was sentenced to six months imprisonment. id.
18. 67 Md. App. at 121, 506 A.2d at 670.
19. 311 Md. at 607,536 A.2d at 1160.
20. 276 Md. 259, 267, 347 A.2d 219, 225 (1975).
21. 311 Md. at 606, 536 A.2d at 1159-60.
22. Id. at 589, 536 A.2d at 1151. The court discussed the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the right to waive counsel as enunciated in Adams v. United States ex re. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), and the right to reject the assistance of counsel and
elect self-representation as postulated in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
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interplay between these two rights created difficulties when defendants make unmeritorious demands to discharge present counsel and
have new counsel appointed if the appointment of new counsel
would require a trial postponement. 2 3 If postponement is improper, the court stated that the trial judge must force the defendant to choose between trial without counsel or trial with the
unwanted attorney. 4 Appellate review of trials in which defendants
choose to represent themselves focus on whether they validly have
waived their right to counsel.2 5
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals reviewed historical attempts to reconcile the rights to counsel and to self-representation, beginning with State v. Renshaw.2 6 In that case, which
involved facts similar to those in Fowikes, the defendant attempted to
have new counsel appointed on the day of trial.2 7 The trial court
denied his request for new counsel and ordered the defendant to
represent himself and consult with his appointed counsel as he
found necessary.2 8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed
without counsel if the defendant waives the right to counsel, a request for different counsel does not waive that right. 29 In fact, the
court stated that absent a waiver, effective representation must be
afforded regardless of whether it was requested by the accused.3 °
The court held that because no waiver was made, the trial court
should have ordered counsel to continue to represent the defendant, "with or without the cooperation of the defendant."'"
In Fowlkes the Court of Appeals interpreted Renshaw to prohibit
23. 311 Md. at 589, 536 A.2d at 1151.
24. Id. at 606, 536 A.2d at 1159.
25. Id. at 601-03, 536 A.2d at 1156-58. See Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 282, 523
A.2d 597, 608 (1987) (defendant's waiver of counsel was invalid because of noncompliance with rule 4-215(a)(3)'s requirement that the trial
court advise defendants of the
penalties allowed for the crimes charged against them); Crowder v. State, 305 Md. 654,
656-57, 506 A.2d 240, 241 (1986) (defendant held to have validly waived his right to
counsel by failing to obtain an attorney); Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 131, 406 A.2d 98,
103 (1979) (defendant's statement that he did not want an attorney deemed not a waiver
but rather a declaration sufficient to require an inquiry into whether he wished to waive
his right to counsel).
26. 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975).
27. Id. at 261-62, 347 A.2d at 222. The defendant in Renihaw claimed that his counsel believed he was lying; therefore, the defendant did not have confidence in his counsel. Id.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 262, 347 A.2d at 222.
Id. at 267, 347 A.2d at 225.
State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270, 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975).
Id.
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defendants from waiving their right to counsel unless they were willing to exercise their right of self-representation. 32 Accordingly, if a
defendant made an unmeritorious request to discharge counsel at
trial, Renshaw required the defendant to have expressly and unequivocally waived his or her right to counsel; if not, the trial court could
only order the current counsel to remain despite the defendant's
objections.3s
In Howell v. State3 4 the Court of Appeals held that when defendants assert their right to counsel, their conduct could constitute a
waiver if it was a delay strategy.3 5 In 1984 rule 4-215(e) codified
Howell, stipulating that if a court finds a discharge request to be unmeritorious, the trial would proceed and the defendant would be
required to retain appointed counsel or to represent himself or hers
self.5 6 The Court of Appeals reviewed this rule in Parren v. State 3
holding that "to protect the fundamental rights involved, to secure
simplicity in procedure, and to promote fairness in administration,
the requirements of Rule 4-215 are to be construed as
38
mandatory."
The Court of Appeals applied rule 4-215(e) to the situation in
Fowlkes. When Fowlkes requested a new attorney, the trial judge
held that the Maryland Rules gave Fowlkes the right to discharge his
attorney, but that the judge must determine if the request was meritorious. The judge stated that the attorney was "highly competent" 3 9 and found that the attorney's alleged failure was caused by
Fowlkes's conduct.4 ° The trial judge then informed Fowlkes of his
finding that the discharge was unmeritorious and offered him the
choice of retaining his counsel or representing himself.4
When Fowlkes refused to retain his counsel, the assistant state's
32. 311 Md. at 600, 536 A.2d at 1156. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
807 (1975).
33. 311 Md. at 600, 536 A.2d at 1156. The Fowlkes court held that Renshaw failed to
acknowledge that a defendant could, through his or her actions, waive his or her right to
counsel "even while asserting, adamantly or ambivalently, that [the defendant] desires
some legal representation." Id.
34. 293 Md. 232, 443 A.2d 103 (1982).
35. Id. at 241, 443 A.2d at 107. Although Howell's conduct did not constitute a
waiver, the recognition that a waiver could occur even if the defendant did not renounce
his or her desire for legal representation was a clear departure from Renshaw. 311 Md.
at 602, 536 A.2d at 1157.
36. For the text of rule 4-215(e), see supra note 3.
37. 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d 597 (1987).
38. Id. at 280, 523 A.2d at 607.
39. 311 Md. at 591, 536 A.2d at 1152.
40. See supra note 15.

41. 311 Md. at 595, 536 A.2d at 1154.
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attorney conducted a waiver inquiry of Fowlkes in accordance with
rule 4-215(b)42 . to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel. Because these procedures satisfied the
rule 4-215 requirements, the Court of Appeals upheld the courtimposed choice of retaining original counsel or representing oneself
and found that Fowlkes had waived his right to counsel
voluntarily.4"
The court enumerated several reasons for overruling Renshaw.
Primarily, it stated that the Renshaw holding was unworkable in
many circumstances.4 4 According to the court, rule 4-215(e) provides the trial judge with greater flexibility than Renshaw because
under the rule, an unmeritorious request to discharge counsel can
be answered either by refusing to permit the discharge, permitting
the discharge but having counsel remain available on a standby basis, or permitting discharge and excusing counsel. 4 5 The court concluded that although the right to counsel usually includes a right to
retain counsel of one's choice, that right may not be manipulated so
as to "frustrate the orderly administration of criminal justice."46
Rule 4-215(e) is designed to reconcile the defendant's right to
counsel with the right to discharge that counsel and represent oneself. As applied in Fowlkes, the Rule prevents defendants from discharging their counsel solely in order to delay the trial. Because the
court held that an unmeritorious request to discharge counsel can
constitute a waiver of the right to counsel, judges may respond to an
unmeritorious discharge request by granting the discharge only if
the defendant represents himself or herself. That result, therefore,
possibly will limit the use of such dilatory tactics.
Although the Fowikes decision did not directly address rule 4215's impact on a meritorious request to discharge counsel, the
Court of Special Appeals considered that impact in Argabright v.
42. Id. at 595-97, 536 A.2d at 1154-55. Rule 4-215(e) provides that if the court permits the discharge of counsel, it must comply with rule 4-215(a)(l)-(4) describing actions the court must take at the defendant's first appearance without counsel. MD. R. 4215(a)(1)-(4), (e). Rule 4-215(a)(4) provides that the court must conduct a waiver inquiry in accordance with rule 4-215(b) if the defendant indicates a desire to waive counsel. MD. R. 4-215(a)(4), (b). The court complied with this rule by ordering the assistant
state's attorney to examine Fowlkes. 311 Md. at 595, 536 A.2d at 1154.
43. 311 Md. at 607, 536 A.2d at 1160.
44. Id. at 604, 536 A.2d at 1158. The court reasoned that a defendant could be so
adamant in his or her unmeritorious insistence on new counsel that continuing the trial
with current counsel would be "virtually impossible." Id.
45. Id. at 604-05, 536 A.2d at 1158-59.
46. Id. at 605, 536 A.2d at 1159.
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State.4 7 In Argabright the court held that a waiver of counsel, either
expressly or by inaction, required compliance with rule 4-215(a)(I)(4)48 regardless of whether the discharge was meritorious or unmeritorious. 49 This holding clarifies the actions required of trial judges
because the same waiver inquiry is required regardless of the reason
for the discharge of counsel.
2. Right to Confrontation.-In Wildermuth v. State50 the Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of a statute allowing the use during
criminal trials of the live testimony of child sex crime victims located
in a separate room via closed circuit television (TV).5" The court
rejected contentions that the statute's application denied the defendants their constitutional right to confrontation. 52 It nevertheless stressed that in order for such a procedure to be used, a trial
court must find that the child's testimony in open court would result
in serious emotional distress such that the child would in effect be
unavailable to testify."
Wildermuth involved appeals from two separate jury trials. 54 In
each case the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for child
abuse.5 5 Additionally, in each case the victim was allowed to testify
from outside the courtroom via closed circuit TV pursuant to
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 9-102.16 Both of
the defendants argued that the statute allowing such testimony was
47. 75 Md. App. 442, 541 A.2d 1017 (1988).
48. MD. R. 4-215(a)(l)-(4). See supra note 42.
49. 75 Md. App. at 456, 541 A.2d at 1024.
50. 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987).
51. d. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
52. Id. For the text of the Maryland and federal right to confrontation provisions,
see infra note 63.
53. 310 Md. at 519-20, 530 A.2d at 286-87.
54. Id. at 500, 530 A.2d at 277. Both appellants, Richard Bryan Wildermuth and
James Sylvester McCoy, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 501 nl, 530
A.2d at 277 n. I. Because of the importance of the issues involved, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari while the cases were still pending before the intermediate appellate
court. Id.
55. Id. at 500, 530 A.2d at 277.
56. d. at 500-01, 530 A.2d at 277. The statute provides in pertinent part:
In a case of abuse of a child ... a court may order that the testimony of a child
victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of
closed-circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate.
MD. CTs. &JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(1) (Supp. 1988).
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invalid because the procedure denied them the right of physical
57
confrontation with the victim-witnesses .
Many state legislatures have passed statutes similar to that in
Maryland, 58 attempting to remedy the child sexual abuse problem
perceived by many to be one of epidemic proportions.5 9 Among the
difficulties posed by this dilemma are a reluctance to report offenses, investigation problems, and obstacles to prosecution.60 One
of the aims of remedial legislation is to protect the physical and psychological well-being of child victims by avoiding, or at least minimizing, the emotional trauma produced by testifying. 6
Although the Supreme Court has found that the protection of
minor sex abuse victims from additional trauma and embarrassment
is a compelling state interest,6 2 allowing a child to testify from
outside the courtroom may conflict with a defendant's constitutional
right to confrontation.6" Courts disagree as to whether this right
requires an "eyeball-to-eyeball" encounter between the witness and
the accused. Some courts, while acknowledging that the confrontation clause is indispensable to cross-examination, have reasoned
that the secondary purpose of allowing the evaluation of a witness's
credibility is secured simply by the witness appearing before the tri57. 310 Md. at 505, 530 A.2d at 279.
58. Id. at 516-18, 530 A.2d at 285-86. See generally D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L.
STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 1-3
(1985) [hereinafter WHITCOMB] (regarding extent of child abuse problem); Brief for the
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae app. at la-9a, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798

(1988) (listing state statutes). At least 25 states have authorized the use of one- or twoway closed circuit television (TV). See id.
59. See, e.g., WHITCOMB, supra note 58.

60. 310 Md. at 516, 530 A.2d at 285.
61. Id. at 518, 530 A.2d at 286. See WHITCOMB, supra note 58, at 17-18 (regarding
effects on child sex victims of testifying in close proximity to defendant); Avery, The Child
Abuse Witness: PotentialforSecondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983) (asserting
that many child abuse cases are not reported because of treatment child receives injudicial process); Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the CriminalJustice

System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 985 (1969) (discussing problems arising from treatment
of child victim in same manner as adult victim, with proposed solutions).
62. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) ("We agree
...that the first interest [of the state]-safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor-is a compelling one" (footnote omitted)).
63. 310 Md. at 518-19, 530 A.2d at 286. The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in pertinent part that "in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be
confronted with the witness against him ....
" MD. CoNsr. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21. The
federal constitution provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right .. .to be confronted with the witness against him ...." U.S. CONST. amend.

VI. The sixth amendment is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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bunal.' The Supreme Court on a number of occasions has expressed a preference for "face-to-face" confrontation between the
accuser and the accused.6 5 Similarly, the court in Wildermuth concluded that this right "ordinarily includes, among other things, the
right of the accused to be seen by his accuser when the accuser is
testifying against the accused." 6 6 In examining its underpinnings,
the court noted that the "essential purpose of the confrontation
clause is truth-finding."6
The right to confrontation, however, is not absolute.6 8 In eval64. See People v. Johnson, 146 I1. App. 3d 640, 646-52, 497 N.E.2d 308, 312-15
(1986) (protections of confrontation clause served when there is an adequate opportunity to cross-examine and a proper showing of necessity to justify the procedure); State
v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Iowa 1986) (declaring that confrontation clause protections are served by cross-examination in full view ofjudge and jury and administration of an oath, despite use of screen between witness and accused); Commonwealth v.
Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 227-31 (Ky. 1986) (stating that modern technological methods
of presenting testimony to jury permit sufficient observation of witness's demeanor to
allow jury to evaluate credibility); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 1021, 498
N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("face-to-face" confrontation requirement held
not to require actual physical confrontation, but rather only opportunity to crossexamine).
65. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("It is the literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause."); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (disallowing as
violation of accused's right to confrontation the admission of prior convictions of codefendants to prove an element of the offense). In Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988), a
decision subsequent to Wildermuth, the Supreme Court held that the wording of the confrontation clause vests criminal defendants with the right to confront adverse witnesses
face to face. Id. at 2802. The Court decided that a screen placed between the defendant
and the child witnesses, a procedure mandated by the legislature when a presumption of
trauma is suspected, violated the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 2803. The
concurring opinion, however, stressed that nothing in the opinion should be construed
to dampen efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses. Id. at 2803-04
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In furtherance of the important public policy goals such as
the protection of young witnesses, the concurrence would allow trial procedures that do
not permit face-to-face confrontation if there is a case-by-case determination of necessity. Id. at 2805.
66. 310 Md. at 512-13, 530 A.2d at 283.
67. Id. at 509, 530 A.2d at 281. This function is served by thejury's evaluation of the
demeanor of the witness, cross-examination, the actual physical presence of the accused,
and the ability of the witness to observe the accused. d. at 510-13, 530 A.2d 282-83. See
also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (primary purpose of the constitutional provision is not only "testing the recollection of the witness, but ... compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge
by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief").
68. 310 Md. at 514-15, 530 A.2d at 284. The right to confrontation "must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Vallox,
156 U.S. at 243. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (holding that admission
into evidence of preliminary hearing testimony of witness who was unavailable to testify
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uating whether the strictures of the sixth amendment right were satisfied, the court used the two-pronged test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Ohio v. Roberts.69 This test requires that a sufficient necessity exist to justify preventing a defendant from confronting the adverse witness directly, as well as adequate indicia of reliability to
"substitute for the truth-seeking confrontation requirement of physical presence.""
The court first addressed the reliability prong of the test. 7' It
found that this prong was satisfied by the application of the provisions set forth in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 9-102,72 that allow for cross-examination, administration of an
oath, and opportunity for the judge, jury, and accused to evaluate
the demeanor of the witness.73 The absence of one reliability function not provided by closed circuit TV witness's view of the accused 74 -presented the court with the core issue of whether the
necessity of having the child in a separate location was strong
enough to overcome the confrontation deficiency. 75 Stressing the
State's interest in encouraging the use of testimony of child abuse
victims to effectively prosecute alleged child abusers, the court concluded that the degree of confrontation allowed by section 9-102
was adequate.7 6
Although concerned with the protection of the child witness,
the court emphasized that section 9-102(a)(1)(ii) 7 7 requires a sufficient showing of emotional distress before the requirement of unavailability is satisfied. 7s Emotional trauma by itself, without a
showing of unavailability, is not enough to justify the use of the procedures set forth in section 9-102. 79
at trial was permissible if the witness's earlier testimony had been tested by questioning
that was equivalent of cross-examination).
69. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
70. Id.
71. 310 Md. at 515-16, 530 A.2d at 284-85.
72. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988).
73. 310 Md. at 515-16, 530 A.2d at 284-85. Additionally, the court held that the
technology used to reproduce the image of the witness in the courtroom and to provide
communications between defendants and their counsel was a sufficient substitute for
typical courtroom conditions. Id.
74. Id. at 516, 530 A.2d at 285.
75. Id. at 516-17, 530 A.2d at 285-86.
76. Id. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
77. MD.CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(i)(ii) (Supp. 1988). For the text of
the statute, see supra note 56.
78. 310 Md. at 518-19, 530 A.2d at 286. In order to make a finding of unavailability,
the judge ordinarily should observe and question the child. Id. at 524, 530 A.2d at 289.
79. Id. Testimony concerning the likely impact on the child of testifying must be
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Because defendant McCoy conceded at trial that he was not opposed to the use of closed circuit TV, the court found the prerequisite conditions satisfied and consequently rejected his appeal. 8 0 In
defendant Wildermuth's case, however, the court found that the evidence relating to the child's expected difficulty in testifying did not
rise to the level of emotional distress required by the statute."' As a
2
result, it reversed the conviction and remanded the case.
A number of cases from other states are consistent with the Wildermuth decision. 3 Indeed, the court's finding that the Maryland requirement for emotional distress is more strict than that in other
state statutes buttressed the court's decision. s4
The court upheld the use of testimony via closed circuit TV in
order to facilitate the prosecution of cases involving child sex abuse.
Such procedures will minimize the emotional trauma suffered by the
child when testifying and will enable prosecutors to use testimony
that otherwise would be difficult to obtain. In order to employ this
procedure, however, the prosecutor must make a showing of emotional distress such that the child would not reasonably be able to
communicate. The practical effect of the Wildermuth decision may be
that victims, judges, and prosecutors will find it difficult to invoke
the benefits of the provision.8 5
specific and must show much more than mere nervousness, excitement, or reluctance to
testify. See Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct.
1301 (1988) (record insufficient to establish enough emotional disturbance to warrant
limitation of defendant's right to confrontation).
80. 310 Md. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
81. Id. at 525, 530 A.2d at 289.
82. Id. at 523-25, 530 A.2d at 288-89.
83. See, e.g., State v. Vigil, 711 P.2d 28, 31-32 (N.M. 1985) (upholding use of videotaped deposition in lieu of live testimony). Cf. People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016,
1028, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (upholding use of live testimony of
sex crime victim via closed circuit TV). But see Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass.
534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988), in which the court struck down a state statute allowing child
witnesses to testify outside the physical presence of defendants. Id. at 546-47, 524
N.E.2d at 374. The Bergstrom court held that such a procedure created a rule of witness
protection too broad to pass scrutiny under a state constitutional analysis. Id.
84. 310 Md. at 519, 530 A.2d at 287.
85. But see Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784, cert. granted, 314 Md. 458,
550 A.2d 1168 (1988). In Craig the Maryland Court of Special Appeals decided a case
similar to 17ildermuth after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coy v. Iowa.
108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). Looking to the Coy' majority's decision not to address the exceptions to the right to confrontation and the concurring opinion's emphasis oil the exception of child abuse victims' testimony if there is a case-by-case finding of necessity, the
court in Craigfollowed the ll'ildermuth analysis. 76 Md. App. at 277-79, 544 A.2d at 79798. The Craig court held that the trial court's finding that the witness was so emotionally
distressed that she would not be able to communicate justified the use of the procedures
in § 9-102. Id. at 284-87, 544 A.2d at 800-02.
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3. Exclusionary Rule.-The Court of Appeals held in Lee v. State 6
that the likely presence of a handgun provided sufficient probable
cause to justify the warrantless search of a gym bag as a search incident to a lawful arrest.8 7 Although the search preceded the actual
arrest, tle court used an analysis based upon searches incident to
arrest because of the existence of probable cause at the time of the
search, the rapid succession of events, and the exigency of the
circumstances.8"
In an anonymous tip, a callerinformed the police that two men
had bragged of perpetrating a robbery during the previous night in
which a person had been shot;8 9 moreover, the caller stated that
these two men would be at a specific location approximately fortyfive minutes later to purchase drugs. 90 The informer warned the
police that the pair would have a small blue bag containing a handgun. 9 ' The investigating officers responded immediately. 92 Upon
arriving at the scene, the officers found the circumstances to be as
the informant described.9" Approaching from three directions with
guns drawn in a "hard take down," the officers ordered the five individuals to lie face down on the ground.9 4 While officers patted
86. 311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1988), afg 69 Md. App. 302, 517 A.2d 774 (1986)
(en banc).
87. Id. at 668-69, 537 A.2d at 247-48.
88. Id. at 668-72, 537 A.2d at 248-49. The court also addressed the issue of whether
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon should merge with the conviction for use of a
handgun. Id. at 646-47, 537 A.2d at 236-37. The court held that there was no merger
issue because the conduct underlying the two convictions occurred on two separate occasions, one on the late afternoon of August 13 and one 17 hours earlier. Id.
89. Id. at 648-49, 537 A.2d at 238. The victim described his assailants to the first
officer on the crime scene as two black males in their early twenties. Id. at 648-49 n.2,
537 A.2d at 238 n.2. Due to the extent of his injuries, however, the victim was unable to
give height and weight descriptions until 12 days later. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 649-50, 537 A.2d at 238.
93. Id. at 650-51, 537 A.2d at 238-39. The officers saw Lee and a man fitting the
description of the second suspect standing among a group of young men. Id. at 650.
537 A.2d at 238-39. Lee was holding a blue gym bag. Id. at 651, 537 A.2d at 239. After
briefly entering one of the adjacent buildings, Lee returned to the group and hung the
bag by its handles on a nearby fence. Id.
94. Id. at 651, 537 A.2d at 239. The court held that the officers' reasonable suspicion of the defendants' criminal activity and possession of a weapon was sufficient to
justify the show of force and brief detention. Id. at 666-67, 537 A.2d at 246-47. The
Supreme Court has allowed such intrusive seizures in the interests of crime prevention
and detection, public safety, and the safety of police officers. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1985) (police officers were "authorized to take such steps as
were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo
during the stop"); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) ('The risk of harm to
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down the five men, another officer lifted the blue bag from its location just a few feet from Lee and feeling that the bag was weighted
down, proceeded to open it, finding a handgun.9 5 The police
then
96
arrested the two suspects for carrying a concealed weapon.
The trial judge found9 7 that the police had probable cause to
arrest based solely on their independent corroboration of the tipster's information.9" Thus, the court upheld the search of the bag as
being incident to a valid warrantless arrest.99 The Court of Special
Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed by an evenly divided court.' 00
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but held that probable cause for
arrest arose upon the lifting of the bag.'
In its analysis the court first determined that the police conduct
when they left their surveillance positions and charged the group
with their weapons drawn constituted a seizure.'12 In evaluating the
validity of the warrantless seizure, the court examined the source of
the information upon which the police relied in developing sufficient reasonable suspicion' 0 3 and found that a seizure based on the
tipster's information was reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances. 0 4 Although the informer had no history of reliabilboth the police and [the suspects] isminimized if the police routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.").
95. 311 Md. at 651-52, 537 A.2d at 239. Ballistics later proved that this handgun was
the one used in the robbery the previous night. Id. at 652 n.3, 537 A.2d at 239 n.3.
96. Id. at 652, 537 A.2d at 239. The informant had associated Lee and Hall with the
handgun, and they were the only people in the group of individuals at the arrest scene to
place their hands on the bag. Id. at 656, 537 A.2d at 241.
97. Lee and Hall argued for suppression of the gun under the federal exclusionary
rule, thus necessitating an analysis under the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 652, 537 A.2d at 239. No portion of their argument rested on state
law. Id. at 657, 537 A.2d at 242.
98. Id. at 652, 537 A.2d at 239.
99. Id.
100. 69 Md. App. at 302, 517 A.2d at 774.
101. 311 Md. at 668, 537 A.2d at 247.
102. Id. at 652-53, 537 A.2d at 240. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980) (seizure held to have occurred when a "reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave").
103. 311 Md. at 653-57, 537 A.2d at 240-42. Cf.Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 234,
550 A.2d 670, 676 (1988) (probable cause found where tip could not have been derived
From media).
104. 311 Md. at 657, 537 A.2d at 242. The court utilized the "totality of the circumstances" test without specifically holding that it applied. Id. at 654, 537 A.2d at 240.
This test ordinarily is used to evaluate the reliability of information provided by an informant in the context of a probable cause determination for a search warrant. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (magistrate issuing a warrant should make a
"practical, commonsense decision" whether evidence will be found in a particular place,
considering totality of circumstances).
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ity, the self-corroborating events and the officers' personal experience with one of the men created a reasonable suspicion. 0 5
Next, the court examined the warrantless search of the bag, exploring the possibility of classifying it as a protective search extending from the Terry frisk.'0 6 Under this analysis the search could
bejustified as a frisk due to the reasonable suspicion of the presence
of a handgun.' 0 7 Recognizing the divergence of viewpoints in this
area,'O8 however, the court sidestepped the issue by finding that the
detection of a heavy object in a small gym bag,'0 9 in light of the tip
relating to the gun, provided sufficient probable cause to arrest and
thus allowed the search as incident to arrest.'0
The court dismissed objections to the search that related to its
having preceded the actual arrest;"' rather, the court joined the
Supreme Court in refusing to be limited by strict timing concerns.'' 2 The court was satisfied that sufficient probable cause existed for an arrest prior to the search, and that both search and
3
arrest occurred quickly in succession.11
In Fosterv. State' "' the Court of Appeals found that the reasonableness of a search of the area under the arrestee's control incident
105. 311 Md. at 654-57, 537 A.2d at 240-42.
106. Id. at 667-68, 537 A.2d at 247. The protective search is an aspect of the stop and
frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Tery allowed seizure based on the
reasonable suspicion that the individual was armed. Id. at 30-3 1.
107. 311 Md. at 667-68, 537 A.2d at 247. See, e.g., United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d
295, 298 (2d Cir. 1973) (search of arrestee's companion's purse held reasonable as limited protective search for concealed weapons); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 705
(2d Cir. 1973) (search of camera case at suspect's feet held reasonable); United States v.
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1971) (search of arrestee's wife's purse held
reasonable).
108. 311 Md. at 667-68, 537 A.2d at 247. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 9.4(e), at 527-28 (1987) (recognizing divergence of views regarding protective
searches beyond the person).
109. "A weighted down gym bag is inconsistent with its contents being a change of
summer-weight clothes and a towel." 311 Md. at 668, 537 A.2d at 247.
110. Id. at 668-69, 537 A.2d at 247-48. The scope of a search incident to arrest is
limited to the suspect's person and the area in his or her immediate control. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The concurrence agreed with the majority's holding that the search was valid as a search incident to arrest, but found that probable cause
to arrest existed at the time of the seizure. 311 Md. at 673, 537 A.2d at 250 (EldridgeJ.,
concurring).
I1I.311 Md. at 669, 537 A.2d at 248.
112. Id. at 668-69, 537 A.2d at 247-48. Accord Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110I1 (1980) ("Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged
search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search
preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.").
113. 311 Md. at 668-69, 537 A.2d at 247-48.
114. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983).
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to arrest is determined by the potentiality for harm and not by any
actual physical control by the arrestee at the time of the search.' '5
The Foster court upheld the search of a partially opened drawer of a
nightstand within two feet of the handcuffed arrestee because "even
after an arrestee has been handcuffed there is a continuing potential
16
for harm."'
Stressing the potential for harm posed by the presence of a
handgun and the existence of probable cause, the court upheld the
search of the gym bag that was not on either of the arrestees' persons, finding that it was part of a search incident to arrest.'" 7 The
bag was still in the arrestees' control when the seizure began, and
even after their seizure the court found the gun's presence continued to pose a threat should any scuffle have ensued."" In accord
with Foster v. State 19 and New York v. Belton, 120 and several Fourth
Circuit cases with similar facts,' 2 ' the court held that the search was
1 22
a valid search
under the "area of control" doctrine of Chimel v.
23
1

California.

Once probable cause exists Lee makes clear that an arrestee and
those possessions within his or her control prior to seizure can be
searched when an arrest immediately follows. The exigency of the
likely presence of a concealed weapon is a determining factor in
considering the timing and extent of such a search. The decision
may uphold a number of convictions which otherwise would have
been reversed if no allowance were made for police to respond to
the exigencies that they may encounter.

115. Id. at 217-20, 464 A.2d at 1000-01.
116. Id. at 219-20, 464 A.2d at 1001. This reasoning is in accordance with the holding
in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The Supreme Court in that case upheld the
search of the arrestee's jacket pocket because the jacket, while not being worn by the
defendant at the time, was still within the area into which an automobile passenger
might reach to seize a weapon or evidence during a search contemporaneous with arrest.
Id. at 462-63.
117. 311 Md. at 672, 537 A.2d at 249.
118. Id.
119. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983).
120. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
121. Fourth Circuit cases applying Belton have allowed searches of similar bags contemporaneous with arrest particularly if certain exigencies were present. See, e.g., United
States v. Litman, 739 F.2d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (upholding search of arrestee's shoulder bag and shopping bag); United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 627 (4th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984) (upholding search of carry-on bag contemporaneous with arrest in police office located in airport).
122. 311 Md. at 672, 537 A.2d at 249.
123. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
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4. Voluntary Confessions.-The Court of Appeals held in Hoey v.
State1 24 that a confession will not be deemed involuntary, and thus
inadmissible, unless the confession was obtained by the police
through improper means1 25 or the defendant was so mentally impaired that he or she did not know or understand what he or she was
saying.' 2 6 The court also held that the insanity statute, which places
the burden on the defense to prove a lack of criminal responsibility,
is not unconstitutional as long as the prosecution is not relieved of
the burden of proving every element of the offense charged.12 7 Finally, the court concluded that the State was under no obligation to
disclose the name of its expert witness whose testimony was to be
used to demonstrate the defendant's criminal responsibility because
2
the testimony was not part of its case in chief.'1
On January 14, 1985, John Hoey threw a Molotov cocktail at a
building in Baltimore County.' 2 9 The next day, the police arrested
Hoey and charged him with attempted storehouse burning, possession of a Molotov cocktail, and wearing or carrying a concealed and
dangerous weapon.' 30 After a police officer read Hoey his rights,
guaranteed by virtue of Miranda v. Arizona,' he signed the waiver
form and orally confessed to the crimes.' 3 2 After the oral confession, the arresting officer asked Hoey to sign a written confession
because it would protect both parties from future disagreements as
to what Hoey had actually admitted.'" 3 The trial judge did not suppress the confession because he found that Hoey's statements had
34
been made freely, voluntarily, and capably.
124. 311 Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622 ()1988).

125. Id. at 483, 536 A.2d at 627.
126. Id. at 482, 536 A.2d at 626.
127. Id. at 491-92, 536 A.2d at 631. The statute provides: "The defendant has the
burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defense of not criminally
responsible." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(b) (Supp. 1988).
128. 311 Md. at 488-89, 536 A.2d at 629.
129. id. at 477, 536 A.2d at 624.
130. Id. at 477-78, 536 A.2d at 624. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 10, 139A, 36 (1987
& Supp. 1988).
131. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). The Supreme Court mandated that certain procedural safeguards must be employed to ensure the privilege against self-incrimination.
The safeguards together constitute the Miranda warning which must be given whenever
an individual is arrested. The content of the warning issued includes that (1) the person
has the right to remain silent, (2) the right to an attorney, and (3) if the person cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed by the court prior to any questioning. Id.
132. 311 Md. at 478, 536 A.2d at 624. As Detective Snyder read Hoey his rights, he
underlined each word so that Hoey could read along. Id.
133. Id. at 479, 536 A.2d at 624-25.
134. Id., 536 A.2d at 625.
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During the trial the State called Dr. David Helsel, Hoey's treat-

ing psychiatrist, to rebut Hoey's attempt to prove he was not criminally responsible.' 35 Defense counsel objected to the admission of
this testimony because the State had not disclosed upon request its
intention to call Dr. Helsel as a witness.' 3 6 The court allowed Dr.

Helsel to testify, but delayed it until the following morning in order
to give the defense time to prepare for cross-examination." 7
The judge instructed the jury that Hoey had the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacked criminal
responsibility.' 3 8 Hoey objected unsuccessfully to this instruction,
and the jury found him guilty and criminally responsible for each
charge. 139 Before the Court of Special Appeals could entertain
Hoey's appeal, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.' °
First, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court
properly admitted Hoey's confession by detailing a three-part standard which must be met before a confession will be admissible. The
confession must be "(1) voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 22
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda."41
For a confession to be voluntary under nonconstitutional law,
two requirements must be met. First, the defendant must be men-

135. Id. Dr. Helsel treated Hoey from January 15, 1985, until February 1985. Id.
Hoey's lack of criminal responsibility defense rested upon the testimony of Dr. Spodak,
an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry. Id. at 478-79, 536 A.2d at 624-25. Dr.
Spodak testified that Hoey suffered from schizophrenia. Id. at 478, 536 A.2d at 624.
136. Id. at 479, 536 A.2d at 625.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 479-80, 536 A.2d at 625.
139. Id. at 480, 536 A.2d at 625.
140. Id.
141. Id. (footnote omitted). The court stated that article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is deemed to be in part materina with the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution, and thus it would not discuss article 22 independently. Id. at 480
n.2, 536 A.2d at 625 n.2. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 247. 513 A.2d 299, 307
(1986) (declining to deviate on state level under article 22 from interpretation of fifth
amendment given on federal level); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 35, 375 A.2d 1105, 1108,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (imposing upon State the federal constitutional prohibition against compelled self-incrimination does not change voluntariness requirement
followed by Maryland). Article 22 is not mentioned again, but appears to be covered
implicitly in the court's discussion of the effect the Miranda voluntariness standard has
on fifth amendment guarantees. Therefore, provided the Airanda standard for voluntariness is met, then neither the fifth amendment nor article 22 is violated. 311 Md. at 48687, 536 A.2d at 628-29.

618

6MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:602

tally capable of making a confession. 42 A confession is involuntary
when the defendant is so mentally impaired that he or she does not
know or understand what he or she is saying. 4 ' A defendant's mere
mental deficiency is insufficient to automatically make the confession involuntary. 4 a Conflicting evidence was presented at trial re45
garding Hoey's mental capacity to understand his confession.'
The Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence, however, to support the trial judge's finding 1that
Hoey was mentally ca46
pable of making a voluntary confession.
The second requirement under nonconstitutional law is that the
confession not be induced by force, undue influence, improper
promises, or threats. 4 7 Hoey alleged that one of the detectives improperly promised "that the State would go easy on him" if he confessed."' Both detectives testified that no such promise was made
and the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not err when
he found that Hoey's confessions were made freely and voluntarily
without coercion from the police.' 4 9
In determining whether the due process clause had been violated, the Court of Appeals applied the Supreme Court's test for
142. 311 Md. at 481, 536 A.2d at 626.
143. Id. at 482, 536 A.2d at 626.
144. Id. The court based this conclusion upon McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 402,
89 A. 1100, 1103 (1914) ("(The question was whether he] was ...so far deprived of his
sense of reason as not to be responsible for what he may have done or said."), and upon
Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97, 102, 200 A.2d 683, 686, cerl. denied, 379 U.S. 861 (1964)
("The crucial question was . . .whether his disclosures to the police were freely and
voluntarily made at a time when he knew and understood what he was saying...
Id.
at 481-82, 536 A.2d at 626.
145. Dr. Spodak, an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry, presented evidence declaring that Hoey was too mentally disturbed to comprehend what he was doing. 311
Md. at 482, 536 A.2d at 626. Hoey's father testified that Hoey was incoherent and unstable on the day before he confessed. Id. Hoey's own testimony concerning his mental
condition at the time of confession was inconsistent. Id. at 482-83, 536 A.2d at 626.
The testimony of the arresting officers was to the effect that Hoey was fully able to comprehend what he was saying. Id. at 483, 536 A.2d at 626-27. Based upon this conflicting
testimony, the court concluded that the trial court could have found that there was sufficient testimony in this case to conclude that Hoe),was mentally capable of understanding what he was saying. Id., 536 A.2d at 627.
146. Id. at 483, 536 A.2d at 627.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 484, 536 A.2d at 627.
149. Id. The question of whether police conduct is improper is dependent upon the
totality of the circumstances. The factors which are to be considered are the defendant's
age and education, the defendant's physical condition and mental capacity, the length of
the interrogation, the manner of questioning, and whether there was any physical mistreatment of the defendant. Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254-55, 513 A.2d 299.311
(1986).
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voluntary confessions adopted in Colorado v. Connelly: 50 "Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no
basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law."'' Although the Court of Appeals
found that the detective's suggestion that Hoey make a written confession constituted a police overreaching issue, the court concluded
that the action was innocuous and not police coercion.15 2 The court
also ruled that the written confession did not violate the Miranda
rule because Hoey voluntarily waived this right. 5 '
The second general issue addressed by the court was the admissibility of Dr. Helsel's testimony. Hoey argued that this testimony
should have been excluded under rule 4-263(b). 54 Rule 4263(b)(4)' 5 5 requires disclosure of the names and findings of any
experts consulted by the State. Rule 4-263(b)(1)"' requires disclosure of the names of witnesses which the State plans to call to prove
its case in chief or to rebut alibi testimony. The court held that rule
4-263(b)(1) did not require the State to disclose the identity of
Hoey's treating psychiatrist' 57 because the State's case in chief was
proving the elements of Hoey's criminal offense, not rebutting his
defense of a lack of criminal responsibility.'
Moreover, the court
150. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). The focus of an inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession must be on "the crucial element of police overreaching." Id. at 163. In the absence
of police misconduct which causes the confession, there is no basis for concluding that a
state actor has deprived the defendant of due process of law, and thus no basis exists
under the federal due process clause to exclude the confession. Id. at 164.
151. Id. at 164.
152. 311 Md. at 486, 536 A.2d at 628. It is important to note that Maryland has both
the constitutional requirements and the nonconstitutional requirements of voluntariness. Therefore, while a confession given in a situation such as that by Connelly-an
insane individual-may be voluntary under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, that same confession may be considered involuntary under Maryland's
nonconstitutional standard of voluntariness, not because of coercion, but because of the
requisite standard of mental capacity. See supra text accompanying notes 142-144.
153. 311 Md. at 486-87, 536 A.2d at 628-29.
154. Id. at 487-88, 536 A.2d at 629.
155. "Upon request of the defendant, the State's Attorney shall ... [produce and
permit the defendant to inspect and copy all written reports or statements made in connection with the action by each expert consulted by the State ....
MD. R. 4-263(b)(4).
The tests conducted by Dr. Helsel were part of the protocol of a treating psychiatrist,
and as a result he was not "consulted" by the State. 311 Md. at 489. 536 A.2d at 629.
156. "Upon request of the defendant, the State's Attorney shall ... [d]isclose to the
defendant the name and address of each person then known whom the State intends to
call as a witness at the hearing or trial to prove its case in chief or to rebut alibi testimony." MD. R. 4-263(b)(1).
157. 311 Md. at 488-90, 536 A.2d at 629-30.
158. Id. at 490, 536 A.2d at 630. If the State had the burden of proving criminal
responsibility, then rule 4-263(b)(1) would have required disclosure of the psychiatrist's
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held that rule 4-263(b)(4) was inapplicable because Dr. Helsel was
not consulted by the State. The court noted that Dr. Helsel's evaluations of Hoey were not made at the request of the State; they were
made as a part of his duties as Hoey's psychiatrist. 5 9
The question of which party bears the burden of proving the
defendant's criminal responsibility was the final issue addressed by
the court. The court held that a state may place the burden of proof
on the defendant to establish lack of criminal responsibility so long
as the prosecution is not thereby relieved of proving every element
of the offense charged. 6 ' Therefore, if the mens rea elements of the
crime are the same as the requirements proving lack of criminal responsibility, then the shifting of this burden onto the defendant
would be unconstitutional.' 6 ' The Court of Appeals noted that the
Supreme Court has held that as long as the mens rea requirements
are distinct from the requirements necessary to show a lack of criminal responsibility, the burden of proof may constitutionally be
shifted to the defendant to show that he or she was not criminally
responsible. 6 ' The Hoey court ruled that none of the offenses
charged required the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct as a mens rea requirement, and as a result the shifting of the
63
burden onto the defendant was not unconstitutional.
name. Maryland's statute, however, constitutionally places the burden of proving crimi-

nal responsibility upon the defense. For the text of the statute, see supra note 127.
159. 311 Md. at 489, 536 A.2d at 629. The court noted that the State cannot determine what evidence will need to be rebutted until the defense completes its case in chief,
and therefore cannot disclose all rebuttal witnesses in advance. Id., 536 A.2d at 630.
Defense counsel also is capable of identifying treating physicians without the assistance
of the state's attorney and, therefore, disclosure of these names by the state's attorney is
unnecessary to prevent surprise. Id. at 489-90, 536 A.2d at 630.
160. Id. at 491-92, 536 A.2d at 631.
161. Id. at 492, 536 A.2d at 631.
162. Id. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977) ("[Insanity] constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion"); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794 (1952) ("Although a plea of insanity was
made, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element
of the crime charged").
163. 311 Md. at 492-93, 536 A.2d at 631-32. For example, the ineis rea requirement
for attempted storehouse burning is that the person must "willfully and maliciously"
attempt to set fire to a building. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10 (1987). As interpreted in
Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979), "willfully" means "intentionally,"
and "maliciously" means "intendling) to bring harm to another person." Id. at 474-75,
403 A.2d at 791-92. To show that a defendant is not criminally responsible, it must be
shown that the defendant "lacks substantial capacity: (1) To appreciate the criminality
of that conduct; or (2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of law." MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108(a) (Supp. 1988).

Proof of intent to burn a structure can be displayed without proof that the defendant was criminally responsible as that term is defined in the statute. Thus, because the
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In Pouncey v. State' 64 the Court of Appeals recognized that a defendant could have the requisite mens rea to commit a crime but still
not be criminally responsible. The Pouncey court acknowledged that
a jury could return both a verdict of guilty and a special verdict of
insane. Therefore, a finding of insanity was not equivalent to an
absence of mens rea, or inconsistent with a general intent to commit a
crime.' 6 5 Confusion arose, however, in Johnson v. State' 66 when the
Court of Appeals declared that "all legally sane individuals are
equally capable of forming and possessing the same types and degrees of intent."' 6 7 This statement implied that insanity is required
to rebut a mental element of a crime. Hence, together, Pouncey and
Johnson placed the burden of proving insanity on the defendant and
appears unconstitutionally to relieve the State of proving the mens
rea elements of the crimes.' 68 The Hoey court, however, made it absolutely clear that evidence offered to show the nonexistence of a
mental element of a crime is admissible, even if it does not rise to
the level of proof necessary to establish that the defendant is insane.' 6 9 The burdens of proof, however, remain unchanged. That
is, the State must prove the existence of each element of a crime

requirements necessary to show the mens rea of attempted storehouse burning are distinct from the requirements necessary to show a lack of criminal responsibility, placing
the burden of proof on the defendant to prove a lack of criminal responsibility does not
relieve the State of its burden of proof. 311 Md. at 492-93, 536 A.2d at 631.
Similarly, the crimes of (1)carrying or wearing a concealed weapon and (2) possession of a Molotov cocktail are based upon possession of these objects and do not require
a showing of criminal responsibility. Consequently, placing the burden on Hoey to
prove a lack of criminal responsibility with respect to these crimes also is constitutional.
Id. at 493. 536 A.2d at 632.
164. 297 Md. 264, 465 A.2d 475 (1983).
165. Id. at 269, 465 A.2d at 478.
166. 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
167. Id. at 420, 439 A.2d at 551.
168. 311 Md. at 494-95, 536 A.2d at 632,
169. Id. at 495, 536 A.2d at 633. In removing the confusion, the court disapproved
the portion of Johnson which indicated that a defendant could not present evidence of
impaired mental condition for the limited purpose of showing the absence of mens rea.
Id. at 495 & n.5, 536 A.2d at 632 & n.5. The Court of Appeals had the opportunity to
clarify the law in Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988). In Simmons the
court reversed the intermediate appellate court's determination that psychiatric testimony offered by Simmons in support of his claim of imperfect self-defense was not admissible under Johnson. Id. at 39, 542 A.2d at 1260-61. Applying the proposition
espoused in Hoev, which permits "a criminal defendant to present evidence of his impaired mental condition for the limited purpose of showing the absence ofmens tea ..."
the court stated that Simmons should be "permitted to present evidence of his mental
state in support of his defense of imperfect self-defense." Id. at 39 n.3, 542 A.2d at 1261
n.3.
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while the defendantmust prove lack of criminal responsibility.?70
Hoey reaffirmed existing legal standards regarding admissibility
of confessions under Maryland nonconstitutional law. 17 ' In so doing, the court recognized the stronger safeguard under Maryland
nonconstitutional law than under federal law.' 72 Maryland requires
a defendant to be mentally capable of comprehending the content
73
of a confession in order to be deemed voluntary and admissible.1
The Maryland courts have chosen to include within their definition
of "involuntary" not only confessions resulting from duress or-police coercion, but also confessions from individuals who were not
able to judge properly for themselves whether or not to speak. This
expanded definition affords protection to individuals whose mental
deficiency impairs proper judgment.
Hoey's second major import concerns the constitutional validity
of Health-General Article, section 12-109(b). 174 More specifically,
courts must analyze the mens rea of a defendant's alleged offense in
order to ascertain if it is distinct and separate from the requirements
of proving the insanity defense. If it is, a defendant raising an insanity defense will not be relieved of the requisite burden of proof, a
theory consistent with the language of section 12-109(b).
5. Double Jeopardy.-In State v. Holmes 171 the Court of Appeals
held that the offenses of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder in the first degree are not the same offense for the
purposes of doublejeopardy. 1 7 6 In so holding, the court upheld the
trial court decision.to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment
with all but thirty-five years suspended for his conviction of at77
tempted murder in the first degree.'
170. 311 Md. at 495, 536 A.2d at 633.
171. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254, 513 A.2d 299, 310 (1986) (confession is
admissible only if, "under the totality of all the attendant circumstances, the statement
was given freely and voluntarily"); Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97, 102, 200 A.2d 683,
687, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 861 (1964) (holding confession admissible if made freely and
voluntarily at a time when defendant knew and understood what he was saying).
172. The constitutional requirements pronounced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 478-79 (1966), do not encompass the protections provided by Maryland nonconstitutional law. See cases cited supra note 171.
173. 311 Md. at 483, 536 A.2d at 627.
174. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(b) (Supp. 1988). For the text of the statute, see supra note 127.
175. 310 Md. 260, 528 A.2d 1279 (1987), revg 65 Md. App. 428, 501 A.2d 76 (1985).
176. Id. at 262, 528 A.2d at 1280. Maryland common-law double jeopardy principles
preclude double punishment for the "same" offense. Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260,
265, 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977).
177. 310 Md. at 262, 528 A.2d at 1279-80.
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Holmes was charged in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County with, inter alia, assault with intent to murder and attempted
murder.'7 8 After the close of the evidence at the trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of assault with intent to murder.' 7 9 The judge instructed the jury on the remaining charges, and
the jury found Holmes guilty of attempted murder in the first
degree.' 8 0
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial
court erred in sentencing Holmes to life imprisonment for his attempted murder conviction.' 8 ' The court reasoned that attempted
murder is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to murder.' 8 2 The court applied the rule in Simms v. State' 8 3 and found the
maximum penalty Holmes could receive for his attempted murder
conviction was thirty years, the maximum penalty for assault with
intent to murder.' 84 Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals va1 85
cated his life sentence.
The principal question for the Court of Appeals in Holmes was
whether the Simms rule was applicable. In Simms the Court of Appeals held:
178. Id., 528 A.2d at 1280.
179. Id.

180. Id.
181. 65 Md. App. at 442, 501 A.2d at 83.
182. id. at 441, 501 A.2d at 82. The Court of Special Appeals relied on the reasoning
in Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 482 A.2d 474 (1984). The court in Hardy considered
whether attempted murder and assault with intent to murder were the same for the
purposes of adult jurisdiction over a juvenile. Id. at 127, 482 A.2d at 476. Hardy acknowledged that "assault with intent to commit a particular crime is, in general, the
same as an attempt to commit that crime except for two additional requirements-(I) a
greater degree of proximity, and (2) actual present ability to commit a battery ...." Id.
at 130, 482 A.2d at 478; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 578 (2d ed. 1969). Accordingly, the
Court of Special Appeals in Holmes concluded that attempted murder is a lesser included
offense of assault with intent to murder. 65 Md. App. at 441, 501 A.2d at 82.
183. 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980). For a discussion of Simms, see infra note 186
and accompanying text.
184. 65 Md. App. at 440-41, 501 A.2d at 82. The maximum sentence for attempted
murder in the first degree is death or life imprisonment. "The sentence of a person who
is convicted of an attempt to commit a crime may not exceed the maximum sentence for
the crime attempted." MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 644A (1987). Murder in the first degree carries a maximum sentence of death or life imprisonment. Id. § 412(b). The maximum sentence for assault with intent to murder is 30 years' imprisonment. MD. CODE
ANN. art. 27, § 12 (1987) ("Every person convicted of the crime of an assault with intent
to murder is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than
two years nor more than 30 years.").
185. 65 Md. App. at 443, 501 A.2d at 83. Holmes's conviction for attempted first
degree murder was upheld by the Court of Appeals. 310 Md. at 272-73, 528 A.2d at
1285.
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[W]hen a defendant is charged with a greater offense and a
lesser included offense based on the same conduct, with
jeopardy attaching to both charges at trial, and when the
defendant is convicted only of the lesser included charge,
he may not receive a sentence for that conviction which eximceeds the maximum sentence which could have been
8 6
posed had he been convicted of the greater charge.'
The aim of the Simms court was to prevent the anomaly of permitting a defendant to receive a more severe punishment as a result
of acquittal on a greater offense than he or she would receive had he
or she been convicted.' 8 7 If attempted murder is a lesser included
offense of assault with intent to murder, then Holmes's sentence,
according to the Simms rule, should be limitedto the maximum sentence of the greater offense, or thirty years. The State argued that
the Simms rule was inapplicable because attempted murder in the
first degree is not a lesser included offense of assault with intent to
murder.'8 8
The Court of Appeals noted that it is well established in Maryland that the only feasible test for determining whether one offense
is the "lesser included offense" and the other the "greater offense"
186. Simns, 288 Md. at 724, 421 A.2d at 964. The Simms court emphasized that a
lesser included offense was not necessarily a less severe crime than the greater offense.
The court stated:
In some situations when the Legislature creates a greater offense by adding an
element to a basic crime such as larceny or false pretenses, the additional element may have been viewed as a mitigating rather than an aggravating factor,
and for this reason, a lesser maximum penalty is provided for the particular
greater offense.
Id. at 726, 421 A.2d at 965.
187. Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 715, 421 A.2d 957, 959 (1980). In Simms the defendant was acquitted of a charge of assault with intent to rob but was convicted of
simple assault. The maximum penalty for assault with intent to rob is 10 years. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1987). Because assault is a common-law crime in Maryland,
there is no limit on the maximum penalty of simple assault other than the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTS. arts. 16, 25. The result of Simms's acquittal on the assault with
intent to rob charges was that he was exposed to a heavier sentence than if he had been
convicted. In Gerald v. State, 299 Md. 138, 472 A.2d 977 (1984), the Court of Appeals
applied the Simms rule to a case where the defendant was charged with armed robbery,
robbery, and assault. The defendant was convicted for assault. Id. at 139, 472 A.2d at
978. The court concluded that the "next greater offense" of robbery limited the sentence Gerald could receive for the "least included" offense of assault. Id. at 145, 472
A.2d at 981.
188. 310 Md. at 263, 528 A.2d at 1280. The State also made a second argument that
"where, as here, a nolle prosequi is entered notwithstanding the existence of sufficient
evidence to support the charge, the nolleprosequi should not be treated as an acquittal for
purposes of applying the Simms rule." Id. at 263-64, 528 A.2d at 1280 (footnote
omitted).
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for double jeopardy purposes, is the required evidence test'8 9 of
Blockberger v. United States.' 90 The court summarized the application
of the required evidence test in Thomas v. State:' 9 '
The required evidence test is that which is minimally necessary to secure a conviction for each . . . offense. If each
offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, or
in other words, if each offense contains an element which
the other does not, the offenses are not the same for
double jeopardy purposes, even though arising from the
same conduct or episode. But, where only one offense requires proof of an additional fact, so that all the elements
of one offense are present in the other, the offenses are
92
deemed to be the same for double jeopardy purposes.1
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the first step in applying
the required evidence test is to determine the offenses to which the
test is to be applied.' 9 3 The court concluded that "when an individual is convicted of a particular degree of attempted murder, it is to
the elements required to sustain that degree that the court must
look in applying the required evidence test for purposes of the
Simms rule.""' Hence, the offenses to which the required evidence
test applied were attempted murder in the first degree and assault
with intent to murder.
The Court of Appeals then applied the required evidence rule.
189. Id. at 267, 528 A.2d at 1282. The court noted that it repeatedly has applied the
required evidence test, most recently in Dillsworth v. State, 308 Md. 354, 356, 519 A.2d
1269, 1270 (1987) (holding the required evidence test did not require merger of the two
offenses where each offense required elements which the other did not).
190. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Court in Blockberger set forth the rule as follows: "The
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not." Id. at 304.
191. 277 Md. 257. 353 A.2d 240 (1976).
192. Id. at 267, 353 A.2d at 246-47.
193. 310 Md. at 268, 528 A.2d at 1282.
194. Id., 528 A.2d at 1283. This view was contrary to that of the intermediate appellate court which "[did] not find significant the fact that appellant in this case was charged
with attempted murder in the first degree, rather than attempted murder generally." 65
Md. App. at 442, 501 A.2d at 83.
Nevertheless, in Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 192, 452 A.2d 1234, 1245
(1982), in which the facts paralleled those of Holmes, the Court of Special Appeals followed the Court of Appeals interpretation of the required evidence test in Newton v.
State, 280 Md. 260, 266-68, 373 A.2d 262, 265-66 (1977). The Walker court concluded
that "the elements of proof needed to raise a crime from one punishment level or degree to another are 'required elements' within the contemplation of double jeopardy
and merger law." Walker, 53 Md. App. at 192, 452 A.2d at 1245.
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The court ruled that in order to prove attempted murder in the first
degree the State must prove that Holmes had the wilful, deliberate,
and premeditated intent to kill and that he committed some overt
act towards that end.' 95 Assault with intent to murder does not require a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent but only requires
a specific intent to kill.' 9 6 Because each of the offenses with which
Holmes was charged required an element that the other does not,
the court concluded that these crimes do not merge under the required evidence.test as set forth in Thomas v. State.' 9 7 In sum, the
Simms rule was inapplicable.'
The holding of the Court of Appeals in Holmes is a narrow one.
It determines the applicability of the Simms rule in a case where both
attempted murder in the first degree and assault with intent to murder have been charged.19 If the reasoning of Holmes is extended, it
is possible that the protection of the Simms rule will be unavailable
to future defendants charged with inchoate crimes. This does not
seem an unfair result, however, if we accept the Hardy view, which
was adopted by Holmes: that attempted murder is simply a different
offense than assault with intent to murder. As the court in Hardy
pointed out, there is a wide range of acts which would constitute
attempted murder but would not be assaultive. 20 0 Furthermore, it is
not difficult to imagine a case in which a victim could be assaulted
and injured almost to the point of death, without any premeditation
on the part of the attacker. This reasoning applies to all inchoate
crimes.
If a defendant is charged with two separate and distinct crimes,
195. 310 Md. at 272, 528 A.2d at 1285. Fora comparison of the crimes of attempted
murder and assault with intent to murder, see Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131-32, 482
A.2d 474, 478-79 (1984). According to the Hardy court, "(b]ecause the overt act necessary for an attempt is frequently an assault, the two crimes have a significant overlap.
But the overlap is not complete, because an overt act can qualify as an attempt and yet
not rise to the level of an assault." Id. at 129, 482 A.2d at 477.
196. 310 Md. at 272, 528 A.2d at 1285.
197. 277 Md. 257, 267, 353 A.2d 240, 246-47 (1976).
198. 310 Md. at 272, 528 A.2d at 1285.
199. The Court of Special Appeals in Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 452 A.2d
1234 (1982), considered attempted rape in the first degree and assault with intent to
rape and concluded that they were not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes;

therefore, the assault with intent to rape count has no limiting effect on the sentence for
attempted first degree rape. Id. at 192, 452 A.2d at 1245.
200. Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 130-31, 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984). Some of the
examples mentioned in Hardy of acts which would qualify as "substantial steps" toward
murder but do not involve assault are: "lying in wait, enticing the victim to go to the
planned site of the crime, reconnoitering, unlawful entry, possession of materials, and
soliciting an agent." Id. at 130, 482 A.2d at 478.
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acquittal on one should have no bearing on the penalty received for
conviction of the other. Hence, the anomaly sought to be avoided
by the Simms court would not be reached by a conviction for an attempt crime and an acquittal for an associated assault with intent
offense, even if the penalty for attempt exceeded the limit set in the
statute governing the assault offense.
6. Jury Unanimity.-InRice v. State2 ° ' the Court of Appeals held
that a conviction under the consolidated theft statute 20 2 does not
require jury unanimity as to which particular subsection of the statute had been violated. 20 3 Therefore, a jury need only agree that a
theft had occurred, not whether a certain type of theft had been
committed, for a defendant to be found guilty of theft under the
consolidated theft statute.2 °4
On the night of January 17, 1984, the Montgomery County police conducted a surveillance in a residential neighborhood because
of the recent increased incidence of armed robberies in the area. 0 5
Harold and Cynthia Resnick, a couple residing in the neighborhood,
reported to the police that they had been the victims of an armed
robbery.20 6 Shortly before the robbery was reported, the police observed a white Cadillac parked near the Resnick house with two men
inside. 0 7 The police located the car the next day outside a pool
hall,20 8 where shortly thereafter the police arrested Anthony Rice,
the defendant. 0 9 The police discovered many items from the Resnick home in the car but neither of the Resnicks were able to identify Rice as one of the robbers. 2t0
The jury convicted Rice of burglary, two counts of robbery with
a deadly and dangerous weapon, two counts of use of a handgun in
a crime of violence, and theft of property having a value of more
201. 311 Md. 116, 532 A.2d 1357 (1987).
202. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1987).
203. 311 Md. at 125-26, 532 A.2d at 1361.
204. Id. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were not erroneous.
The instructions allowed thejury to find the defendant guilty of theft provided that each
juror agreed that the defendant had committed larceny under § 342(a), was in possession of stolen property under § 342(c), or both. Id. at 121-22, 532 A.2d at 1359-60.
205. Id. at 120, 532 A.2d at 1359.
206. Id. at 120-21, 532 A.2d at 1359.
207. Id. at 120, 532 A.2d at 1359. After learning of the robbery, the police identified
the owner of the vehicle as Annabelle Postell, known to be an associate of the defendant
Rice and his twin brother. Id. at 121, 532 A.2d at 1359.
208. Id. at 121, 532 A.2d at 1359.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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than $300.21" With respect to the theft count, the trial judge instructed the jury that in order to declare the defendant guilty, they
must find that the defendant violated subsection (a) or subsection
(c) of the consolidated theft statute, or both. 1 2 The judge also instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous.2 1 3 Rice appealed his conviction, asserting that these instructions failed to
require jury unanimity.21 " The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the decision in an unreported opinion. 1 5
The Court of Appeals found that the legislature did not intend
to require jury unanimity as to which particular subsection of the
theft statute had been violated.2 6 The court noted that the legislature had recognized two inferences which could arise when a party is
found in possession of stolen goods: the possessor was either the
taker or the receiver of the stolen goods. 21 7 The legislature eliminated the need for the jury to choose between conflicting inferences
211. Id. at 120, 532 A.2d at 1359.
212. Id. The consolidated theft statute provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control.-A person commits the offense
of theft when he willfully or knowingly obtains control which is unauthorized or
exerts control which is unauthorized over property of the owner, and:
(1) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(2) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in
such manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(3) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.
(c) Possession of stolen property.-(!) A person commits the offense of theft if
he possesses stolen personal property knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, and:
(i) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(ii) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in
such manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(iii) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(a), (c) (1987).
213. 311 Md. at 122, 532 A.2d at 1359-60. Although the jury had to be unanimous in
finding the defendant guilty, the instructions given to the jury did not require jury unanimity as to which subsection of the consolidated theft statute was violated. Therefore,
the possibility existed that six jurors could find that Rice violated subsection (a) but not
(c), and six could find that Rice violated subsection (c) but not (a), and he would still be
guilty. Id., 532 A.2d at 1360.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 124-26, 532 A.2d at 1360-62.
217. The court cited an October 1978 report of the Maryland General Assembly's
Joint Subcommittee on Theft Related Offenses which evidenced the subcommittee's intent that both stealing and receiving stolen property be aspects of the same offensetheft. ld. at 124-25. 532 A.2d at 1361".
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through the enactment of the consolidated theft statute. 2 t 8 By declaring that the acts represent a single offense,, either inference
drawn would lead to the conclusion that a particular defendant was
guilty of theft. 2 ' 9 Requiring jury unanimity as to the particular section violated would place obstacles in the "straight and clear path"
from proof of unlawful appropriation to conviction.2 20
The Court of Appeals also held that the absence of jury unanimity as to which particular subsection had been violated did not
violate article 21 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights.2 2 1 In so holding, the Court of Appeals found support for this interpretation in
the leading case of People v. Sullivan.2 2 2 In Sullivan the court held
that if the jury's conclusion can be based upon two interpretations
of the facts, "the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that a
part of the jury
proceeded upon one interpretation and part upon
3
the other.

22

The Court of Special Appeals applied the Sullivan rationale in
Craddock v. State 2 4 when it declared that "[a]s long as jurors unanimously agree that theft in some form was committed, nothing more
is required. 212 5 The Court of Appeals in Rice, however, was dissatisfied with the lack of depth in the Sullivan analysis. The court said
218. Id. at 125, 532 A.2d at 1361.
219. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 341 (1987).
220. 311 Md. at 125, 532 A.2d at 1361. The court stated that it had reached a similar
conclusion in Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 493 A.2d 1062 (1985). In Jones the court
stated that the purpose of the theft statute is "to create a single statutory crime encompassing various common law theft-type offenses in order to eliminate the confusing and
fine-line common law distinctions between particular forms of larceny." Id. at 333, 493
A.2d at 1067. In coming to this conclusion, the court emphasized that even in Rice's
hypothetical that all 12jurors did not agree as to which section had been violated, all 12
jurors did agree that the defendant had "unlawfully appropriate[d] the personal property of another to his own use." 311 Md. at 125, 532 A.2d at 1361. See aLso Farlow v.
State, 9 Md. App. 515, 516, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (1970).
221. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21. The relevant part of article 21 states "[tihat in
all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial by an impartial
jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty." Id.
222. 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989 (1903). In Sullivan the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder for shooting and killing a police officer while the defendant was
traveling to commit a post office burglary. Id. at 132, 65 N.E. at 991. Thejury convicted
the defendant without concurring on whether the defendant was guilty of felony murder
or premeditated murder. id. at 133, 65 N.E. at 992.
The court cited a number of Maryland cases but admitted that they are, in large
measure, inapposite to the issue at hand. 311 Md. at 131, 532 A.2d at 1364.
223. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. at 127, 65 N.E. at 989; see also Murray v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 96 N.Y. 613, 622 (1884).
224. 64 Md. App. 269, 494 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 304 Md. 297, 498 A.2d 1184 (1985).
225. Id. at 278, 494 A.2d at 975. This was the basis of the unreported opinion of the
Court of Special Appeals. 311 Md. at 122, 532 A.2d at 1360.
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that the rule places virtually no restraints upon the legislature's capability to define- divergent criminal conduct as one single crime.22 6
The*Court of Appeals agreed that under article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which requires jury unanimity, the distinction must be made between a single crime committed in
alternative ways and multiple autonomous crimes. 22 7 The leading
case offering guidance to distinguish between these two types of
criminal statutes is United States v. Gipson.2 2 8 Although not explicitly
enumerated as such in the Gipson opinion, the Rice court found two
criteria upon which the Gipson court made this distinction. Both of
of the crime, and
these criteria address solely the actus reus elements2 29
the Rice court found this focus to be too narrow.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals ruled that all the elements of a
criminal act must be considered. In addition to the defendant's
criminal conduct, the defendant's mental state, the attendant circumstances, and the result of the conduct are all factors which must
be considered. 2 0 The court said that "[i]f after comparing the statutory alternatives with respect to these basic elements the differences that emerge are substantial, the alternatives may have to be
regarded as separate crimes for jury unanimity purposes. "231
In applying these principles, the court recognized that it was a
legal impossibility for Rice to have both stolen the Resnick property
and possessed it as stolen property. This fact was accorded significant weight in the court's decision whether to classify this as a single
226. 311 Md. at 131, 532 A.2d at 1364. For example, the court demonstrated the
problems arising from a hypothetical crime named "misconduct" which could consist of
hitting one's spouse or driving an unsafe vehicle. No matter how strong the statutory
language, it is untenable to argue that "misconduct" is one single crime. Id. at 132, 532
A.2d at 1365.
227. Id. at 132, 532 A.2d at 1365.
228. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). The defendant in Gipson was charged with "transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce" and "selling or receiving a stolen vehicle moving through interstate commerce." Id. at 455. At trial: thejury was instructed to
return a guilty verdict if it found Gipson unanimously guilty of either one of the charges
or any combination thereof. The defense objected to this instruction and appealed to
the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 456. In reversing the district court's ruling on the objection, the
Fifth Circuit held that the instruction was improper and it was necessary to have the jury
unanimously agree to one of the two offenses for which the defendant was charged. Id.
at 459.
229. 311 Md. at 133-35, 532 A.2d at 1365-66. The criteria derived from Gipson were:
(i) "whether a single act may simultaneously constitute two or more types of prohibited
conduct," and (2) "whether distinguishing among the prohibited acts would present jurors with characterization problems." Id. at 133, 532 A.2d at 1365.
230. Id. at 135, 532 A.2d at 1366.
231. Id.
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crime or multiple crimes. 3 Because the evidence of possession
supports either of these inconsistent inferences regarding the defendant's actus reus, the court reasoned that the two subsections are
logically related. 2 " Thus, the criminal conduct factor indicates that
these subsections define a single crime.
The fact that "the basic mental state-the intent to deprive the
owner of the property-is identical in both subsections" supports
23 4
the conclusion that these subsections constitute a single crime.
Moreover, the court stated that another element, the attendant circumstances, long recognized as a key element of the classification of
crimes, also indicates that these subsections should be considered a
single crime. 21 5 Despite the fact that subsection (c) requires proof
that the property was stolen, the fact that both subsections require
that the property was wrongfully taken from the owner illustrates
23 6
the similarity in attendant circumstances.
Finally, the court placed the most emphasis upon the final result of each subsection's violation. Violations of both subsections
involve nonconsensual possession of another's property.23 7 Recognizing that this factor gives these actions their wrongful character,
the court relied heavily upon this final result and concluded that
subsections (a) and (c) are not multiple, autonomous crimes but
rather constitute one crime defined in two different ways. 3 8
Although the court upheld the constitutionality of the jury instructions in this case, the Court of Appeals implicitly stated that
more of an inquiry is necessary than simply determining if the legislature declared the conduct to be a single crime. A full-scale determination must be made based upon the elements of a crime, not just
the actus reus. Only if this full-scale determination reveals that the
disparate acts amount to a single crime, then the jury may be allowed to be unanimous as to the result without the requirement of
unanimity as to the particular subsection violated.
At the same time, however, Rice eliminates many of the serious
problems associated with obtaining a unanimous jury verdict with
232. Id.
233. Id. The court recognized that these subsections are unique in their ability to
support these inconsistent inferences. Presumably, the court was implying that in the
absence of this unique situation, the fact that the oatus reiwere so disparate would require jury unanimity as to the particular subsection violated. Id.
234. Id. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note 212.
235. 311 Md. at 136, 532 A.2d at 1367.
236. Id.
237. id.
238. Id.
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all the various types of common-law theft. As a result, the number
of theft convictions can only increase since the generic crime of theft
properly encompasses the various subcrimes. No longer will an individual be found not guilty of one form of theft because of a subtle
common-law distinction. And foremost, the legislature's intent to
enumerate several methods of theft when defining consolidated
theft is properly effectuated.
Extending the application of the Rice decision, the Court of
Special Appeals in Cardin v. State 9 ' held that not only for the purposes ofjury unanimity, but also for sufficiency of evidence, the consolidated theft statute 2 40 constitutes a single crime and that the
subsections of article 27, section 342, merely specify different acts
or transactions through which theft can be proved. 241' The court
also held that the consolidated theft statute does not require detrimental reliance as an element of the crime of theft.2 4 2 In so holding, the court gave force to the intent of the legislature "to give the
statute the flexibility necessary to tackle sophisticated white collar
prosecutions."243

The intermediate appellate court upheld the trial court's rulings regarding jury instructions, 2 11 Voir dire,24 ' and the allowable
239. 73 Md. App. 200, 533 A.2d 928 (1987).
240. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 340-344 (1987).
241. 73 Md. App. at 210-12, 533 A.2d at 933-34 (jury unanimity); id. at 220-22, 533
A.2d at 938-39 (sufficiency of evidence). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1987).
242. 73 Md. App. at 222, 533 A.2d at 939.
243. Letter from Deborah E. Jennings (Nails), Chief Counsel for Investigations of the
Maryland Attorney General's Office, to Joseph E. Owens, Chairman of the HouseJudiciary Committee (Feb. 15, 1979) [hereinafter Jennings Letter] (available in Maryland
Court of Appeals Library, Annapolis, Md.).
244. Discussion of the court's holding with respect to jury instructions is beyond the
scope of this note. Briefly summarized they are: (1)that conduct by the defendant related to his receipt and handling of money which was likely to mislead or conceal was
relevant to the question of intent, 73 Md. App. at 213-14, 533 A.2d at 934-35; (2) that
the jury could consider evidence of possible violations of the Code of Professional Ethics
to determine criminal intent, id.
at 2 14-17, 533 A.2d at 935-36; (3) that under Maryland
law, profits from savings and loan associations should be allocated at least annually, at
the times provided by the by-laws, id. at 217-18, 533 A.2d at 936-37; (4) that the instructions given by the judge regarding evidence of Cardin's good character fairly covered
those requested by Cardin, id. at 218-19, 533 A.2d at 937; and (5) that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion by refusing. to define Cardin's statutory defenses of "good faith
claim of right"'when instead he instructed the jury by reading verbatim the language of
article 27, § 343(c), because the statutory language was straightforward and lucid, id. at
219, 533 A.2d at 937-38.
245. 73 Md. App. at 224-25, 533 A.2d at 940-41. Cardin claimed "that the trial judge
unduly restricted the scope of voir dire." Id. at 224, 533 A.2d at 940. The court stated a
trial judge has discretion in determining the specific questions to be asked during voir
dire. In this instance, the questions which the trial judge refused to pose to the jury were
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scope of the prosecutor's closing argument.2 46 Following a summary of the relevant facts of this celebrated Baltimore case, this note
will discuss the Court of Appeals holdings with respect to the consolidated theft statute.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Jerome Cardin,
an attorney in Baltimore and former co-owner of the now-defunct
Old Court Savings and Loan Association (Old Court), of five counts
of theft for illegally receiving funds totaling $385,000.247 The court
sentenced Cardin to five concurrent fifteen-year terms of imprisonment. 4 8
Cardin formed Old Court in 1959.249 In 1979 Old Court began
to fail financially due to rapidly rising interest rates.2 50 The Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation advised Cardin to sell
Old Court or merge with another financial institution. 25 ' He eventually sold his controlling interests to Jeffrey Levitt and Allan Pearlstein, retaining only an eighteen percent ownership interest in Old
Court. 512 Cardin negotiated an agreement of sale which included a
provision to retain "his law firm, Cardin and Cardin, P.A., as counsel to Old Court at an annual retainer of $40,000 plus hours
designed to help Cardin's attorney make peremptory challenges and not to discover
bias; therefore, the trial judge was not in error. Id. at 225, 533 A.2d at 940-41.
246. Id. at 226-28, 533 A.2d at 941-42. "Cardin claim[ed] that the State's closing
argument was inflammatory and improper," id. at 226, 533 A.2d at 941, but the court
held that it "was well within the permissible bounds of advocacy." Id. at 228, 533 A.2d
at 942. An example of a statement claimed to be prejudicial by Cardin was: "We all
know it isn't the inner city kids with sweat shirts that steal but from time to time, people
in white collars, fancy clothes do so because greed knows no class." Id. at 226-27, 533
A.2d at 941 (emphasis omitted).
247. Id. at 207, 533 A.2d at 931-32. Cardin was charged with the following crimes:
Count I: Cardin was charged with stealing $1,000,000 from a real estate developer's escrow account which had been deposited at Old Court Savings and Loan Association (Old Court). Id., 533 A.2d at 932. Cardin obtained the money by submitting an
invoice on the real estate developer's letterhead, falsely claiming to have rendered services. Id. at 208, 533 A.2d at 932.
Counts II and III: Cardin was charged with stealing $150,000 from two other Old
Court accounts. Again, this money was received by falsely claiming to have rendered
ser-vices. Id.
Count IV: Cardin was charged with stealing $50,000 by submitting two invoices to
another real estate developer's account. This amount was received by falsely claiming to
have rendered consultation services. Id. at 208-09, 533 A.2d at 932.
Count V: Cardin was charged with stealing $85,000 from another company's Old
Court account by drawing a check on that account for legal consultation services which
he had not performed. Id. at 209-10, 535 A.2d at 932-33.
248. Id. at 204, 533 A.2d at 930.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 204-05, 533 A.2d at 930.
251. Id. at 205, 533 A.2d at 930.
252. Id.
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billed. '2 - 3 In addition, Cardin and Cardin, P.A. would "receive fifty
percent of all closing fees charged by attorneys handling Old
Court's loan settlements. ' 25 4 Even after the law firm ceased to perform legal services, Cardin continued to receive fifty percent of the
closing fees. 25 5 Aware that the fee-splitting agreement might violate
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,2 56 Levitt and Cardin entered into two other agreements for legal services. 25 7 Under this
agreement "Cardin & Cardin, P.A., received $1.3 million over a
three year period for 'legal services' rendered to Old Court over and
above the $1,040,000 he already received pursuant to the fee splitting agreement. '2 5 8 Levitt and Cardin also joined in a number of
questionable business and real estate ventures financed through Old
Court.

59

As previously stated, the consolidated theft statute enumerates
five different subsections describing methods or forms of theft. 60
Proof of all of the elements of at least one subsection constitutes the
crime of theft.2 6 ' Cardin claimed that the trial judge's instruction
that the jury is only required to agree "that all elements of one or
more forms of theft have been proven" was erroneous. 2 62 Cardin
argued that the jury must unanimously agree
upon which form of
2 63
theft was committed in order to convict.
The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument, ruling
that jury unanimity is only required on the fact that a theft was com253. Id.
254. Id.

255. Id., 533 A.2d at 931.
256. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-107(A) provided:
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not
a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless: (1) The client
consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made. (2) The division is made in proportion to the services
performed and responsibility assumed by each. (3) The total fee of the lawyers
does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal services the)' rendered the client.
MD. R. app. DR 2-107(A) (1986) (codified as amended at MD. R. app. 1.5 (1988)).
257. 73 Md. App. at 206, 533 A.2d at 931.
258. Id. at 207, 533 A.2d at 93 1.
259. Id. at 207-09, 533 A.2d at 932-33. See supra note 247.
260. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1987). For the pertinent text of § 342, see supra
note 212.
261. State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 182, 345 A.2d 436, 438 (1975) (holding that Maryland law and the federal constitution both require the State to prove all elements of a
crime).
262. 73 Md. App. a( 210-11, 533 A.2d at 933.
263. Id. at 211, 533 A.2d at 933.
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mitted, not on the method used to commit the theft. 2 4 In so holding, the court followed the reasoning in Craddock v. State26 5 and Rice
v. State.2 6 6 The court noted that Craddock construed the consolidated theft statute as the legislature's attempt to merge the offenses
of larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, and receiving stolen
property into one theft statute to "avoid the subtle distinctions that
existed and had to be alleged and proved to establish the separate
crimes under the former law."12 67 The Court of Appeals in Rice held
that jury unanimity on all the elements of at least one subsection of
article 27, section 342, is not required because the subsections "are
not autonomous offenses but rather one crime defined two
ways. '"268

In rejecting Cardin's argument that the State's evidence was insufficient to convict him of theft under article 27, section 342(a) or
(b),269 the court reasoned that if the evidence was sufficient to prove
theft under any subsection of section 342, then Cardin had committed the crime of theft. 2 7' Notably, Cardin did not claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove theft under section 342(c). The
court concluded that because the evidence was sufficient to convict
Cardin under section 342(c) it also was sufficient to convict him
under (a). 27 '
Cardin also claimed that the State's evidence was not sufficient
to prove theft by deception under section 342(b) because the State
did not show detrimental reliance.2 7 2 The court ruled, however,
that both the plain language of section 342(b) and the legislative
history demonstrated that detrimental reliance is not an element of
theft by deception because "the defendant's criminality should not
27
depend on what the victim is thinking. 1 The Cardin court interpreted the consolidated theft statute in a
manner that adhered to the legislative intent to simplify the compli264. Id.
265. 64 Md. App. 269, 494 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 304 Md. 297, 498 A.2d 1184 (1985).
266. 311 Md. 116, 532 A.2d 1357 (1987). For a discussion of Rice, see supra notes
201-238 and accompanying text.
267. Craddock, 64 Md. App. at 277, 494 A.2d at 975.
268. Rice, 311 Md. at 136, 532 A.2d at 1367. In particular, the Rice court analyzed jury
unanimity with respect to subsections (a) and (c) of article 27, section 342. Id.
269. 73 Md. App. at 220, 533 A.2d at 938. Cardin was charged with committing theft
in violation of article 27 by unauthorized control (§ 342(a)) or theft by deception (§
342(b)). MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(a), (b) (1987).
270. 73 Md. App. at 221, 533 A.2d at 938.
271. Id. at 222, 533 A.2d at 939.
272. Id. at 220, 533 A.2d at 938.
273. Jennings Letter, supra note 243, quoted in 73 Md. App. at 223, 533 A.2d at 939.
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cated requirements of allegations and .proof necessary for conviction under the statute. In doing so, the court made a strong
statement that white collar crime would not be tolerated, which accurately reflected public sentiment in the wake of Maryland's savings and loan crisis.
7. Writ of Mandamus.-In re Petitionfor Writ of Prohibition2 74 confirms the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue extraordinary
writs2 7 5 in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.2 7 6 It also expands the
authority of a trial court to grant motions for new trials in criminal
cases when, in the judge's opinion, the weight of the evidence preponderates against a jury verdict.2 7 7
In May 1986 Paul Katz "was tried by jury in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County... on charges of attempted robbery with a
dangerous and deadly weapon, assault with intent to rob, and simple assault. 2 78 Judge Miller denied Katz's motions for judgment of
acquittal, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.2 7 9
Counsel for the defendant then moved for a new trial, alleging
that defects iii the judicial process deprived Katz of a fair trial.2 80
Counsel for the defendant also asserted "that the jury verdict was
'contrary to the evidence,' and, in effect, that [the verdict] was
against the weight of the evidence."-2 8' The latter allegations were
based on the State's inability to produce the victim as a witness,
forcing it to rely entirely upon another witness for its case. 282
Although Judge Miller found no defects in the trial proceedings
which would justify a new trial, he did grant the new trial motion
because he was "disturbed" about "a possibility of some injustices"
274. 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988).
275. The extraordinary or prerogative writs available at common law included prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari, quo warranto, and ne exeat regno. Id. at 28687 & n.1, 539 A.2d at 667 & n.l. See I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
226-31 (7th ed. 1956). The court declined to specify whether mandamus or prohibition
would have been more appropriate in cases of this sort, remarking -that "we are not
disposed to engage in common law quibbles about the differences between mandamus
and prohibition." 312 Md. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676.
276. 312 Md. at 293, 539 A.2d at 670.
277. Id. at 326, 539 A.2d at 686.
278. Id. at 283, 539 A.2d at 665.
279. Id.
280. Id. These defects were alleged to be unfair surprise, newly discovered evidence,
incorrect instructions, and jury misconduct. Id.
281. Id. Set Brief for Petitioner at 4, In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md.

280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988) (No. 86-27).
282. 312 Md. at 284, 539 A.2d at 665.
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In February 1987 Judge Miller denied the

State's motion to reconsider the order granting a new trial, explaining that he was not convinced that Katz was guilty, and while he did
"not like to substitute [his] judgment for the jury," he .thought it
"appropriate" to sit as a "13th juror" in this case. 8 4
Conceding that it did not have a statutory right to appeal a new
trial order, the State petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of
prohibition or mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the new
trial order and proceed with Katz's sentencing. 28 5 In its petition, the
State asserted that the Court of Appeals has authority to grant extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition through its superintending powers over inferior courts,2 8 6 and in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.2 8 7 By substituting his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury, the State argued that
Judge Miller not only committed an error ofjudgment, but usurped
the authority vested in the jury as exclusive triers of fact under the
Maryland Constitution. 8 8 Thus, an extraordinary writ of prohibition or mandamus would be an appropriate remedy in this case. 2 89
Notably, both the Maryland Constitution and statutes are silent
as to the mandamus or prohibition power of the Court of Ap283. Id., 539 A.2d at 666. Judge Miller stated:
I just think that there are enough things that disturb me as to whether or
not there is at least a possibility of some injustices. It in no way involves the
State's conduct in the matter .... I just feel that it is a disturbing case, one that
disturbed me about the verdict, and given that fact I am going to exercise my
discretion in granting a new trial.
Id.
284. Id. at 284-85, 539 A.2d at 666. Judge Miller explained:
What truly troubles me is that I was faced with the prospect of sentencing
somebody that I was not convinced was guilty....
I understand it was a credibility issue, but that is the posture that I was in,
and I have some grave reservations about what has happened, and it is a matter
of (conscience] and I do not like to substitute my judgment for the jury, but
they do not have to sentence Mr. Katz, and I did, and it troubled me. ...
...If another jury convicts him, and if somebody else has to sentence him,
that is fine, but ...

it just troubles me too much ....

•.. I guess to some extent the judge is a 13th juror in some cases, and that
should not be in many, but in this one I think it is appropriate, and I just felt
that-given all things considered ...he ought to have a new trial .... I cannot

articulate [a] good reason, but I just feel that it is appropriate.
Id. at 285, 539 A.2d at 666 (brackets in original).
285. Brief of Petitioner at 22, In rePetition (No. 86-27).
286. Id. at 13.
287. Id. at 15.
288. Id. at 17.22.
289. Id.
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peals. 2 90 Because the case law also was somewhat murky on this issue, 29 1 the. Court of Appeals applied a historical analysis to
determine whether this power might have been "passed" from the
British Crown's Provincial Court to the predecessors of the Maryland Court of Appeals in -1776.292
Recognizing that the Court of Appeals is a court of appellate
jurisdiction only, 293 the court reasoned that it could not inherit authority to issue prerogative writs based on the original jurisdiction
of its common-law -predecessors. 29 4 Also, the court explicitly declined to decide whether it might have inherited the prerogative writ
authority as part of a broader "superintending power" over the
courts below it in the judicial hierarchy similar to that exercised by
the pre-revolutionary Court of King's Bench. 29 5 Instead, the court
discovered authority which indicated that the Provincial Court's
power to issue writs "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" had been
transferred to the Court of Appeals by early Maryland constitutional
provisions.2 9 6
Prior cases such as State v. Haas297 have indicated that in order
for the court to issue writs "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" there
would have to be an appeal before the court, or at least an appealable judgment from a lower court on which to act. 29 8 A review of
290. 312 Md. at 292, 539 A.2d at 669.
291. The Court of Appeals has expressed doubts about its power to issue prerogative
writs in the past. See, e.g., Henson v. State, 227 Md. 659, 660, 180 A.2d 300, 301 (1962)
(concerning an original petition for mandamus not related to the Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction). But such cases are characterized as petitions for writs pursuant to
original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction. 312 Md. at 295, 539 A.2d at 671.
292. 312 Md. at 290-91, 539 A.2d at 668-69.
293. Id. at 293, 539 A.2d at 670. See Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisors of Assessments, 276
Md. 36, 40, 343 A.2d 521, 524 (1975) (holding limitations of jurisdiction of Court of
Appeals "inherent in the concept of the 'Court of Appeals' ").
294. 312 Md. at 293, 539 A.2d at 670.
295. Id. at 287-93, 539 A.2d at 667-70. Nevertheless, the court's discussion of the
history of the "superintending power" suggests that it finds strong authority for the
proposition that this power did pass from the provincial courts to the Court of Appeals.
Id.
296. Id. at 294-95, 539 A.2d at 67 1. A review of the subsequent case history revealed
that the court had "long recognized" the availability of prerogative writs. See State e%rel.
Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 526, 325 A.2d 573, 586 (1974) (State may appeal from
the imposition of an illegal sentence). See also Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493, 500 n.5, 489
A.2d 22, 25 n.5 (1985) (implying writ might be issued in extreme cases). The court has
the power to issue writs even though it has rarely exercised this power. 312 Md. at 297,
539 A.2d at 672.
297. 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1947).
298. Id. at 67, 51 A.2d at 649. See also Thompson v. M'Kim, 6 H. &J. 302, 321 (Md.
1823) (issuing stay of lower court order to pay a large sum of money into court pending
appeal).
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decisions in other states and on the federal level, however, showed a
less restrictive interpretation of this power.2 9 9 These jurisdictions
used prerogative writs to compel lower courts to take actions which
would allow questions to be brought to appeal,3 0 0 or to prohibit improper actions by lower courts that might not be reviewable on the
appellate level. 3 0 ' By providing for the review of potentially unreviewable questions, extraordinary writs protect the appellate courts'
ability to hear appeals, assists them in bringing lower courts into
conformity with their mandates, and thus are aids to these courts'
appellate jurisdiction. 0 2
The In re Petition court was "persuaded" that the prevalent view
in the other jurisdictions was "sound, ' 3 0 3 and held that it has the
power to issue prerogative writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
even if there is a lack of an immediately appealable judgment from
the lower courts.3 0 4 Borrowing from the language of Marbury v.
Madison3 0 5 the court explained that if the application of a writ is
"necessary to enable . . . [the Court] to exercise its appellate juris-

diction" it is essentially an aid of that jurisdiction. 0 6 It reasoned
that the power to issue the writ is necessary "to preserve the usefulness of ... appellate jurisdiction" if the failure to exercise it would
cause the right to appellate review to "be but a shadow, pending
30 7
which the substance might be lost."
299. 312 Md. at 298-301, 539 A.2d at 672-74. See, e.g., McClellan v. United States,
217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910) (stating "where a case is within the appellate jurisdiction of a
higher court a writ of mandamus may issue in aid of the appellate jurisdiction"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803) (mandamus may be issued if
necessary to enable Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction); State ex rel. Kain
v. Hall, 65 Tenn. 3, 6 (1873) (stating that the Tennessee Supreme Court had power to
issue writ in aid of its appellate jurisdiction).
300. For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court suggested that a writ of mandamus

could be used to compel a trial judge to act on a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict after an extended failure to do so. See Woods v. Lee, 390 So. 2d 1010, 1012
(Miss. 1980).
301. For example, writs of prohibition have been issued to command a trial judge not
to sit after the judge has improperly refused to recuse himself. See State v. Maples. 402
So. 2d 350, 353 (Miss. 1981). The .aples court recognized that refusal to recuse was not
immediately appealable and if it denied the writ, the court could not review the question, because in the event the defendant was acquitted, the State could not appeal. Id.
302. 312 Md. at 299-300, 539 A.2d at 673.
303. Id. at 304, 539 A.2d at 675.
304. Id. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676.
305. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). "To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus,
it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction." Id. at 175.
306. Mlarbury, 5 U.S. at 175, quoted in 312 Md. at 304, 539 A.2d at 675.
307. Thompson v. M'Kim, 6 H. &J. 302, 333 (Md. 1823), quoted in 312 Md. at 304,
539 A.2d at 675.
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In re Petition overrules the previous Maryland cases3 08 indicating
that a writ cannot issue from the Court of Appeals unless there is an
appealable judgment from below, or a case actually pending before
it.3 0 9 These cases, however, are "characterized as efforts to seek

writs pursuant to original jurisdiction as opposed to in aid of appellate jurisdiction. 's3 ° The court in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisors of Assessments 3 1 indicated that the touchstone of appellate jurisdiction is "an
initial exercise of judicial power or authority by a court."'3 t 2 Judge
Miller's decision to grant a motion for a new trial was an initial exercise of judicial authority by the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County.3 1 3 In this case, issuing an extraordinary writ to an inferior
court was in the nature of appellate jurisdiction.31 4 Notably, none
of the previous cases had considered authorities with these precise
circumstances. 1 3
After concluding that the Court of Appeals could issue extraordinary writs, the court proceeded with an analysis of the appropriateness of the. order granting a new trial. By considering the
witness's credibility when determining whether he was convinced of
the guilt of the defendant, Judge Miller engaged in an independent
weighing of the evidence. 1 6 The State argued that, in so doing,
Judge Miller exceeded his authority under article 23 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. 1 7
As originally drafted by the Constitutional Convention of 1851,
this provision stated that "[iln the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury
shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact. ' 3' " This provision was
interpreted as precluding judicial consideration of motions for judgment of acquittal, motions for directed verdict, or similar motions
because it would require the judge to pass upon the sufficiency of
308. 312 Md. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676.
309. See State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 67, 51 A.2d 647, 649 (1947); Hendrick v. State,
115 Md. 552, 558-59, 81 A. 18, 20 (1911).
310. 312 Md. at 295, 539 A.2d at 671.
311. 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521 (1975).
312. Id. at 42, 343 A.2d at 525. "Appellate jurisdiction is the review of that initial
exercise of judicial authority." Id.
313. 312 Md. at 294, 539 A.2d at 671.
314. Id. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676.
315. Id. at 305 n.14, 539 A.2d at 676 n.14.
316. Id. at 308, 539 A.2d at 677.
317. See Brief of Petitioner at 18-22, In re Petition (No. 86-27). Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights states in pertinent part: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 23.
318. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. X, § 5 (current version at MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art.

23).
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the evidence.3 9 In 1950 this constitutional clause was amended by
appending the proviso: "except that the Court may pass upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. 3 2 ° In State v.
Devers3 2 the Court of Appeals held that this provision did not allow
evidence to be weighed by the trial court on a new trial motion. 2
Instead, the only test that could be applied in considering a motion
for a new trial "is exactly that applied in considering a motion for
judgment of acquittal: was there any relevant evidence, properly
before the jury, legally sufficient to sustain a conviction? Any wider
scope of review of the evidence would be impermissible under our
Constitution. ' 23
Because it "stems from venerable custom and usage," Devers
recognized that new trials were allowed at common law "where the
jury's verdict is clearly contrary to the evidence." ' 4 It defined this
possibility into oblivion, however, by setting the test for granting a
new trial as "no more than a determination by the trial court that
' 3 25
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
The test for evidentiary sufficiency is whether the evidence
either directly shows or supports a rational inference of the facts to
be proved, from which a jury could be fairly convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3 2 6 The evidence must
be read in a light most favorable to the State, and if any rational
factfinder could find it sufficient to convict, then it is sufficient to
convict.3 2 7 This viewpoint does not allow issues of witness credibil3 28
ity to enter into considerations of evidentiary sufficiency.
The Court of Appeals easily could have found that Judge Miller
failed to follow the test for evidentiary sufficiency set forth in Devers
as a new trial standard,3 29 and left it at that. Instead, the court
found logical inconsistencies in setting the same standard for a motion for judgment of acquittal under rule 4-324s ° as would be re319. 312 Md. at 309-10, 539 A.2d at 678.
320. Act of Apr. 29, 1949, ch. 594, 1949 Md. Laws 1447 (codified as amended at MD.
ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 593 (1987)).
321. 260 Md. 360, 272 A.2d 794 (1971).
322. Id. at 379, 272 A.2d at 804.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 379-80, 272 A.2d at 804.
325. State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360, 380, 272 A.2d 794, 804 (1971).
326. Thomas v. State, 32 Md. App. 465, 476, 361 A.2d 138, 145 (1976).
327. 312 Md. at 325, 539 A.2d at 686.
328. Id.
329. Brief of Petitioner at 20-2 1,In re Petition (No. 86-27).
330. "A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts.... at
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quired in a rule 4-331 s"' new trial motion for evidentiary reasons.3 3 2
Theoretically, there is no reason to allow insufficiency of evidence to
be raised in a new trial motion because a judgment of acquittal
would always be appropriate in such cases.3 3s Moreover, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. United States, ss4
insufficiency of evidence is a "singularly inappropriate basis for ordering a new trial, because if the evidence was insufficient to go to
the jury in the first place, double jeopardy principles preclude a new
trial."3 3 5 Granting a motion for a new trial for lack of evidence
would be tantamount to granting a motion for judgment of acquittal,.3 6 and the drafters of the rules certainly did not intend these
motions to be identical.
Further, the court found persuasive the "greater weight" of authority on the state and federal level accepting the view that "credibility is an appropriate factor to consider on a weight of the
evidence motion for a new trial."3 3s7 Finally, the court examined the
"legislative aim" of article 23 and concluded that "one purpose...
is to protect the criminal defendant from unfair oppression. 3 s8 Allowing a judge to weigh evidence in granting a new trial motion
"does not reduce" the protection that a jury's ability to acquit affords against hostile or biased judges. 3 9 It does increase the protection of a defendant, however, "from a jury swayed by emotion,
bias, or popular clamor. 31 4 0 The court concluded that a judge may
weigh the evidence on a new trial motion, a theory consistent with
the overall goals and objectives of article 23."~'
the close of the evidence offered by the State and, in a jury trial, the close of all the
evidence." MD. R. 4-324(a).
331. "On motion of the defendant filed within ten days after a verdict, the court, in
the interest ofjustice, may order a new trial. The court has revisory power and control
over the judgment to set aside an unjust or improper verdict and grant a new trial ....
MD. R. 4-331(a), (b).
332. 312 Md. at 312, 539 A.2d at 679-80.
333. Id. at 312-13, 539 A.2d at 680.
334. 437 U.S. I (1978).
335. 312 Md. at 313, 539 A.2d at 680. "The double jeopardy clause forbids a second
trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence that it failed to muster in the first proceeding." Burks, 437 U.S. at II.
336. 312 Md. at 313, 539 A.2d at 680.
337. Id. at 324, 539 A.2d at 685. See, e.g., United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376,
387 (1st Cir. 1979) (credibility may be considered on new trial motion due to jury verdict against weight of evidence).
338. 312 Md. at 325, 539 A.2d at 686.
339. Id. at 325-26, 539 A.2d at 686.
340. Id. at 326, 539 A.2d at 686.
341. Id. More accurately, the original goal of article 23 to limit the judicial power of
judges may have stemmed from judicial suspicion by the drafters. The court's expan-
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Accordingly, the court held that Judge Miller "had authority to
weigh the evidence and to consider the credibility of witnesses when
he decided Katz's motion for new trial." 4 ' The court explicitly
overruled the Devers holding that applied the sufficiency of evidence
standard to new trial motions, as well as its finding that any broader
standard would violate article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 43 Although part of the "weighing process" may involve
considerations of credibility, the court declined to embrace the concept of a judge as the thirteenth juror, and held that a new trial may
not be granted "merely because the judge would have reached a
result different from that of the jury's. 3 4 4 Furthermore, the court
added language limiting the effect that "[m]otions for new trial on
[evidentiary grounds] are not favored and should be granted only in
exceptional cases, when the weight of the evidence preponderates
so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage ofjustice
3 45
to let the verdict stand.

Lastly, the court clarified the scope of authority to issue prerogative writs. The court indicated, in dicta, that it would issue ex'
traordinary writs only with "great caution." 346
Emphasizing the
proposition that "extraordinary writs issue only under extraordinary
circumstances ' 3 4 7 the court found that the State failed to meet its
burden "to show us that the circumstances are so extraordinary as
to justify the issuance of a writ." 4 ' It declined to decide whether
Judge Miller's order was an abuse of discretion because an extraordinary writ would only be appropriate if the abuse was clear or
if there had been a usurpation ofjudicial power.3 4 9 Thus, the court

sion of the objective of article 23 from merely protecting against oppressive judges to
oppressive juries and oppression in general is an example of impressive judicial innovation, particularly in view of the language in article 23 itself. But as the court points out,
it is long recognized that article 23 "does not mean precisely what it seems to say."
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89 (1963), quoted in 312 Md. at 318. 539 A.2d at 682.
342. 312 Md. at 326, 539 A.2d at 686.
343. Id.
344. Id. Also, the court stated that there should be "at minimum substantial impeachment of a witness before the judge finds that witness's testimony deficient on the basis of
credibility." Id. at 327, 539 A.2d at 687.
345. Id. at 326, 539 A.2d at 686-87.
346. Id. at 305, 539 A.2d at 676. "[W]e may issue a prerogative writ if we believe the
interests of justice require us to do so in order to restrain a lower court from acting in
excess of its jurisdiction, otherwise grossly exceeding its authority, or failing to act when
it ought to act." Id. at 307, 539 A.2d at 677.
347. Id. at 327, 539 A.2d at 687.
348. Id. at 329, 539 A.2d at 688.
349. Id. at 327, 539 A.2d at 687.
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left Judge Miller's order for a new trial in place. 5 0
By declaring, in effect, that it would "hardly ever" interfere with
a trial judge's grant of a new trial for lack of evidence, 3 5 ' In re Petition
provides judges with a potent tool to use against the verdict power
ofjuries where there remains doubt as to the guilt of a criminal defendant. Yet, the high standard that the Court of Appeals would
like trial courts to follow in weighing evidence on new trial motions352 raises the same double jeopardy issues as the sufficiency of
evidence test that was overturned in Burks. In Burks the. Supreme
Court declared that "where the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no 'equities' to be balanced, for
the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds
which are not open to judicial examination." '
In light of this strict
constitutional command, there may be significant problems with giving the prosecution a second opportunity to offer evidence at a new
trial after a trial judge rules that "the weight of the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would.be a miscarriage
of justice to let the verdict stand." 5 4
This issue is particularly thorny in states such as Maryland
where prior to trial the defendant has the option to allow a judge to
become the trier of fact as well as law in lieu of a jury. 5 5 Thus a
judge is usually a person with considerable experience and a legally
recognized mandate for ferreting out the facts in criminal cases.3 50
350. Id. at 329, 539 A.2d at 688.
351. Id.
352. See id.
at 326, 539 A.2d at 686 (motions for new trial on the ground of weight of
the evidence are not favored and should be granted only inexceptional cases where it
would be a miscarriage ofjustice to let the verdict stand).
353. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 12 n.6 (1978).
354. 312 Md. at 326, 539 A.2d at 686-87.
[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does
not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove
its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g.,
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or
prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest
in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society
maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. The same
cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a
failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could
assemble.
Burks, 437 U.S. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
355. See MD. R. 4-328.
356. Id.
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One could argue that it would be a miscarriage of justice to force a
defendant to face the possibility of punishment again after such a
judge decrees that the evidence clearly supports a verdict of not
guilty, merely because the accused picked the wrong trier of fact
before trial. Such a decree in itself may raise reasonable doubts
about the defendant's guilt. Yet, if one ignores the "preponderates
so heavily" and "miscarriage of justice" dicta, and focuses on the
fact that the court upheld a new trial granted by a judge merely because the evidence disturbed or -troubled him to the point that there
was "at least the possibility of some injustices" and he "was not convinced" the defendant was guilty, 5 7 the doublejeopardy issue fades
considerably. For this reason, like article 23, In re Petition may even'
tually be found not to "mean precisely what it seems to say. "358
8. Collateral Order Doctrine.-In Bunting v. States 9 the Court of
Appeals held that a circuit court's pretrial order ruling that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Interstate Agreement) 360 had not
been violated, and that dismissal of criminal charges therefore was
not required, was not an appealable judgment under the collateral
order doctrine.3 6 ' The court determined that while the Interstate
Agreement's single transfer rule3 62 gives a defendant a right not to
357. 312 Md. at 284, 539 A.2d at 666.
358. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89 (1963).
359. 312 Md. 472, 540 A.2d 805 (1988) (per curiam).
360. A "detainer" is, as the word implies, "the restraint of a [person's] personal liberty against his will .... " BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 404 (5th ed. 1979). The Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (Interstate Agreement) provides that whenever a detainer is
lodged in Maryland against a person who is already imprisoned in another jurisdiction
that is a party to the Agreement, the defendant has a right to request a "final disposition" of the charges against him or her and to stand trial on those charges before returning to prison. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D (1987).
361. 312 Md. at 482, 540 A.2d at 809. The collateral order doctrine allows interlocutory appeals under special circumstances and is an exception to the rule that there can
be no appeal before final judgment. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 854
(1978) (disallowing appeal, before trial, of order denying motion to dismiss based on
alleged violation of sixth amendment right to speedy trial). The doctrine "treats as final
and appealable a limited class of orders which do not terminate the litigation in the trial
court." Public Serv. Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley Conservation League, 300 Md. 200,
206, 477 A.2d 759, 762 (1984). The Court of Appeals noted that to fit within this limited class an order must meet four requirements: "[Tihe order must [(I)] conclusively
determine the disputed question, [(2)] resolve an important issue[, (3) be] completely
separate from the merits of the action, and [(4)] be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213, 406 A.2d 922, 925 (1979).
Accord Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 615, 440 A.2d 388, 390 (1982); Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 284 Md. 86, 92, 394 A.2d 801, 804
(1978).
362. The single transfer rule provides that "[i]f trial is not had on any indictment,
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be returned to his or her original place of imprisonment before
standing trial, it does not provide the right to avoid trial altogether.s63 The court reasoned that the order in this case failed to
come within the limited scope of the collateral order doctrine because the order was effectively reviewable on appeal from a final
judgment of conviction. 64 In holding the order was not immediately appealable, the court reaffirmed its narrow application of the
collateral order doctrine3 6 5 from which, arguably, it had recently
deviated. 6
In early 1986 Gerald T. Bunting was charged in Somerset
County, Maryland, with felony theft. At the time of these Maryland
charges, Bunting already was imprisoned in a federal penitentiary in
Pennsylvania for violations of federal fraud laws. 3 6 7 The State of
Maryland therefore lodged detainers with the federal authorities in
3 68
Pennsylvania pursuant to the Interstate Agreement.
After requesting final disposition of the Maryland charges pursuant to the Interstate Agreement, Bunting was taken to Somerset
County to attend a hearing on pretrial motions made by the defense.3 6 The following day, without a trial having taken place,
information or complaint ... prior to return of the prisoner to the original place of
imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further
force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D(d) (1987).
363. 312 Md. at 479, 540 A.2d at 808.
364. Id. at 477, 540 A.2d at 807.
365. Id. at 480, 540 A.2d at 808. In the past, the court has recognized that the collateral order doctrine "is narrow in scope" and therefore has limited interlocutory appeals
under the doctrine. Clark v.'Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213, 406 A.2d 922, 925 (1979). For a
discussion of cases in which Maryland courts have applied the doctrine, see infra notes
390-393 and accompanying text.
366. In State v. Hogg, 311 Md. 446, 535 A.2d 923 (1988), a case arising out of the
Maryland savings and loan crisis, the Court of Appeals held a circuit court order precluding the State from asserting the defense of sovereign immunity was immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 457, 535 A.2d at 928. For a discussion of the case and how the doctrine's application may be distinguished from that in
Bunting, see infra note 400. For a complete discussion of Hogg, see Surv' of Developments
in Mtaryland Law. 1987-88-StateGovernment andAdministration, 49 MD. L. REv. 803 (1989).
367. 312 Md. at 474, 540 A.2d at 806. Bunting "'had pleaded guilty to federal charges
of defrauding customers of his grain elevator in Princess Anne, Maryland." Id. at 474
n. 1, 540 A.2d at 806 n. 1.The Maryland felony theft charges arose from the same transactions. Id.
368. Id. at 474-75, 540 A.2d at 806. Maryland and Pennsylvania are parties to the
Interstate Agreement by virtue of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D (1987) and 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9101 (Purdon 1982), respectively. Federal authorities are subject to
the Interstate Agreement by federal statute. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1982). For the provisions of the Interstate Agreement and the single transfer rule, see supra notes 360 & 362.
369. 312 Md. at 475, 540 A.2d at 806. At the hearing the court considered Bunting's
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Maryland authorities returned Bunting to Pennsylvania and surrendered him into federal custody." ° One week later, in the Circuit
Court for Somerset County, Bunting moved to dismiss the Maryland
charges against him, arguing that the State was compelled to do so
37
under the Interstate Agreement's single transfer rule.

'

The circuit court denied the motion, apparently taking the position that Bunting had "to prove that some prejudice resulted from
the violation of the single transfer rule."3s 72 The Court of Special
Appeals dismissed Bunting's appeal on the grounds that it was not
from a final judgment3 73 and that the collateral order doctrine did
not authorize the appeal.3 7 4 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine if the trial court's order was an appealable judgment under the collateral order doctrine. 7 5
In affirming the Court of Special Appeals, 7 6 the court noted
that for the circuit court's ruling to fall within the "limited class of
orders" that the collateral order doctrine treats as final and appealable, 7 7 the ruling had to be, inter alia, "effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment. 3 -7 ' The court found that the single
transfer rule is intended to prevent delay before trial, and not intended to give the defendant a right to avoid the trial itself.3 79
Therefore, the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a violation of
the rule was effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. s s° The court similarly rejected the argument that because the
motions for removal on the ground of prejudicial pretrial publicity, dismissal of charges,
and disqualification of the state's attorney. Id. at 475 n.2, 540 A.2d at 806 n.2.
370. Id. at 475, 540 A.2d at 806.
371. Id. The court questioned Bunting's good faith in moving to dismiss under the
single transfer rule because it did not appear the defense had even anticipated trying the
case on the merits before Bunting was returned to Pennsylvania. As the court noted, if
the defendant's preliminary motion to disqualify the state's attorney had been successful, trial would have been delayed. Id. at 475 n.3, 540 A.2d at 806 n.3.
372. Id. at 475 n.4, 540 A.2d at 806 n.4.
373. Id. at 475-76, 540 A.2d at 806. The general rule is that the defendant in a circuit
court criminal case has a right of appeal only from final judgments. MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1984). In this case, the circuit court's order denying the
motion to dismiss was not final because the criminal prosecution against Bunting was
still pending in the circuit court. 312 Md. at 476, 540 A.2d at 806.
374. 312 Md. at 475-76, 540 A.2d at 806. For the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine exception to the final judgment rule, see supra note 361.
375. 312 Md. at 476, 540 A.2d at 806.
376. Id. at 482, 540 A.2d at 809.
377. See supra note 361.
378. 312 Md. at 477, 540 A.2d at 807.
379. Id. at 479, 540 A.2d at 808.
380. Id. at 478-79, 540 A.2d at 808. The court relied upon United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant may not,
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Interstate Agreement authorizes the trial court to dismiss the
charges against the defendant for a violation of the single transfer
rule,3 8 ' it follows that his "statutory right is to avoid trial
altogether. "382
The court determined that, as a policy matter, it is important to
construe narrowly "the' idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable after the termination of the trial because it involves a 'right' to
avoid the trial itself."' 3" Otherwise, the court reasoned, there
would be a "proliferation of appeals" under the collateral order
doctrine which would "erodethe final judgment rule. ' 38 4 The court
noted that many "rights" could be viewed as entitling a party to
avoid trial in some instances, 8 5 citing as examples "the 'right' to
summary judgment [, which] might be characterized as a right not to
stand trial unless the opposing party has created a genuine issue of
material fact, ' 38 6 or the statute of limitations, which could be viewed
as "granting a defendant a right not to be tried out of time." ' 7 The
court concluded that use of the collateral order doctrine should be
limited "to double jeopardy claims and a very few other extraordinary situations13 8 8 in order to maintain the public policy against

"piecemeal appeals" which would repeatedly interrupt and delay
3 89
lower court proceedings.
In evaluating the applicability of the collateral order doctrine in
Bunting, the Court of Appeals adhered strictly to precedent narrowly
applying the requirement that the challenged court order not be efbefore trial, appeal a federal district court's order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment because of an alleged violation of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Id.
at 857. The Court noted that "the Speedy Trial Clause does not ... encompass a 'right
not to be tried' which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all. It is the
delay before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guarantee of
a speedy trial." Id. at 861.
381. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D(d) (1987).
382. 312 Md. at 479, 540 A.2d at 808.
383. Id. at 480-81, 540 A.2d at 808-09.
384. Id. at 480-82, 540 A.2d at 808-09.
385. Id. at 479-80, 540 A.2d at 808.
386. Id. at 480, 540 A.2d at 808.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 481-82, 540 A.2d at 809. The court did not specify what would qualify as
an "extraordinary situation" to which the collateral order doctrine should apply. It is
clear from the court's analysis, however, that specific situations should be analyzed in
light of the four-pronged rule quoted in Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213, 406 A.2d 922,
925 (1979). See supra note 361. It is equally clear that strict adherence to the requirements of the rule are necessary. In Bunting the court did not even consider whether the
challenged order satisfied three of the four requirements, because it failed to satisfy the
fourth. 312 Md. at 477, 540 A.2d at'807.
389. Id. at 482, 540 A.2d at 809.
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fectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment."' 0 The Maryland cases have emphasized that this requirement of the doctrine
will be overridden only when there is "a serious risk of irreparable
loss of the claimed right if appellate review is deferred until after
final judgment."'
For example, Maryland courts have recognized
that although the defendant may take an immediate appeal from a
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the ground of double jeopardy,3 9 2 the defendant may not do so on the ground of a right to a
speedy trial."' The rationale for this decision lies in the fundamental nature of the constitutional rights being protected. 9 4 The prohibition against double jeopardy is not only the explicit guarantee
against double punishment, but also the implied right not to stand
trial for the same offense a second time. This implied right could
not be restored by reversing a conviction after the second trial. 3 9 5
The right to a speedy trial, on the other hand, "can be vindicated by
39 6
reversal after conviction.1
The Bunting court's holding that a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on the single transfer rule is not appealable
under the collateral order doctrine is consistent with previous Maryland cases.3 9 7 The purpose of the Interstate Agreement is to ensure
a speedy trial on pending charges before the difficulty of proof sets
390. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 320, 529 A.2d 356, 361 (1987) (pretrial
order disqualifying counsel not appealable prior to final judgment); Parrott v. State, 301
Md. 411, 426, 483 A.2d 68, 75 (1984) (per curiam) (interlocutory order of removal not
appealable prior to final judgment); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley Conservation League, 300 Md. 200, 210, 477 A.2d 759, 764 (1984) (order denying Commission's
motion for protective order against property owners' request for summons to take oral
depositions of commissioners immediately appealable); Clark, 286 Md. at 213, 406 A.2d
at 925 (trial court's order refusing to enforce an executory oral agreement to settle a
pending lawsuit immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine).
391. Parrott, 301 Md. at 424-25, 483 A.2d at 75.
392. See Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 326, 322 A.2d 887, 889 (1974) (denial of pretrial
motion to dismiss indictment on double jeopardy grounds is final judgment and therefore immediately appealable).
393. See Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 566-70, 386 A.2d 1206, 1210-13 (1978) (denial
of pretrial motion to dismiss based on alleged violation of defendant's right to speedy
trial not immediately appealable).
394. These fundamental rights are set forth in the fifth and sixth amendments of the
United States Constitution. The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o
person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

395. Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411, 425, 483 A.2d 68, 75 (1984) (per curtam).
396. ld.
397. See supra note 390.
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in, not to avoid trial itself 3 "' Although the statute prescribes dismissal of charges for violation of.the rule, 9 9 the right not to. be returned to the original place of imprisonment without standing trial
is merely to protect a defendant from prejudice in his or her criminal prosecution, not to immunize the accused from standing trial.4 ° °
Thus, the court properly held that the collateral order doctrine did
not provide Bunting an appeal from the circuit court's order prior
to final judgment.
B. Juvenile Proceedings
1. Miranda Waivers.-In McIntyre v. State4 0 1 the Court of Appeals held that denying the request of a juvenile defendant accused
of rape to see his mother after being given his Miranda rights, was
not tantamount to a violation of his fifth and sixth amendment
rights.4 °2 In so holding, the court postulated that a totality of the
circumstances test is the appropriate standard to apply when determining whether the denial of the juvenile's request for his or her
398. Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 307, 455 A.2d 973, 975 (1983).
399. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D(d) (1987).
400. In a concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge expressed his view that the collateral
order doctrine approach taken in Bunting cannot be reconciled with State v. Hogg, 311
Md. 446, 535 A.2d 923 (1988), and Hogg, therefore, should be overruled. 312 Md. at
482, 540 A.2d at 809-10 (EldridgeJ., concurring).
In Hogg, a case arising out of the Maryland savings and loan crisis, the Court of
Appeals held that a trial court's order precluding the State from asserting sovereign
immunity was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Hogg, 311 Md. at 457, 535
A.2d at 928. The court found that an order improperly failing to recognize the bar of
sovereign immunity, which not only protects the public treasury but also protects the
State and its instrumentalities from standing trial, id. at 455, 535 A.2d at 927, "would
effectively escape review if the sovereign were forced to stand trial on that claim and
await final judgment before obtaining appellate review." Id.at 456-57, 535 A.2d at 928.
As the court highlights in Bunting, although the decision in Hogg may contain broad
language concerning the application of the collateral order doctrine to protect the State
from standing trial, the Hogg opinion should be restricted to the particular facts of that
case. 312 Md. at 482 n.9, 540 A.2d at 809 n.9. Viewed in light of the savings and loan
crisis, Hogg's more liberal application of the collateral order doctrine may be limited to
those instances where the State has an overriding interest in an interlocutory appeal.
The Bunting court retreated from Hogg's broad language, noting that the case should not
be viewed as reflecting a position contrary to the long-established policy against piecemeal appeals, and contending that it "must be read in the context of what was before the
Court." Id. This "context" is an obvious reference to the catastrophic situation that
Maryland was faced with as a result of the savings and loan crisis that erupted in 1985.
Maryland attorneys should view Hogg's application of the collateral order doctrine in this
light and heed the narrower application of the doctrine in Bunting and prior Maryland
cases cited supra note 390.
401. 309 Md. 607, 526 A.2d 30 (1987).
402. Id. at 625, !526 A.2d at 38-39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79
(1966). For the Miranda safeguards, see supra note 131.
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parents negated the knowing, intelligen't, and voluntary requirements of Miranda.4 ° s Although the request to see one's parents certainly is one factor included in the test, the court determined that it
does not constitute a per se violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. 4"
Patrick McIntyre, a fifteen-year-old tenth grader, was arrested
while on his way to school.4"' The police handcuffed him, put him
in a police car, and told him that he was accused of the crime of
rape.4"' The defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.4 0 7 McIntyre
said that he understood these rights and then requested to see his
mother. The police told the defendant that he could not see his
mother because he was being charged as an adult.40 ' The police
restated thejuvenile's Miranda rights once they arrived at the station
house. McIntyre acknowledged that he understood the rights and
repeated his request to see his mother.40 9 His request was again
denied. McIntyre then signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights
and gave the police what was for the most part an exculpatory
statement.4 t0
McIntyre's attorney was not informed of his client's two requests to see his mother. 4 1 ' He first learned about them while one
403. 309 Md. at 621, 526 A.2d at 37.
404. Id. at 622-23, 526 A.2d at 37. Several states have developed a per se approach in
cases involving juveniles' requests to see their parents. See, e.g., People v. Burton, 6 Cal.
3d 375, 383-84, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971) (juvenile's request to see
parent is equivalent to request to consult an attorney); Sublette v. State, 365 So. 2d 775,
777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), appeal dismissed, 378 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1979) (juvenile's
request to call parent is an assertion of the juvenile's fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 389 Mass. 128, 134, 449
N.E.2d 654, 657 (1983) (standard applies absolutely for children under 14; for those
over 14, the State has heavy burden if no consultation permitted). In rejecting the interested adult rule, the Court of Appeals noted the observation made by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 223, 465 A.2d 989, 992
(1983) ("protection ofjuveniles against the innate disadvantages associated with the immaturity of most youth may . .. be achieved in a manner that affords more adequate
weight to the interests of society, and of justice.
405. 309 Md. at 609, 526 A.2d at 31.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. d. According to MD. CTs. &Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(d)(1) (1984 & Supp.
1988), the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a 14-year-old or older juvenile
who is charged with a crime where the penalty is death or life imprisonment. Id.
409. 309 Md. at 609, 526 A.2d at 31.
410. Id. at 609-10, 526 A.2d at 31. This entire sequence of events occurred within 55
minutes. Id.
411. Id. at 610, 526 A.2d at 31. It was for this reason that there was no pretrial motion to suppress the defendant's waiver and statement. Id.
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of the arresting officers testified during the trial about the Miranda
waiver and offered the information that the defendant had asked
twice to see his mother before signing the waiver form. 4 12 When the
State. tried to offer the written waiver form into evidence, McIntyre's
counsel objected, and the court held a suppression hearing outside
the presence of the jury.41 3
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court concluded
that the evidence did not support the contention that there was any
undue influence or inducements on the part of the law enforcement
officials. 4" 4 In addition, the court found no authority for the proposition that a juvenile defendant has a right to have a parent present
while a statement is being elicited.4 1 5 The statement was admitted
into evidence 41 6 and McIntyre subsequently was convicted of first
degree rape.41 7 The defendant appealed, the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals, and the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari.41 I
The Court of Appeals considered only one question on review:
whether there is a constitutional violation when a fifteen-year-old
juvenile is arrested and charged with a serious crime, and is denied
access to a parent or adult friend prior to the police extracting a
statement. 41 9 The thrust of the defendant's argument was that the
request to see his mother was tantamount to invoking the right to
counsel under both the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution.4 20 Moreover, because the requests were made subsequent to
the delivery of the Miranda rights, the request for "counsel of par412. Id.
413. Id. At the suppression hearing, McIntyre's counsel argued that McIntyre was
arrested on his way to school, that he was nervous, and that his repeated requests to see
his mother were "tantamount to a request for counsel." Id. at 610-11, 526 A.2d at 31.
The defense counsel contended that the denial had two effects: first, that the defendant
"needed the opportunity to speak to his mother to secure counsel;" and second, that
juveniles ordinarily are afforded the presence of a parent to safeguard against undue
influence and overreaching by the police. Id. at 611. 526 A.2d at 31-32.
414. Id.at 611, 526 A.2d at 32.
415. Id.
416. Although the statement was introduced into evidence, the statement essentially
was exculpatory. The prosecution, nevertheless, extracted several admissions that constituted, along with other evidence, proof of McIntyre's guilt. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 611-12, 526 A.2d at 32.
419. Id. at 612, 526 A.2d at 32.
420. Id. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. McIntyre contended that juveniles subjected
to police interrogation are in greater need of protection of their constitutional rights
than adults. He argued that such protection may be provided by the presence of an
"interested" adult. 309 Md. at 612, 526 A.2d at 32.
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ent" should have halted immediately the police interrogation.4 2 '
In rejecting McIntyre's argument, the Court of Appeals looked
to the nature and scope of the Supreme Court's Miranda directive.4 2 2 The Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court
intended to give notice to the critical position that attorneys occupy
in the criminal process.42 3 This position is limited specifically to
counsel, however, because the Supreme Court previously has upheld convictions ofjuveniles who were denied access to adults other
than their attorneys.4 24 To find that ajuvenile's access to a parent is
equivalent to the right to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments would amount to "an extension of the Miranda requirements
[that] would cut this Court's holding in that case completely loose
from its explicitly stated rationale. ' 4 25 The Court of Appeals did
not extend the Miranda rationale to parents for fear that similar exceptions would apply to a juvenile's request to speak with almost
any adult that "he considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice." 4' 2 6
The court examined the individual factors of the Miranda standard-whether the written waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary-to determine that McIntyre's waiver was valid.42 It noted
that there was no evidence to suggest that the accused did not understand his rights.4 2 8 Similarly, there was no indication that the
421. 309 Md. at 612, 526 A.2d at 32.
422. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court redefined the standard for
voluntary confessions. The privilege against self-incrimination, described by the Court
as "the essential mainstay of our adversary system," id.at 460, became the principal
protection against the practices of police interrogation. The rule of Miranda is clear. If
statements obtained during custodial interrogation of the accused are to be admitted
into evidence, the State must advise the accused, prior to interrogation, of his or her
right to remain silent and of his or her right to have counsel, retained or appointed,
present during interrogation. Id. at 473. Therefore, statements obtained during a custodial interrogation in violation of this rule may not be used as evidence against the
defendant during the State's case in chief. Id. at 479. See supra note 131.
423. 309 Md. at 613, 526 A.2d at 33. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, reh'g denied,
444 U.S. 887 (1979). The Court explained that an attorney performs three functions at
an interrogation. First, the attorney helps the client preserve his or her fifth amendment
rights during the adversary process; second, the attorney acts as a buffer against coercive
police interrogation procedures; and third, the attorney ensures that any statements actually obtained are accurately transcribed for presentation into evidence. Id. at 719. In

sum, the attorney is looked upon, by society as a whole, as a protector of the legal rights
of the accused. Id.
424. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724 (a juvenile's request for probation officer did not constitute
a per se invocation of the juvenile's fifth amendment rights under Miranda).
425. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976).
426. Fare, 442 U.S. at 723.
427. 309 Md. at 623, 526 A.2d at 38.
428. Id. at 624, 526 A.2d at 38.
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defendant did not have the capacity to understand his rights. 4 29
The opinion also analyzed the special considerations surrounding
the voluntary aspect of the Miranda standard. The Court of Appeals
noted that under Colorado v. Connelly 4 s° the sole fifth amendment
concern is to prevent governmental coercion.43 1 In other words,
the only relevant consideration in the voluntary requirement is
whether the waiver was a free and deliberate choice rather than a
choice tainted by intimidation, coercion, or deception. 3 2
The court also considered.its previous decision in Miller v.
State,4s which applied the principles of Miranda and Connelly. In that
case the issue was whether the defendant's refusal to sign his statement before seeing his parents indicated that he had not knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
counsel under Miranda.4 s4 The court applied the totality of the circumstances test, noting that a waiver of a constitutional right is usually "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege . . .[which] must depend, in each case, upon the

particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 4 5 The
Miller court held that, although the "admissions ofjuveniles require
special caution,""'

ajuvenile defendant could waive his or her con-

43 7
stitutional rights and make an admissible voluntary statement.
In applying these principles, the Court of Appeals held that
even when a defendant is a juvenile, the courts need only apply the
totality of the circumstances test.43 8 The Court of Appeals stressed
that such a test is the appropriate way to determine violations of the
Miranda rule, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is a juvenile.43 9 If a juvenile requests to see a parent or close adult, that is

429. Id. at 624-25, 526 A.2d at 38.
430. 479 U.S. 157(1986).
431. 309 Md. at 617, 526 A.2d at 34.
432. Id.
433. 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530 (1968). The defendant inMiller, a 16-year-old boy,
was accused of brutally murdering a young girl. Id. at 365, 247 A.2d at 531-32. The
defendant was apprised of his constitutional rights upon his arrival at the police station,
but initially denied any complicity in the crime. Id. at 365-66, 247 A.2d at 532. Later,
the defendant made a full confession, but refused to sign it before seeing his parents,
even though he had not asked to see them previously. id. at 366-76, 247 A.2d at 532-37.
434. Id. at 377, 247 A.2d at 538.
435. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
436. Miller, 251 Md. at 378-79, 247 A.2d at 539.
437. Id. at 379, 247 A.2d at 539.
438. 309 Md. at 615, 526 A.2d at 33-34.
439. Id., 526 A.2d at 34. Indeed, the court found the rationale of Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, reh g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979), compelling. In that case, the Court could

1989]

CRIMINAL LAW

655

one factor to consider when determining whether a juvenile defendant's rights under Miranda and Connelly are adequately protected.4 40
The decision of the McIntyre court is appropriate in light of the
purpose and scope of Miranda and its progeny. The Supreme Court
has carved a niche for attorneys in the legal process. Miranda, Fare,
and Connelly clearly point to the attorney's unique role in the critical
stages of the criminal process. In Fare the Court rejected the suggestion that denying a juvenile access to a probation officer, who
was both close to the accused and played a vital role in the defendant's rehabilitation, was tantamount to denying the right to counsel. 4 ' Though a parent can be an important confidant and
counselor when their child is arrested for a serious crime, the parent
certainly does not play the same role as an attorney. Indeed, in McIntyre the defendant argued that he needed his mother to help obtain counsel. 4 Thus, when McIntyre signed a written waiver of his
Miranda rights, the only question for the court to consider was
whether, under these circumstances, the waiver was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.
In considering this question, the court properly applied the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the defendant's
waiver met the Miranda standards. The court included within its review of that standard the denial Of access to the defendant's mother,
the defendant's mental state at the time, and the defendant's physical condition. The court then determined that the evidence
presented satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard. 4 4 3
It is clear that the safeguard of a totality of the circumstances test,
molded to fit the individual facts, is a sufficient safeguard.
discern "no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required .... The totality
approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation." Id. at 725.
440. 309 Md. at 619, 526 A.2d at 35-36. See also United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen,
653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir. 1981) (in deferring to the pivotal role a parent may play
during custodial interrogation of a child, a case-by-case approach to requests for parental advice was adopted); State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 94, 273 A.2d 867, 871 (1970),
rert.
denied, 402 U.S. 946 (1971)

(although adult consent is desired, under totality of

circumstances test, 20-year-old defendant voluntarily could confess without advice of
parent or adult friend); State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 440, 212 N.W.2d 664, 671
(1973) (although importance of parental presence and advice during interrogation of
juvenile is recognized, court rejected absolute rule that every minor is incapable as a
matter of law of waiving constitutional rights); State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 297, 301 (Utah
1980) (statements made by 16-year-old defendant without the advice of parent or adult
friend, but preceded by Miranda warnings, were voluntary).
441. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724.
442. 309 Md. at 612, 526 A.2d at 32.

443. Id. at 625-26. 526 A.2d at 39.
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In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Adkins opined that the
majority's application of the totality of the circumstances test sunk
4 44
to a mere perfunctory recital of that constitutional principle.
Judge Adkins argued that the State failed to satisfy its burden of
establishing that McIntyre possessed the requisite experience or sophistication to protect his constitutional rights during the interrogation process.4 4 5 Judge Adkins would have excluded McIntyre's
statement from evidence on three grounds. First, McIntyre's immaturity and inexperience rendered him unable to exercise competent
judgment in protecting or advancing his interests; 446 second, the
courts recognizing the interested adult rule, which requires that a
juvenile must be given the opportunity to consult with an informed
adult before waiving his or her constitutional rights, are persuasive; -4 4 7 and third, several states including Maryland have enacted
specific safeguards to protect juvenile waivers of constitutional

rights.4 48
The dissent advocated an almost unrebuttable presumption
that juveniles are incapable of protecting themselves against the
criminal justice system. The majority's position is more tenable,
however, because the totality of the circumstances test makes a necessary distinction between the inexperienced youth exhibiting
merely delinquent behavior and the juvenile criminal who commits
heinous crimes for which punishment should ensue.
2. ParentalNotification Provisions.-InJones v. State44 9 the Court
of Appeals held that the parental notification provisions of the
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article 4 50 were inapplicable to a sev444. Id. at 640, 526 A.2d at 46 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
445. Id. at 639, 526 A.2d at 46.
446. Id. at 626, 526 A.2d at 39.
447. Id. at 628, 526 A.2d at 40. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 41 Cal. 3d 388, 395, 710
P.2d 362, 366, 221 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (1985) (per se rule that when a minor requests to

see parent during a custodial interrogation, it must be construed as an invocation of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
448. 309 Md. at 629, 526 A.2d at 40. See, e.g., MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3814(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988). For the relevant text of § 3-814(b), see infra note 450.
449. 311 Md. 398, 535 A.2d 471 (1988).
450. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-814 (1984 & Supp. 1988). The statute
reads in relevant part:
(b) If a law enforcement officer takes a child into custody, he shall immediately notify, or cause to be notified, the child's parents, guardian, or custodian of the action. After making every reasonable effort to give notice, the law
enforcement officer shall with all reasonable speed:
(1) Release the child to his parents, guardian, or custodian or to any
other person designated by the court ...

or

1989]

CRIMINAL LAW -

enteen-year-old defendant charged with first degree murder.4 5 '
The court applied the totality of the circumstances test to determine
that noncompliance with the statutory provisions did not render the
juvenile's confession involuntary.4 5 2 In particular, the Jones court
analyzed the General Assembly's purpose in enacting the Juvenile
Causes Act,4 53 which provides for the care and protection of chil-

dren falling within the provisions of the Act. The court held that the
juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over Jones because he did
not come within the purview of the statute's protection.45 4 Jones,
therefore, could not invoke the protections afforded by the notice
provisions of the Act.
Seventeen-year-old Gary jones was detained by the police on
March 19, 1985, for questioning about his role in the murder of
Nellie Hines, a Baltimore City school teacher.45 5 A statement made
to the police by the defendant's fifteen-year-old cousin implicated
Jones in the crime. 45 6 Upon his arrival at the police station, the po45
lice read Jones his Miranda warnings before interrogating him.
. Jones initially denied complicity in the crime. He later acknowledged, however, that he had been in the company of Tony Hopson
when Hopson robbed and shot Hines.45 s Jones also admitted that
he received money taken from the victim's purse.4 59 Afterwards,
Jones made a written statement to the police which he read, edited,
and signed.4 6 Josephine Jones, the defendant's grandmother and
guardian, was in an outer office of the police station when Jones
made his statement.4 6 ' Whether the police intentionally prevented
(2) Deliver the child to the court or a place of detention or shelter care
designated by the court.
Id. at (b).
451. 311 Md. at 407, 535 A.2d at 476.
452. Id.
453. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-801 to -836 (1984 & Supp. 1988).

454. 311 Md. at 406-07, 535 A.2d at 475.
455. Id. at 402, 535 A.2d at 473.
456. Id. Jones's cousin testified before a Baltimore City grand jury in connection with
the crime. His statement to the police identified Jones and Tony Hopson as the youths
who robbed the school teacher, Nellie Hines. Hopson shot Hines in the stomach when
she resisted his attempts to steal her purse. Hines subsequently died as a result of the
gunshot wound. Id.
457. Id. For the Miranda warnings, see supra note 131.
458. 311 Md. at 402, 535 A.2d at 473.
459. Id.
460. Id. Before signing his statement, Jones made numerous corrections, many of
them typographical errors. The trial judge noted that this fact indicated that Jones was
..an average intelligent young man [who was] ... interested in accuracy." Id. at 408 n.5.
535 A.2d at 476 n.5.
461. Id. at 402, 535 A.2d at 473. It was unclear from the evidence whether the de-
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Josephine Jones from seeing her grandson and whether she was informed of his situation was not clear from the evidence.48 2
The district court found probable cause to detain the defendant
based on the evidence, Jones's statement, and a statement of
charges. 4 63 A Baltimore City grand jury indicted Jones for armed
robbery, first degree murder, and other related offenses. 4 c" Jones
moved to suppress his inculpatory statement on the ground that police procedures rendered his statement involuntary. The trial judge
denied the motion.4 6 5
Jones was acquitted of the first degree murder and armed robbery charges, but was convicted of robbery in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City. 466 His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion. The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari.4 6 7
On appeal, Jones maintained that the statute-applied because it
specifies that a law enforcement officer must notify a child's parents
or guardian immediately upon taking the child into custody. 4 6 A
literal reading of the statute mandates that any person under eighteen years of age is entitled to the protections of the notification provision. 469 The defendant contended that this interpretation was
consistent with the legislative intent to protect the constitutional
rights ofjuveniles.4 70 Specifically, Jones argued that the notification
provision ensures that the police cannot detain and charge a juvenile with an offense beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and
then discover, upon conclusion of the interrogation, that the juvenile properly belonged in the juvenile court.4 7'
fendant's grandmother was at the station in connection with Jones's cousin's interrogation or with Jones's arrest. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 403, 535 A.2d at 473.
464. Id.
465. Id. Jones argued that he fell within the parental notification and release provisions of§ 3-814(b) of the Juvenile Causes Act and that his statement was obtained involuntarily because the police deliberately failed to comply with the statute's provisions.
The motion was denied on the ground that the statute was inapplicable because Jones
was charged with crimes beyond the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The trial court held
that Jones's statement was voluntary and, therefore, admissible regardless of whether or
not the police had notified his grandmother. Id., 535 A.2d at 473-74. See MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-814(b) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
466. 311 Md. at 403, 535 A.2d at 474.
467. Id.

468. Id., 535 A.2d at 473. For the relevant portion of the statute, see supra note 450.
469. See MD. CTS. &JoD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(d) (Supp. 1988).
470. 311 Md. at 404, 535 A.2d at 474.
471. Id. The defendant relied on Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824
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47 2
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument.
First, the court noted that the primary source for interpreting legislative intent is in the express language of the statute. 47 s This interpretation must be gathered from the whole statute rather than from
just one provision.4 74 The court reasoned that Jones's literal interpretation created an illogical transition from the first to the second
sentence of section 3-814(b), which provides that a child could be
released to a parent or guardian or, alternatively, "to the court or a
place of detention or shelter care designated by the court. '4 7 ' The
reference to "the court" means the juvenile court.47 6 Jurisdiction of
the juvenile court attaches when an authorized party files a petition
alleging that a child is delinquent and in need of supervision.4 7
Nonetheless, article 27, section 594A, regarding the transfer of certain juvenile causes, specifies that when the crime charged "is murder in the first degree and the accused child is 16 or 17 at the time
the alleged offense was committed," the juvenile court may never obtain jurisdiction over thejuvenile. 47 8 Thus,Jones's interpretation of
the statutes would lead to the illogical conclusion that the legislature intended that juveniles accused of murder were to be brought
before a court that, by statute, could not have jurisdiction over
them.47 9
Second, the court found that the defendant's interpretation of

(1977). In that case, the court held that the requirements of a Georgia juvenile detention statute were applicable to a 16-year-old defendant charged as an adult. In dicta, the
court expressed concern that the rules governing confessions of juveniles should be
strictly adhered to "because law enforcement officers cannot be certain when they question a juvenile what kind of case may develop." Id. at 325, 240 S.E.2d at 827.
472. 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 475.
473. Id., 535 A.2d at 474. See In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520, 471 A.2d 313, 315
(1984) ("The primary source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself,
with the words used being given their ordinary and popularly understood meaning, absent a manifest contrary legislative intention.").
474. 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 474. See, e.g., In re Stephen K., 289 Md. 294, 298,
424 A.2d 153, 155 (1981) ("When construing a (particular] provision ...which is part of
a single statutory scheme, the legislative intention must be gathered from the entire
statute, rather than from only one part.").
475. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-814(b)(1), (2) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
476. 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 475.
477. Id. at 405-06, 535 A.2d at 475. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 3804(a), 3-812 (1984 & Supp. 1988). See, e.g., Parojinog v. State, 282 Md. 256, 261-62,
384 A.2d 86, 89 (1978) (juvenile court acquired jurisdiction over 17-year-old defendant
when State filed a petition alleging delinquent acts of arson and conspiracy to commit
arson); Hart v. Bull, 69 Md. App. 229, 233, 516 A.2d 1043, 1045 (1986) (jurisdiction of
the juvenile court does not exist until a petition is filed by the State; only the State and
the offender are proper parties to a juvenile proceeding).
478. MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594A(b)(3) (1987).
479. 311 Md. at 406, 535 A.2d at 475.
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the Juvenile Causes Act was irreconcilable with its stated purposes. . In particular, section 3- 8 02(a)(1) states that "the purposes
of this subtitle are: (1) To provide for the care, protection, and
wholesome mental and physical development of children coming
within the provisions of this subtitle ...,,4
Yet the legislature
clearly did not intend to extend the protections of the statute to all
juveniles.4 8 2 Consequently, the court held that the parental notification provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act do not extend to the statutorily excluded individuals charged with offenses beyond the
juvenile court's jurisdiction. 8 3
Finally, the court considered the question of the validity of
Jones's confession. 4 The court held that because the notification
provisions were inapplicable to Jones, law enforcement noncompli48 5
ance had no bearing on the voluntariness of Jones's confession.
480. Id. The underlying philosophy of the Juvenile Causes Act is that juvenile proceedings are designed specially to meet the peculiar needs of the adolescent. In re
Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 529, 248 A.2d 364, 370 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969).
The proceedings of a juvenile court are not criminal in nature, nor are its dispositions
intended as punishments for crime. In re Wooten, 13 Md. App. 521, 527, 284 A.2d 32,
35 (1971). This notion, however, is limited. That is, § 3-804(e) states that "a juvenile,
14 years old or older, alleged to have done an act which, if committed by an adult, would
be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, as well as other charges arising out
of the same incident" is not within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but must be
tried as an adult. MD.CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(e)( 1) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
The juvenile court's jurisdiction was not intended to extend beyond a delinquent child
in need of protection or rehabilitation. See In re Hamill, 10 Md. App. 586, 591, 271 A.2d
762, 765 (1970).
481. MD. CTs. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-802(a)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1988).
482. 311 Md. at 406. 535 A.2d at 475. MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3804(e)(1), (4) (1984 & Supp. 1988) specifies in relevant part that the juvenile court does
not have jurisdiction over
(1) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have done an act which, if
committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment ....(4) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have committed the crime
of robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon ....
Id.
483. 311 Md. at 406-07, 535 A.2d at 475. The court found Crawford v. State, 240 Ga.
321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977), inapposite to Jones because Georgia, unlike Maryland, permits a juvenile court concurrent jurisdiction with a superior court over a juvenile accused of committing a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. 311 Md. at 407,
535 A.2d at 475-76. See, e.g., Colyer v. State, 577 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tenn. 1979) (holding that the statute was limited in scope to proceedings in the juvenile court and, therefore, extra-judicial statements obtained in violation of that statute could not be excluded
from criminal proceedings).
484. 311 Md. at 407, 535 A.2d at 476.
485. Id. In deciding whether the validity ofJones's confession was affected directly by
the failure to notify his guardian, theJones court first noted that § 3-814(b) of the Juvenile Causes Act was designed to protect the child from unnecessary separation from a
parent or guardian. Id. The court then examined juvenile protection statutes in other
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The court, however, recognized the importance of assuring that
statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before admitting them into evidence.4 8 6
To this end, the court considered the recent decision of McIntyre v. State,48 7 which held that the age of a juvenile is but one factor
in determining the voluntariness of the defendant's confession. 4 8
The validity of a juvenile's confession is more appropriately determined by the totality of the circumstances test.4 89 Consequently, in
Jones, the fact that Jones was not permitted to speak with his grandmother before making an inculpatory statement did not constitute
an abridgement of his constitutional rights. 490 As the court noted,
there was no evidence that Jones ever requested to speak to his
grandmother, 49 ' nor was there evidence that the police coerced the
defendant into making his statement.4 9 2 Indeed, the defendant assured the accuracy of his confession by correcting several typographical errors in his written statement. 493 Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals held the defendant's confession voluntary and admissible and, therefore, affirmed the judgment.4 9 4
TheJones court was asked to resolve a question of pure statutory construction. The issue was neither complex nor difficult to
resolve given the plain meaning of the Juvenile Causes Act. The
court found that a literal reading of the Act, and all relevant provisions therein, excludes the defendant from the purview of section 3814(b).4 9 5 Furthermore, other jurisdictions with analogous statutory provisions similarly have held that the purpose of such statutes
is to protect children from unnecessary separation from a parent or
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Doerr v. State, 346 So. 2d 938, 940-41 (Fla. 1977) (voluntary
confession of 16-year-old defendant was not rendered inadmissible for officer's failure
to notify parents); State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 297, 301 (Utah 1980) (a minor, certified to be
tried as an adult, was not entitled to the benefits of a statute designed to protect statements made by ajuvenile while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court); Theriault v.
State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 50. 223 N.W.2d 850, 857 (1974) (noncompliance with the juvenile
protection statute was only one factor to consider when determining the voluntariness
of the confession).
486. 311 Md. at 407, 535 A.2d at 476.
487. 309 Md. 607, 526 A.2d 30 (1987). For a thorough discussion of .clintYre, see
supra notes 401-448 and accompanying text.
488. McIntyre, 309 Md. at 621, 526 A.2d at 36-37.
489. Id. at 620-21, 526 A.2d at 36-37.
490. 311 Md. at 407-08, 535 A.2d at 476.
491. Id.
492. d. at 408 n.5, 535 A.2d at 476 n.5.
493, See supra note 460.

494. 311 Md. at 408, 535 A.2d at 476.
495, Id. at 405, 535 A.2d at 475.
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guardian; more importantly, where the statute mandates that the
child be tried as an adult, the child is no longer entitled to the benefit of the statute.4 9 6
Strong public policy considerations justify the court's conclusion. A juvenile committing heinous crimes such as rape, murder,
or armed robbery simply should not fall within the purview of the
Juvenile Causes Act. One of the purposes of the Act is "[t]o remove
from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and
the consequences of criminal behavior." '4 97 It is illogical to consider
murder a mere delinquent act. Although the statute defines a delinquent act as "an act which would be a crime if committed by an
adult," '4 98 it also excludes specifically from its jurisdiction "any act
which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by
death or life imprisonment." 4 9' 9 The legislature did not, and in fact
could not, include these heinous of crimes under the Act because to
do so would have violated the spirit of the penal system. The legislature properly recognized the sharp distinction that must be drawn
when treating juveniles who engage in mischievous adolescent behavior and those who commit crimes that are an affront to the mores
of society.
C.

Defenses

In Anderson v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene"° ' the Court
of Appeals held that a statute passed after the commission of a criminal act, affecting substantial rights and changing the consequences
of committing the criminal act in a disadvantageous way to the defendant, falls within the constitutional ex post facto prohibition. 5"'
Consequently, the statute which shifted the burden of proving sanity
from the State to the defendant in an administrative release hearing 50 2 violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions when the criminal conduct of the insane defendant took
496. Id. at 407, 535 A.2d at 476.
497. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
added).
498. Id. § 3-801(k).

ANN.

§ 3-802(a)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis

499. Id. § 3-804(d)(1).
500. 310 Md. 217, 528 A.2d 904 (1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1088 (1988).
501. Id. at 227, 528 A.2d at 909.
502. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-113(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988). The statute provides: "To be released, a committed individual has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence eligibility for discharge or eligibility for conditional release."
Id.
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place prior to the effective date of the statute.
Late in 1980 Anderson shot and killed his brother. 5 ° 4 At..the
conclusion of his trial, Anderson was found "not guilty by reason of
insanity." 5°5 The trial court committed Anderson to the Clifton T.
Perkins Hospital Center in accordance with the recommendation of
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH). °6
Three years later, Anderson applied for an administrative re50 7
lease hearing to request a release from the mental institution.
The circuit court granted the request but held that the determination shall be conducted under the amended laws regarding criminal
insanity which became effective July 1, 1984.508 The effect of this
ruling was to place the burden of proof in the administrative proceeding on Anderson instead of on the State as the prior law had
mandated. 0 9 The circuit court rejected the argument that applying
the new law to Anderson would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.5 '0 On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the circuit court decision and held that the ex post
facto clause was not violated because institutional confinement is
not a penal or punitive consequence.5 "' The Court of Appeals is51 2
sued a writ of certiorari to consider the issue.
The court's first step in determining whether the statute, as applied to Anderson, violated the prohibition of ex post facto laws was
to define the scope of the amendments to the statute. Under the
prior statute, the State had the burden of proving, beyond a reason503. 310 Md. at 230, 528 A.2d at 911.
504. 64 Md. App. 674, 676, 498 A.2d 679, 680 (1985).
505. 310 Md. at 219, 528 A.2d at 905. The court recognized in Langworthy v. State,
284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979), that this terminology is incorrect because the trial
court found the defendant guilty of the crime charged but insane at the time of commission. Id. at 599 n.12, 399 A.2d at 584 n.12. The more accurate term used to describe

the defendant is the term chosen by the Court of Special Appeals, that of "insanity acquittee." 64 Md. App. at 679, 498 A.2d at 680.
506. 310 Md. at 219, 528 A.2d at 905.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. See supra note 502.
510. 310 Md. at 219, 528 A.2d at 905. Maryland's guarantee against enactment of ex
post facto laws is as follows: "That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before
the existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust
and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made- nor
any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed or required."

MD. CONST. DECL. OF

RTS. art. 17. The federal constitution provides: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
511. 64 Md. App. at 694, 498 A.2d at 689.
512. 310 Md. at 220, 528 A.2d at 906.
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able doubt, the sanity of the defendant in the initial trial. 51 3 If the
trial court found the accused guilty of the crime charged but insane
at the time of the crime, the individual was committed for a limited
period to DHMH to determine if he or she needed indefinite institutional confinement." 4 The prior law also allowed for periodic requests for release by an administrative proceeding with judicial
review 5 " a direct statutory judicial proceeding,5 6 or a habeas
corpus proceeding." 7 At an administrative trial, the State had the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant should continue to be confined. 1 8
The amended statute substantially changed these provisions.
First, in the initial criminal trial, the defendant now has the burden
of establishing the defense of not criminally responsible. 5 t 9 The defendant is committed automatically for an indefinite period of time
upon a finding that he or she was not criminally responsible. 520 Finally, in an administrative release hearing, the defendant has the
burden of establishing that he or she should be released from the
institution. 52 ' This latter statutory change was directly at issue on
appeal in Anderson.
5 2 2 and federal versions 5 23
The court stated that both the state
of the ex post facto clause provide the same protection .524 In particular, the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws applies
513. Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 513, 200 A.2d 150, 155 (1964). This rule is
purely doctrinal and is not mandated by the old statute.
514. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-109 to -113 (1982).
515. Id. § 12-114(b).
516. Id. at (c).
517. Id. § 10-804.
518. 310 Md. at 221, 528 A.2d at 906. Under a direct statutory judicial release proceeding, however, the burden of proving that he or she should no longer be committed
was placed on the defendant. Id.
519. Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-109(b) (Supp. 1988).
520. Id. § 12 -111(a).
521. Id. § 12-113(d). The Court of Special Appeals noted in Anderson that these
changes in the law most likely are the result of the Supreme Court decision in Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983), which upheld a District of Columbia law with
the same provisions as Maryland's amended law. 64 Md. App. at 681-82, 498 A.2d at
683.
522. MD. CONST. DECL, OF RTS. art. 17. In Maryland "the prohibition of ex post facto
laws applies only to criminal cases." Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602. 609,471 A.2d 730,
734 (1984) (citations omitted).
523. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Under the federal constitution, "the restriction not
to pass any ex post facto laws was intended to secure the person of the subject from
injury or punishment, in consequence of such law." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386,
390 (1798). See also Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2450-51 (1987) (reiterating the
scope of the ex post facto clause).
524. 310 Md. at 223. 528 A.2d at 907.
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to any law passed after the commission of an offense which in relation to that offense, or its consequences, puts an individual at a
greater disadvantage than he or she would have been in prior to the
change in the law. 5 2 5
The critical threshold determination to be made concerning the
ex post facto clause is whether the change in the consequences affecting the individual is penal or punitive. The Court of Appeals,
relying on Supreme Court precedent, declared that the change in
consequences must be punitive or must enhance the punishment in
order to implicate the ex post facto prohibition.5 26 The State's principal argument focused upon the proposition "that the ex post facto
clauses are inapplicable to changes in the law relating to the 'civil'
consequences of a criminal act or the consequences of a criminal act
which do not constitute 'punishment.' -527
The court rejected this narrow application of the ex post facto
clause.5 28 The court reasoned that the majority of Supreme Court
cases propose that the ex post facto prohibition applies when the
legislation, passed after the commission of a crime, affects substantial rights and changes the consequences of committing the crime to
5 29
the disadvantage of the offender.
While this appears to be the explicit holding of the court, it
elected to take its analysis one step further. The court stated that
even if the consequences constitute a form of punishment, as both
the dissent5 . and the lower court holding suggested, the concept of
525. See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1883).
526. 310 Md. at 226, 528 A.2d at 909. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
594 (1952) (ex post facto provision forbids "penal legislation which imposes or increases criminal punishment for conduct lawful previous to its enactment. Deportation,
however severe its consequences," is not subject to the ex post facto prohibition).
527. 310 Md. at 227, 528 A.2d at 909. The State asserted that the purposes of commitment was not for punishment but for rehabilitation of the individual and protection
of society from these potentially dangerous individuals. Id. at 227-28, 528 A.2d at 90910.
528. Id. at 227, 528 A.2d at 909.
529. Id. at 226, 528 A.2d at 909. A number of Supreme Court cases contain general
language as to the "disadvantage" to a defendant, never explicitly mentioning the words
"penal" or "punitive." See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2452 (1987) (ex post
facto clause prohibited retroactive changes in sentencing guidelines); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (statute violates the ex post facto clause because it violates
disadvantaged petitioner and other similarly situated prisoners); Lindsey v. Washington,
301 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937) (legislation passed after commission of crime changed consequences to the substantial disadvantage of the petitioners); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160,
171 (1890) (laws passed after commission of an offense that inflict greater punishment
or otherwise disadvantage the accused are ex post facto laws).
530. The dissent argued that the majority's reliance upon the discussion in Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 597, 399 A.2d 578, 583 (1979), concerning the nature of the
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punishment is not limited to a prison sentence or a fine, but should
include confinement in a mental institution."' Rationalizing this
broad interpretation, the court emphasized that the confinement in
a mental hospital constitutes the disposition portion of the judg53 2
ment in the criminal trial which declared the defendant guilty.
More importantly, the Court of Appeals focused upon the consequences and effect of institutional confinement upon a committed
individual.5 3 Thus, the court implicitly rejected the notion that a
court should examine the statutory purpose when determining
whether a law is penal in character. 5 4 By removing this barrier and
determining that the law is punitive, the Court of Appeals concluded the statute as applied to Anderson violated the ex post facto
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 5
The specific holding of this case may not apply to a great
number of individuals. That is, by a narrow reading only those individuals who were committed to a mental hospital based upon criminal acts before July 1, 1984, and who seek release through an
administrative hearing, will be relieved of the burden of proving
that he or she currently is sane and no longer needs institutional
confinement in an institution is misplaced. Rather than characterizing the confinement,
the Langworthy discussion is merely a "technical discussion of a jurisdictional-procedural
issue." 310 Md. at 232, 528 A.2d at 912 (Rodowsky,J., dissenting). According to the
dissent, the proper conclusion must be based upon the discussion in Langworthy stating
that an insane accused is to be found guilty but is not to be punished for his or her acts.
Lang-aorthy, 284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584. Judge Rodowsky concluded that the ex
post facto prohibition was not implicated in Anderson. 310 Md. at 232, 528 A.2d at 912.
531. 310 Md. at 227-29, 528 A.2d at 909-10.
532. Id. at 224-25, 528 A.2d at 908. See Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 270, 465 A.2d
475, 478 (1983) ("The legislature . . . has not seen fit to remove all consequences of
committing a criminal act while insane, e.g., the defendant may be held in a mental institution until it is determined that release would not constitute a danger to the individual
or to the person or property of others"); Langworthv,.284 Md. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583
(commitment to a mental hospital is the "disposition" portion of the judgment in the
criminal case).
533. 310 Md. at 228-29, 528 A.2d at 910.
534. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1958) ("In deciding whether or not a law
is penal, this Court has generally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute ....
But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to
punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose"). The Anderson
court recognized that the purpose of commitment is for treatment and not for punishment. 310 Md. at 228, 528 A.2d at 910. A rehabilitative purpose instead of a penal
purpose, however, should not dismiss the statute from the purview of the ex post facto
doctrine. Indeed, it would be an anomaly to state that the consequences were not punitive merely because the statutory purpose was not punitive. If a statute has punitive
effects, it should be regarded as punitive. Examples of the adverse effects of confinement
in a mental institution include the deprivation of liberty and the social stigma accompanying the label of mental patient. Id.
535. 310 Md. at 230. 528 A.2d at 911.
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confinement. The burden of disproving the confined individual's
sanity will be placed upon the State.
The scope of this decision is potentially much broader. That is,
because the consequences of a change in the law need only disadvantage the individual and not necessarily be punitive in nature, ex
post facto arguments may be more widely available.
D.

Sentencing

1. Common-law Assault and Battery.-In Ireland v. State5 36 the
Court of Appeals held that a trial court could permissibly impose a
three-year prison term for common-law assault and battery, even
though the common law which seemingly permitted only fines was
not modified by the legislature.5"" In so ruling, the court determined that American and British common-law precedent gave the
trial judge broad discretionary power to sentence individuals convicted of common-law crimes.5 38 The court, however, never
reached the question of whether a judge can modify the common
law by imposing a three-year prison sentence for assault and battery.
Instead, the court stressed that it was merely exercising its unquestioned authority to interpret the common law.5 3 9
William M. Ireland was charged in the district court with committing a battery against his estranged wife by kicking and beating
her.5 40 The case was removed to the circuit court when Ireland demanded a jury trial.5 4 ' In the circuit court, the jury convicted Ireland of the battery and the judge imposed a sentence of three years.
Ireland appealed.5 4 2
The Court of Special Appeals upheld the conviction and sentence of the trial court 5 43 and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider the defendant's argument that the court simply did
not have the authority to imprison a person convicted of assault and
battery.5 44 The defendant argued that to allow the courts to modify
536. 310 Md. 328, 529 A.2d 365 (1987).
537. Id. at 341, 529 A.2d at 371.
538. Id. at 334, 529 A.2d at 368.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 330, 529 A.2d at 365-66.
541. Id., 529 A.2d at 366. See MD. R. 3-325 (demand for jury trial).
542. 310 Md. at 330, 529 A.2d at 366.
543. Id.
544. Id. In essence, Ireland contended that the legislature's failure to provide for a
particular penalty for assault and battery, coupled with the notion that, for these crimes,
a prison sentence was not a legally permissible sanction according to the received com.
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the received common law, especially in the area of criminal law,
would be tantamount to legislative action.5 4 5
The Court of Appeals emphatically disagreed with this logic. It
noted that "the resolution of [the] case turns not upon the power of
this Court to modify the common law, but upon its unquestioned
authority to determine and interpret that law." ' 54 6 The court reasoned that its authority extended not only to enforcing the received
common law of England, but also toward ensuring that it be implemented consistently with the letter and spirit of the state constitution and political institutions. 54 7 Although arguably the defendant
may have been correct in asserting that the court had only changed
the common law with respect to procedure,5 4 8 the court nonetheless
stated that its authority to interpret both procedural and substantive
law was well established by precedent. 4 9
In modern times the court has not abided strictly by the rule
that only the legislature has the authority to modify the common
law. For example, in Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc. 510 the court noted a
ten-year-old doctrine which recognized the inherent dynamism of
the common law that enables it to stay abreast of the changing
needs of society.5 5 ' In justifying its modification of the common-law
principles of strict liability to allow recovery against manufacturers
for damages caused by a criminal's use of a "Saturday Night Special," the court held that "[t]he common law is, therefore, subject to
judicial modification in light of modern circumstances or increased
mon law of England as of July 4, 1776, showed conclusively that the court was not empowered to provide a legal sanction where one previously did not exist. Id.
545. Id. at 332, 529 A.2d at 367. Traditionally, it was left to the legislature to determine the appropriate penalty for violations of the common law. In State v. Buchanan, 5

H. &J. 317 (Md. 1821), the court stated that "[the common law, like our Acts of Assembly, are subject to the control and modification of the Legislature .
Id. at 366.
546. 310 Md. at 334, 529 A.2d at 368.
547. Id. at 331, 529 A.2d at 366.
548. The defendant argued that the modifications which the court cites largely affected only procedural matters, and in cases where substantive changes were made, the
changes subtracted from, rather than added to, the existing common law. Id. at 333, 529
A.2d at 367.
549. The court attempted to reconcile the defendant's contentions with its historical
role in the development of the criminal common law. The court arrived at three possible results. First, if the court's changes in the common law were merely procedural, it
could mean an implicit recognition by the court that creating crimes and punishments is
strictly within the province of the legislature. Second, it may imply an exercise in judicial restraint in an area where the judiciary and the legislature share the authority to
create new crimes and fashion appropriate punishments. Or third, it could mean merely
that the court has never had an occasion to rule on such a modification. Id.
550. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
551. Id. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
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knowledge." 5 51 The court noted, however, that its latitude in modifying the common law is limited by the public policy set forth by the
General Assembly. 5 '
The court also rejected Ireland's argument that the only permitted sanction for the crime of battery was a criminal fine. 55 4 It
cited a large number of cases where the legislature did not provide a
penalty and the court had to decide whether the punishment for
common-law misdemeanors was to be a fine, imprisonment, or
both.5"5 The sole limitation upon the court's authority to impose
these penalties is the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. 55 6 The opinion noted that judges in both
England and colonial America historically had broad discretion in
battery cases to impose either a fine or a prison sentence.55 '
The authority of the court to modify and interpret the common
law was established in the seminal case of State v. Buchanan.55 8 In
552. Id. at 140, 497 A.2d at 1150-51. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 354-56,
509 A.2d 120, 125-26 (1986) (acknowledging changes in the common law of allocution
since 1776);Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153,. 161, 486 A.2d 184, 188-89 (1985) (modifying
common law to permit an accessory to be convicted of a crime greater than that which
the principal was convicted); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522
(1983) (abrogating common-law rule of interspousal immunity in negligence cases).
553. Kelly, 304 Md. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd.
of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983) (refusing to abandon the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence in deference to legislative intent to keep
it).
In addition to the changes in the civil common law, the court also has exercised its
discretion over criminal common-law cases. The broad range of modifications made to
the criminal common law in recent years seems to support the proposition that the court
indeed possesses an unquestioned authority to determine and interpret the common law
in civil suits as well as criminal cases. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738. 751, 517
A.2d 94, 101 (1986) (the depraved heart species of common-law murder does not require that more than one life be placed in danger); Evans v. State, 301 Md. 45, 57-58,
481 A.2d 1135, 1141 (1984), cert. denied sub non. Grandison v. Maryland, 470 U.S. 1034
(1985) (changing common law regarding double jeopardy to permit successive prosecution for the same offense by separate sovereigns).
554. 310 Md. at 334, 529 A.2d at 368.
555. Id. at 335, 529 A.2d at 368. See, e.g., Street v. State, 307 Md. 262, 266, 513 A.2d
870, 872 (1986) (common-law offense of false imprisonment has no statutorily prescribed penalty; sole restriction on sentencing is that the sentence be within reasonable
discretion of trial judge); Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277, 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964)
(refusing to construe penal limits for statutory assaults by implying legislative intent to
confine sentences for common-law assault to less than those prescribed for statutory
assaults); State v. Falkenham, 73 Md. 463, 466, 21 A. 370, 371 (1891) (legislature attached no specific penalty for misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals, but left to the
courts to impose punishment of fine, imprisonment, or both).
556. 310 Md. at 335, 529 A.2d at 368. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIIl; MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RTS. arts. 16, 25.

557. 310 Md. at 334, 529 A.2d at 368.
558. 5 H. &J. 317 (Md. 1821). In Buchanan the court considered whether a charge of
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Buchanan Chief Judge Chase first considered the nature of the English common law and whether it was the law of the State of Maryland. " 9 Judge Chase characterized the common law of England as a
"system of jurisprudence founded on the immutable principles of
justice15 60 and confirmed that Maryland not only. embraced the
common law of England, but asserted its right to that law by the
Declaration of Rights in 1776.56 The Buchanan court held that it
came within the province of the judiciary to determine the nature of
the common law and whether particular aspects of the common law
applied to the circumstances of the State and what parts of the com62
mon law have become obsolete from nonuse or other causes.
The court carefully pointed out, however, that the common law was
subject to the control of the legislature which had the authority
to
63
abrogate or modify the common law as it deemed necessary.1
The gravamen of the Ireland opinion is that the court was not
modifying the common law when it allowed a three-year prison term
for assault and battery. Instead, the court was merely exercising its
authority to interpret the common law when it concluded that the
three-year prison sentence was justifiable. Despite the court's apparent diffidence in modifying the common law, the results of this case
are correct.
The court could have approached this case three ways. First, the
court could have stated that it was empowered to modify the common law and, therefore, could have sentenced the defendant to a
common-law conspiracy to defraud the Bank of the United States (the Bank) fell within
the jurisdiction of Maryland state courts. The defendant argued that common-law conspiracy was not an indictable offense in England at the time the State of Maryland
adopted the common law. Buchanan argued that the court's authority was limited to the
common law established by English judicial precedent and not the common law expanded upon by subsequent decisions. Because the common-law offense of conspiracy
applied only to persons or beings known to the State, the Bank, which was created by a
foreign government, was not subject to the laws of the State. Id. at 328-29.
559. Id. at 365.
560. Id.
561. Id. Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights states:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England . . .as existed on the Fourth day ofJuly. seventeen hundred and seventysix; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and
other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the
Courts of Law or Equity; .. .except such as may have since expired, or may be
inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to
the revision of, and amendment or repeal of, by the Legislature of this State
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5.
562. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. &J. 317, 365-66 (Md. 1821).
563. Id.
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prison term of three years. Second, the court could have stated that
it was merely interpreting the common law and that the common
law allowed prison sentences. Third, the court could have stated
that the common law does not allow for prison terms, thereby simply refusing to modify the common law. The court chose the second
method. In so choosing, the court detracted from its authority in
order to mold the common law to fit the changing needs of modern
society.
In both Robinson v. State56 4 and Harris v. State 56 5 the Court of
Appeals recently stressed the need to modify the common law
where society had outgrown its confines. Indeed, society has
changed since the common law was received from England in 1776.
Society in the last two hundred years is more enlightened, and assault and battery are considered more serious offenses.
Perhaps the Ireland court should have overtly modified the common law in this instance because its authority to interpret the common law as allowing a three-year prison sentence is scant at best. 56 6

Where, however, there is little or no authority that reconciles the
court's result with existing law, and societal views and circumstances
have changed substantially, it is best for the court simply to acknowledge that it is modifying the common law.
2. Capital Sentencing.---a. Mitigating Factors.-The Supreme
Court in Mills v. Aaryland5 6 ' held that Maryland's death penalty statute 5 68 was unconstitutionally mandatory as applied to Mills; therefore, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
resentencing. 56 9 Although conceding that the Court of Appeals
construction of the statute was plausible, the Court could not conclude with sufficient certainty that the jury did not adopt Mills's interpretation of the verdict form and jury instructions, thus basing its
sentencing decision on improper grounds.5 70 In so holding, the
564. 307 Md. 738, 750-51, 517 A.2d 94, 100 (1986).
565. 306 Md. 344, 357, 509 A.2d 120, 126 (1986).
566. In fact, the court's reasoning centers primarily on post-revolutionary English
common law, which is merely persuasive. 310 Md. at 337-39, 529 A.2d at 369-70.
567. 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988), vacating 310 Md. 33, 527 A.2d 3 (1987).
568. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1987).
569. 108 S. Ct. at 1870. Mills was not the only one to benefit from this decision. The
Court of Appeals subsequently held in State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 548 A.2d 506 (1988),
that the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in .ills applies retroactively in accordance with § 645A(d) of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, thus requiring that
Colvin's sentence be vacated. Id. at 24-25, 548 A.2d at 517-18. See Mo. ANN. CODE art.
27. § 645A(d) (1987 & Supp. 1988).
570. 108 S. Ct. at 1867. See infra notes 578-580 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court forced the State to grapple once again with its death
penalty statute, thus fine-tuning the law to conform with federal
constitutional jurisprudence. I
On August 6, 1984, correctional officers at the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, Maryland, investigated a disturbance in Ralph William Mills's prison cell. 5 72 Upon opening the cell
door, Mills emerged carrying a blood-stained-homemade knife.57 3
Inside, the officers found his cellmate's body, stabbed six times in
the chest and thirty-nine times in the back.5 74
A state court jury convicted Mills of first degree murder. 5 In
the sentencing portion of the trial, the jury found that the State had
established that Mills had committed the murder while confined in a
correctional institution, a statutory aggravating circumstance.5
Notwithstanding defense counsel's attempt to establish the presence
of certain mitigating circumstances, the jury marked "no" beside
each of the mitigating circumstances listed on the verdict form and
returned a sentence of death. 7 7
571. Changes in Maryland's death penalty law have been frequent. The Court of Appeals has declared the statute unconstitutional on more than one occasion. See, e.g.,
Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 473, 365 A.2d 545, 549 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918
(1977) (failure of the Maryland death penalty statute to provide precise guidelines enabling sentencing authority to focus upon particularized mitigation factors rendered
statute unconstitutional); Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 184, 297 A.2d 696. 701
(1972) (imposition of death sentence under any of the presently existing discretionary
statutes of Maryland which authorize that penalty is unconstitutional under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments). The court decided Blachwell in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furman Court declared that mandatory death penalty statutes for first degree murder were unconstitutional because they did not allow the sentencer to weigh mitigating circumstances and
the character of the offense before deciding to impose the death sentence. d. at 239-40.
Moreover, in response to three Supreme Court cases upholding death penalty statutes
where the sentencing authority had been adequately directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious action, see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 206-07 (1976), the state legislature crafted yet another death penalty statute. See
Act of Mar. 10, 1978, ch. 3, 1978 Md. Laws 6 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413
(1987)). This law added seven specific mitigating circumstances to be considered along
with the same aggravating circumstances of the previous law. Finally, in response to
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), the legislature amended the law to add an
eighth mitigating factor for any other facts which the factfinder sets forth in writing as
mitigating circumstances in the case. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (1987).
572. 310 Md. at 39, 527 A.2d at 5.
573. Id.
574. Id. Three weeks prior to the incident, Mills had written to the warden threatening to kill his cellmate if certain complaints were not satisfactorily resolved. Id.
575. 108 S. Ct. at 1863.
576. Id. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(2) (1987).
577. Id. Among the mitigating factors recognized by statute are:
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Mills challenged, inter alia, that the capital punishment statute
as applied to him was unconstitutionally mandatory.5 7 8 He argued
that the statute 5 79 as explained to the jury and implemented by the
verdict form mandated the imposition of the death penalty if the
jury was unable to agree unanimously as to the existence of any one
mitigating circumstance.58 0
The Court of Appeals rejected Mills's argument, asserting that
he had misconstrued the statute.-5 ' The court stated that nothing in
the pertinent language of the statute purports to abolish the traditional common-law and state requirements that, absent a waiver,
jury determinations on critical issues must be unanimous. 5 s 2 Moreover, the court held that the unanimity requirement applies to the
entire jury determination, including not only the acceptance but
also the rejection of mitigating circumstances.58 3
4. The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental
disorder or emotional disturbance.
5. The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
7. It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity
that would constitute a threat to society.
8. Any other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in
writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case.
MD. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 4 13(g) (1987). The defense introduced evidence that Mills
had only a sixth grade education, that he was only 20 years old at the time of the murder.
and that he had been in trouble since an early age. 108 S. Ct. at 1863 n.l. At the time of
the murder, Mills was serving the second year of a 30-year sentence for second degree
murder. Id.
578. 108 S. Ct. at 1863. In particular, Mills argued that a statutory scheme mandating
imposition of death without allowing the sentencer to consider factors which could
speak to the imposition of a lesser sentence was unconstitutionally mandatory. 310 Md.
at 50, 527 A.2d at 11. Accord Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(considering the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances
of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of imposing the death penalty).
579. The death penalty statute provides in relevant part: "if [the court or jury] finds
that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the
sentence shall be death." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h)(2) (1987).
580. 108 S. Ct. at 1864. The instructions on the verdict form indicated that if any
aggravating circumstances were present and the jury found no mitigating circumstances
to exist, the jury should enter a verdict of death. 310 Md. at 49, 527 A.2d at I1. Thus,
Mills argued, if the jury believed that a lack of unanimity as to the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance required the entry of "no" as to the existence of that circumstance, the jury would be prevented from considering any mitigating factors if the jury
was unable to agree unanimously on any one circumstance. Id. at 52, 527 A.2d at 12.
581. 310 Md. at 52, 527 A.2d at 12.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 53-54, 527 A.2d at 12-13. The court cited § 413(i) to support its proposi-
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The Court of Appeals reasoned that the unanimity requirement
was presented clearly to the jury not only by the judge's instructions
but also by the express wording of the sentencing form: "we unanimously find that each of the following mitigating circumstances
which is marked 'yes' has been proven to exist ... and each mitigating circumstance marked 'no' has not been proven
. *584
The

Court of Appeals concluded that "[als long as one juror believes
that there exists a mitigating factor, and that this factor is not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, and if such juror continues to adhere to his or her position, the sentence will not be death
58 5
under the statutory scheme.-

. In arriving at its decision to vacate the sentence, the Supreme
Court quoted Lockett v. Ohio'6 to support the proposition that it is
beyond dispute that in a capital case, "the sentencer [may] not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death."5'8 7 The Court also concluded that, to the extent that Mills's
argument was correct, a jury that does not unanimously agree on
the existence of the same mitigating circumstances will be precluded
from considering mitigating evidence at all, thus automatically conferring a death sentence upon the defendant.58 8
tion: "(i) Determination to be written and unanimous.-The determination of the court or
jury shall be in writing, and, if a jury, shall be unanimous and shall be signed by the
foreman." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(i) (1987).
584. 310 Md. at 58-59, 527 A.2d at 15. Additionally, the court noted that the trial
judge instructed the jury more than once that "your decision with regard to any of these
items must be unanimous." Id. at 58, 527 A.2d at 15.
585. Id. at 54, 527 A.2d at 13. The difficulty arises when the jury is unable to agree
unanimously on all issues submitted. The Court of Appeals noted that the statute permitted dismissal of the jury and a court-imposed death sentence "[if) the jury, within a
reasonable time, is not able to agree as to whether a sentence of death shall be imposed." Id. at 64,527 A.2d at 18. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(k)(2) (1987). Additionally, short of pulling the matter from the jury, the court held that
with regard to mitigating circumstances, the jury should mark the sentencing
form "yes" for each mitigating circumstance which is unanimously found to
exist, mark the form "no" for each mitigating circumstance which is unanimously found not to exist, and leave the form blank with regard to those mitigating circumstance[s] (if any) as to which there is disagreement.
310 Md. at 68, 527 A.2d at 20.
586. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
587. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, quoted in 108 S. Ct. at 1865 (emphasis in original). See
also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1986) (holding that the trial court's
exclusion of favorable testimony of two jailers and a regular visitor denied petitioner his
right to place before the jury all relevant mitigating evidence).
588. 108 S. Ct. at 1866. The Court noted that the manner in which a barrier to the
sentencer's consideration of all mitigating evidence is interposed is irrelevant. Id. Exam-
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The Court's central concern was whether the jury rested its decision on improper grounds, i.e., that the failure to find unanimously
that a mitigating circumstance existed required the entry of "no"
next to that circumstance on the verdict form. 5 8 9 The Court stated
that the general rule is that a jury's verdict must be set aside if the
verdict could be supported on one ground, but not on another, and
the reviewing court is uncertain as to which of the two grounds was
relied upon by the jury in making their determination. 590 In addressing this issue, the Court focused on what a reasonable jury
could have inferred from the jury instructions and verdict form in
this case.5 9 1
Upon review of the evidence before it, the Court was unable to
conclude that the jury did not adopt Mills's interpretation. 592 The
Court examined, albeit unsuccessfully, the judge's instructions and
the verdict form itself for evidence sufficient to support the Court of
Appeals interpretation. 59 3 Neither the instructions nor the sentencing form contained any directions to complete the form as the court
suggested. Thus, an entry of "no" for all mitigating circumstances
pies of defeated barriers include those interposed by statute, see Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605;
by the sentencing court, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); and by
evidentiary ruling, see Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7-9. North Carolina's death penalty statute
provides that if the defendant fails to convince all of the jurors of the existence of a
particular mitigating circumstance, he or she has failed to meet the required evidentiary
burden, and the evidence relating to that circumstance becomes legally irrelevant. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1988). See also State v. McKoy, 372 S.E.2d 12, 33-34
(NC 1988) (holding that the removal of such evidence from the jury does not compromise the sentencing procedure because of the legal irrelevance of the evidence).
589. 108 S. Ct. at 1867.
590. Id. at 1866. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (holding that the
verdict had to be set aside when it could be supported on one ground, but not on another, and it was impossible to tell which ground the jury selected); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931) (where one of the possible grounds upon which the
verdict could have been based was invalid, if it was impossible to distinguish which one
was relied upon, the conviction should not be upheld).
In reviewing death sentences, the Court has demanded even greater certainty. See.
e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("ITIhe risk that the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty
... is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments"); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948) ("In death cases
doubts .

.

. should be resolved in favor of the accused"). See also Zant v. Stephens, 462

U.S. 862, 885 (1983) ("The severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the
review of any colorable claim of error.").
591. 108 S. Ct. at 1866. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979)
("The Supreme Court of Montana is, of course, the final authority to be given a presumption under Montana law, but it is not the authority on the interpretation which a
jury could have given the instruction.").
592. 108 S. Ct. at 1867. See supra notes 578-580 and accompanying text.
593. 108 S. Ct. at 1867-68.
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did not permit the jury to weigh the mitigating circumstances along
with the aggravating, notwithstanding any doubts that may have existed.5 9 4 Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals promulgated a new
sentencing form on an emergency basis while awaiting the Supreme
Court decision. The new form expressly incorporated the require59 5
ment of unanimity for the rejection of a mitigating circumstance.
The Supreme Court also analyzed this new form when formulating
5 96
its decision to vacate the sentence.

While recognizing the plausibility of the Court of Appeals analysis 59 7 and the lack of any extrinsic evidence as to what the jury really thought,5 9 the Court decided that there was "at least a
substantial risk that the jury was misinformed.

' 599

Notwithstanding

the trial court's instructions on the unanimity requirement, the
Court found it difficult to believe that a jury would leave blanks on
such a form unless specifically instructed to do so, and therefore
rejected the Court of Appeals interpretation. °°
Although the new findings and sentencing form promulgated
by the Court of Appeals eliminate the specific ambiguities relating
to the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances that were at
issue in Mills, the Supreme Court's decision is a sharp reminder of
the Court's continuing concern over the imposition of the death
penalty. Thus, while continuing to uphold the death penalty itself,
the Court will retain a sympathetic ear for appeals when a state fails
to adhere to the strict guidelines for imposing this uniquely irreversible sentence.

594. Id.

595. See MD. R. 4-343(e).
596. 108 S. Ct. at 1867-68. See MD. R. 4-343(e).
597. 108 S. Ct. at 1867.
598. Id. at 1869.
599. Id. Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed that a reasonable
jury would have considered the evidence in a constitutional manner. Id. at 1875 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist went further, addressing the issue not reached
by the majority: whether certain evidence admitted at trial was in violation of the Court's
holding in Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 (1987), that the use of victim impact statements (VISs) in a capital sentencing case was unconstitutional. The .Millsdissent not only challenged the holding in Booth, but questioned the entire philosophy that
requires introduction of exhaustive mitigating evidence. 108 S. Ct. at 1876. The dissent
argued that by providing mitigating evidence such as in Mills while failing to provide
information on the loss to the victim's family and to society, the jury is prevented from
meaningfully assessing the defendant's "moral culpability and blameworthiness." Id.
600. 108 S. Ct. at 1870.
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b. Victim Impact Statements.-The Court of Appeals held in Harris v. State6 °1 that a victim impact statement (VIS) may not be used
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder case. 60 2 The court
relied on Booth v. Maryland6 " in which the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals,60 4 holding that the introduc60 5
tion of a VIS in such situations violated the eighth amendment
because it created a risk that the capital sentencing decision would
be made arbitrarily.60 6 Concluding that the use of a VIS violated the
eighth amendment, the Supreme Court invalidated the statute 607 requiring the use of these statements. 60 8
Jackie Kevin Harris pleaded guilty to first degree murder,
armed robbery, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime
of violence.6" 9 He received a death sentence which had twice been
reimposed by the Court of Appeals. 6 ' Harris, however, appealed
from the latest reimposition of the death sentence, relying primarily
61
on the use of VISs at his most recent sentencing hearing. '
Briefly, the State introduced separate statements from Frances
R. and William L. Hviding, Jr., the mother and brother of the murder victim, Steven Hviding, at the sentencing hearing. 6 12 Each family member discussed their personal grief and the negative impact of
Steven's death on their emotional well being. 6 - William's VIS,
however, also included his opinions about the crime itself, asking
601. 312 Md. 225, 539 A.2d 637 (1988).
602. Id. at 237, 539 A.2d at 642.
603. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987). See generally Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knellfor the
Victim Impact Statement?, 47 Mr. L. REv. 701 (1988). The Supreme Court will revisit the
VIS issue in South Carolina v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140, cert. granted, 109 S.

Ct. 218 (1988). The questions presented for oral argument are (1) whether, under the
eighth amendment as construed in Booth, a prosecutor may comment during the sentencing hearing on characteristics of the victim based on evidence admitted at trial, and
(2) whether Booth was wrongly decided. 57 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1988).
604. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986).
605. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
606. Booth, 107 S.Ct. at 2536.
607. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1987) states: "In any case in which the death
penalty is requested . . . a presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement ...shall be considered by the court or jury before whom the separate sentencing
proceeding is conducted ...." Id.
608. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 (1987).
609. 312 Md. at 231-32, 539 A.2d at 640.
610. id. at 232, 539 A.2d at 640.
611. Id. at 233, 539 A.2d at 640.
612. These statements were introduced at the sentencing hearing before the Supreme
Court had prohibited their use in Booth. Id. at 234-35, 539 A.2d at 641.
613. Id. at 235, 539 A.2d at 641.
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the sentencers to "think about your closest friend or relative being
murdered . . . gasping for air after being shot repeatedly by an
armed robber. ' '61 4 The Court of Appeals held that the VISs were
inadmissible under Booth because they impermissibly focused on
"the victim and the effect on his family, ' ' 61 5 rather than on the ac61 6
cused; the court vacated the death sentence.
The Court of Appeals first examined the use of VISs in a capital
case of Lodowski v. State.61 7 The court reviewed the history of the
VIS legislation 6 "18 and concluded that "the legislature did not believe that victim impact evidence was an arbitrary factor ...[but] it
has expressly authorized consideration of such evidence in non-capital cases and required its consideration in capital cases." 6 ' 9 In response to the defendant's assertion that the sentence should be
fashioned to reflect the facts and circumstances surrounding the
crime and the individual being sentenced, the court declared, in
614. Id., 539 A.2d at 642.
615. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2534 (1987).
616. 312 Md. at 233, 539 A.2d at 640.
617. 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985). The victim impact evidence in Lodowski
consisted of written statements, family pictures, and testimony describing in graphic detail the adverse effect the murder of each victim had on his respective family. Id. at 73536, 490 A.2d at 1251.
618. The issue of VISs began with the 1982 enactment of chapter 494 which required
that the Division of Parole and Probation provide a presentence investigation, including
a VIS, to the judge of a court prior to the sentencing of felons who had caused "physical,
psychological or economic injury." Act ofJune 1, 1982, ch. 494, 1982 Md. Laws 3108,
3110 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(2)(1) (1986)). A VIS
should:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim
or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense
upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986). In 1983 the legislature expressly required
VISs for capital cases and allowed family members to provide the information if the
victim was deceased or unable to provide the information. Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 297,
1983 Md. Laws 1046-47 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1986)). Further, § 4-609(c)(4) states: "If the victim is deceased, under a mental, physical, or legal
disability, or otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section,
the information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or committee, or such family members as may be necessary." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4609(c)(4) (1986).
619. Lodowski, 302 Md. at 738, 490 A.2d at 1252.
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dicta, that "there is a reasonable nexus between the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family and the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime especially as to the gravity or aggravating quality of the offense." 62 0 The court also stated that,
although the legislation provided only for written reports, it did not
preclude testimony in open court. 6 2 '
62 2
The Court of Appeals again reviewed VISs in Booth v. State.
The court followed the Lodowski precedent in holding that "there is
no per se constitutional defect in using a victim impact statement at a
capital sentencing proceeding." 62 ' The Supreme Court, however,
granted certiorari to determine if the use of VISs at the sentencing
6 24
phase of a criminal trial violated the eighth amendment.
In Booth v. Maryland6"' the Supreme Court began its examination by reasoning that a jury's discretion to impose the death sentence had to be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.- 62 6 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that it normally defers to a state legislature's
determination as to what factors are relevant to the sentencing decision, but reasoned that the Constitution imposes limits on that discretion. °62 The most important limit is the requirement that a jury
character
make an "individualized determination on the basis of the
6 28
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."
The Supreme Court determined that the VIS in Booth contained
two types of information: (1) the personal characteristics of the victims and the emotional impact of the crimes on the family, and (2)
the family members' opinions of the crimes and the defendant.6 2 9
The Court held that the first type of information in the VIS focused
on the character of the victim and the effect on his or her family,
rather than on the defendant.6 3 ° As a result, use of the VIS could
result in the imposition of the death sentence due to factors which
620. Id. at 741-42, 490 A.2d at 1254.
621. Id. at 749, 490 A.2d at 1257-58.
622. 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986). The VISs were determined to be relatively
straightforward and a necessary factual description of the effects of the murders on family members. Id. at 223, 507 A.2d at 1124.
623. Id. at 223, 507 A.2d at 1124 (emphasis in original).
624. 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
625. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
626. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
627. Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2532.
628. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (emphasis in original).
629. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2533, 2535 (1987).
630. Id. at 2534.
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were irrelevant to the defendant's blameworthiness. 63 ' Furthermore, the Court held that victim impact information is not easily
rebutted and attempts to rebut would shift the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant. 6 2 The emotional distress of
the victim's family and the victim's personal characteristics, therefore, were held to be improper sentencing considerations in a capi6 s3
tal case.
The Supreme Court in Booth also held that the second type of
information in the VIS-the family's characterizations of the
crimes-were inadmissible as they served no purpose other than to
"inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case 63
on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant." 4 Because
the two types of information in the VIS were inadmissible, the
Supreme Court held that the use of VISs in the sentencing phase of
a capital murder trial violated the eighth amendment. 6 "
In Harris the Court of Appeals relied on the Booth holding and
concluded that VISs were inadmissible in the sentencing phase of a
capital case.6 s6 In so holding, the court rejected the State's argument that the admission of the VIS was a harmless error because any
prejudice would be limited to its impact on the process of weighing
mitigating against aggravating factors. Because there were no mitigating factors in Harris, the State argued that there could be no prejudice. The Court of Appeals responded, however, that the Supreme
Court had excluded VISs because they were irrelevant to the defendant's blameworthiness, and not because they skewed the weighing process. 6 37 The court then stated that, even if the effect of VISs
on the weighing process was considered, it could not be harmless
error because the sentencing authority could treat as a mitigating
circumstance any factor that convinced it that death was not appropriate. 6 38 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated Harris's death
63 1. Id. The Court reasoned that defendants rarely select their victims after considering what effect the murder will have on people other than the victim. The Court also
illustrated that the imposition of the death sentence could depend on how articulate
families were in describing their sense of loss, which clearly was irrelevant. Id.
632. Id. at 2535. The Court assumed that if the State could introduce evidence of the
victim's personal qualities, the'defendant must be given a chance to rebut that evidence.
The court labeled this a "minitrial" on the victim's character. Id.
633. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1987).
634. Id. at 2536.
635. Id.
636. 312 Md. at 235-37, 539 A.2d at 642.
637. Id. at 236, 539 A.2d at 642.
638. Id. at 236-37, 539 A.2d at 642. Therefore, there is always a weighing process
taking place, even if none of the seven specific statutory mitigating factors are present.
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63 9

sentence.
The Harris court held that, because of the Supreme Court's
holding in Booth, the use of VISs during the sentencing phase of
capital cases was invalid despite the statute mandating its use.640
Although VISs are prohibited during capital case sentencing hearings, evidence of victim impact and victim characteristics still are admissible at other times in the court's proceedings. The Supreme
Court in Booth refused to hold that the information contained in
VISs could never be relevant in any context. 64 ' The Court of Appeals followed this reasoning in Hunt v. State642 when it refused to
grant a mistrial after the victim's family became emotionally moved
by a tape recording and exited the courtroom. 64 3 The court held
that the departure was not the equivalent of victim impact evidence
and thus did not warrant the granting of a mistrial.Y
Harris therefore clarifies the treatment of VISs in capital sentencing hearings because it strictly prohibits their use. Previously,
the Court of Appeals had held in Booth v. State that a sentencing
authority was not restricted to considering "only the operative facts
in the commission of the crime, in addition to the circumstances of
the perpetrator. ''
Because the Booth VIS was deemed "relatively
Id. The seven statutory mitigating factors are identified in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413(g) (1987).
639. 312 Md. at 233, 539 A.2d at 640. After holding that the use of VISs during
Harris's sentencing hearing required it to vacate the death sentence, the court considered Harris's argument that forcing him to undergo capital sentencing for a fourth consecutive time violated the doctrines of cruel and unusual punishment, due process, and
double jeopardy. The court held that double jeopardy did not apply because Harris's
successful appeals had wiped the slate clean each time. Id. at 240, 539 A.2d at 644. The
cruel and unusual punishment argument also was rejected when the court agreed that
four successive capital sentencings were an "onerous burden," but held that that burden
did not, in and of itself, amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 241-42, 539
A.2d at 645. Finally, the court held that the four capital sentencing proceedings did not
violate Harris's due process rights because there was no substantial prejudice to Harris.
Id. at 243, 539 A.2d at 645.
640. Id. at 237, 539 A.2d at 642.
641. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 n.10 (1987). The Supreme Court
stated that victim information could be admissible if it related directly to the circumstances of the crime, to rebut an argument offered by the defendant, and in noncapital
criminal trials. id.
642. 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125 (1988).
643. Id. at 502, 540 A.2d at 1129.
644. Id. at 500, 540 A.2d at 1128. The court doubted whether Booth was applicable at
the trial stage but assumed, argumndo, that it was. Accordingly, the court held that mistrials based on the presence of the victim's family should be granted only under urgent or
extraordinary circumstances. The judge's determination is not to be disturbed unless
the defendant establishes a clear showing of prejudice. Id. at 503, 540 A.2d at 1129.
645. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 223, 507 A.2d 1098, 1124 (1986).
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it was admissible. That holding
straightforward and factual,""
suggested that the admissibility of VISs in future cases would be determined on a case-by-case basis after reviewing the VIS content,
rendering it difficult to predict whether a VIS was admissible. Harris
eliminates that uncertainty by establishing an absolute rule regarding
VIS admissibility in capital sentencing hearings.
There remains uncertainty, however, over Haris's application
outside of the capital sentencing hearing context. Hunt refused to
dismiss the assertion that the VIS prohibition extended to capital
prosecutions, but assumed, arguendo, that it did before holding that
the emotional reaction of the victim's family in the courtroom was
not the equivalent of a VIS. Future cases will need to clarify the
applicability of Harris outside the scope of capital sentencing
hearings.
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V.

A.

EVIDENCE

Witnesses

In Bohnert v. State' the Court of Appeals held that a social
worker's expert testimony asserting that a child was the victim of
sexual abuse, founded solely on the child's unsubstantiated allegations and the expert's intuitive reaction to the child's story, was
inadmissible.' The court determined that admitting the expert's
opinion into evidence constituted an infringement upon the jury's
role of judging the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicting
evidence. 3 Consequently, it held that the trial court's decision to
admit the testimony was reversible error.
Bradley William Bohnert was charged in 1984 with abusing and
committing a sexual offense in the second degree upon Alicia Rojas,
a child under the age of fourteen years.4 Prior to his indictment,
Bohnert had lived in a one-bedroom apartment with Alicia, her
brother, and her mother.5 Alicia testified that Bohnert frequently
took her into the apartment's bathroom and forced her to engage in
fellatio and anal intercourse;6 Bohnert denied Alicia's accusations
when he took the stand in his own defense at trial.7
Alicia's allegations were not supported by eyewitnesses or physical evidence;' therefore, the credibility of Alicia's testimony was
1. 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988).
2. Id. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662.
3. Id. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663.
4. Id. at 268, 539 A.2d at 658. Bohnert was tried and convicted of these charges
twice before a jury in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. Id. at 269, 539 A.2d at 658.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgments entered in the first trial, holding
that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Alicia's mother to testify that
her daughter's account was the "whole truth" and by permitting a social worker to testify that Bohnert was the criminal agent. Bohnert v. State, No. 84-1235, slip op. at 7-8,
11-13 (Md. App. Apr. 30, 1985). The court concluded, however, that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the social worker's expert opinion
that Alicia had been sexually abused, because it was within her area of expertise. Id.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments entered in the second trial, again
deciding that the trial court did not err in allowing this opinion to be received into
evidence. Bohnert v. State, No. 86-1264, slip op. at I I (Md. App. May 25, 1987).
5. 312 Md. at 269, 539 A.2d at 659.
6. Id. at 269-70, 539 A.2d at 659.
7. Id. at 273, 539 A.2d at 660.
8. Id. at 270, 539 A.2d at 659. When Alicia first recounted her allegations against
Bohnert, her mother took her to the hospital for a physical examination. Id. The family
doctor later testified that the hospital report did not disclose any evidence of abuse and
that he did not note signs of sexual abuse during his regular visits with Alicia in the
period the acts allegedly occurred. Id. Furthermore, a second physician testified that his
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crucial. 9 Consequently, the State attempted to enhance Alicia's
credibility by concluding its case with the expert testimony of Dora
Temple, a social worker who had investigated Alicia's allegations.' 0
After a lengthy evaluation of her credentials, the trial court ruled
that Temple, a Protective Services Investigator with the Department
of Social Services, was "an expert in the field of child sexual
abuse."" Temple testified that in her opinion Alicia had been sexually abused., 2
After reviewing the trial court record, the Court of Appeals
cited the rule enunciated in State Department of Health v. Walker '" that

governs when an expert may express an opinion in his or her field of
expertise. In Walker the court espoused that an expert's opinion
must be supported by facts that "permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distinguished from mere conjecture or guess." ' 14 Applying

this rule to Bohnert, the court found no facts supporting Alicia's allegations from which to draw a "reasonably accurate conclusion" that
she was a victim of sexual abuse.' 5 Moreover, the court observed

examination of Alicia did not reveal "any direct evidence of any new or old physical or
genital injury or scarring." Id.
9. Id. The Court of Appeals indicated that "[i]t [was] perfectly clear ... that the
outcome of this case depended on thejury's determination of the credibility of two witnesses, the accuser and the accused." Ia. at 273, 539 A.2d at 660.
10. Id. at 270-71, 539 A.2d at 659.
11. Id. at 271, 539 A.2d at 659.
12. Id. The Court of Appeals emphasized the great significance accorded Temple's
expert testimony in relation to the jury's determination of Alicia's credibility. Id. at 27374, 539 A.2d at 660-61. It noted that throughout Bohnert's trial the prosecutor repeatedly called the jury's attention to Temple's qualifications and her status as an expert in
the area of child sexual abuse. Id.
13. 238 Md. 512, 209 A.2d 555 (1965).
14. Id. at 520, 209 A.2d at 559-60. In Walker the expert was a sanitarian employed by
the Maryland Health Department who testified on the suitability of certain property for
water treatment facilities. The expert did not make a personal investigation to determine the condition of the proposed site or obtain any reliable information from other
sources. The court held that such an opinion, although given by an expert. amounted to
mere conjecture and was not admissible. Id. at 520-22, 209 A.2d at 560.
15. 312 Md. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662. The court also observed that additional testimony introduced at trial revealed that "Alicia was not without improper motivations in
her accusations against Bohnert." Id. at 270, 539 A.2d at 659. Alicia related her alleged
encounters with Bohnert only after being confronted about a miniature whiskey bottle
found in her possession at school. Id. Testimony presented by the defense suggested
jealousy of Bohnert's relationship with Alicia's mother coupled with a fear that he
"might take her mother away" as a possible motive for Alicia's charges against Bohnert.
Id. The defense further offered the presence of sexually explicit magazines in the apartment as a possible explanation for Alicia's graphic description of her alleged experiences with Bohnert. Id. The court also noted that on a number of occasions Alicia
retracted her allegations, later asserting that "her denials were prompted by fear and by
the probability that no one would believe her." Id.
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that "Temple proffered no evidence as to objective tests or medically recognized syndromes with respect to the child. Nor did Temple present any evidence as to the child's behavior compared to
general behavioral characteristics of child abuse victims."' 6
Temple indicated that there were other unidentified sources of
information, but she admitted during cross-examination that the
"[s]trongest part of [her] opinion [was] based on the child's statement, because of her age."' 7 Finding that Temple based her opinion exclusively upon Alicia's "unsubstantiated averments" and "a
certain sense about children which Temple believed she possessed,"' 8 the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the opinion into evidence."
The court, advancing an alternative reason to support its decision, held that it is reversible error for a court to permit any witness
to comment on or evaluate the credibility of another witness in the
presence of the jury.2 0 Judge Orth, writing for the court explained
that in a criminal trial the credibility of a witness and the weight to
be accorded the witness's testimony are solely within the province of
the jury. 2 Temple's opinion that Alicia was sexually abused
amounted to an assertion that Alicia's testimony was credible while
Bohnert's was not; therefore, it intruded upon the province of the
jury. 2 Strongly avowing that "[t]estimony from a witness relating
to the credibility of another witness is to be rejected as a matter of
law, ' 2 3 the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the lower
court and remanded the case for a new trial.2 4
The decision in Bohnert illuminates a serious and recurring
problem in the adjudication of rape and sexual abuse cases. Frequently there are no eyewitnesses and no physical or psychological
evidence of the alleged crime.2 5 This forces the jury to render a
16. Id. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662. The court suggested that if Temple had used objective tests in formulating her opinion, her testimony would have been allowed. d.
17. Id. at 273, 539 A.2d at 660.
18. Id. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662.
19. Id. The Court of Appeals previously recognized that "the admissibility of expert
testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court ....

[But the trial

court] may be reversed if ... [it] clearly abused its discretion." Radman v. Harold, 279
Md. 167, 173, 367 A.2d 472, 476 (1977) (citations omitted).
20. 312 Md. at 277, 539 A.2d at 662.
21. Id. See also Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675. 685, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980) ("The
credibility of the witness was for the trier of fact.
22. 312 Md. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663.
23. Id. at 278, 539 A.2d at 663.
24. Id. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663.
25. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1988). See also Christiansen,
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judgment based solely on the testimonies of the accuser and the accused.2 6 Without the testimony of an expert to reinforce the victim's accusations, the State may be reluctant to prosecute such cases
or victims may be deterred from testifying for fear that others will
disbelieve them. As a result, the State must find an expert to support the accusations, whether or not any factual basis exists for the
victim's allegations.2 7 Although this type of superficial expert analysis seems undesirable independent of evidentiary rules, the real issue, as illustrated in Bohnert, is that the testimony of such an expert
may compromise the role exclusively reserved for thejury: to deter28
mine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The court's ruling in Bohnert extends to more than the evidentiary dilemma encountered in rape and sexual abuse cases. Bohnert
reaffirms the necessity for some type of substantive basis for any expert testimony that is to be admitted into evidence.
B.

Hearsay

The Court of Appeals in State v. Rivenbark 29 held that a coconspirator's statement is inadmissible in evidence unless it was made
before the attainment of the conspiracy's central objective.3 0 In so
doing, the court rejected the theory that every criminal conspiracy
includes an implied subsidiary conspiracy to conceal evidence of the
substantive offense the conspirators agreed to commit. 3 ' Although
the Court of Special Appeals previously addressed similar questions,"2 this was a case of first impression for the Court of Appeals.
Police charged Billy Rivenbark, the defendant, and Ronald
Johnson with the murder of Katherine Buress and the burglary of
The Testimony of Child IVitnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of PretrialInterviews, 62 WASH.

L. REv. 705, 705-06 (1987) (noting that "often the child victim's statements in or out of
the court are the only evidence supporting prosecution.").
26. See Morgan, 846 F.2d at 945.
27. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
29. 311 Md. 147, 533 A.2d 271 (1987), aff'g 66 Md. App. 378, 504 A.2d 647 (1986).
30. Id. at 158, 533 A.2d at 276.
31. Id.

32. See Thomas v. State, 63 Md. App. 337, 347-48, 492 A.2d 939, 944-45 (1985)
(statements made in furtherance of and during pendency of conspiracy fall within coconspirator exception); Myers v. State, 58 Md. App. 211, 240, 472 A.2d 1027, 1042, cert.
denied, 300 Md. 484, 479 A.2d 373 (1984) (statements made after offense for purpose of
concealment fall within coconspirator exception); Irvin v. State, 23 Md. App. 457, 473,
328 A.2d 329, 338 (1974), aff'd, 276 Md. 168, 344 A.2d 418 (1975) (statements made
after conspirators achieve "main aim" do not fall within coconspirator exception);Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 327, 341, 264 A.2d 280, 289, cert. denied, 258 Md. 728 (1970)
(crime of conspiracy can encompass acts performed to conceal crime).
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her home.-" The jury convicted Rivenbark of felony murder3 4 and
burglary. 5 The most important piece of evidence against
Rivenbark was a statement made by Johnson to his girlfriend, Shirley Wilson, approximately six months after Buress's death. 6 At trial
the court admitted Wilson's testimony under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule. 37 Rivenbark claimed that Wilson's hearsay
testimony was inadmissible and appealed his conviction.38
The Court of Special Appeals found that after the attainment of
a conspiracy's central objective, there may be an actual conspiracy of
silence to conceal the crime.3 9 The State offered no evidence demonstrating an actual conspiracy to conceal, however, and the court
therefore refused to recognize the implied conspiracy to conceal
theory. 40 As a result, the Court of Special Appeals held Johnson's
statements inadmissible.' The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that Wilson's statement was inadmissible under the hearsay rule.
Furthermore, her testimony did not fall within the coconspirator ex42
ception to the hearsay rule.
Under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule, a coconspirator's statements made while the conspiracy is in effect and in
furtherance of its aims are admissible against fellow conspirators.4
33. 311 Md. at 151, 533 A.2d at 273.
34. Id. at 152 n.1, 533 A.2d at 273 n.j.

35. Id. at 152, 533 A.2d at 273.
36. Id. Wilson, acting under police direction, wore a body wire and obtained statements fromJohnson in whichJohnson inculpated himself and Rivenbark in the murder.
Id. at 151, 533 A.2d at 273.
37. 66 Md. App. at 381, 504 A.2d at 648. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
38. id.
39. id. at 389, 504 A.2d at 652-53.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 389, 504 A.2d at 653. The court also held that Rivenbark had appealed
effectively only his murder conviction. Id. at 390, 504 A.2d at 653. The court decided
that because Rivenbark did not mention the burglary conviction in his brief, the court
need not address the issue. Id.
42. 311 Md. at 160, 533 A.2d at 277. The court also held that the burglary conviction should have been reversed. Id. at 161, 533 A.2d at 277-78. The court held that
even though Rivenbark did not address the burglary conviction in his brief, "an appellant is not required to state expressly that an argument applies not only to a greater
offense but also to every lesser included offense." Id. at 160, 533 A.2d at 277. Thus the
argument against the conviction for murder, which is the greater offense, applied
equally to the conviction for burglary, the lesser included offense. Id.
43. Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 20, 63 A. 96, 97-98 (1906). The standards set
forth in Lawrence for applying the conspiracy exception had been well established since
Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 521 (1878). In Bloomer the court stated that once the existence
of a conspiracy is proved "every act and declaration of each member of the confederacy
in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is
in contemplation of law, the act and declaration of them all." Id. at 531.
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In its attempts to admit Wilson's statements, the State contended
that Johnson and Rivenbark conspired to rob Buress, and additionally that their conspiracy included a "conspiracy of silence" still in
effect when Johnson made his incriminating statements to Wilson.4 4
The court found that the facts were not sufficient to establish an
express conspiracy of concealment.4 5 The issue before the court,
therefore, was whether a conspiracy of silence could be implied
from the primary conspiracy.
In Thomas v. State4" the Court of Special Appeals examined the
requirement in the conspiracy exception that the statement be in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It interpreted the requirement
broadly, so that "[i]f some connection is established between the declaration and the conspiracy then the declaration is taken as in furtherance of the conspiracy." 4 The State's argument in Rivenbark,
however, included an implied conspiracy of silence underlying the
conspiracy to rob. The Supreme Court addressed this similar argument in Krulewitch v. United States.4 8 In that case the Court rejected
the government's argument that "even after the central criminal
objectives of a conspiracy have succeeded or failed, an implicit subsidiary phase of the conspiracy always survives, the phase which has
concealment as its sole objective." 4 9 The Court held that a coconspirator's statement is inadmissible unless it was made before the
attainment of the conspiracy's central objective or "main aim.""5
44. 311 Md. at 152, 533 A.2d at 273.
45. Id. at 159, 533 A.2d at 277. Johnson and Rivenbark did not "distinctly or explicitly communicate to the other his assent to the 'agreement.' " Id.
46. 63 Md. App. 337, 492 A.2d 939 (1985).
47. Id. at 347, 492 A.2d at 944-45 (emphasis in original). See also Levie, Hearsay and
Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1168 (1954).
48. 336 U.S. 440 (1949). Krulewitch was convicted of transporting the complaining
witness from New York to Florida for the purposes of prostitution. The evidence in
question was a coconspirator's statement that was made to the witness one-and-one-half
months after the crime. Id. at 441-42.
49. Id. at 443.
50. Id. at 443-44. The Supreme Court has followed Krulewitch and rejected the theory of an implied subsidiary conspiracy of concealment for several decades. See, e.g.,
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 399-406 (1957) (subsequent activities of conspirators to conceal irregularities through which "no prosecution" rulings were obtained for certain taxpayers were not part of an actual agreement to conceal and no such
agreement could be implied); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615-18 (1953)
(because there were no overt acts of concealment and no evidence that conspirators
agreed to conceal conspiracy, declarations by coconspirator made after conspiracy
ended were not in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus were inadmissible as to all but
declarant). Likewise, a significant number of state cases have followed Krulewitch. See,
e.g., State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 63-64, 676 P.2d 1118, 1121-22 (1984); Smith v. State, 6
Ark. App. 228, 232, 640 S.W.2d 805, 808 (1982); People v.Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 853-
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Justice Jackson expressed concern in a concurring opinion that a
contrary decision would lead to an intolerable expansion of the
coconspirator exception because it is "difficult to see any logical
limit to the 'implied conspiracy' either as to duration or means."' S
The Court of Appeals in Rivenbark acknowledged that "some
courts have admitted coconspirator's statements made after the conspirators had achieved their main aim but in connection with an attempt to conceal evidence of the substantive offense." ' 52 The court
recognized, however, that even courts that adopted the theory of an
implied subsidiary conspiracy to conceal seldom hold that the implied conspiracy extended more than a few weeks after the commission of the offense.53 Moreover, courts endorsing the implied
ongoing conspiracy of concealment theory have actually limited
their holdings to instances where a conspiracy endures through acts
of concealment performed before the conspirators achieved their
main aim.54
The court in Rivenbarh did not preclude the admissibility of
54, 500 P.2d 610, 616, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698, 704 (1972); Napier v. Commonwealth, 515
S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. 1974); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 40-41, 308 A.2d 300, 316
(1973).
51. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 456 (ackson,J., concurring).
52. 311 Md. at 155, 533 A.2d at 275. See, e.g., Crew v. State, 100 Nev. 38, 46, 675
P.2d 986, 991 (1984) (statements made in course of carrying out plan to move bodies in
order to avoid detection held admissible); State v. Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d 173, 178
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (witness allowed to testify about threats made by coconspirators for purpose of preventing witness from testifying). But see People v. Meagher, 70 111.
App. 3d 597, 603-04, 388 N.E.2d 801, 805 (1979) ("a conspiracy includes subsequent
efforts at concealment, but only if those efforts are proximate in time to the commission
of the principal crime").
53. 311 Md. at 156, 533 A.2d at 275. See, e.g., People v. Columbo, 118 111.App. 3d
882, 948-49, 455 N.E.2d 733, 781-82 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984) (morning
after); People v. Link, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1006, 427 N.E.2d 589, 593-94 (1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982) (two days); People v. Mclnnis, 88 I11.App. 3d 555, 566, 411
N.E.2d 26, 34 (1980) (half hour); Meagher, 70 I1. App. 3d at 603, 388 N.E.2d at 805
(following day); Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d at 178 (approximately one month).
The robbery in Rivenbar took place in May 1981. The statements introduced by
the State were made in November 1981, six months after the substantive offense occurred. 311 Md. at 156, 533 A.2d at 275. But see Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 402, 150
S.E.2d 240, 248, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 953 (1966), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Harris v.
State, 255 Ga. 464, 339 S.E.2d 712 (1986) (holding that a conspiracy of concealment
may last more than six months).
54. 311 Md. at 157, 533 A.2d at 276. See, e.g., People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 852,
500 P.2d 610, 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. 698, 703 (1972) (statements made during payment to
coconspirator for murder of defendant's wife held to be made during conspiracy); State
v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1976) (post-robbery statements made to advance
aims of ongoing conspiracy held admissible); Foss v. State, 92 Nev. 163, 167, 547 P.2d
688, 691 (1976) (allowing statements by defendant after killing his wife but before disposal of body, because disposal of body was an integral part of conspiracy).
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statements made in connection with concealment as long as the
statements were made prior to fulfillment of the conspirators' main
aim. 5 According to the court, if the conspirators expressly agree at
the outset to engage in acts of concealment after committing a substantive offense, then their principal aim includes concealment; any
statements made in connection with those acts are admissible.5 6
The court rejected the theory that every conspiracy includes an implied subsidiary conspiracy to conceal.5 7 Moreover, it found that
there was no express conspiracy to conceal. 58 The main aim of the
conspiracy, therefore, was realized six months before Johnson's
statements were made to Wilson. Accordingly, the court held that
Johnson's statements did not fall within the conspiracy exception
and were thus inadmissible as hearsay.
The Rivenbark court finally adopted the previous theories advanced by the Court of Special Appeals. 9 Indeed, the standard set
forth in Rivenbark may result in fewer convictions of members of
criminal conspiracies by barring probative testimony of a coconspirator. By rejecting the State's theory, the court in Rivenbark took
heed of Justice Jackson's admonitions in Krulewitch that "the looseness and pliability of the doctrine of conspiracy present[ed] inherent
dangers which should be in the background of judicial thought
wherever it is sought to extend the doctrine to meet the exigencies
of a particular case. "60

C.

Impeachment by PriorConviction

In Prout v. State6 1 the Court of Appeals held that in order for a
conviction to be automatically admissible for impeachment purposes, it must have been for an infamous crime as defined at com55. 311 Md. at 158, 533 A.2d at 276. See, e.g., Myers v. State, 58 Md. App. 211,240,
472 A.2d 1027, 1042, cert.
denied, 300 Md. 484, 479 A.2d 373 (1984) (statements made
after offense was committed were admissible because part of an explicit conspiracy to
.cover up" involvement of the conspirators);Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 327, 341, 264
A.2d 280, 289, cert. denied, 258 Md. 728 (1970) (statements made in getaway car after
robbery were held admissible).
56. 311 Md. at 158, 533 A.2d at 276. In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957), the Court held that "secrecy plus overt acts of concealment" after the accomplishment of the crime do not by themselves constitute an actual agreement to conceal.
Id. at 404. To show an "actual" agreement there must be "an express original agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their
own self-protection, traces of the crime after its commission." id.
57. 311 Md. at 158, 533 A.2d at 276.
58. Id. at 159, 533 A.2d at 277.
59. See cases cited supra note 32.
60. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949) (JacksonJ., concurring).
61. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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mon law. 62 The court also ruled that lesser crimes bearing upon a
witness's credibility are admissible at the discretion of the trial
court.63 By eliminating the separate class of crimes of moral turpitude, the court attempted to clarify the law of impeachment by prior
conviction."
Lewis D. Prout was charged with assaulting and robbing
Cynthia Stewart on a street corner in Baltimore City. 6 5 At trial
Prout's counsel requested a motion in limine66 to "advise the court"
of his intention to cross-examine the State's only witness about her
62. Id. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452. These crimes consist of treason, a common-law
felony, or crimenfalsi. The offenses defined as felonies under the common law of England were "felonious homicide (divided by statutes into murder and manslaughter),
mayhem, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, prison breach (although an early statute took prison breach out of the felony class if the escape was by one in custody for a
non-capital offense), and rescue of a felon." R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, CRIMINAL LAw 14
(3d ed. 1982) (footnotes omitted). Sodomy is recognized as a common-law felony in the
United States. Id. at 14-15. Crimeinfalsi has been defined as "any crime involving an
element of deceit, fraud or corruption," id. at 26, and as a crime "not only involv[ing]
the charge of falsehood, but also... one which may injuriously affect the administration
ofjustice, by the introduction of falsehood and fraud." 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 520,
at 730 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
63. 311 Md. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
64. Id. at 358, 535 A.2d at 450. In the context of impeachment by prior conviction,
the Court of Appeals has defined crimes of moral turpitude as those "which impressed
upon their perpetrator such a moral taint that to permit him to testify in legal proceedings would injuriously affect the public administration of justice." Garitee v. Bond, 102
Md. 379, 383, 62 A. 631, 633 (1905). The case also presented the procedural issue, see
infra note 66, concerning the preservation for appeal of the admissibility of evidence
argued in a motion in lirine. 311 Md. at 355-56, 535 A.2d at 448-49.
65. 311 Md. at 351, 535 A.2d at 446. The specific details and surrounding circumstances of Prout's alleged offenses were set forth in Judge McAuliffe's dissent. Id. at
368-69, 535 A.2d at 455 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 351, 535 A.2d at 446. A motion in limine usually seeks an order restricting
opposing counsel from offering questionable evidence before the judge has had an opportunity to rule on its admissibility. Id. at 356, 535 A.2d at 448. The motion customarily is made before or during a jury trial outside of the hearing of the jury. Id. Prout's
motion in limine asked the court to admit, rather than exclude, the evidence of the witness's prior convictions. Id. at 355 n.4, 535 A.2d at 448 n.4. Therefore, the court's
denial of Prout's motion in limine had the same effect as the grant of a traditional motion
in limine. Id.
In response to the State's contention that Prout failed to preserve the issue of the
admissibility of the prior convictions by not making a subsequent objection to the exclusion, the court ruled that
when a trial judge, in response to a motion in limine, makes a ruling to exclude
evidence that is clearly intended to be the final word on the matter, and that
will not be affected by the manner in which the evidence unfolds at trial, and
the proponent of the evidence makes a contemporaneous objection, his objection ordinarily is preserved under [Maryland] Rule 4-322(c).
Id. at 357, 535 A.2d at 449 (emphasis added). In Hickman v. State, 76 Md. App. I ll,
543 A.2d 870 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals held that when a motion in limine is
denied so that the evidence is admitted, the opponent to the admission of the evidence
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criminal background.6 7 The trial court declined to admit evidence
of the witness's prior convictions for prostitution and solicitation for
prostitution, reasoning that the prostitution and solicitation convictions did not affect her credibility or believability."8 A jury subsequently found Prout guilty of assault, 69 and the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed in an unreported per curiam decision.7 °
On appeal, Prout argued that because prostitution and solicitation are crimes of moral turpitude, they always must be admitted for
impeachment purposes; 7 the trial court therefore had no discretion
to exclude evidence of the witness's prior convictions.7 2 The State
argued that the crimes of prostitution and solicitation are not crimes
of moral turpitude and consequently must be admitted into evidence;73 alternatively, the State contended that the trial court's refusal to admit the convictions for impeachment purposes was
7
harmless error. 1
Holding that it was within the trial court's discretion to exclude
evidence of the witness's prior convictions for lesser, noninfamous
crimes, the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. 5 The court
reasoned that because prostitution and solicitation are neither
must object when the evidence is actually admitted in order to preserve the issue for
appeal. Id. at 117, 543 A.2d at 873.
67. 311 Md. at 351, 535 A.2d at 446. The witness's criminal record included convictions for grand theft, shoplifting, failure to appear in court, resisting arrest, violation of
probation, prostitution, and three convictions for soliciting. Id. Only the convictions for
prostitution and solicitation were at issue on appeal. Id. at 355, 535 A.2d at 448.
68. Id. at 352-53, 535 A.2d at 447.
69. Id. at 353, 535 A.2d at 447. Prout was acquitted of the robbery of Cynthia Stewart's girlfriend, who was not present in court. Id. at 355 n.3, 535 A.2d at 448 n.3. The
court did not address Prout's argument that the guilty verdict and acquittal were inconsistent-an argument effectively negated by Prout's more plausible assertion that the
jury apparently questioned the credibility of the State's only witness. Id.
70. Prout v. State, No. 85-79 (Md. App. Sept. 23, 1985).
71. 311 Md. at 358, 535 A.2d at 450. Prout's argument is supported by the court's
previous decision in Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981). In Ricketts the
Court of Appeals concluded that "[m]oral turpitude, while being somewhat less specific
than infamous crimes, still connotes such a disregard for social values on the part of the
perpetrator, that one could reasonably infer that such a person's testimony is suspect."
Id. at 711, 436 A.2d at 912.
72. 311 Md. at 355, 535 A.2d at 448.
73. Id.
74. Id. Countering the proposition that the error was harmless, Prout argued that
(1)the inconsistency of the verdicts returned by the jury indicated that the jury questioned the credibility of the State's sole witness, (2) the prostitution and solicitation convictions "would not be merely cumulative," and (3) "because 'different crimes may be
relevant to credibility in different ways,' the witness's prostitution and solicitation convictions should be admitted due to their distinctive nature." Id.
75. Id. at 365, 535 A.2d at 453.
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crimes of treason, common-law felonies, nor crimenfalsi, they do not
constitute infamous crimes. 7 6 The court also affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that prostitution and solicitation had no bearing
on the witness's credibility." Consequently, the court held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in its decision to exclude
evidence of the witness's prior convictions for prostitution and
78
solicitation.
The difficulty in designating crimes of moral turpitude
originated in the court's earlier decision in Ricketts v. State.79 In Ricketts the court determined that a defendant's prior conviction for indecent exposure was neither an infamous crime nor a crime of
moral turpitude.8 0 According to the Prout court, the court in Ricketts
placed unwarranted emphasis on crimes of moral turpitude as a separate subset of infamous crimes.8 '
Prout reversed the portion of Ricketts that impliedly endorsed
the admission of crimes of moral turpitude for impeachment purposes.8 2 After analyzing the legislative history of section 10-905 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article"3 in order to determine
the meaning of the term "infamous crime," the court found that the
section was originally enacted to ameliorate the harsh common-law
practice of rendering incompetent those convicted of infamous
76. Id. at 364-65, 535 A.2d at 453.
77. Id. at 365, 535 A.2d at 453. The trial court expressed this opinion to counsel
while waiting for verification of the witness's conviction. Id. at 352-53, 535 A.2d at 447.
78. Id. at 365, 535 A.2d at 453.
79. 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981).
80. Id. at 708, 436 A.2d at 910. Ricketts was charged with second degree rape, second degree sexual offense, and burglary in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
Id. at 702, 436 A.2d at 907. Although he had a prior conviction of indecent exposure,
Ricketts argued on appeal that because indecent exposure is not an infamous crime, a
crime of moral turpitude, or a lesser crime having a bearing on his credibility as a witness, the trial court erred in admitting his prior conviction for indecent exposure. Id. at
702-03, 436 A.2d at 907. Conversely, the State argued that indecent exposure was a
crime of moral turpitude. Id. at 703, 436 A.2d at 907.
81. 311 Md. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
82. Id. The court, however, retained that part of Ricketts which held that "to be admissible for impeachment purposes, a lesser crime must be sufficiently specific to enable
the factfinder 'to make a reasoned judgment as to whether the offense affects the [witness's] credibility .... . " d. (quoting Ricketts, 291 Md. at 714, 436 A.2d at 913).
83. MD. CTS. &Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 10-905 (1984). The statute states in pertinent part:
(a) Ingeneral.-Evidenceis admissible to prove the interest of a witness in
any proceeding, or thefact of his convictioni of an infamous crime. Evidence of conviction is not admissible if an appeal is pending, or the time for an appeal has
not expired, or the conviction has been reversed, and there has been no retrial
or reconviction.
Id. at (a) (emphasis added).
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crimes." Instead the legislature chose to limit the crimes available
for impeachment purposes to the common-law infamous crimes.8 5
Noting that the label "moral turpitude" serves no purpose other
than to classify those infamous and noninfamous crimes that society
finds particularly repugnant, 6 the court dismissed Prout's argument
that crimes of moral turpitude are admissible for impeachment purposes separate and apart from infamous crimes.8 7
The court was careful to define the broad scope of its decision,
setting forth only general classes of crimes admissible for impeachment purposes.8 8 It concluded that while infamous crimes are always admissible for impeachment purposes, noninfamous crimes
are admissible at the sound discretion of the trial judge.8 9 In exercising this discretion, a trial judge must determine whether the probative value of admitting the prior conviction outweighs any
prejudicial effect on the witness." ° The court concluded that only
after conducting this type of analysis should evidence of a prior conviction be admitted for impeachment purposes. 9 ' Once such a balancing has been made, however, "[s]uch exercise of discretion will
be accorded every reasonable presumption of correctness and will
not be upset except in a clear case of abuse." 92
In a pointed dissent, Judge McAuliffe strongly disagreed with
the majority's determination that whether a lesser, noninfamous
crime bears on the credibility of a witness is within the realm of a

84. 311 Md. at 359, 535 A.2d at 450. At common law, one convicted of an infamous
crime achieved the ominous state of civil death, which is "the state of a person who,
though possessing natural life, has lost all his civil rights, and as to them, is considered
as dead."

R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 62, at 27 n.35.

85. 311 Md. at 359, 535 A.2d at 450. The court noted that the General Assembly
first addressed impeachment by prior conviction over a century ago and is now currently
embodied in § 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Id. at 358-59, 535
A.2d at 450. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-905(a) (1984).
86. 311 Md. at 360, 535 A.2d at 451.
87. id.
88. Id. at 364, 535 A.2d at 452. The court expressly announced that it did not intend
"to establish rigid guidelines to be followed by the trial judges in determining the admissibilityof impeachment evidence." Id. Rather, the court "suggested" several factors
for lower courts to consider. Id.
89. Id. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
90. Id. Improper prejudice to a defendant-witness can result when the court admits
evidence of a prior conviction for the same or very similar crime to the one for which he
or she is being tried. The jury possibly will conclude that the defendant currently is
guilty now because he or she previously was found guilty. See id. at 364, 535 A.2d at 453.
91. Id. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
92. Id. at 363-64, 535 A.2d at 452.
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trial judge's discretion. 93 Because of the absence of logic and propriety in permitting different conclusions about the probative value
of the same crime,9 4 Judge McAuliffe advocated that the formulation
of distinctions among crimes should be a matter of law. 9 5 Under
this view, a trial judge would have no discretion to determine
whether a particular crime could reasonably bear upon a witness's
credibility.9" The discretion would be limited to determining only
whether the conviction has any probative value for impeachment
97
purposes.
Applying the newly announced Prout guidelines in the analogous case of Watson v. State,9" the Court of Appeals subsequently
held that the trial court erred in concluding that attempted rape is
an infamous crime.9 9 The court held that while infamous crimes are
always admissible for impeachment purposes, attempted rape is not
an infamous crime within the meaning of section 10-905."' ° Reasoning that because an attempt to commit any crime was a misdemeanor at common law, the court concluded that attempted rape
could not be a common-law felony.'' Additionally, because attempted rape involves neither fraud nor dishonesty, attempted rape
is not a crimenfalsi.'12 Because the trial judge had determined independently that the prejudicial effect of admitting the conviction for
attempted rape into evidence outweighed any probative value, the
93. Id. at 367, 535 A.2d at 454 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Judge McAuliffe divided
all crimes into four categories:
I. Treason and all common-law felonies
II. Crimenfalsi
1l1. Other crimes that reasonably bear upon a witness's credibility
IV. Other crimes that do not reasonably bear upon a witness's credibility
Id. at 366, 535 A.2d at 454. He argued that trial judges should have no discretion to
determine whether a crime was in category III or IV; the only discretion should pertain
to whether to admit it into evidence given all of the attendant circumstances. Id. at 36768, 535 A.2d at 454.
94. Id. at 367, 535 A.2d at 454.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 368, 535 A.2d at 454.
98. 311 Md. 370, 535 A.2d 455 (1988).
99. Id. at 376, 535 A.2d at 458. James Watson was charged in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County with first degree rape, second degree rape, assault with intent to
rape, and battery. Id. at 371, 535 A.2d at 456. The court held that because of the very
high potential for improper prejudice, Watson's prior conviction for attempted rape
could be properly admitted into evidence only if attempted rape is an infamous crime as
defined at common law. id. at 374, 535 A.2d at 458.
100. Id. at 376, 535 A.2d at 458.
101. Id. at 375, 535 A.2d at 458. The court also properly concluded that attempted
rape was not treason as defined at common law. Id.
102. Id. For a discussion of oimen falsi. see supra note 62.
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court remanded the case for a new trial.1
Similarly, in Wicks v. State104 the Court of Appeals further refined the scope of prior conviction evidence. The court affirmed the
trial court's decision that it lacked the discretion to exclude the defendant's thirty-five-year-old petit larceny conviction.' 0 5 Because
larceny, whether petit or grand, 10 6 was a felony at common law, the
court found petit larceny to be an infamous crime for impeachment
purposes.'0 7 Applying the Prout framework, the court ruled that a
trial court has no discretion to exclude evidence of an infamous
crime from evidence.'68 As a result, the court affirmed Wicks's
conviction.' 0 9
By declaring that only common-law infamous crimes automatically are admissible for impeachment purposes, the Court of Appeals in Prout clarified the law in the area of impeachment by prior
conviction. Based on the court's reasoning, lesser crimes that may
bear upon the credibility of a particular witness are admissible only
at the discretion of the trial court. In light of the dissent's concerns
about the exercise of overly broad discretion, however, the Prout
holding provides the potential that old arguments about crimes of
moral turpitude will resurface under the guise of convictions with
probative value.

D. Exclusionary Rule
The Court of Appeals in Chu v. Anne Arundel County "o held that
103. 311 Md. at 375-76, 535 A.2d at 458. The trial judge stated: "If I am in error on
whether [attempted rape is an infamous crime] ....
I state strongly, affirmatively, positively and without equivocation that [the attempted rape conviction] is prejudicial and
the case should be reversed." Id. at 372, 535 A.2d at 457.
104. 311 Md. 376, 535 A.2d 459 (1988).
105. Id. at 384, 535 A.2d at 462. Jack Eliwood Wicks was indicted in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County for sexual child abuse, third degree sexual offense, and battery. Id. at 378-79, 535 A.2d at 460.
106. Petit larceny is larceny under or equal to the value of $100; grand larceny is
larceny of a value greater than $100. Wilkins v. State, 4 Md. App. 334, 340, 242 A.2d
808, 812 (1968). Petit larceny was made a misdemeanor in 1933. Act of Dec. 15, 1933.
ch. 78, 1933 Md. Laws (Special Sess.) 249.
107. 311 Md. at 381, 535 A.2d at 461. See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 62,
at 335. Although petit larceny is currently a misdemeanor, it was previously a felony,
and thus an infamous crime, that was admissible for impeachment purposes. 311 Md. at
381, 535 A.2d at 461. Because "theft, in any amount, is the embodiment of deceitfulness," petit larceny is a crimenfalsi. Id. at 382, 535 A.2d at 462. Petit larceny therefore is
considered an infamous crime for the purposes of § 10-905. Id.
108. 311 Md. at 384, 535 A.2d at 462.
109. Id., 535 A.2d at 463.
110. 311 Md. 673, 537 A.2d 250 (1988), aff'g 69 Md. App. 523, 518 A.2d 733 (1987).
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the state civil statute for the return of seized property did not incorporate the federal exclusionary rule.' ' A case involving statutory
construction, Chu marks the first time the court directly interpreted
article 27, section 551,112 in light of the federal exclusionary rule. 'S
Drs. Peter and Nancy Chu practiced dentistry from an office
building located in Odenton, Maryland.' 14 Investigating possible
dental insurance fraud, a detective for the state's attorney for Anne
Arundel County applied for a warrant to search the Chus' office and
to seize various records." 5 The affidavit supporting the application
contained information received from an audit conducted two
months earlier by Maryland Blue Cross/Blue Shield." 6 The search
warrant was issued and executed on the day the detective filed the
application. " 7
Prior to any criminal charges being brought against them, the
Chus filed a civil action pursuant to section 551 seeking the return
of the records seized from their office."' The Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County ordered the return of the confiscated
records.' 9 The Court of Special Appeals reversed the order, 20 and
12 1
the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals held that the intermediate appellate
court correctly rejected the Chus' construction of section 551.2
The Chus argued that the section 551 reference to probable
cause' 23 embraced the federal exclusionary rule.'2 4 The Chus also
11. Id. at 674, 537 A.2d at 250.
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1987 & Supp. 1988), encompasses the
"[ilssuance; contents; time of search, etc; (and] disposition of property seized." Id. Section 55 1(a) states in relevant part: "If, at any time, on application to a judge . . . it
appears ... that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on
which the warrant was issued . . . [the] judge must cause it to be restored to the person
from whom it was taken." d. at (a).
113. The federal exclusionary rule requires that unconstitutionally seized evidence
must be excluded from federal and slate criminal proceedings. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
114. 311 Md. at 675, 537 A.2d at 251.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.There was no question that sufficient probable cause existed to believe that
the dental records contained evidence of fraud. Id. at 675-76, 537 A.2d at 251.
118. Id. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note 112. No criminal proceedings had been brought in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against the Chus.
311 Md. at 675, 537 A.2d at 251.
119. 311 Md. at 675, 537 A.2d at 251.
120. 69 Md. App. at 535, 518 A.2d at 739.
121. 311 Md. at 675, 537 A.2d at 251.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 112.
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suggested that as fourth amendment jurisprudence evolved to provide broader protections against unreasonable government searches
and seizures, section 551 should be interpretedto reflect and accommodate these expansions. 25 The Chus premised their argument for the return of the seized records on the notion that section
551 must be interpreted broadly.' 26 Because the court did not accept this threshold contention, it found it unnecessary to decide
..the
7
remaining issues.
The court evaluated the argument advanced by the Chus in
light of the history of exclusionary rules both at the state and federal
level.1 21 Section 551 had its inception in chapter 749 of the Acts of
1939.129 The central purpose of the enactment was to set forth the
requirements for procuring a search warrant. 3 0° It was not until the
1961 Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio'
that the federal
exclusionary rule became applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 32 Mapp requires the exclusion from criminal
124. 311 Md. at 674-75, 537 A.2d at 250-51.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 676, 537 A.2d at 251. The Chus first contended that the § 551 probable
cause concept incorporated the federal exclusionary rule that deters state agents from
violating the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Id. They next proposed that because
an agent of the State performed the audit requested by Maryland Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, the Chus' consent to that audit was not legally effective. Id. Because the audit
was said to have violated the Chus' fourth and fourteenth amendment rights, all information gathered from the requested audit-had to be excised from the affidavit when
reviewing it for probable cause. Id. The court determined that this final step required a
conclusion that, in reduced form, the affidavit did not contain sufficient probable cause
to sustain issuance of the search warrant. Id. The court, however, did not reach these
issues because it did not accept the Chus' first contention. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Prior to 1929 Maryland had no exclusionary rule. See Lawrence v. State, 103
Md. 17, 33, 63 A. 96, 102 (1906) (evidence relevant to the issue is admissible although
obtained illegally). Even though a federal exclusionary rule existed in limited instances,
see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule for property
seized in illegal search and seizure applicable to federal law enforcement officials), the
Court of Appeals declined the opportunity to apply the W1eeks exclusionary rule to Maryland law officers. See Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 199, 142 A. 190, 192-93 (1928).
In 1929 the General Assembly enacted an exclusionary rule known as the Bouse Act that
was limited to misdemeanors. 311 Md. at 677, 537 A.2d at 252. The legislature repealed this Act in 1973 following the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). See 311 Md. at 679, 537 A.2d at 253.
129. See Act of May 1I, 1939, ch. 749, 1939 Md.Laws 1606.
130. Id. See Inre Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 160, 458 A.2d 820,
826 (1983).
131. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
132. Id. at 655. Mapp expressly overruled Wolf v.Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
which held that the fourteenth amendment did not require the states to adopt an exclusionary rule applicable to evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. Id. at 33.
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proceedings of evidence procured by an illegal search and
seizure. 3 3
The court framed the issue as whether the federal exclusionary
rule should be incorporated into the probable cause concept of section 551, thus excising information from an affidavit supporting a
search warrant before determining whether probable cause existed. ' 4 The Chus argued that when a section 551 action rests on
an alleged want of probable cause to support the search warrant, the
reference to probable cause in section 551 (a) must be interpreted in
light of evolving fourth amendment law.' s5 Section 551 provides
for the return of seized property in certain instances, including
when it is seized without sufficient probable cause.'3 " The court,
while recognizing that it had looked to fourth amendment decisions
for a qualitative measure of probable cause in prior section 551 actions,13 7 disagreed with the Chus' interpretation of fourth and fourteenth amendment cases.' 3 8
In rejecting the Chus' construction of section 551,' 9 the court
noted that the section pre-dated the application of the federal exclusionary rule to the states.' 4 0 The court reasoned that in the absence
of historical evidence showing that the legislature had intended section 551 to absorb subsequent federal exclusionary rules, it could
4
not import such a purpose.1 '
The court found the 1958 proposed amendment devoid of any
legislative purpose establishing section 551 as "the independent,
freestanding, state law source of its own exclusionary rule." 4 ' Particularly significant to the court was the fact that when the bill was
introduced it contained a proposed exclusionary rule, but the Gen133. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
134. 311 Md. at 680, 537 A.2d at 253.
135. Id.

136. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1987 & Supp. 1988). Two other situations that
trigger § 551 deal with defects in the execution of a warrant. Id.
137. See, e.g., Wood v. State, 185 Md. 280, 285, 44 A.2d 859, 861 (1945) (looking to
the fourth amendment for the meaning of "probable cause" in the Act of 1939).
138. 311 Md. at 680, 537 A.2d at 253. The court stated that "the Chus find themselves in need of a legal scalpel to excise masses of information from the body of the
affidavit." Id. at 679, 537 A.2d at 253.
139. Id. at 680, 537 A.2d at 253.
140. id. at 679, 537 A.2d at 253.
141. Id. at 681,537 A.2d at 254. Had the General Assembly wanted to create a statutorily based exclusionary rule, the court believed it could have done so by adopting the
rule set forth in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The legislature declined to do so. 311 Md. at 681, 537 A.2d at 254.
142. 311 Md. at 681, 537 A.2d at 254.
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eral Assembly struck the rule from the bill before its enactment. 43
The court also was influenced by a 1983 Court of Special Appeals
decision holding that section 551 did not contain its own independent exclusionary rule. 4 4 The Chu court commented that the legislature had not acted to modify section 551 in response to that
decision; it therefore suggested that the legislature's inaction reflected a tacit agreement with the Court of Special Appeals that section 551 was not'intended to contain an independent exclusionary
rule. 145
In Chu the Court of Appeals explicitly announced that section
551 does not embody the exclusionary rule. Assuming the requisite
probable cause, potential white collar crime defendants must seek
another avenue for shielding their seized business records from the
province of the trier of fact.
E.

Other Developments

1. Telephone Wiretaps.-In Calhoun v. State 146 the Court of Special Appeals held that law enforcement officials other than the
state's attorney could submit to the issuing judge progress reports
mandated by the Maryland Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law
(the Act).' 4 7 Moreover, the issuing judge has the authority to designate the particular reporting agent.' 48 While the court implicitly had
reached this conclusion in the past, 14 9 Calhoun marked the first deci-

sion in which the court made explicit its viewpoint. 5 '
In Calhoun the state's attorney for Baltimore County applied to
a Baltimore County Circuit Court judge for an order authorizing
143. id. at 682, 537 A.2d at 254.
144. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 176-77, 458 A.2d 820, 83435 (1983).
145. 311 Md. at 682, 537 A.2d at 254. The court stated that "[tlhis lack of modification indicates that the General Assembly did not consider that the Court of Special Appeals had misperceived the legislative purpose of § 551." Id.
146. 72 Md. App. 685, 532 A.2d 707 (1987).
147. Mo. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -413 (1984 & Supp. 1988). For
the relevant text of the statute, see infra note 153.
148. 72 Md. App. at 692, 532 A.2d at 711. The court also held that progress reports
are not discoverable in order to ascertain the mental processes by which the issuing
judge determined whether to continue or terminate a surveillance. Id. at 693. 532 A.2d
at 711-12. The court found that while the Maryland Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance
Law (the Act) required that there be progress reports, the particulars of the report were
left to the discretion of the issuing judge. Thus, the reports were discoverable only to
determine that they existed and were not shams. Id.
149. See infra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
150. 72 Md. App. at 692, 532 A.2d at 711.
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surreptitious wiretap surveillance on four separate occasions. '5"
The judge issued the wiretap orders upon a finding that each application was procedurally valid.' 5 2 Pursuant to section 10-408(f) of
the Act,1 53 the orders directed that progress reports be made to the
judge by "the Baltimore County Police Department, the applicant,
or a duly sworn Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore County" no
later than every seventy-two hours. 54 The wiretap orders, however,
did not specify the mode of reporting. -5 In compliance with the
orders, the police officers made timely reports to the judge during
56
the surveillance period.
With evidence derived principally from these wiretaps, Roy Edwin Calhoun was convicted in both Baltimore County and Baltimore
City.' 57 On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals,'
Calhoun alleged procedural defects in the execution of the wiretap surveillance.' 59 Specifically, Calhoun argued that section 10-408(f)
mandated that the requisite progress reports be made by the state's
60
attorney personally and not by other law enforcement officials.'
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that
law enforcement officials other than the state's attorney could sub6
mit the progress reports to the issuing judge.' '
The court first determined that while the Act requires the submission of progress reports to the judge, section 10-408(0 is silent
151. Id. at 688, 532 A.2d at 709.
152. Id. An affidavit properly sworn to and signed by two detectives of the Baltimore
County Police Department's narcotics unit supported each application. Id.
153. Section 10-408(f) states:
Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this subtitle, the order shall require reports to be made to the judge who issued the
order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. The reports shall be
made at the intervals the judge requires.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 10-408(f) (Supp. 1988).
154. 72 Md. App. at 688, 532 A.2d at 709.
155. Id.
156. Id. The progress reports submitted to the issuing judge consisted of updates
from the wiretap logs maintained by police members of the surveillance team. Following each report, the judge ordered the police officer either to continue or terminate the
surveillance. Id. at 688-89, 532 A.2d at 709.
157. Id. at 688 n.I, 532 A.2d at 709 n.I,
158. The defendant consolidated both the Baltimore County and Baltimore City cases
on appeal. Id.
159. Id. Calhoun did not challenge the probable cause for issuance of the wiretap
order, sufficiency of the evidence, his culpability, or the term of imprisonment. Id.
160. Id. at 689-90, 532 A.2d at 709-10.
161. Id. at 692, 532 A.2d at 711.
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as to the identity of the reporting agent.' 6 1 Calhoun argued that the
Act requires thaf progress reports be submitted exclusively by the
state's attorney.' 6 3 Calhoun theorized that the submission of progress reports is procedurally analogous to other submissions required by the Act, such as applications for wiretap orders and
requests for postponement of notice to the suspect. 64 The Act
vests exclusive authority to submit wiretap applications and requests
for postponement5 in the attorney general, state prosecutor, or any
6
state's attorney,'
The court rejected Calhoun's argument. 6 6 The court held that
the Act, while requiring that progress reports be submitted, vests
the issuing judge with complete discretion concerning the mode of
reporting. 67 The court stated that the issuing judge decides the
period of time covered by the report, the frequency of the reports,
68
and whether the reports should be oral or written.'
Recognizing that the purpose of progress reports is to show the
issuing judge "what progress has been made toward achievement of
the authorized objective,"'169 the court concluded that a police of70
ficer engaged in surveillance is competent to make these reports.
The court reasoned that a police member of the surveillance team is
in a much better position to apprise the judge about the progress of
the surveillance than is the principal prosecutor.' 7 ' The police officer, unlike the prosecutor, is at the surveillance scene and thus has
firsthand knowledge of the progress of the surveillance. Because
section 10-408() neither directs nor requires the principal prosecut162. Id. at 689, 532 A.2d at 710.
163. Id. at 689-90, 532 A.2d at 709-10.
164. Id. at 690, 532 A.2d at 710. Calhoun relied on Poore v. State, 39 Md. App. 44,
384 A.2d 103, cert. denied, 282 Md. 737 (1978), in which the Court of Special Appeals
stated that "[n]owhere in any of the former statutes or the present statute is there so
much as a hint that the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may delegate the authority to apply for interception orders." Id. at 58, 384 A.2d at 112. The issue in Calhoun, however, was whether a law enforcement official other than the prosecuting
attorney could submit the required progress reports. 72 Md. App. at 689, 532 A.2d at
709-10.
165. MD.CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1988).
166. 72 Md. App. at 690, 532 A.2d at 710.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. MD. CTS. &Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(f) (Supp. 1988). For the relevant
text, see supra note 153.
170. 72 Md. App. at 690, 532 A.2d at 710.
171. Id. Because the prosecuting attorney must rely on information received from the
surveillance team, the prosecutor's reports to the judge would necessarily be based on
secondhand or thirdhand data. Id.
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ing attorney to personally make progress reports to the issuing
judge,17 2 the court held that the judge
may receive firsthand infor73
mation from the surveillance team.'
Prior to Calhoun, the Court of Special Appeals implicitly sanctioned a police officer's submission of progress reports to the issuing judge. 74 In Howard v. State' 7 5 the court upheld wiretap orders
that directed that the state's attorney "or his designee shall advise
this Court of the progress of the interception process .... ,,176 In
Baldwin v. State' 7 1 the court specifically stated that "[tI]he issuingjudge
shall provide in the orderfor the interception that the police report to thejudge
at designated intervals on the progress being made by the police in attaining
their objective."' 78 Although the basis of the identity of the reporting
agent was not determined, t79 Baldwin and Howard provided valuable
guidance for the Calhoun court's interpretation of section 10-408(f)
because of their implicit conclusion that a judge may designate a
police officer or another similarly trusted observer to submit progress reports.
By explicitly stating what prior law already assumed to be valid,
the Court of Special Appeals in Calhoun properly interpreted section
10-408(f). In light of the purpose of the requisite progress reports,
the issuing judge should have authority to appoint a police member
of the surveillance team to serve as the reporting agent.
2. Scientific Tests.-In Cobey v. State' the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court's admission into evidence of the results of a Chromosome Variant Analysis (CVA)'' conducted on an
172. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(f) (Supp. 1988). For the relevant
text of the statute, see supra note 153.
173. 72 Md. App. at 690, 532 A.2d at 710.
174. Id. at 691, 532 A.2d at 710-11.
175. 51 Md. App. 46, 442 A.2d 176 (1982).
176. Id. at 65, 442 A.2d at 187-88. In Howard the Court of Special Appeals rejected an
argument similar to that set forth by Calhoun. The court stated that "[ilt takes no keen
analysis of the statutes to appreciate that neither of them has a requirement that the
progress reports be prepared by 'the principal prosecuting attorney.' " Id. at 66, 442
A.2d at 187-88.
177. 45 Md. App. 378,413 A.2d 246 (1980). afftd. 289 Md. 635,426 A.2d 916 (1981).
178. Id. at 393, 413 A.2d at 255 (emphasis in original).
179. 72 Md. App. at 691, 532 A.2d at 711.
180. 73 Md. App. 233, 533 A.2d 944 (1987). cert. denied, 312 Md. 127, 538 A.2d 778
(1988).
181. Chromosome Variant Analysis (CVA) is a scientific technique used to establish
paternity. Id. at 242, 533 A.2d at 948. Like a blood test, CVA cannot prove conclusively
that a specific individual is the father of a child; rather, it only can ascertain if an individual is possibly the father. Id. at 236, 533 A.2d at 946. For a detailed explanation of CVA,
see infra note 197.
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aborted fetus of a rape victim constituted reversible error. In so
holding, the court adhered to the strict guidelines of the Fye-Reed
test,' 8 2 which requires proof that a new scientific technique be generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community
before the results of such a technique may be admissible evidence at
trial. 1813
On September 4, 1985, while walking on a wooded path in
Northwest Branch Park, a woman was grabbed from behind, dragged into the woods, and forcibly raped.'8 4 Her assailant then took
the keys to her 1985 blue Subaru automobile and disappeared., 8 5
Twenty-three days later Kenneth S. Cobey was stopped by a police officer at a traffic observation checkpoint in the District of Columbia for two nonmoving traffic violations.'8 6 Cobey was driving a
1985 blue Subaru." s7 Cobey claimed the car belonged to a friend,
but was unable to remember the friend's last name or address or to
produce the car's registration.' 88 When a computer check of the
rear license plate number failed to reveal any other information, the
officer impounded the vehicle for further investigation.'8 9 Cobey,
however, was merely given two traffic citations and permitted to
leave.' 9 ° Three days later, after the police automobile theft unit
learned that this was the 1985 blue Subaru stolen from a rape victim
earlier that month, Montgomery County police located and arrested
Cobey, charging him with rape, several counts of sexual offense,

182. The Frye-Reed test, first expounded in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391
A.2d 364 (1978). For a discussion of Reed, see infra text accompanying notes 203-207.
183. 73 Md. App. at 237, 533 A.2d at 946.
184. Id. at 235, 533 A.2d at 945.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 235-36, 533 A.2d at 945. The officer who stopped Cobey testified that he
did so because the car failed to display an inspection sticker and a front license plate,
both of which are required under District of Columbia law. Id. Cobey challehged the
legality of this stop on appeal, asserting that it violated the requirements for a valid
roadblock as outlined in Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984), and that all
evidence obtained as a result of the stop should have been excluded as "fruit of the
poisonous tree." 73 Md. App. at 245, 533 A.2d at 950. The Court of Special Appeals
accepted the testimony of the officer in charge of the checkpoint, who maintained that it
was not a Little-type roadblock because only cars with obvious violations of the District of
Columbia traffic code were pulled over. Id. The court concluded that these violations
gave the officer probable cause io stop every car which was in fact stopped, including
Cobey's. id.
187. 73 Md. App. at 235, 533 A.2d at 945.
188. Id. at 236, 533 A.2d at 945.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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robbery, and theft of over $300.19 1
The rape victim subsequently discovered she was pregnant; according to her testimony at Cobey's trial, the pregnancy was attributable only to the previous month's ordeal. 9 ' The young woman
terminated the pregnancy on October 21, 1985.'"9 The police then
sent the aborted fetus, along with blood samples from both the rape
victim and Cobey, to Dr. Susan Olson, a cytogeneticist' 94 at Oregon
Health Sciences University, for a CVA to determine whether Cobey
might be the man who fathered the fetus. '9
The trial court judge conducted a hearing out of the presence
of the jury to decide whether to allow Dr. Olson to testify as to the
results of the CVA performed on the victim, Cobey, and the aborted
97
fetus.' 96 At the hearing Dr. Olson explained CVA in great detail.
In addition, an article summarizing the results of several CVA studies supervised by Dr. Olson was offered into evidence.' 98 Based on
191. Id., 533 A.2d at 945-46.
192. Id., 533 A.2d at 946.

193. Id.
194. "Cytogenetics" is defined as a specialized branch of medical genetics that concentrates on chromosomal structures and abnormalities. Id. at 240, 533 A.2d at 948. See

also WEBSTER'S

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

321 (9th ed. 1987).

195. 73 Md. App. at 236, 533 A.2d at 946.
196. Id. at 240, 533 A.2d at 948.
197. Dr. Olson began by defining chromosomes as genetic material composed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and other proteins that function to transmit units of genetic
information from one generation to another. Id. Every person has a set of chromosomes in each cell consisting of 23 distinct pairs; one chromosome from each pair is
donated by the person's mother and the other is donated by the father. Id. Dr. Olson
explained that each chromosome contains an area of the DNA protein structure known
as the heterochromatin, the amount and shape of which may vary from person to person. d. at 241, 533 A.2d at 948. Humans inherit the different shapes of the heterochromatin, known as variants, so that a particular chromosome will exhibit the same variant
in parent and child. Id.
Dr. Olson described the process whereby cytogeneticists examine chromosome
variants. Id. In simplified terms, cell cultures are chemically treated to expose human
chromosomes in an examination dish, and then the chromosomes are stained, photographed, and enlarged to make the variants clearly visible and easy to compare with
other variants. d.
In paternity disputes, cytogeneticists compare the variants of the child with those of
the mother to determine which chromosomes the mother contributed. Id. at 242, 533
A.2d at 948. The remaining variants are compared to those of an alleged father. Id. If
each of the child's nonmaternal variants matches a variant of one of the male's chromosomes, then that male could have donated all of the chromosomes; however, if any of the
child's variants does not have a match among the father's variants, the man could not
possibly be the child's father. Id., 533 A.2d at 948-49. Finally, Dr. Olson testified that
the principles and techniques involved in CVA were generally accepted as valid within
the scientific community. Id. at 243, 533 A.2d at 949.
198. 73 Md. App. at 242, 533 A.2d at 949. Dr. Olson's article describes a CVA study
performed on twelve mother-father-child trios in which the father's variants were sepa-
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this evidence, the trial court judge denied Cobey's motion to exclude Dr. Olson's testimony.' 99
Dr. Olson testified at Cobey's trial that the CVA disclosed that
the nonmaternal variants of the aborted fetus matched variants in
Cobey's chromosomes. 20 0 Furthermore, she asserted only a .3 percent possibility existed that another man had variants identical to
Cobey's.2° 1
In reviewing the trial court's decision to allow Dr. Olson's testimony, 20 2 the Court of Special Appeals recognized that the Frye-Reed
test, endorsed by the Court of Appeals in Reed v. State,2 °3 controlled
the admissibility of the results of a new scientific technique as evidence in a criminal trial. 20 4 Reed involved the admissibility of voice
identification testimony based on the analysis of spectrograms or
voiceprints.2 °5 The test adopted in Reed requires that "before a scirated from those.of their respective mother-child combinations and coded for anonymity. See Olson, Human Chromosome Variation: The Discriminatory Power of Q-band
Heteromorphism (Variant) Analysis inDistinguishingbetween Individuals, with Specific Application
to Cases of Questionable Paternity, 38 AM. J. HUM. GECETICS 235 (1986). Out of the 120

possible cases of paternity that resulted from this "scrambling" of the fathers' variants,
the article reports that 108 cases in which the alleged father was not the natural father
were correctly excluded, while 12 cases of actual paternity were correctly determined.
Id. at 235-36. The article concludes that, assuming no laboratory error, the likelihood of
excluding a wrongfully accused man in a paternity dispute therefore is 100%. Id. at 242.
Olson's article then concedes that in a 1981 study by Niebuhr and Gurtler, the
probability of vindicating the wrong man fell in the much lower range of 72-74%, depending upon the sex of the'child. Id. at 243. Olson offered no explanation for this
difference, asserting only that different scoring criteria made it difficult to compare the
results of her study with those of the Niebuhr-Gurtler study. Id.
199. 73 Md. App. at 236, 533 A.2d at 946.
200. Id. at 244, 533 A.2d at 950.
201. Id. At the hearing on Cobey's motion to suppress the results of the C'VA, Dr.
Olson testified that in a study comparing the variants of 57 caucasians, she found that no
two people had the same variants on all of the chromosomes. Id. at 242, 533 A.2d at 949.
Based on this finding Dr. Olson concluded that aside from identical twins, there was
only a .03% chance that any two people will have identical sets of variants. Id. Dr.
Olson's article explains that this .03% figure is based on the frequency with which each
chromosome was useful for telling two people apart. See Olson, supra note 198, at 235.
The Court of Special Appeals briefly noted the unexplained discrepancy between this
.03% chance estimated from Olson's study and the .3% possibility to which she testified
at Cobey's trial. 73 Md. App. at 244-45, 533 A.2d at 950.
202. In fact two trials were involved. Cobey's first trial, in which Judge Irma Raker
denied Cobey's motion to exclude Dr. Olson's testimony, resulted in a mistrial. 73 Md.
App. at 236-37, 533 A.2d at 946. At Cobey's second trial, however, Judge Richard
Latham accepted Raker's prior ruling on this motion and allowed Dr. Olson's expert
testimony without rehearing the issue. Id. at 237, 533 A.2d at 946. On appeal the court
focused on the propriety of Judge Raker's ruling. Id.
203. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
204. 73 Md. App. at 237, 533 A.2d at 946.
205. Reed, 283 Md. at 375, 391 A.2d at 364-65.
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entific opinion will be received as evidence at trial, the basis of that
opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within
the expert's particular scientific field." ' 6 The Reed court held that
voiceprints had not yet attained the general acceptance of experts in
the field of acoustics and therefore were inadmissible. 0 7
Although the Frye-Reed test was the correct standard to apply in
reviewing the lower court's decision to admit the results of the
CVA,2 0 8 the Court of Special Appeals found that Reed left two questions unsettled: (1) whether the test was limited to evaluating only
the evidence before the trial court, and (2) what standard of review
should be applied to the trial court's decision.20 9 The court answered the first of these questions by observing that the court in
Reed "seems to have gone beyond the record, 2 ' 0 and grounded its
decision on "[the] examination of the record, ...
the judicial opinions which have considered this question, and the available legal and
scientific commentaries .
"...
112 The court also referred to Collins v.
State, 2 in which both appellate courts examined materials outside
the record in concluding that hypnosis was not generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community. 2 s The court in Cobey therefore
opted not to limit itself solely to the evidence before the trial court.
Next, the court stated that the applicable standard of review in
cases involving the admission of scientific evidence is whether the
trial court's finding of reliability is against the weight of the evidence, rather than the more strict clearly erroneous standard."1 4 In
arriving at this conclusion, the court followed the reasoning in Reed
that because the general acceptance of a scientific technique within
the relevant field of experts does not vary from case to case, the
question of acceptance is not within a trial judge's individual discretion.2' 1 5 The court also pointed out that the clearly erroneous standard of review would be inconsistent with the appellate court's
206. Id. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368. According to the majority opinion in Reed, most of
the courts in the country that have dealt with the issue of the admissibility of scientific
evidence have accepted this same standard. Id. at 382, 391 A.2d at 368.
207. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978).
208. 73 Md. App. at 237, 533 A.2d at 946.
209. Id. at 238, 533 A.2d at 947.
210. Id. (emphasis in original).
211. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (emphasis added).
The Reed court listed commentaries outside of the record which it considered. Id.
212. 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982), aff'd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028
(1983).
213. 73 Md. App. at 238, 533 A.2d at 947.
214. Id. at 239, 533 A.2d at 947.
215. Id.
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ability to consider evidence outside the trial court record. 21 6
After defining the standards, the Court of Special Appeals then
examined the specific evidence upon which the trial court judge
based her decision to admit the results of the CVA. This evidence
included Dr. Olson's testimony21 7 and article. 2t8 The court noted
that Dr. Olson did not produce any published articles or the names
of other cytogeneticists supporting her theories to reinforce the
foundation of her testimony. 2 9 More importantly, the court was
unable to discover any scientific commentary outside of the trial
court record which promoted or even discussed the findings reported in Dr. Olson's article. 22 ' As a result, the court held that because the State failed to meet its burden under the Frye-Reed test of
establishing that CVA was in fact generally accepted as reliable in
the scientific community, Dr. Olson's testimony was inadmissible. 2 2 '
Finally, the court stipulated that its holding was subject to reconsideration in future cases if evidence is presented confirming that CVA
is generally accepted as reliable in paternity disputes.2 2 2
The court's decision in Cobey appears to clarify Reed both by declaring that an appellate court may go outside the trial court record
in reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence and by articulating the applicable standard of review in such a case.22 3 In analyzing
these issues, however, Cobey raises a number of other important
questions. First, in permitting an appellate court to proceed on a
factfinding expedition of its own, the court contradicts the test
enunciated in Reed that places the burden of persuasion on the proponent of the new scientific technique.2 2 4 An appellate court, in

proceeding beyond the trial court record, conceivably could establish the general acceptance of a scientific process even though the
State failed to do so, in effect eliminating the burden of persuasion
requirement. It is unclear in the Cobey decision whether this is the
result the court intended.2 2 5
216. Id.
217. See supra note 197.
218. See supra note 198.
219. 73 Md. App. at 243-44, 533 A.2d at 949.
220. Id. at 244, 533 A.2d at 950.
221. Id. at 245, 533 A.2d at 950.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 238-39, 533 A.2d at 947.
224. Id. at 238, 533 A.2d at 946. See also Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 497,
404 A.2d 269, 274 (1979) (holding that the proponent of a blood testing technique to
establish paternity must show that the technique has gained general acceptance in its
field).
225. For example, the Cobe. court questioned whether the State in a criminal trial
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Furthermore, the court in Cobey failed to disclose either how far
an appellate court must go beyond the trial court record or how
much evidence is necessary to go against the "weight of the evidence." In Cobey the court was unable to find any scientific commentary outside the record supporting Dr. Olson's theory.2 2 6 The court
did not clarify whether the absence of another scholarly writing on
the subject necessarily established that the scientific community had
not accepted CVA.2 7 It also is unclear whether just one more supportive study or article would have been enough to sway the weight
of evidence in Dr. Olson's favor.
The Reed court defined the relevant scientific community used
to assess the reliability of a new scientific technique as "those whose
scientific background and training are sufficient to allow them to
comprehend and understand the process and form a judgment
about it."' 22 8 Yet neither Reed nor Cobey provided a definitive answer
as to the scope of a scientific community which must be surveyed or
the number of experts who must agree before a procedure becomes
reliable. Moreover, the decision left unresolved whether the relevant experts who assess CVA are limited to cytogeneticists, or
whether they could include anyone with a background in genetics,
medicine, or another related area of study.
In a vehement and persuasive dissent in Reed, Judge Smith suggested that the opinions of the scientific community concerning the
reliability of a given scientific procedure should go to the weight of
the evidence rather than its admissibility. 22 9 Judge Smith would allow the jury, as the trier of fact, to decide precisely how much value
to award such expert evidence. 23 0 The majority in Reed dismissed
this idea by stating that scientific disputes should not be resolved on
must prove the reliability of a new scientific process beyond a reasonable doubt or
merely by a preponderance of the evidence. 73 Md. App. at 238, 533 A.2d at 946. The
court then declined to respond to its own question by finding that the State failed under
either possible standard. Id. This proposition conflicts with the appellate court initiative of looking for general acceptance beyond the record.
226. id. at 244, 533 A.2d at 950.
227. The Court of Special Appeals observed that at Cobey's trial, Dr. Olson averred
that her belief in the reliability of CVA was "shared by a number of different
[cytogeneticists] that are familiar with this particular testing," although she never specifically named them. Id. at 243, 533 A.2d at 949. Additionally, CVA was held admissible
in two paternity cases in Oregon, but Dr. Olson did not give specific citations to these
judicial opinions. Id. at 244, 533 A.2d at 949. Although seemingly anxious to go
outside of the lower court record, the court surprisingly failed to pursue either of these
possibilities.
228. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 382, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978).
229. Id. at 502, 391 A.2d at 427 (Smith, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
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a case-by-case basis, and that it would lead to inconsistencies if, for
example, one jury found a particular scientific process reliable,
while another came to an opposite conclusion. 23 ' Likewise, the majority in Cobeyjustified its decision to make an independent examination of evidence outside of the record as necessary to establish
consistent standards for the admission of scientific evidence. 2 In
its efforts to be congruous in this respect, the Court of Special Appeals in Cobey created other inconsistencies and ambiguities, all of
which may require future litigation for clarification.
KATHRYN S. BERTHOT

H.

SCOTr CURTIS

MARGHERITA A. Luzzi
BEVERLY BRENEMAN SALMON

231. Id. at 387, 391 A.2d at 371.
232. 73 Md. App. at 240, 533 A.2d at 947-48.

VI.

FAMILY LAW

A.

Custody

The Court of Appeals in In re Jessica M. I held that the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City did not abuse its discretion in granting custody and guardianship of two children to foster parents who were
leaving the country for three years because such an arrangement
was in the best interest of the children.' The court found that,
although the natural mother would be isolated physically from her
children for a long period of time, this factor alone was "not very
persuasive when weighed against the best interest of the children."'
In July 1984 Baltimore City police officers found three children
alone and unsupervised.4 Two of the children, Joseph M. and Jessica M., subsequently were placed in emergency shelter care and
then in separate foster homes.5
In October 1984 the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS) filed petitions declaring that the children were "children in need of assistance," 6 alleging that their natural mother and
father were drug users and-had failed to provide them with adequate
care.7 A month later the mother and father entered into a service
agreement with BCDSS in which they agreed to attend regularly a
drug abuse program, counseling sessions, and weekly visitations
with their children.'
At an adjudicatory hearing in January 1985 the children were
declared to be in need of assistance and, shortly thereafter, were
placed in the home of foster parents. In April 1985 the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City held a disposition hearing at which it committed the children to BCDSS for foster care placement.9 The court
1. 312 Md. 93, 538 A.2d 305 (1988), aff'g 72 Md. App. 7, 527 A.2d 766 (1987).
2. Id. at 115, 538 A.2d at 316.
3. Id. at 113, 538 A.2d at 315.
4. Id. at 96, 538 A.2d at 306. Only two of the three children were the subject of this
case: Jessica M., 18 months old, and Joseph M., 3 months old. Their older brother's
custody was not in dispute. 72 Md. App. at 9, 527 A.2d at 767.
5. 312 Md. at 96, 538 A.2d at 306.
6. Id. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-801, states in pertinent part:
"'Child in need of assistance' is a child who requires the assistance of the court because
...(2) His parents.., are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the
child...."MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (Supp. 1988).
7. 312 Md. at 96, 538 A.2d at 306.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 97, 538 A.2d at 307.
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also ordered the children's mother and father to participate in drug
abuse counseling' ° and to enter into and abide by the terms of the
service agreement with BCDSS. "
BCDSS prepared an amended service agreement in April 1985,
which the mother did not sign until August 21, 1985. 2 The
amended agreement differed from the earlier one in that visitation
was to be held monthly and at the offices of the Howard County
Department of Social Services, near the foster parents' home:-3 The
mother attended neither the drug abuse counseling nor the sessions
with social workers that the amended service agreement required.
In addition, the mother visited her children only four times between
January 1985 and May 1986, even though BCDSS had provided her
with ample means to make the monthly visits.'

4

In late 1985, because of the mother's noncompliance with the
service agreement, BCDSS decided the children should not be reunited with their mother but instead should be eligible either for
adoption or for custody and guardianship. 5 A review hearing
before a master was held on April 30, 1986. The foster parents and
their counsel, the father and his counsel, counsel for the children,
and counsel for the mother were present, but the mother herself did
not attend. ' 6 The master recommended that the commitment of the
children to BCDSS be rescinded; custody and guardianship be
granted to the foster parents; the guardians, who planned to move
to England for three years, were not to pursue adoption of the children while overseas; and the father and the children's older brother
were to be granted reasonable visitation rights.' 7
Two weeks after the review hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued an order adopting the master's recommendations,
10. By the time the children were placed in the foster parents' home, the record

showed the mother had been a cocaine addict for three years, had abused heroin for one
year, had been convicted three times for possession of narcotics and once for solicitation, had been unemployed since 1984, and had engaged in prostitution and door-todoor solicitation to support her drug habit. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 97-98, 538 A.2d at 307. The mother gave no reason for the delay in executing the agreement. Id. at 98, 538 A.2d at 307. The service agreement contained a
warning that the mother's failure to fulfill the agreement could lead to termination of
her parental rights. Id. at 99, 538 A.2d at 308.
13. Id. at 97-98, 538 A.2d at 307.
14. Id. at 98, 538 A.2d at 307.
15. Id. at 99, 538 A.2d at 308. In January 1986 the local foster care review board
issued a report on each of the children, recommending that the children be adopted by
the current foster parents. Id. at 100-01, 538 A.2d at 308.
16. Id. at 101, 538 A.2d at 309.
17. Id. at 102, 538 A.2d at 309.
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with an addition that the mother also receive visitation rights." The
circuit court later vacated the order pending a hearing on exceptions to the master's disposition that the mother filed on May 5,
1986.19
At the May 28, 1986 hearing to consider the exceptions, the
mother testified that she did not want the children released to her at
that time because she had no job, no home, no money, no family,
and no idea when she would be getting out ofjail. 20 She also admitted to a current cocaine dependency. BCDSS social workers, on the
other hand, presented evidence that the two children were doing
very well in their foster home: they had overcome many of their
emotional and developmental problems and were very attached to
the foster parents."' Finding that the mother was not in a position
to care for the children at that time, the circuit court said:
At the present time what is in the best interest of these children is that custody and guardianship be given to [the foster parents]. . . . [C]ommitment to the Department of
Social Service should be rescinded. This is not a termination of parental right. This is not the granting of any adoption or creating a right of adoption on the part of [the
foster parents].
A week later the court issued an order in accordance with its an23
nouncement at the hearing, thus denying the mother's exceptions.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit
court's judgment with the direction that it be modified to include a
provision allowing adoption proceedings to be instituted only in
Maryland. 4 The Court of Appeals granted the mother's petition for
certiorari.
The Court of Appeals first found that the mother could not
claim she was unaware that the purpose of the May 28, 1986 review
hearing was to determine whether commitment of the children to
BCDSS would be rescinded and custody and guardianship would be
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id. The mother attended the hearing on release from Baltimore City jail, where
she had been held since her arrest on May 23, 1986. Id. The father, also incarcerated at
Baltimore City jail, was excused from the hearing to attend a program at the jail. Id. He
had agreed previously that custody and guardianship be granted to the foster parents.
Id. at 103, 538 A.2d at 310.
21. Id. at 103, 538 A.2d at 310.
22. Id. at 104, 538 A.2d at 310.
23. Id. at 105, 538 A.2d at 311.
24. 72 Md. App. at 18, 527 A.2d at 771.
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granted to the foster parents.2 5 The court noted that the amended
service agreement, signed by the mother on August 21, 1985,
26
warned her in "plain language" of her tenuous parental rights.
According to the court, the mother "utterly failed to abide by any of
[the agreement's] terms. "27 In addition, while the mother herself
did not attend the April 30, 1986 review hearing, her counsel was
fully aware of the master's recommendations, and there was no indication in the record that the mother's counsel failed to inform the
mother of those recommendations.2 8 Finally, the court noted that
counsel for the mother never argued at the May 28, 1986 hearing
that notice to the mother of the purpose of the hearing had been
29
insufficient.
The court then examined whether the circuit court, exercising
juvenile powers, had jurisdiction to issue its order granting custody
and guardianship to foster parents moving overseas for three
years. 30 As the court noted, a juvenile court "has exclusive original
' 3
jurisdiction over a child alleged to be ... in need of assistance '
and may "[p]lace the child ... in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, upon terms the court deems
appropriate. 3s 2 - Equity courts, on the other hand, have jurisdiction
over the adoption of a child, 3 3 and "jurisdiction over adoption does
not extend to ajuvenile court." 4 The children's mother contended
that because she would have no access to her children for the three
years they were in England, the juvenile court effectively had terminated her parental rights, a function that a juvenile court has no
3 5
jurisdiction to perform.
The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the juvenile court
decided the case within its jurisdictional limits and neither granted
an adoption nor conferred upon the foster parents a right to adopt
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

312 Md. at 106, 538 A.2d at 311.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106-07, 538 A.2d at 311-12.
Id. at 107, 538 A.2d at 312.
Id.

MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(a) (Supp. 1988). The court used the
term "juvenile court" to refer to a circuit court hearing juvenile matters and the term
"equity court" to refer to a circuit court hearing equity matters. 312 Md. at 108 n.7, 538
A.2d at 312 n.7.
32. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-820(c)(1)(i) (Supp. 1988).
33. MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201(a)(1) (Supp. 1988).

34. In re Arlene G., 301 Md. 355, 361, 483 A.2d 39, 42 (1984).
35. 312 Md. at 109, 538 A.2d at 313.
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the children in the future.3 6 As the court pointed out, the juvenile
court's order required the foster parents to allow the natural parents and the older sibling to visit with the children; because the children would live overseas, visitation was to be "under reasonable
circumstances." 3 7 In addition, the juvenile court's order mandated
that any adoption proceedings be instituted in Baltimore City, thus
allowing the natural parents a right to notification and participation.3 8 Accordingly, the court held that the juvenile court's order
"neither by intent nor letter, terminated the mother's 'parental
rights,' such as they may be," and that such an order was "beyond
question" within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. 9
Next, the court addressed the question of whether the juvenile
court erred in awarding custody and guardianship of the children to
foster parents who were to be out of the country for three years. In
setting out the standard of appellate review in child custody cases,
the court quoted its 1978 decision in Davis v. Davis:4"
[Wihen the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion
of the chancellor founded upon sound legal principles and
based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,
the chancellor's deGision should be disturbed only if there
has been a clear abuse of discretion.'
TheJessica M. court further relied on Ross v. Hoffman 42 for the proposition that the best interest of the child standard was "firmly entrenched in Maryland"143 as the proper legal principle to apply in
child custody cases.4 4 The court concluded that statements such as
"[alt the present time what is in the best interest of these children is
that custody and guardianship be given to [the foster parents]" indicated that the juvenile court properly applied this principle.4 5 As
the facts in the case were undisputed,4 6 and because the court's conclusion was founded upon a sound legal principle, the Court of Appeals would not disturb the decision unless there had been a clear
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 109-10, 538 A.2d at 313.
40. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977), rehgdenied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978).
41. Id. at 125-26, 372 A.2d at 234, quoted in In reJessica M.. 312 Md. at 110-11. 538
A.2d at 313-14.
42. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
43. Id. at 174, 372 A.2d at 585.
44. 312 Md.at 111, 538 A.2d at 314.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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abuse of discretion.4 7
The mother based her argument that the circuit court clearly
abused its discretion solely on the fact that the children would be in
England for three years. 4" She agreed that the foster parents were
fit guardians, and that she herself would be unable to care for the
children within the reasonably near future. 49 Nonetheless, she argued, the relocation of the children would infringe upon her rights
of visitation; BCDSS should be compelled to attempt to find another
suitable local foster home for the children. 50
The court flatly rejected the mother's contention, finding that
the mother "had precipitated a severance of a continuing relationship with her children."'" For instance, the mother had not lived up
to the service agreements she had signed and had "virtually ignored" her children.52 As the court noted, "[T]he lamentations of
the mother that she would be isolated physically from her children
when
for three years are, to say the least, not very persuasive
53
weighed against the best interest of the children."

While the general rule, according to the court, is that a parent
whose child is placed in another's custody has a right to visit the
child at reasonable times, that right is not an absolute right; it must
yield to the welfare of the child.54 In addition, legislative policy requires that doubts be resolved in favor of the child when there is a
conflict between the interests of a minor child and the interests of an
adult.55 Finally, the court concluded that in juvenile proceedings
family ties may be broken and a child may be separated from his or
her parents when necessary for the welfare of the child. 5 1 "Beyond
question, it is necessary in this case." '5 7 Noting that the custody order encouraged the foster parents to facilitate contact between the
children and the mother, and that the foster parents consented to
do so, 58 the court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its dis47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

111-12, 538 A.2d at 314.
112, 538 A.2d at 314.

1 12-13, 538 A.2d at 314-15.
113, 538 A.2d at 315.

54. 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.26, at 274-75 (rev. 2d ed. 1961).
The court quoted an earlier edition, but the passage quoted is identical in the revised
edition.
55. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-502(b)(2) (1984).
56. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-802(a)(3) (1984).
57. 312 Md. at 115, 538 A.2d at 316.
58. Id.
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cretion in granting custody and guardianship to the foster parents
despite the significant curtailment of the mother's visitation rights.5
In Jessica M. the court strongly reaffirmed the longstanding
principle that in custody cases, the deciding factor should be the
best interest of the child."0 One can argue, however, that even after
Jessica M. a true best interest standard does not rule in Maryland.
The court's favorable citing of Ross v. Hoffman 6 indicated that that
case remains the current standard for defining the best interest standard. While the Ross court espoused the best interest standard, it
also retained a strong presumption favoring custody in the natural
parents:
[Ilt is presumed that the child's best interest is subserved
by custody in the parent. That presumption is overcome
and such custody will be denied if (a) the parent is unfit to
have custody, or (b) if there ate such exceptional circumstances as make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child. 6 2
Thus, the Ross court held, in deciding to place a child in the custody
of foster parents, that a court first must deem a natural parent unfit
or find exceptional circumstances showing that staying with the nat59. Id.

60. This was not a revolutionary conclusion; the court relied on authority from as far
back as 1938 that the best interests of the child were paramount in deciding visitation
rights. The court stated in Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 199 A. 507 (1938), that
visitation opportunities can be denied "if the best interest of the child is subserved." Id.
at 476, 199 A. at 510. In Radford v. Matczuk, 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960), the
Court of Appeals explained that a parent's right of visitation "is an important, natural
and legal right, although it is not an absolute right." Id. at 488, 164 A.2d at 907.
Although the court did not directly address any particular test to determine what is
in the best interest of the child, the Court of Special Appeals articulated a best interest
test in Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1978). The
ten criteria set out in Sanders are:
1) fitness of the parents; 2) character and reputation of the parties; 3) desire of
the natural parents and agreements between the parties; 4) potentiality of
maintaining natural family relations; 5) preference of the child; 6) material opportunities affecting the future life of the child; 7) age, health and sex of the
child; 8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation; 9) length of separation from the natural parents; and 10) prior voluntary abandonment or
surrender.
Id. at 420, 381 A.2d at 1163 (citations omitted). The Court of Special Appeals in In re
Jessica M. held that all of Sanders's criteria, except those concerning opportunities of
visitation, confirmed that it would be in the best interest of the two children to stay with
the foster parents. In addition, the Court of Special Appeals found the difficult question
of visitation to be outweighed by the nine other factors, concluding that the foster parents would indeed be the best guardians. 72 Md. App. at 14-15, 527 A.2d at 769.
61. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
62. Id. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587.
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ural parent would be detrimental to the child's best interest. 63
Although this strict requirement was met in Jessica M., where the
mother herself admitted to being unfit, application of the best interest standard may not always work where the facts are less clear.
B.

Adoption

1. Jurisdiction.-The Court of Appeals in In re Lynn M. ' held
that a Maryland circuit court had both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction to determine if nonresidents of Maryland should be
granted an adoption decree.6 5 The court also held that a child born
in Maryland is domiciled in Maryland for purposes of the State's
adoption venue statute, even if the child is held in temporary cus66
tody by the adoptive parents in another state.
In an effort to adopt a child, Gene and Penny Juve, who were
then residents of Virginia,6 7 placed classified adoption advertisements in several newspapers. 68 They received a response from an

expectant Prince George's County couple, who agreed to allow the
Juves to adopt their child when it was born. When the child and her
mother were discharged from the hospital, the natural parents allowed theJuves to assume temporary custody of the infant pending
the court's granting of the adoption.6 9 Immediately thereafter the
Juves filed a petition for adoption in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County.7 ° The child's natural parents joined the petition
as parties to the proceeding, specifically consenting to the adoption. 7 The circuit court granted temporary custody and guardianship of the child to the Juves. 72
At the adoption hearing the judge dismissed theJuves' petition
without prejudice, ruling sua sponte that the circuit court had. no
63. Id.
64. 312 Md. 461, 540 A.2d 799 (1988).
65. Id. at 472, 540 A.2d at 804.
66. Id.
67. TheJuves moved to Georgia in February 1986. Id. at 466 n.3, 540 A.2d at 802
n.3.
68. Id. at 467, 540 A.2d at 802. Adoptions may be initiated either through a child
placement agency or independent of such an agency, by an individual. Id. at 463-64, 540
A.2d at 800. See also MD.FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-507 (1984).
69. 312 Md. at 467, 540 A.2d at 802.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. MD.R. D78(d) permits a circuit court to "make a temporary award of custody of
a minor prior to a hearing and prior to an interlocutory decree of adoption as it may
deem in the best interest of the child." Id.
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jurisdiction to consider the petition because both the child and the
adoptive parents were residing in Virginia. 7 - According to the circuit court judge, the facts surrounding the petition met none of the
five conditions listed in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
section 6-203(e), that give Maryland circuit courts venue in an adoption proceeding. 74 The Juves appealed, and the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari prior to a determination by the Court of Special
Appeals.75
In arriving at its decision the Court of Appeals considered the
validity of two conclusions drawn by the trial court: (1) that there
was neither venue nor jurisdiction in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County to entertain the adoption petition because the
Juves were not residents of Maryland, and (2) that the child no
longer was domiciled in Maryland because the Juves had moved her
out of the State.7 6
Confronting the trial court's first conclusion, concerning venue
and jurisdiction over the Juves, the Court of Appeals noted that the
circuit courts of Maryland clearly have the power to grant adoptions.7 7 And while the appellate court found nothing in the Maryland adoption statute7 to determine whether the circuit courts have
jurisdiction over nonresidents who petition for adoption of a
child,79 the court did find an answer in the "unmistakable language"
of its 1935 decision in Waller v. Ellis.8 0

According to the Waller

73. 312 Md. at 468-69, 540 A.2d at 803.
74. id. at 469, 540 A.2d at 803. MD. CTS &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-203(e) (1984)
provides:
(e) Adoption.-The venue for a proceeding for adoption of a person who
is physically within the State or subject to the jurisdiction of an equity court is
in a county in which:
(i) The petitioner is domiciled;
(2) The petitioner has resided for at least 90 days next preceding the
filing of the petition;
(3) A licensed child placement agency having legal or physical custody of the person to be adopted is located;
(4) The person to be adopted is domiciled, if he is related to the
petitioner by blood or marriage or is an adult; or
(5) An equity court has continuing jurisdiction over the custody of
the person to be adopted.
Id.
75. 312 Md. at 469, 540 A.2d at 803.
76. Id.
77. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 1-201(a)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part:
"An equity court has jurisdiction over ... adoption of a child." Id.
78. Id. §§ 5-301 to -330 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
79. 312 Md. at 470, 540 A.2d at 804.
80. 169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
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court,
Since the whole purpose of the statute is to insure the
welfare of the infant, it is not apparent why in a proper case
that end may not be as well served upon the application of
a nonresident as by that of a resident ....
It is the character of the adoptive parent, and not his residence, which
should and does concern the court. Under the statute
adopted in this state the proceeding is judicial rather than
administrative, and the courts ordinarily are open to nonresidents as well as to residents."'
From this language, the Lynn M. court concluded there was no statutory impediment prohibiting the circuit court from entertaining the
Juves' petition for adoption.8 2
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that even with personal
jurisdiction over the Juves, the trial court could not effect an adoption decree without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
natural parents."3 Because the natural parents had filed their consent to the adoption and joined in the petition requesting that the
Juves be permitted to adopt their child, and because the natural parents resided and were domiciled in Prince George's County, the
Court of Appeals found the circuit court had personal jurisdiction
over them as consenting parties."4
Having concluded that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over both the adoptive and natural parents, the Court of Appeals proceeded to determine the remaining jurisdictional issue:
Did the child lose her Maryland domicile as a result of her being
held out of state in theJuves' temporary custody? In analyzing this
question, the court first stated that, at birth, the child clearly was
domiciled in Maryland.8 5 Further, the court explained that because
the adoptive and natural parents had agreed that the child would
remain in the Juves' temporary custody pending the court's final
81. Id. at 23-24, 179 A. at 293.
82. 312 Md. at 471, 540 A.2d at 804.

83. Id.
84. Id.

MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-311(a) (Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part:
"Unless the natural parents' rights have been terminated by a judicial proceeding, an
individual may not be adopted without the consent of: (1) the natural mother; (2) the
natural father; and (3) the individual, if the individual is at least 10 years old." Id.
85. 312 Md. at 471, 540 A.2d at 804. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 26 Md.
App. 296, 302, 338 A.2d 363, 367 (1975) ("The first domicile a legitimate child acquires
is a 'domicile of origin' which is the domicile of the father at the time of the child's
birth."). See also I J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 14.1 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAws § 14 (1971) ("The domicile of a legitimate child at birth is the domicile of its father at that time .... ").
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judgment, 8 and because the Juves never contended that they possessed anything more than temporary custody of the child, 7 the
domicile of the child remained unchanged in Maryland."8 The circuit court, therefore, had jurisdiction to determine if the Juves
should be granted an adoption decree, and according to the Court
of Appeals, it was error for the circuit court to dismiss the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. 9
In holding that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County
had personal jurisdiction over the Juves, the Court of Appeals in
Lynn M. restated a proposition first enunciated more than fifty years
ago in Waller v. Ellis:9 0 that in keeping with the purpose of Maryland's adoption statute to insure the welfare of the infant, courts of
this State ordinarily have jurisdiction over both residents and nonresidents petitioning for the adoption of a child in Maryland. 9 '
More significantly, the court introduced the principle that a child
born in Maryland is domiciled in Maryland even if the child is held
in the temporary custody of its adoptive parents out of Maryland
pending a judicial decree of adoption. This latter holding is consistent with the view that the interests and welfare of the infant are the
most important considerations in an adoption proceeding. In effect,
the court gave its imprimatur to temporary custody arrangements,
allowing children to live with their adoptive parents from the beginning of the adoption process, regardless of the adoptive parents'
domicile. Thus, natural parents, such as the couple in Lynn M., may
avoid the emotional pain they would suffer if they were required to
maintain custody of their child during the often lengthy adoption
process.9 2

86. 312 Md. at 467, 540 A.2d at 802.
87. Id. at 472. 540 A.2d at 804.
88. Id. See Krakow v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 454, 95 N.E.2d
184, 185 (1950) (where child sought to be adopted was born in Massachusetts and taken
by adoptive parents to New York a few weeks after birth, domicile of the child was in
Massachusetts); In re Adoption of a Child by McKinley, 157 N.J. Super. 293, 296, 384
A.2d 920, 921 (1978) (New Jersey court may entertain a petition for adoption where the
natural parents live in New Jersey but the adoptive parents and the child reside in New
York); Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S.C. 443, 451, 199 S.E. 677, 681 (1938) (minor's domicile is
that of his or her father, even though the child lives apart from the father in another
state).
89. 312 Md. at 472, 540 A.2d at 804.
90. 169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
91. Id. at 23-24, 179 A.2d 289, cited in In re Lynn M., 312 Md. at 471, 540 A.2d at 804.
92. The Lynn Al. court noted that the natural parents allowed the Juves to assume
temporary custody of the child because they wished to avoid the formation of such emotional ties. 312 Md. at 467. 540 A.2d at 802.
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2. FinalOrder.-InIn re Adoption No. 85365027/AD 93 the Court
of Special Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to vacate an adoption order where there was evidence that
the adoptive parents' attorney rushed to have a judge sign the final
decree of adoption after learning that the natural mother was considering. revoking her consent, that the adoptive parents' attorney
failed to disclose this information to the ordering judge in the ex
parte meeting, and that the natural mother signed a revocation of
consent within hours after the judge signed the final decree of adoption.9 4 The court also held that, because the natural mother's revocation of consent statutorily restored her rights as the child's natural
parent, the trial court erred in considering factual evidence as to the
parties' fitness as parents.9 5
Christine gave birth to a son on December 28, 1985.96 Pursuant
to a private adoption arrangement, and while still recovering in the
hospital, Christine signed a consent to the adoption of her child by
an adoptive couple on December 30, 1985. 9 ' The adoptive couple
filed their consent and petition for adoption in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City on December 31, 1985.98 Judge Byrnes entered an
adoption decree that same day. 99
OnJanuary 14, 1986, Christine informed her attorney, Ms. Gallogly, that she was having second thoughts about the adoption. The
next day Gallogly telephoned Mr. Frank, the adoptive parents' attorney and brother of the adoptive father, informing him of the emotionally charged conversation with the natural mother.' 0
Concerned that the December 31 adoption decree was not final because it violated Family Law Article, section 5-324, which prohibits
the entry of a final decree of adoption until at least fifteen days after
the child's birth," ° ' Frank met with Judge Byrnes ex parte the next
93. 71 Md. App. 362, 525 A.2d 1081 (1987).
94. Id. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1087.

95. id.
96. Id. at 364, 525 A.2d at 1082.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. According to Frank, Gallogly informed him that Christine was hysterical and
wanted to know where the child was. Id. at 364-65, 525 A.2d at 1082. Gallogly, however, testified that she expressly told Frank that Christine wanted to revoke her consent.
Id. at 373 n.4, 525 A.2d at 1086 n.4.
101. "The court may not enter a final adoption until at least 15 days after the birth of
the individual to be adopted." MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-324 (1984). Frank learned
of this statute from Gallogly when she told him during their telephone conversation that
she did not feel the December 31 decree could be construed as final. 71 Md. App. at
365, 525 A.2d at 1082.
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morning, at eight o'clock.' 0 2 Frank failed to mention that Christine
had second thoughts about the adoption.' 0 3 Accordingly, the judge
signed a new, final decree of adoption.' °4 A few hours later Gallogly filed Christine's signed revocation of consent.10 5
Christine moved to vacate Judge Byrnes's final adoption decree
on January 26 and circuit court Judge Hilary Caplan heard arguments on the motion on March 4 and May 27, 1986.106 At trial
Christine testified that Gallogly informed her that adoption procedures usually involved a six-month waiting period during which she
could revoke her consent; 0 7 the form on which she gave her consent provided no notice that an interlocutory decree would cut off
her right to revoke the adoption; Gallogly informed her on January
2 that she had until "mid-January" to revoke her consent; and when
she called Gallogly on January 14 questioning her decision to consent, Gallogly recommended that she seek counseling to help her
make her decision.'0 8 The court also heard testimony that during
the ex parte meeting between Frank and Judge Byrnes just prior to
the final adoption decree, Frank did not disclose to the judge his
earlier telephone conversation with Gallogly about Christine's apparent desire to revoke consent.' 0 9
Even after hearing this testimony, and after finding that Frank
"basically beat other counsel down to the courthouse to file the decree of adoption before the revocation was filed," Judge Caplan refused to vacate the adoption order." 0 According to Judge Caplan,
Christine's testimony that she was seeking counseling before she
made a "final decision" indicated that she had not finalized her decision before the final order was granted, and thus her revocation was
ineffective. "'
Acknowledging that the fitness of the parties does not affect
whether there is a revocation of consent, Judge Caplan proceeded
102. 71 Md. App. at 365, 525 A.2d at 1082.
103. Id. at 372 n.4, 525 A.2d at 1086 n.4.
104. Id. at 365, 525 A.2d at 1082.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 368, 525 A.2d at 1083-84. Although adoption procedures usually do involve such a six-month waiting period, the adoptive parents accelerated the process by
successfully petitioning the circuit court to waive an investigation of them. Id. at 368
n.2, 525 A.2d at 1084 n.2.
108. Id. at 368, 525 A.2d at 1083-84.
109. Id. at 372 n.4, 525 A.2d at 1086 n.4.
110. Id. at 369, 525 A.2d at 1084.
Il. Id.
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to contrast the adoptive parents' fitness as parents with what he perceived as Christine's lack of fitness:
[C]learly the adoptive parents can offer more opportunity
for the child in almost every aspect. The natural mother is
young. I don't mean to say that she is not emotionally stable, but she certainly has [been] going through a severe
change from wanting to have a child adopted to not wanting to have a child adopted, and then wanting to get counsel in order to make a final decision. That is the sign of
immaturity ....

The Court will not perpetrate that indeci-

sion by placing this child back with the natural mother in
the emotional turmoil that they create for this child." 2
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals first reviewed the trial
court's consideration of Christine's motion to vacate. According to
the court, because Christine filed her motion to vacate within thirty
days after judgment, rule 2-535(a)" 's permitted the trial court to exercise revisory power over the judgment." 4 In fact, prior Maryland
case law has interpreted the language of rule 2-535(a) to impose
upon the trial court an affirmative obligation to exercise its "extremely broad power of revision liberally lest technicality triumph
over justice.'"'5

The question for appellate review, then, was whether the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the order. In answering this question, an appellate court must pay particular attention to whether the trial court "entertained a reasonable doubt" that
justice has been served. ' 6 Because "notions of equity, statutory
112. Id. at 370-71, 525 A.2d at 1085 (brackets in original).
113. "On motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court
may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment .... MD. R. 2-535(a).
114. 71 Md. App. at 365, 525 A.2d at 1082.
115. Id. See, e.g., Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 558, 451 A.2d 658, 663 (1982) (trial
court's broad discretionary power to revise unenrolled judgments and decrees extends
to a decree foreclosing owners' right of redemption after tax sale);J.B. Corp. v. Fowler,
258 Md. 432, 435, 265 A.2d 876, 878 (1970) (abuse of discretion by trial court to refuse
to strike summary judgment where there was reasonable indication defendant had meritorious defense of counterclaim); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Md. 240, 243, 218 A.2d
684, 686, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 924 (1966) (chancellor did not abuse discretion in failing
to set aside divorce decree where no meritorious defense had been interposed by wife);
Eshelman Motors Corp. v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 301, 189 A.2d 818, 818 (1963) (trial
court abused its discretion in failing to set aside defaultjudgment when appellant had
shown it had meritorious defense to action and default was inadvertent).
116. 71 Md. App. at 366, 525 A.2d at 1083. See Abrams v. Gay Investment Co., 253
Md. 121, 123, 251 A.2d 876, 877 (1969) (decisive point of whetherjudgment should be
vacated was whether court entertained a reasonable doubt that justice had not been
done); Cromwell v. Ripley, I I Md. App. 173, 176-77, 273 A.2d 218, 221 (1971) (same).
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and case law all attempt to safeguard the parental rights of the natural mother and father,"' ' 17 the court concluded that a trial court ruling on a motion to vacate an unenrolled adoption decree must
exercise a "perhaps extraordinary degree of caution to ensure that
'technicality' has not 'triumphed' over the just rights of the par' ' 8 According to the court, both
ent.""
the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals have held that an adoption should not be granted
over parental objection unless such a decision clearly is justified.' 19
The court also noted that Family Law Article, section 5-303,
states as two of its purposes the protection of "natural parents from
a hurried or ill-considered decision to give up a child . . . [and]
adoptive parents ...from a future disturbance of their relationship
with the child by a natural parent."'"2 Combining that statute with
rule. 2-535(a), which governs unenrolled decrees, the court concluded that a trial court must vacate an adoption decree if the natural parent both moved to vacate the final order of adoption within
thirty days after the order was entered and created in the. trial
judge's mind a reasonable doubt that justice has been served.' 2'
Because Christine moved to vacate the final adoption order ten days
after the order was entered but before enrollment was entered, the
trial judge should have vacated the order if he had any reasonable
doubts that Christine's parental rights had been terminated "in a
22
manner consistent with justice."'
To determine whether Judge Caplan should have entertained a
reasonable doubt, the court first examined the trial judge's finding
that Christine truly had not made up her mind about the revocation.12 s The appellate court explained that there was "no need to
look beyond the revocation for extrinsic evidence as to appellant's
state of mind. The revocation is unequivocal."' 2 4 Thus, Judge
117. 71 Md. App. at 366, 525 A.2d at 1083.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Supreme Court has held that natural parental rights are "far more precious than ... property rights" and protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). See also Bridges v. Nicely, 304
Md. 1, 7, 497 A.2d 142, 145 (1985) ("Maryland law provides that adoption should not
be granted over parental objection unless that course is clearly warranted."); Walker v.
Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 276 (1960) (same).
120. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-303(b) (1984).
121. 71 Md. App. at 367, 525 A.2d at 1083. After the decree is enrolled, the adoptive
parents are protected from interference in their relationship with the child, absent a
showing of fraud, mistake or irregularity. MD. R. 2-535(b).
122. 71 Md. App. at 367-68, 525 A.2d at 1083.
123. Id. at 371, 525 A.2d at 1085.
124. Id.
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Caplan's finding that Christine's state of mind was not clear was "irrelevant," and the trial judge erred in using such a finding to decide
25
that there was no revocation.
The adoptive parents contended that even if Christine's signed
statement was a true revocation, it nevertheless was filed after the
final order was signed and thus was ineffective.'2 6 The Court of Special Appeals declared, however, that social policy is not served in
adoption cases "by rigid adherence to the doctrine of 'First in time,
first in right.' "127 Thus, the trial judge should not have ended his
inquiry into whether Christine successfully revoked her consent simply because the adoptive parents' attorney won what was, as Judge
Caplan himself
found, nothing more than a race to the
28
courthouse.
The intermediate appellate court stressed that a more appropriate inquiry would have resulted in an examination of what the effects of the knowledge of the telephone call between the two
attorneys would have had on Judge Byrnes's decision.' 29 The court
concluded the undisclosed information was of such "probative
force" that it certainly would have prevented Judge Byrnes' from
signing the final adoption decree.' ° Accordingly, Judge Caplan
should have vacated the adoption order because of the reasonable
doubt that "justice had been served" when Judge Byrnes signed the
3
order without knowledge of the telephone call.' '
For further support, the court noted that even in cases not involving adoption, courts have found it an abuse of discretion for
trial courts to refuse to set aside default judgments where "equitable circumstances would justify striking the judgment."' 132 Final
125. Id.

126.
127.
terests
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. Cf U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1977) (priority standard for conflicting security inis the first to file or perfect).
71 Md. App. at 371-72, 525 A.2d at 1085.
Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1085-86.
Id., 525 A.2d at 1086. The court said:
The information would have revealed that the consenting party had communicated serious doubts about her consent to her attorney, and that a strong
possibility existed that she would exercise her statutory right to revoke the consent .... The information would also have revealed that the sole reason for

Frank's appearance before him at 8:00 that morning was the telephone call
from opposing counsel ....
Id.
131. Id. at 373, 525 A.2d at 1086.
132. Id. See Berkson v. Berryman, 63 Md. App. 134, 145, 492 A.2d 338, 344, cert.
denied, 304 Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985) (abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse
to set aside default judgment where moving party has shown reasonable indication of a
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adoption orders, the court pointed out, demand careful scrutiny.'" 3
The court relied on Falck v. Chadwick,'" 4 a situation nearly identical to the In re.Adoption facts except that the natural parents did not
move to revoke the adoption decree until three months after the
decree was enrolled.'
In Falck the natural parents signed a consent form less than a week after their baby was born. The adoptive
parents took custody of the child and obtained an adoption decree
six weeks later.'3 6 The natural mother's attorney advised her that
the adoption was-provisional and would not become final and binding for six months, at which point the mother could decide whether
to give her final consent.' 3 7 The natural parents did not move to
revoke the decree until nearly three months -after the decree was
enrolled.'3 8 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's decision to re-open the adoption decree, writing that, because the decree was obtained exparte, the trial court was allowed to
determine if the consent of the natural parents was "intelligently
and voluntarily given."' 3 9 The In re Adoption court concluded that
because such careful scrutiny is required in adoption cases, Judge
Caplan should have credited Christine's challenge to the order. In
sum, the "order never should have been entered. The trial court
' 40
therefore erred in refusing to vacate it."'
Finally, the court noted its holding that the order should have
been vacated restored all of Christine's rights as the child's natural
mother.14' Therefore, the trial court improperly considered the fitness of the parties as parents.' 42 In fact, the trial court should have
meritorious defense); Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359. 362, 370 A.2d 577, 579

(1977) (trial judge abused discretion by denying motion to set aside unenrolled consent
decree, where court knew that appellant did not so consent).
133. 71 Md. App. at 373, 525 A.2d at 1086.
134. 190 Md. 461, 59 A.2d 187 (1948).
135. Id. at 465, 59 A.2d at 188-89.
136. Id., 59 A.2d at 188.
137. Id., 59 A.2d at 188-89.
138. Id. at 465-66, 59 A.2d at 189.
139. Id. at 467-68, 59 A.2d at 190.
140. 71 Md. App. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1087.
141. Id.
142. The court also cautioned trial courts on the prudence of requiring a hearing
before issuing a final adoption decree, even though rule D77 does not require one. In
adoption cases, "[t]he court shall hold such hearing as justice may require." MD. R.
D77. In Venables v. Ayres, 54 Md. App. 520, 459 A.2d 601 (1983), the court wrote:
[Tihe opportunity for fraud, mistake, or irregularity would ... be greatly lessened if the court were to require a personal appearance by the parties ...
before issuing a final order. Trial courts would thus be prudent to regard
Maryland Rule D77 . . . as requiring an evidentiary hearing of some sort in every
case.
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granted Christine custody of the child unless, under Family Law Article, sections 5-312 and 5-313,1 4 - governing adoption cases without

parental consent, the child could not be returned to her.' 44 The
child, however, had been in the adoptive parents' custody for sixteen months by the time the appellate court finished its opinion.
The court determined that a trial court could more easily determine
45
the factual findings necessary under sections 5-312 and 5-313.1
Id. at 533, 459 A.2d at 608, quoted in In re Adoption, 71 Md. App. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1087
(emphasis in original).
143. Section 5-312 reads in pertinent part:
(b) In general.-Without the consent of the child's natural parent, a court
may grant a decree of adoption to a stepparent, relative, or other individual
who has exercised physical care, custody, or control of a child for at least 6
months, if by clear and convincing evidence the court finds that:
(1) it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent's rights as to the child;
(2) the child has been out of the custody of the natural parent for at
least 1 year;
(3) the child has developed significant feelings toward and emotional
ties with the petitioner; and
(4) the natural parent:
(i) has not maintained meaningful contact with the child during
the time the petitioner has had custody despite the opportunity to do so;
(ii) has repeatedly failed to contribute to the physical care and
support of the child although financially able to do so; or
(iii) has been convicted of child abuse of the child.
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-312(b) (Supp. 1988). Section 5-313 reads in pertinent
part:
(a) In general.-A court may grant a decree of adoption or a decree of
guardianship, without the consent of a natural parent . .. if the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent's rights as to the child and that:
(1) the child is abandoned as provided in subsection (b) of this
section;
(2) in a prior juvenile proceeding, the child has been adjudicated to be
a child in need of assistance, a neglected child, an abused child, or a dependent
child; or
(3) the following set of circumstances exist:
(i) the child has been continuously out of the custody of the natural parent and in the custody of a child placement agency for at least I year;
(ii) the conditions that led to the separation from the natural parent still exist or similar conditions of a potentially harmful nature still exist;
(iii) there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied
at an early date so that the child can be returned to the natural parent in the
immediate future; and
(iv) a continuation of the relationship between the natural parent
and the child would diminish greatly the child's prospects for early integration
into a stable and permanent family.
Id. §5-313(a).
144. 71 Md. App. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1087.
145. Id.
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Reversing Judge Caplan's decision, the court remanded the case to
46
the trial court.
The In re Adoption court held that with such a sensitive question
as adoption, equity rather than technical rules must govern. The
parental rights of a natural parent carry considerable weight and
may override the stringent requirements of adoption proceedings.
It should be noted, however, that the court did not go so far as to
grant an absolute right to a natural parent to revoke prior consent
anytime he or she desires. Rather, the court only reaffirmed the view
that adoption proceedings should be carefully scrutinized where the
right of a natural parent is involved.
LAWRENCE
RANDALL

146. Id.

T.

L.

ECKERT
HAGEN

VII.

A.

LABOR LAW

Abusive Discharge

1. Federal Preemption.-In Ewing v. Koppers' the Court of Appeals held that, while federal law preempted abusive discharge
claims by contractual employees under collective agreements, such
preemption was "less than absolute."' Thus, a contractual employee could bring an abusive discharge claim as a supplemental
remedy after the employee had completed the process required by
the collective bargaining agreement: grievance proceedings, arbitration, and if necessary, a section 301 action.'
The plaintiff, Lawton Ewing, was a unionized employee of Koppers Company, Inc. (Koppers).4 The terms and conditions of his
employment were fixed by a collective bargaining agreement which
provided that "[n]o discharge shall be made without just cause." 5
Ewing was fired in March 1983; his employer cited a number of reasons for dismissal, including his attendance record and his physical
inability to work.'
Ewing filed a grievance, alleging that he had been terminated
without just cause." When the required grievance procedures failed
to resolve the dispute, the parties appeared before an arbitrator.'
The arbitrator denied the grievance, finding that the employer had
9
had just cause to terminate Ewing.
Ewing then filed a civil action for abusive discharge against
Koppers in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging the employer fired him "in retaliation for an earlier filing of a worker's
compensation claim."' ° Koppers filed a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, (1) that an employee whose
I. 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988).
2. Id. at 56, 537 A.2d at 1178.
3. Id. at 55-56, 537 A.2d at 1177-78.
4. Id. at 47, 537.A.2d at 1173-74.
5. Id. at 47 n. 1, 537 A.2d at 1174 n. 1. The agreement also required that any protest
of a discharge was to be pursued through specific grievance procedures. Any disputes
not resolved at that level were to be submitted to "final and binding" arbitration. Id.
6. Id. at 47, 537 A.2d at i 174.
7. Id. Ewing sought reinstatement, back pay, and restoration of fringe benefits. Id.
8. Id. at 47-48, 537 A.2d at 1174. The arbitrator held two days of hearings and
received briefs from each party. Id. at 48, 537 A.2d at 1174.
9. Id.
10. Id. Ewing sought compensatory damages for past and future loss of wages, pension rights, and fringe benefits, plus punitive damages for the alleged abusive discharge.
Id.
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rights are protected by contract has no cause of action for abusive
discharge under Maryland law and (2) that such an employee may
not bring an abusive discharge claim because section 301 of the La2
bor Management Relations Act'' preempts the action.'
The circuit court. entered summary judgment in favor of the
employer, holding that although a cause of action for abusive discharge was available to a contract employee, such a state tort claim
was preempted by section 301. ' Ewing appealed and the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion before the
Court of Special Appeals considered the case. 4
In affirming the circuit court, the Court of Appeals first addressed the question of whether an employee protected by an employment contract may bring a tort claim for abusive discharge.
Koppers argued that the Court of Appeals decision in Adler v. American Standard Corp. , which recognized a cause of action for abusive
discharge by a employer of an at-will employee "when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public
policy,"' 6 did not apply to contractual employees. 7
The Ewing court disagreed with the employer, reasoning that an
extension of the cause of action for abusive discharge "to all employees, at will and contractual, will foster the State's interest in deterring particularly reprehensible conduct."' 8 In addition, denying
contract employees access to the courts equal to that afforded at-will
employees would be "illogical."' 9 The court thus held that "a cause
of action for abusive discharge exists in favor of employees who
20
serve under contract as well as those who serve at will."
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether section 301 preempted abusive discharge actions by union employees whose terms
of employment were governed by collective bargaining agreements.
Section 301 states in pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts
11. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 301, 61 Stat.
1956 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
12. 312 Md. at 48, 537 A.2d at 1174.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 48-49, 537 A.2d at 1174.
15. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). The Court of Appeals decision in Adler was a
response to two certified questions from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Adler on appeal from
the district court, see infra notes 35-67 and accompanying text.
16. Adler, 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
17. 312 Md. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1174.
18. Id., 537 A.2d at 1175.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . .. may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties .... ,,2" The Court of Appeals noted that federal law, rather

than state law, governs when adjudicating section 301 claims. 2 2 Relying on the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck,2 3 the court then pointed out that section 301 's coverage is not
limited to claims for violations of provisions in the collective bar24
gaining agreement; the statute also covers state law tort actions.
In Allis-Chalmers an employee brought a state law tort action
against his employer for the mishandling of disability benefits payable under a collective bargaining agreement. 25 The Supreme Court
ruled that a state tort action is preempted by section 301 if "evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration
of the terms of the labor contract."-26 Applying this rule, the
Supreme Court found that the question of whether the employer
had a duty of good faith could not be determined without first interpreting the labor contract. 2 7 Thus, the Court held section 301 preempted the state tort action.28
Following the Allis-Chalmers framework, the Court of Appeals
discussed whether Congress intended section 301 to absolutely preempt state tort actions for discharge in retaliation for the filing of a
workers' compensation claim. 29 According to the court, deterrence
21. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
22. 312 Md. at 51, 537 A.2d at 1175. The court quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), in which the Court
stated:
The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of
federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute....
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disrupted influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements.
Id. at 103-04.
23. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
24. 312 Md. at 51-52, 537 A.2d at 1176.
25. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 206.
26. Id. at 213.
27. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218 (1985).
28. Id. at 219.
29. Acknowledging that the issue was a difficult one, the court stated:
The Court in Allis-Chalmers made it clear that Congress intended to establish a
broad, uniform, and paramount body of federal law that would exclusively govern the resolutioh of disputes arising out of labor contracts. At the same time,
however, the Court recognized that the states retained a legitimate interest in
areas such as the establishment of labor standards and the regulation of matters
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of such practices by employers is a legitimate state interest,3 ° and
"[als long as the process fixed by the collective bargaining agreement and by § 301 is utilized to determine the issues with respect to
the discharge, accomplishment of an important state objective
by the allowance of a supplemental remedy would seem
appropriate.'3
It seems, therefore, that if Ewing had followed the process dictated by the collective bargaining agreement-grievance proceedings, arbitration, and if necessary, a section 301 action-and
through that process it had been determined that he was discharged
without just cause, he could have brought an action for abusive discharge.3 2 As the court pointed out, however, the arbitrator found
that Koppers had just cause to fire Ewing. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the employer, concluding
that "an essential element of the cause of action was determined
adversely to the employee by final arbitration, and the preemptive
effects of § 301 require that this State accord that finding preclusive
33
effect."
The Ewing court gave union employees both favorable and unfavorable news. On the positive side, the court cleared the way for
union employees to bring future abusive discharge claims against
their employers. That is, the Adler decision did not apply exclusively
to at-will employees. On the negative side, however, the court
enunciated that contractual employees must participate in a more
extensive and costly process than at-will employees before they can
bring a state abusive discharge claim. In addition, if the administrative process concludes that the employer had just cause to discharge
the union employee, the employee may not bring a state tort claim.
The court's holding, therefore, effectively denies contract employees access to the courts equal to that afforded at-will employees.

that could be the subject of collective bargaining, and that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt those powers.
312 Md. at 54, 537 A.2d at 1177.
30. Id. at 55, 537 A.2d at 1177.
31. Id., 537 A.2d at 1177-78.
32. id. at 55-56, 537 A.2d at 1178.
33. Id. at 58, 537 A.2d at 1179. Without deciding to what extent it would be approved for general application in Maryland, the court also cited the Restatement (Second) of
Judgnents, which states in pertinent part: "When arbitration affords opportunity for
presentation of evidence and argument substantially similar in form and scope to judicial proceedings, the award should have the same effect on issues necessarily determined
as a judgment has." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 comment c (1982)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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34
The court itself called such a result "illogical."

2. At-Will Doctrine.-In Adler v. American Standard Corp."5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
firing of an at-will employee for threatening to report illegal activities to higher corporate officials did not violate Maryland public policy because the conduct did not involve an actual refusal to engage
in the illegal activity or the intention to fulfill a statutorily prescribed
duty. 6 Thus, the discharged employee could not recover for abusive discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will
doctrine.3 7
Gerald F. Adler had worked in American Standard's Hunt Valley, Maryland headquarters since 1975.38 Although his personal
and working relationship with Mr. Kenealy, his immediate supervisor, was poor, Adler had received superior job ratings and promotions.3 9 In August 1978 Adler replaced Bernard Greene as chief
executive of Stern-Majestic, a printing company within American
Standard's commercial printing division. 40
Shortly thereafter, Adler conducted sales and profits projections for the coming year. 4 ' He learned that the prior chief executive had set up a kickback scheme whereby employees at two
companies were paid for providing Stern-Majestic with business. 4 2
Adler told Kenealy and another supervisor, Sinclair, that he would
not include these two pay-off accounts in the coming year's sales
and profits projections because they were kickback accounts.4 3
When Kenealy and Sinclair disagreed with Adler's new projections,
Adler told Kenealy he planned to reveal these improprieties to corporate executives at the upcoming October 13 meeting.4 4 Kenealy
and Sinclair fired Adler on October 12, and a few days later informed him by letter that he was terminated for "unsatisfactory performance." 4 5 Copies of this letter were sent to four officials at
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

312 Md. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1175.
830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
Id.at 1307.
Id.
Id.at 1304.
Id.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id.
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American Standard's headquarters. 4 6
Adler subsequently told executives of American Standard about
the kickback accounts and the reasons for his termination. 47 After
an internal audit and a report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Greene pleaded guilty to "unspecified charges" and Kenealy
was asked to resign.4 8
Adler brought an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland against American Standard for abusive discharge, alleging, inter alia, that his superiors had discharged him to
prevent his disclosure of the commercial bribery. 49 The district
court certified two questions to the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
(1) did Maryland recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge,
and (2) if so, were Adler's allegations sufficient to state such a
claim.5s
The state court first noted that Maryland follows the commonlaw rule that unwritten employment contracts, like the one between
Adler and American Standard, amounted to an employment-at-will
relationship, and thus is terminable legally "at the pleasure of either
party at any time."s" The court held, however, that a cause of action
for abusive discharge exists where "an at will employee's interests in
job security, particularly when continued employment is threatened
not by genuine dissatisfaction with job performance but because the
employee has refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to
perform a statutorily prescribed
duty, is deserving of
2
recognition."

5

More importantly, the court held that a claim for abusive discharge could be maintained "when the motivation for the discharge
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1304-05.
49. Id. at 1305. Adler first filed the claim in the Southern District of New York, but
upon motion by American Standard the case was transferred to the Maryland federal
court. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 478 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Adler then
amended his complaint to invoke the appropriate Maryland law. The amended complaint alleged the following improper or illegal practices of American Standard:
attempts to treat capital expenditures as expenses; payment of commercial
bribes; falsification of corporate sales and income data and alteration of commercial documents to support the falsified information; misuse of corporate
funds by officers for their personal benefit. manipulation of work-in-progress
inventory information; and alteration of forecasts in connection with intracompany financial reporting.
830 F.2d at 1305.
50. 291 Md. 31, 32, 432 A.2d 464, 464 (1981).
51. Id. at 35, 432 A.2d at 467.
52. Id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470-71.
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contravenes some clear mandate of public policy.""3 In answering
the federal court's second question, however, the court stated that
Adler's complaint had relied on the wrong criminal statute and had
54
thus failed to state a cause of action for abusive discharge.
Adler amended his complaint again, this time alleging that he
had been fired to prevent disclosure to headquarters officials concerning possible federal and state law violations.55 Finding that the
second amended complaint recited "with the requisite degree of
specificity the manner in which certain statutes were offended so as
to constitute a violation of the public policy of this State," the federal district court denied American Standard's motion to dismiss
and proceeded to trial.5 6
At the close of evidence, the district judge told the jury that "it
would be a violation of the public policy of this State, if Mr. Adler's
discharge was motivated by a desire to prevent disclosure of illegal
57
activities involving [the two kickback] accounts at Stern-Majestic.
The jury awarded Adler $1,232,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages on his abusive discharge claim. 58
The court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the punitive damage award but allowed the compensatory damage award
to stand.5 9
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court decision, finding
that the court "erred in determining that Adler had properly stated
and proved a cause of action for abusive discharge under Maryland
law." 6 0 According to the Fourth Circuit, the public policy exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine was not so broad as to include
claims by employees threatening to report illegal activities to corporate officials. 6 Quoting the Maryland court in Adler, the Fourth Cir53. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
54. Id. Adler's complaint alleged that his discharge offended Maryland public policy
in two ways: (1) that employees of American Standard participated in commercial bribes
and falsification of corporate records in violation of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 174
(1987), and (2) that as these practices were so obviously against the public policy of the
State, no specific rule had to be identified. 291 Md. at 43-44, 432 A.2d at 471.
55. 538 F. Supp. 572, 577-78 (D. Md. 1982).
56. Id. at 579.
57. 830 F.2d at 1306.
58. Id. at 1305. Thejury also awarded Adler compensatory and punitive damages on
a claim for defamation based upon the discharge letter sent by Adler's supervisors to
headquarters officials. The district court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this claim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed this part of the decision. Id. at 1305,
1307.
59. Id. at 1305.
60. Id. at 1307.
61. ld. at 1306.
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cuit noted that courts must be careful when creating new public
policy: "[Riecognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a
basis for a judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a given case, and that declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch." 6
The Fourth Circuit found that Adler presented at his trial little
more than the allegations of his first amended complaint, which the
Maryland Court of Appeals had found insufficient to represent a violation of "some clear mandate of public policy." 6 3 Adler showed
only that he was discharged for threatening to reveal to corporate
officials the existence of illegal activities. ' "This is not a violation
of clearly mandated Maryland public policy and it does not involve
an effort by Adler to fulfill a statutorily prescribed duty nor his failure to engage in illegal activity.' '65
While the Fourth Circuit did not eliminate abusive discharge as
a cause of action in Maryland, the court clearly intended to circumscribe narrowly the circumstances when the claim is available. It
seems the Fourth Circuit's majority has gone too far to protect the
rights of employers who terminate employees at-will. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Adler ruled that at-will employees have a
claim for abusive discharge if their continued employment is
threatened because they have "refused to act in an unlawful manner."6 6 In the dissent to the Fourth Circuit's decision, Judge
Butzner stated that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
that Kenealy and Sinclair knew not only that Adler was going to reveal to the corporate officials his predecessor's past crimes, but "also
that he was going to announce that he would not engage in, permit,
or condone similar crimes in the future."6 7 Thus, Adler was fired
because he "refused to act in an unlawful manner." Clearly this retaliation was an abusive discharge. In finding that it was not, the
Fourth Circuit majority has lifted one of the most effective barriers
to illegal corporate activity-the internal watchdog. At-will employees must actually refuse to engage in unlawful conduct before a
court will recognize the exception to the at-will doctrine. The mere
reporting of actions such as kickback accounts and alteration of
62. 291 Md. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 283 Md. 228, 243, 389 A.2d 359, 367 (1978) (public policy did not preclude requiring insurer to pay exemplary damages assessed against insured bank).
63. 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473; 830 F.2d at 1307.
64. 830 F.2d at 1307.

65. Id.
66. 291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470.
67. 830 F.2d at 1308 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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business documents will not vest the employees with a cause of action against employers who terminate them in retaliation.
B.

Occupational Disease

In Miller v. Western Electric Co.6 the Court of Appeals held that
an employee claiming compensation for permanent partial disability
produced by an occupational disease was not required to show actual wage loss as a prerequisite to recovery.6 9 The employee thus
was able to recover even though her total income, through overtime
pay and cost-of-living increases, had not decreased since she contracted the disease. 70
The claimant, Doris M. Miller, was employed as a solderer for
Western Electric Company (Western Electric) for approximately fifteen years. 7 1 As a result of her employment, she developed carpal
tunnel syndrome,7 2 an occupational disease that afflicted her hands
and wrists and required medical attention. 73 Her condition worsened until she was placed on permanent work restriction and made
a machine operator.7 4
Some months later, Miller filed a claim for permanent partial
disability benefits with the Workmen's Compensation Commission. 75 Following a hearing, the Commission awarded compensation, finding that Miller had sustained a twenty percent permanent
partial disability of her left hand due to an occupational disease.7 6
77
Western Electric appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

68. 310 Md. 173, 528 A.2d 486 (1987).
69. id. at 187, 528 A.2d at 493.
70. Id. at 194, 528 A.2d at 496-97.
71. Id. at 176, 528 A.2d at 488.
72. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a "condition resulting from pressure on the median
nerve as it traverses the carpel tunnel" and is characterized by "pain, tingling, burning,
[and] numbness ... in the skin of the palm, fingers, [and] wrist." I J. SCHMiDT, ArrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE C-61 (1986).
73. 310 Md. at 176, 528 A.2d at 488. Miller finally was compelled to have surgery on
both wrists in late 1980. Following a period of temporary total disability, Miller returned to work in January 1981. Id. She performed light duties for three months and
then resumed her position as a solderer. Miller continued to suffer pain and limited
mobility in her left wrist and hand. Id. On several occasions, staff physicians at Western
Electric Company (Western Electric) placed her on temporary work restrictions. Id.
74. Id. Miller then worked as a machine operator until she was laid off due to a
Western Electric plant closing later in 1985. Id.
75. Id. Under the Maryland workers' compensation law, permanent partial disability
benefits are administered when there is a "disability partial in character but permanent
in quality." MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).
76. 310 Md. at 176, 528 A.2d at 488.
77. Id.
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In a jury trial Miller testified that when she returned to her solderer position she was unable to work as fast as she had before the
surgery or to make the company "rate," the piecework quota required of each employee, because of the stiffness and pain in her
hand and wrist. 78 Because she received regularly scheduled wage
increases and overtime pay, however, Miller suffered no loss of income. 79 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Miller. 8 0
Western Electric appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that under Belschner v. Anchor Post Products Co. ,8 a leading occupational disease case decided by the Court of Appeals in 1961, it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to
instructions that would have required the jury to find against Miller
if the jury determined that she was able to continue working in a
satisfactory manner with no loss of wages.8" Relying upon its decision in Adams v. Western Electric Co.,"s the Court of Special Appeals
interpreted Belschner to stand for the proposition that a claimant who
did not suffer a loss of wages could not receive compensation.8 4 Applying this interpretation to the facts in Miller, the intermediate appellate court found that because Miller had performed her job
satisfactorily without experiencing any diminution of wages, she was
not entitled to compensation; thus, the court reversed the circuit
court's decision.8 5 The Court of Appeals subsequently granted
certiorari."
Before the Court of Appeals, Miller argued that the Court of
Special Appeals erroneously interpreted Belschner as creating an "irrebuttable presumption that an employee suffering from an occupational disease who returns to work at the same or higher wage level
78. Id. at 177, 528 A.2d at 488. Miller also testified that she now had more difficulty
handling tools and doing household chores. Id. A Western Electric benefits investigator
testified that a worker who failed to meet the company rate normally received a disciplinary "write-up," but that Miller's personnel file included no such notices. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 178, 528 A.2d at 489.
81. 227 Md. 89, 175 A.2d 419 (1961).
82. 310 Md. at 178-79, 528 A.2d at 489. The trial judge refused Western Electric's
request for such instructions. Id. at 178, 528 A.2d at 489.
83. 63 Md. App. 587, 493 A.2d 392, cert. denied, 304 Md. 301, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985).
84. 310 Md. at 175, 528 A.2d at 487. The court in4dams interpreted the applicable
statute in combination with BeLschner to mean that "[i]f, indeed, the [occupational disease] claimant is able to continue to perform reasonably analogous work within the same
occupational classification at the same or higher wages, he is not incapacitated 'from
performing his work in the last occupation.' " Adams, 63 Md. App. at 593, 493 A.2d at
395.
85. 310 Md. at 179, 528 A.2d at 489.
86. Id.
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is not compensably disabled.-1 7 Miller further argued that the use
of a "wage loss" test to determine whether benefits should be
granted for occupational disease is contrary to the "letter and
88
spirit" of the workers' compensation law.
The court first noted that until 1939 the Maryland workers'
compensation law included no provision at all for occupational disease. 9 The law only allowed compensation for accidental injury
arising out of and in the course of employment. 90 In such cases, a
claimant was not required to show actual loss of wages in order to
9
recover. 1
By the time statutory occupational disease provisions first appeared in 1939, "[o]ccupational disease was recognized as a problem, like on-the-job accidental injury, that an industrial society had
to address in a comprehensive fashion." 92 Because the onset of occupational disease may occur over a long period of time and because its connection to the employment is not always readily
apparent, the legislature chose to treat occupational disease differently than accidental injury. The lawmakers attached an actual incapacitation requirement to occupational disease compensation;
they attached no such requirement to accidental injury compensation.9 4 According to the court, the legislature also "took great care
to assure that the cause of the disease was related to a particular
occupation and the cost of compensation for its effects laid on a particular employer."9 5
The court concluded that by requiring a showing of actual inca87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 179-80, 528 A.2d at 489.
90. Id. at 179, 528 A.2d at 489.
91. Id. at 180, 528 A.2d at 490.
92. Id. at 182, 528 A.2d at 491.
93. Id at 185, 528 A.2d at 492.
94. Id at 185-86, 528 A.2d at 492. The court noted that the definition of "occupational disease," in Mo. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67(13) (1985), requires that the employee
become "actually incapacitated, either temporarily, partially or totally, because of a disease contracted as the result of and in the course of employment . . . ."Id. The definition of "injury," however, contains no such "actual incapacitation" requirement. Id. at
(6). The definition of "disablement," which is applicable to occupational disease compensation but not to accidental injury, also includes a requirement of actual incapacitation. Id. at (15).
95. 310 Md. at 186, 528 A.2d at 492. The legislative concern with causation is seen
in MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 23(c)(I)-(2) (1985):
An employer shall not be liable for any compensation for occupational disease
unless:
(1) Such disease is due to the nature of an employment in which the
hazards of the disease actually exist, and it may reasonably be concluded, based
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pacitation and a more intense causation analysis in occupation disease cases, the legislature did not intend to make the showing of a
wage loss a prerequisite to compensation." As the court pointed
out, actual wage loss was not a prerequisite to worker compensation
when the occupational disease provisions were created in 1939. In
addition, the court continued,
reliance on wage loss as the conclusive factor establishes an
irrational criterion for awarding compensation benefits. It
is irrational because a worker may be partially disabled by
virtue of occupational disease, but earn more after the disability than before it. This may occur not because of lack of
actual incapacitation but because increases in rate of pay,
7
cost-of-living raises, or the like, produce that outcome.1
Finally, as the court pointed out, strict adherence to a wage loss
requirement can produce absurd results.9" For example, a physically disabled worker may be deprived of an award and thus be penalized for working.9 9 Such strict adherence also "promotes the
fiction" that a worker is not suffering from a permanent partial disability simply because his or her earnings have not decreased., °°
The court therefore held that an employee who claims compensation for permanent partial disability brought on by an occupational disease does not have to show actual wage loss as a
prerequisite to recovery.'0 1 "Absent any other evidence of actual
incapacity, a showing of lack of wage loss might justify a fact-finder
in concluding that there was no actual incapacity. But proving actual wage loss is not a sine qua non of obtaining compensation for
0 2
occupational disease."
The court then responded to Western Electric's argument that
on the weight of the evidence, that the disease was incurred as a result of his
employment; or
(2) The manifestations of the disease are consistent with those known to
result from exposure to a given physical, biological, or chemical agent attributable to his type of employment, and it may reasonably be concluded, based on
the weight of the evidence, that the disease was incurred as a result of his
employment.
Id.
96. 310 Md. at 186, 528 A.2d at 493.
97. Id. at 186-87, 528 A.2d at 493. The court noted that there was evidence of such
increases in the case before it. Id. at 187, 528 A.2d at 493.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 188, 528 A.2d at 493-94.
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Belschner required a contrary holding. In that case, Belschner had
suffered a forty-four percent hearing loss as a result of industrial
noise exposure in his job as a saw operator.' 03 Despite his hearing
loss, Belschner continued to work as a saw operator without any loss
of wages. 0 4 Quoting a Texas case, the Belschner court stated that an
employee is not incapacitated within the meaning of the occupational disease provisions "if, though injured, [the employee] still has
the capacity, the ability to, and does continue to perform his regular
work, for which he was employed, and receives his usual pay for the
work."' 0 5
Testimony at the Belschner trial indicated that Belschner "was
doing his work 'just as well' and 'producing the same thing' as he
did before the impairment and was 'making the same living.' "106
From this testimony, the Miller court concluded that wage loss was
simply one of several pertinent items the Beschner court considered
in deciding whether Belschner's hearing loss incapacitated him from
his employment as a saw operator. 0 7 The Miller court concluded,
therefore, "that Belschner establishes no more than that wage loss at
most is one of several factors to be considered when making a determination of actual incapacitation.""°8
Following the disposition of the wage loss issue, the Court of
Appeals focused on Western Electric's second argument: that the
company was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the
record demonstrated that Miller's performance as a solderer had
been "satisfactory" at all times.' 0 Western Electric based the argument on the Betschner court's indication that "an employee who has
continued to perform his work in a satisfactory manner without loss of
wages in the same occupation he had been engaged in for years"
0
cannot be awarded occupational disease compensation."1
The Miller court dismissed this argument because Western
Electric mistakenly had assumed, without authority, that "satisfactory manner" meant satisfactory to the employer."' Reiterating that
103. Belschner v. Anchor Post Prods. Co., 227 Md. 89, 91, 175 A.2d 419, 420 (1961).

104. Id.
105. Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Coody, 278 S.W. 856, 857 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926). quoted in Belschner, 227 Md. at 93, 175 A.2d at 421.
106. Belschner, 227 Md. at 91, 175 A.2d at 420.
107. 310 Md. at 191, 528 A.2d at 495. According to the court, wage loss was given no
greater weight than Belschner's ability to do the work "just as well" and the fact that he
was "producing the same thing." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 192, 528 A.2d at 496.
110. Belschner v. Anchor Post Prods. Co., 227 Md. 89,95, 175 A.2d 419, 422 (1961).
III. 310 Md. at 193, 528 A.2d at 496.
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the test in occupational disease cases is actual incapacity, the court
ruled that employer satisfaction or dissatisfaction alone, like ab12
sence of wage loss alone, does not prove actual incapacity.'
Finally, the court reasoned that although the evidence did not
necessarily compel the conclusion that Miller was partially incapacitated, there was enough of a question to create a jury issue.'" Because it found that a jury, crediting all the evidence most favorably
to Miller, could have found in her favor, the court reversed the
Court of Special Appeals decision." 4
The Court of Appeals holding is a significant clarification of
both Belschner, a frequently cited occupational disease case, and the
occupational disease provisions of the Maryland workers' compensation law. In finding that an employee claiming compensation for
permanent partial disability is not required to show actual wage loss
as a prerequisite to recovery, the court did not deny that wage loss
could be a helpful factor in deciding compensability for actual incapacitation. Miller simply concludes that wage loss should not be the
sole criterion in disability cases. This decision should be regarded
as more than an analysis of whether wage loss is a prerequisite for
recovery of compensation for occupational disease. Miller also indicates that a determination of compensability cannot rest solely upon
a single factor.
C.

Fair Labor Standards Act

In Karabetis v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore"-' the Court of
Special Appeals held that the Wage Commission for Baltimore City
had fundamental jurisdiction to investigate and hear cases regarding
an employer's alleged failure to pay overtime compensation.' "6 The
court also held that the employer, who alleged that the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)"' preempted a city overtime ordinance,
failed to prove that its employees were engaged in commerce, and
that FLSA applied; thus, the employer's preemption defense
failed.' "'
112. Id. The court pointed out that "[f]or reasons of sympathy or for less laudable
reasons an employer may permit a partially incapacitated employee to continue working,
and may express no dissatisfaction with the work." Id.
113. Id. at 194, 528 A.2d at 497.
114. Id.
115. 72 Md. App. 407, 530 A.2d 293 (1987).
116. Id. at 420, 530 A.2d at 299.
117. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
118. 72 Md. App. at 423, 530 A.2d at 301.
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In 1983 the city wage commission and the Federal Wage and
Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor investigated the Elrino Bakery for suspected delinquency in paying overtime compensation to its employees." 9 The Baltimore City
investigator delayed his investigation when he learned of the federal
investigation. 2 0 The federal investigator found that the bakery had
violated the FLSA provision requiring employers to pay overtime at
the rate of time and a half. '' He offered the bakery owners a settle22
ment of $26,000, which the owners accepted and promptly paid.
After the settlement, the federal investigator referred the case
back to the Baltimore City wage commission, which reopened its investigation.' 2 3 The city investigator determined that the violations
found by the federal investigator were only a "drop in the
24
bucket."
After holding two hearings, the commission issued an order requiring the owners to pay $54,294.66 in restitution and $24,000 in
civil penalties. 12 5 The bakery owners failed to appeal within the
thirty-day period required by the city wage law.' 26 The Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City to enforce the commission's order. 127 The circuit
court granted the city's motion for summary judgment, and the
128
bakery owners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
The appellate court first addressed the owners' argument that
despite their lack of a timely appeal from the commission's order,
they still were entitled to defend the enforcement action by challenging the order as preempted by the FLSA. 129 The court noted
that subtitle B of the Maryland Rules governs appeals from administrative agencies such as the wage commission,' 3 0 and that rule B4a
119. Id. at 412, 530 A.2d at 295.
120. Id.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1982).
122. 72 Md. App. at 412, 530 A.2d at 295.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 412-13, 530 A.2d at 295.
125. Id. at 413, 530 A.2d at 295-96.
126. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 19, § 70(d) (1983).
127. 72 Md. App. at 413, 530 A.2d at 296.
128. Id. at 414, 530 A.2d at 296.
129. Id. at 414-15, 530 A.2d at 296.
130. Rule B I states that subtitle B "shall apply to the review of any final action of an
administrative agency by a court where such review is specially authorized by statute
... MD.. R. BI. Because BALTIMORE Crrv, MI., CODE art. 19, § 70(d) (1983), "specifically authorizes" appeals to the circuit court from the wage commission, the court found
the subtitle B rules applicable to the case before it. 72 Md. App. at 415, 530 A.2d at 297.
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requires that an order for appeal be filed "within 30 days from the
date of the action appealed from."'3 1 If a timely appeal is not taken,
"the court shall dismiss the appeal unless cause to the contrary be
2
shown."S3
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in FederatedDepartment
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,' s" the Court of Special Appeals explained that
failing to file a timely appeal renders ajudgment final even when the
judgment of the lower tribunal was "wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case."'13 4 According to the
Karabetis court, the decision of an administrative agency has the
same res judicata effect as a judgment of a court,' 3 5 and objections
not raised in the administrative proceeding "will not be considered
on review by an appellate court."' 3 6 Thus, because the bakery owners failed to raise the preemption defense during the commission
hearing and failed to file a timely appeal of the administrative hearing to the circuit court, the agency's decision was final.' 3 7 The court
concluded that:
appellant's pre-emption defense, unless considered jurisdictional, was barred by the doctrine of res judicata since it
could have been raised before the administrative tribunal
and on a timely administrative appeal. A challenge to the
Commission's jurisdiction (i.e., its power to hear the case)
could, of course, be raised at any time.'
The Court of Special Appeals then addressed the bakery owners' contention that, because FLSA and the city wage ordinance
both required that employees be paid at the rate of time and a half
for all work over forty hours in a workweek,' 3 9 FLSA preempted the
city ordinance and the wage commission had no jurisdiction over

131. MD. R. B4a.

132. Id.
133. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
134. Id. at 398. The Supreme Court observed that "[tihe indulgence of a contrary
view would result in creating elements of uncertainty and confusion and in undermining
the conclusive character of judgments, consequences which it was the very purpose of
the doctrine of res judicata to avert." Id.
135. 72 Md. App. at 416, 530 A.2d at 297. RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, at § 83(1).
136. 72 Md. App. at 417, 530 A.2d at 298. See Cicala v. Disability Review Bd., 288 Md.
254, 263, 418 A.2d 205, 210-11 (1980) (issue not raised during administrative hearing
could not be raised in judicial review proceeding).
137. 72 Md. App. at 418, 530 A.2d at 298.
138. Id.
139. See BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 19, § 67 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)

(1982).
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the case.14 0 In responding to this argument, the court first defined
the term "jurisdiction," quoting Stewart v. State,' 41 in which the
Court of Appeals stated that "[j]uridically, jurisdiction refers to two
quite distinct concepts: (i) the power of a court to render a valid [fi2
nal judgment], and (ii) thepropriety of granting the relief sought."14
The court then explained the difference between the two concepts. A judgment will be rendered null only if a court lacks the
"power" or "fundamental jurisdiction" to assert any authority. 4 3
According to the Court of Special Appeals, the lack of fundamental
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, but the propriety to grant
relief "merges into the final judgment and cannot be attacked" once
the judgment has been enrolled.' 4 4 The question before the court,
then, was whether the wage commission had the fundamental power
to hear the case and if so, whether it was proper for the commission
45
to do so.'
Elrino Bakery, the court noted, was located in Baltimore City
and was an employer within the scope of the Baltimore City wage
law.' 4 6 The court also pointed out that the wage commission had
the power to investigate and hear all cases in which a violation of the
Baltimore City wage laws was alleged.' 4 7 Because the complaint
against the bakery alleged that it had failed to pay overtime for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, a direct viola140. Id. The owners contended that "in the area of wage and hour regulation ...
Congress intended to allow the states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction only when the
state law or municipal ordinance provided for a higher minimum wage or lower maximum hour provision than the FLSA." 72 Md. App. at 418, 530 A.2d at 298.
141. 287 Md. 524, 413 A.2d 1337 (1980).
142. Id. at 526, 413 A.2d at 1338, quoted in Karabetis, 72 Md. App. at 418-19, 530 A.2d
at 298 (emphasis in original).
143. Id. As the Stewart court held,
it is only when a court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to render the judgment
it did that there is an absence of authority in the court so as to render its judgment a nullity. ...
...If, by that law which defines the authority of the court, a judicial body is
given the power to render a judgment over the class of cases within which a
particular one falls, then its action cannot be assailed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis in original).
144. 72 Md. App. at 419, 530 A.2d at 299.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 420, 530 A.2d at 299. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 19, § 64(2) (1983),
defines "employer" as "any person, individual, partnership, association, corporation...
employing two or more persons in the City of Baltimore." Id.
147. 72 Md. App. at 420, 530 A.2d at 299 (citing BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 19,
§§ 62, 63, 70 (1983)).
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tion of a section of the wage laws, 1 48 the court concluded "that the
Wage Commission did not exceed its fundamental jurisdiction when
it investigated and heard the case.'' 149
Having established that the commission did have jurisdiction,
the court then addressed the issue of whether FLSA preempted that
jurisdiction.'
The court first noted the long-established premise
that reviewing courts ordinarily should not analyze constitutional issues such as preemption if a case can be resolved on any other
ground.' 5" Because it found the bakery owners failed to produce
sufficient evidence to show that FLSA applied to them, the court
refused to respond to the preemption issue."t 2 According to the
court, FLSA did not apply to the bakery unless either the bakery or
its employees were "engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce." 1 53 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Warren-BradshawDrillingCo. v. Hall,' 54 the court noted that "the burden of proving FLSA's applicability rests with the party who would
assert it.""' The court found that the bakery owners, who had asserted the applicability of FLSA, presented no evidence showing
that the bakery or its employees were engaged in commerce within
the meaning of FLSA. 5 Accordingly, the court found that the
148. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 19, § 67 (1983).
149. 72 Md. App. at 420, 530 A.2d at 299.
150. Id.
151. Id. See, e.g., Commissioner of Labor & Indus. v. Fitzwater, 280 Md. 14. 19, 371
A.2d 137, 140 (1977) (courts should not decide constitutional questions if case can be
decided on other grounds); Caplan Bros. v. Village of Cross Keys, 277 Md. 41, 45-46,
353 A.2d 237, 240 (1976) (courts should not address constitutionality issue if same result can be achieved on other grounds); Tauber v. Montgomery County, 244 Md. 332,
337-38, 223 A.2d 615, 618-19 (1966) (courts should refrain from deciding constitutional
issues not essential to proper disposition of case).
152. 72 Md. App. at 420, 530 A.2d at 299.
153. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(1), 206(a) (1982). An employer's business must satisfy a
two-prong test before FLSA will be applicable: (1) the business must have an annual
dollar volume that exceeds $250,000, and (2) the business must have employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or
produced for commerce by any person." Id. § 203(s)(1).
154. 317 U.S. 88, 90 (1942).
155. 72 Md. App. at 422, 530 A.2d at 300. See also Winslow v. National Elec. Prods.
Corp., 5 F.R.D. 126, 131 (W.D. Pa. 1946) (employee has burden of establishing entitlement to FLSA benefits); Samuels v. Houston, 46 F. Supp. 364, 367 (S.D. Ga. 1942)
(employee not entitled to FLSA benefits where failed to prove he was engaged in commerce or in production of goods for commerce within meaning of FLSA).
156. 72 Md. App. at 423, 530 A.2d at 300-01. The court stated,
no evidence was presented to suggest the annual dollar value of Elrino's business and, although evidence was undoubtedly available, no evidence was
presented concerning the employees handling, selling or working on materials
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bakery's preemption argument failed on evidentiary grounds.'1 7
The court concluded that "a finding of pre-emption must be
jealously guarded; and, if found at all, it must be predicated on a
sound record."' 5 8 Because the record before it failed to show that
FLSA applied to the case, the court found that it would be improper
to consider the preemption issue.'
"That issue, important as it is,
must be saved for another day."' 6 0
In Karabetis the Court of Special Appeals made it clear that city
and state administrative agencies have fundamental jurisdiction to
investigate and adjudicate wage violation cases, even when the ordinance or statute in question is nearly identical to the federal wage
statute. Because the court refused to address the preemption issue,
however, it remains unclear how often FLSA will preempt that jurisdiction. It will be only a matter of time before an employer asserting a preemption defense will be able to prove that the employer or
its employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce." Indeed, most employers could easily meet this requirement. More importantly, the Elrino Bakery probably could
have met it. t 61 In the future, courts facing the constitutional preemption issue will need to focus on how much authority the state
and local agencies will retain.
BETH GOLDMAN ADLER
GREGORY L. LOCKWOOD
GERALD DARNELL ROBERSON

which have moved through interstate commerce. To the contrary, the only testimony admitted into evidence regarding where the bakery supplies its donuts
indicated that the donuts were sold only within the State of Maryland.
Id., 530 A.2d at 301.
157. Id., 530 A.2d at 301.
158. Id. at 424-25, 530 A.2d at 301.
159. Id. at 425, 530 A.2d at 302.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 156.

VIII.

A.

PROPERTY

Personal Property

1. Bailments.-In Commodities Reserve Corp. v. Belt's Wharf Warehouses, Inc.I the Court of Appeals decided questions concerning the
burdens of proof a bailor and bailee respectively bear in establishing
causation for damage to warehoused goods under section 7-403 of
the Commercial Law Article. 2 The court held that the bailor bears
the initial burden of producing evidence of the bailee's negligence
and may do this either by proof of the bailee's specific negligence or
by evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of unspecified negligence.3 The bailee may then meet the bailor's proof by producing
evidence that either proves the bailee's lack of negligence for a specific cause or that tends to prove lack of negligence as to all possible
causes.4 Significantly, the court interpreted section 7-403 as placing
the ultimate burden of persuasion on the bailee. 5
Commodities Reserve Corporation (Commodities) and Klein
Brothers, Inc., the bailors, contracted with Belt's Wharf Warehouses, Inc. (Belt's), the bailee, to store 2200 tons of Turkish
garbanzo beans. 6 The Turkish beans shared a warehouse with a
shipment of previously delivered Mexican garbanzo beans. After
several months in storage, it was discovered that the beans were infested with cowpea weevils.' Commodities then sued Belt's and the
owner of the Mexican beans for the infestation's damage to the
9
Turkish beans.
The case was tried before a United States magistrate as the
finder of fact.' ° On the ultimate factual question, that is, which lot
of beans contained the initial source of the weevils, the magistrate
1. 310 Md. 365, 529 A.2d 822 (1987).
2. Id. For the relevant text of the statute, see infra note 17.
3. 310 Md. at 370, 529 A.2d at 824.
4. Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 824-25.
5. Id. at 375, 529 A.2d at 827.
6. Id. at 369, 529 A.2d at 823. The Turkish beans arrived in two shipments. Commodities Reserve Corporation (Commodities) had proven that the first shipment arrived
in good condition, but could not prove the arrival condition of the second shipment. See
Commodities Reserve Corp. v. M/S Roumania, 806 F.2d 501, 503 (4th Cir. 1986).
7. 310 Md. at 369, 529 A.2d at 823.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a) provides:
When specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by local rule or order of
the district court and when all parties consent thereto, a magistrate may exer-
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determined that both the Turkish beans and the Mexican beans
were possible sources and that neither side had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the other was responsible.' The magistrate held that the ultimate burden of persuasion was on
Commodities, the bailor.' 2 As Commodities had failed to meet its
burden of persuasion, leaving the evidence in "equipoise," Belt's
could not be held liable for damage to the warehoused goods.'"
Commodities appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.' 4 The Fourth Circuit certified two questions

to the Maryland Court of Appeals"5 to determine the respective liabilities and burdens of proof regarding the damaged bailed property.' 6 The Court of Appeals agreed with the magistrate and held in
effect that Commodities should be liable for the damage for failure
to meet the ultimate burden of persuasion 7 mandated by section 7403(1)(b) of the Commercial Law Article.'
cise the authority provided by Title 28, U.S.C. § 636(c) and may conduct any or
all proceedings, including a jury or nonjury trial, in a civil-case ....
Id.
11. 310 Md. at 369-70, 529 A.2d at 824. Commodities introduced evidence that the
shipment of Mexican beans had been rejected by an earlier buyer on the ground of
infestation. Belt's Wharf Warehouses, Inc. (Belt's) introduced evidence that the shipment of Turkish beans could have been infested and caused the damage to the Mexican
beans, which had already been received, inspected, and stored by the time the Turkish
beans arrived. Commodities Reserve Corp. v. M/S Roumania, 806 F.2d 501, 503 (4th
Cir. 1986).
12. 310 Md. at 370, 529 A.2d at 824.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 367-68, 529 A.2d at 822-23.
15. The questions were certified to the Maryland Court of Appeals under the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions Act, MD. CTs. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 12601 to -609 (1984). 310 Md. at 367 n.l,.529 A.2d at 822 n.l.
16. 310 Md. at 367-68, 529 A.2d at 822-23. Two questions certified were:
1. What are the respective liabilities of a warehouseman (or bailee) and the
owner (or bailor) of property stored with the warehouseman for loss of or damages to such property by reason of the failure of the bailee to return the property at the termination of the bailment in the same condition as it was when
delivered to the bailee and, in particular, what is the burden of proof ifany, resting on
each ... in establishing the cause of such loss or damage?
2. As between the bailor and the bailee, who carries the ultimate burden of
proof when the evidence presented as to the proximate cause of the damages to
the bailed property is in equipoise?
Id. (emphasis added).
17. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 7-403(1)(b) (1975) provides in relevant part:
(1) The bailee must deliver the goods to a person entitled under the document ....

unless and to the extent that the bailee establishes any of the fol-

lowing:
(b) Damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods for which the
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Initially, the court noted that the term "burden of proof" actually has two distinct components: (1) the burden of production and
(2) the burden of persuasion.' 8 To meet the burden of production,
a party must show sufficient evidence to sustain a finding for that
party in a court of law. 9 Commodities, as the plaintiff, had the initial burden to produce evidence of Belt's negligence under section
7-204(1) of the Commercial Law Article. 2° As the court noted,
Commodities could meet that burden by introducing evidence
"demonstrating a specific lack of care by [Belt's] or by evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of some unspecified negligence on the
part of [Belt's]. '" 2 ' As Commodities met its initial burden of proof
on the issue of Belt's negligence, 22 "the 'burden of proof' [was] said
to 'shift' to the defendant. ' 2 ' Accordingly, Belt's offered a defense
of due care.2 4
As the evidence presented by Commodities and Belt's was in
"equipoise,, 2 s the court noted that the crucial issue was which party
had the ultimate burden of persuasion. 26 The court determined that
section 7-403(l)(b) of the Commercial Law Article places the ultimate burden on the complaining bailor, in this case on Commodities. 27 As the court noted, "Where, as here, the bailee is a
warehouser who issued a document of title, the answer is found in
the language of the 'but' clause of CL § 7-403(l)(b). It specifies that
'the burden of establishing negligence in such cases is on the person

bailee is not liable, but the burden of establishing negligence in such cases is on
the person entitled under the document ....

Id.
18. 310 Md. at 368 n.2, 529 A.2d at 823 n.2. See also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw o" EVIDENCE § 336, at 947 (3d ed. 1984).
19. E. CLEARY, supra note 18.
20. 310 Md. at 370, 529 A.2d at 824. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 7-204(1) (1975)
provides:
A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods caused
by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful
man would exercise under like circumstances but unless otherwise agreed he is
not liable for damages which could not have been avoided by the exercise of
such care.

Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

310 Md. at 370, 529 A.2d at 824.
Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 825.
Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 824.
Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 825.
Id. at 370, 529 A.2d at 824.
Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 825.
Id. at 375, 529 A.2d at 827. For the relevant text of the statute, see supra note 17.
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entitled under the document[.]' "28
The root of the confusion concerning the burden of persuasion
can be blamed on the fact that this clause was optional in the official
text of section 7-403 that the legislature included when adopting the
Uniform Commercial Code.2 9 A majority of states have not adopted
the optional clause.3 0 Without the optional language, the statute
unanimously has been interpreted as placing the ultimate burden of
3
persuasion upon the defendant/bailee. 1
In interpreting the meaning of the section, the Court of Appeals looked to judicial and scholarly authorities who have interpreted the meaning of the optional text,3 2 the General Assembly's
policy decision in adopting the optional clause a" and the plain language of the statute. 4
The court first considered judicial authority from other jurisdictions. In a diversity action, J. Aron & Co. v. Service Transportation
Co.,- the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
interpreted section 7-403(1)(b) of the Commercial Law Article as
placing "the ultimate burden of proof upon the owner of the bailed
goods ....
6 In that case, the bailor produced evidence sufficient
to support a prima facie case and the warehouser failed to rebut the
subsequent presumption of negligence. 7 The court resolved that
the burden of production shifts between the bailor and warehouser,
but that the burden of persuasion never shifts: the risk of nonpersuasion remained on the bailor."s The Commodities court noted that
28. 310 Md. at 372, 529 A.2d at 825 (brackets in original) (quoting MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 7-403(1)(b) (1975)).

29. Id. at 373, 529 A.2d at 825.
30. To date, only 15 states have included the optional language. These states are:
Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-3, at 141 n.17 (3d ed. 1988). For the rele-

vant text of the statute, see supra note 17.
31. J. WrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30. § 21-3, at 141-42. Professors White and
Summers adamantly are opposed to the adoption of the optional language:
In our view, enactment of the [optional] language is not only a step backward,
but also unsound. In the usual case the warehouseman will have far better access to the facts than the plaintiff, and he should have to explain how the loss or
damage occurred and why he was not negligently responsible.
Id. at 141.
32. 310 Md. 373-76, 529 A.2d at 825-27.
33. Id. at 375, 529 A.2d at 827.
34. Id. at 375, 379, 529 A.2d at 826-28.
35. 486 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Md. 1980).
36. Id. at 1073.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1073-74.
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this interpretation is also consistent with general Maryland bailment
law, which holds that "the burden of proving negligence never shifts
from the plaintiff."'3 9 The Florida Supreme Court, the only state
court addressing the issue to date, has held that the optional language of the statute changed Florida's general bailment law by removing the burden from the bailee and placing it on the bailor 4 °
Next, the court considered the opinions of legal scholars. While
noting that interpretations of the issue differ, 4 ' the court determined that "the majority of the commentators ... (agree] that the
purpose and effect of the optional language is to place on the bailor
the risk of nonpersuasion on the negligence issue. "42
Finally, the court also examined the plain language of the statute. Adopting a literal approach, the court refused to "read the statutory language placing the burden [of ultimate persuasion] 'on the
person entitled under the document [of title]' to mean it is placed
on the person who issued the document, ' 4 1 i.e., the bailee. Further
examining the statutory text, the court also refused to read the word
"establishes" interpretively, noting to do so, as Commodities suggested, would obfuscate the issue:
[W]hile the statute uses "establishes" concerning the warehouser, it uses the § 1-201(8) definitional term of art, "burden of establishing," concerning the bailor. The difference
is consistent with the warehouser's having a burden of producing evidence and with the bailor's having the risk of
nonpersuasion. Second, to read "establishes" as meaning
"burden of establishing" creates a burden of persuasion on

the bailee to show an exculpatory cause while there is also a
39. 310 Md. at 376, 529 A.2d at 827. See Clemson v. Butler Aviation, 266 Md. 666,
670, 296 A.2d 419, 421 (1972) (burden of proving negligence never shifts from plaintiff). Accord Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc. v. Babbington, 264 Md. 724, 727, 288
A.2d 131, 133 (1972); Trans-System Serv., Inc. v,Keener, 249 Md. 369, 372, 239 A.2d
897, 898 (1968); Fox Chevrolet Sales v. Middleton, 203 Md. 158, 161, 99 A.2d 731, 732
(1953); Schleisner Co. v. Birchett, 202 Md. 360, 365, 96 A.2d 494, 497 (1953); Security
Storage & Trust Co. v. Martin, 144 Md. 536, 551, 125 A. 449, 454 (1924).
40. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Gulf Fla. Terminal Co., 386 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 1980).
41. 310 Md. at 373-75, 529 A.2d at 826. See R. ANDERSON, ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403:5 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (questioning the wisdom of giving optional language its literal effect); W. HAWKLAND, T. HOLLAND & R. ANZIVINO, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 7-403:03, at 255-56 (1986) (optional language places ultimate burden on bailor); R. HENSON, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.3, at 48-49 (1983) (same);J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 20-3, at 791 (1980) (same but objecting
strenuously on policy grounds).

42. 310 Md. at 375, 529 A.2d at 827.
43. Id.
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burden of persuasion on the bailor to show an inculpatory
cause for the same loss. That is an unreasonableand confusing
construction of the statute which avoids, rather than answers,
the question of which party bears the risk of nonpersuasion
on the negligence issue."
The court found that the legislative intent in adopting the optional
language of section 7-403(I)(b) was an "explicit allocation to the
bailor of the burden of persuasion"4 5 that was a "policy decision
[the court] . . . cannot rewrite . . . . 46 That policy decision limits the
liability of the warehouser to incidents of proven negligence. To
decide otherwise would effectively appoint the warehouser as the insurer of goods and introduce elements of strict liability. 4 7 Such a

result would be contrary to Maryland law, which has endorsed consistently the proposition 4that
warehousers exercising reasonable
8
care will incur no liability.

The court's decision in Commodities is a significant addition to
the law of commercial bailments. The opinion clarifies previously
unaddressed burdens of production and ultimate persuasion that
parties in a commercial transaction will bear in the event of litigation over damaged warehoused goods. The newly explicated rules,
however, reflect a questionable legislative policy decision as it places
the heavier burden of proof on the party who seems less likely to
have access to the pertinent facts.4 9 Practitioners representing clients who routinely engage in commercial warehousing should consider notifying them of the burden they will bear should they ever
resort to litigation over goods damaged in the warehouse. Bailors in
the commercial context should implement inspection protocols
which require the inspection of goods upon delivery; moreover,
bailors should maintain accurate records of such inspections, both
before and after warehousing, in case the data is subsequently
needed as evidence for ultimate persuasion at trial.
2. Spendthrift Trusts.-The Court of Appeals held in Brent v.
State of Maryland Central Collection Unit" that spendthrift provisions
44. Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 827 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 379, 529 A.2d at 828.
46. Id. at 375-76, 529 A.2d at 827.
47. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 21-3, at 138.
48. 310 Md. at 376, 529 A.2d at 827. See cases cited supra note 39.
49. SeeJ. WHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 41. See also Broude, The EmergingPattern of
Field Warehouse Litigation: Liabilityfor Unexplained Losses and Nonexistent Goods, 47 NEB. L.
REv. 3, 21 (1968) (adopting same views .as White & Summers).
50. 311 Md. 626, 537 A.2d 227 (1988), aff'g 71 Md. App. 265, 525 A.2d 241 (1987).
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of a terminated trust were no longer an effective shield against creditors once the beneficiary had the right to demand the distribution
of the trust.5 ' In so doing, the court allowed the State to attach the
2

trust fund of an incompetent beneficiary to pay her hospital bills.1
Further, the court held that the incompetency of a beneficiary would
not extend the life of the spendthrift trust unless the settlor of the
trust specifically provided for that possibility when creating the
53
trust.
Dr. Hugh Warren Brent, the settlor, executed a trust agreement
providing for the income of the corpus to be paid to his surviving
widow for the duration of her natural life. 54 Upon her death, the
trust was to be divided among Dr. Brent's children.5 5 After Dr.
Brent's death, his daughter Laura was declared incompetent.5 6 Mrs.
Brent paid for her daughter's institutional fees with the income from
the trust. 5 ' Upon Mrs. Brent's death, the trust was divided pursuant
58
to its terms, and Laura's brother acted as her "committee.1
The trust provided that when the beneficiary, in this case Laura,
attained the age of forty, she had an absolute right to the trust principal at her request.5 9 The trust also contained a spendthrift provision, 60 which in relevant part stated:
51. Id. at 641, 537 A.2d at 234. The court distinguished the "light to demand" distribution of the trust from the "ability to demand" it. Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 642, 537 A.2d at 234.
53. Id. at 640-41, 537 A.2d at 233-34.
54. Id. at 627, 537 A.2d at 227.
55. Id. The trust provided that each child was to receive the income for life, and the
corpus was to be distributed subject to the following terms:
[Alfter the attainment by [the beneficiary] of the age of forty (40) years, he or
she shall have the absolute right and option at any time and from time to time
to request and direct the Trustee to convey, deliver and pay over unto him or
her, free and clear of any and all further trust, the whole or any portion of his
or her respective share thereof remaining in the hands of the Trustee, and
upon the receipt by the Trustee of such written request and direction as hereinbefore provided, the Trustee shall convey, deliver and pay over unto him or her
the whole or such portion of the principal of his or her respective share of the
trust fund as he or she may in such writing so request and direct to be paid over
unto him or her . . . [and] the trust as to such portion or the whole thereof so
conveyed, delivered and paid over unto him or her by reason of such request
and direction shall cease and determine.
Id. at 629, 537 A.2d at 228.
56. Id. at 627, 537 A.2d at 227.
57. Id. at 628, 537 A.2d at 228.
58. Id. at 641, 537 A.2d at 234.
59. Id. at 628-29, 537 A.2d at 228. For the operative language of the trust, see supra
•note 55.
60. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines a spendthrift trust as a "trust in which by
the terms of the trust or by statute a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary
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The Trustee shall make all payments provided for hereunder directly into the hands of the beneficiary. .. hereunder
entitled to receive the same and not into the hands of another howsoever claiming ... and no assignment or order
by any beneficiary of any part of the payments provided for
... her hereunder shall be valid nor shall the same be subject to attachment by garnishment or any other legal proceeding whatsoever6 while remaining in the hands of the
Trustee hereunder. 1
In 1961 Laura turned forty, thereby satisfying the provision granting her access to the corpus of the trust. She was personally unable
to request the money, however, due to her mental incapacity. 62
Until'1973 the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
accepted Laura's trust income as payment for her care at Springfield
State Hospital Center." In 1973 the State reassessed the cost for
her care above the amount that the trust's income could provide.'
Although the trustee continued to apply the trust's income toward the hospital fees, a large portion of the charges remained unpaid due to the increased payment schedule. 6 5 The Maryland
Central Collection Unit sued for the unpaid balance, and the State
received a consent judgment for $59,793.55, plus interest and
costs.6 6 As the judgment could not be satisfied without invading the
corpus of the trust, the State instituted garnishment proceedings to
reach those funds.6 7 The trustee, who was joined in the action as
garnishee, argued successfully in the circuit court that the corpus of
the trust was not subject to garnishment due to the restrictive provisions of the spendthrift trust.6" The State then appealed successtransfer of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS]. The validity of spendthrift trusts was recognized in Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 A. 497 (1888). In Smith
the court determined that "the founder of a trust may provide in direct terms that his
property shall go to his beneficiary to the exclusion of his alienees, and to the exclusion
of his creditors." Id. at 90, 14 A. at 500.
61. 311 Md. at 629-30, 537 A.2d at 228.
62. Id. at 627, 537 A.2d at 227.
63. Id. at 627-28, 537 A.2d at 227.
64. Id. at 628, 537 A.2d at 227.
65. Id., 537 A.2d at 228.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 629, 537 A.2d at 228. For the relevant language of the spendthrift provision, see supra text accompanying note 61. The trustee took "refuge behind the spendthrift trust clause of Dr. Brent's trust and assert[ed] that [he was] without authority to
invade the corpus of the trusi so as to meet payment of the judgment." 71 Md. App. at
269, 525 A.2d at 243.
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fully to the Court of Special Appeals. 9 . The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to determine an issue of first impression: whether
a spendthrift provision remains in force after a trust terminates by
its own provisions but before the beneficiary requests that the funds
be disbursed. 70 Answering this question was necessary'to decide
the course of the garnishment. If the spendthrift clause was no
longer in effect when the trial court issued the writ of garnishment,
the writ was valid and the corpus of the trust would be subject to
levy.
The Court of Appeals examined case law in other jurisdictions
and found two conflicting views. 7 ' The majority view'was that a
trust beneficiary's creditors can reach the corpus of a spendthrift
trust when the beneficiary's right of ownership vests in the trust,
even if the beneficiary has not yet exercised the right to demand
payment of the corpus. 72 The minority view was that a spendthrift
trust is protected from the beneficiary's creditors until the corpus is
actually distributed.7' The Court of Appeals, affirming the Court of
Special Appeals, held the first view correct, noting that relatively few
jurisdictions support the second view.74
The Court of Appeals followed the reasoning of the New York
court in Ullman v. Cameron that it is "contrary to sound public policy
to permit a person to have the absolute and uncontrolled ownership
of property for his own purposes, and to be able at the same time to

69. 71 Md. App. at 273, 525 A.2d at 245.
70. 311 Md. at 632, 537 A.2d at 230.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 632-36, 537 A.2d at 230-32. This view was expressed early in Ullman v.
Cameron, 186 N.Y. 339, 78 N.E. 1074 (1906). There, the court held that where the
testatrix's husband was entitled to all or any part of a trust fund on demand, the property could not be kept from his creditors. Id. at 345, 78 N.E. at 1076. Numerous cases
following Ullman's principles have upheld the concept that the beneficiary's right to the
corpus of a trust prevents the corpus from being immune to attachment and alienation.
See. e.g., Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 466, 57 So. 243, 244-45
(1911) (following Ullman rationale); La Salle Nat'l Bank v. MacDonald, 2 Ill.
2d 581, 587,
119 N.E.2d 266, 269 (1954) (same); Smith v. Smith, 312 Minn. 541, 545, 253 N.W.2d
143, 146 (1977) (same); First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corp., 189 Neb. 734,
738, 205 N.W.2d 115, 118 (1973) (same); Sproul-Bolton v. Sproul-Bolton, 383 Pa. 85,
94, 117 A.2d 688, 692 (1955) (same). See also RESTATEMENT oF TRUSTS, supra note 60, at
§ 153(2) (declaring invalid a restraint on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest when the beneficiary is entitled to have the property paid or conveyed
to him or her).
73. 311 Md. at 638, 537 A.2d at 232.
74. Id. at 638, 537 A.2d at 232-33. See, e.g., Darling v. Dodge, 200 Iowa 1303, 1307,.
206 N.W. 266, 268 (1925) (restraint on alienation of corpus prevails until beneficiary
actually makes election to receive funds).
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keep it from his creditors., 75 According to an overwhelming majority view, creditors may attach the corpus when the right to alienate
the trust vests in the beneficiary, regardless of whether
the benefici76
trust.
the
from
funds
requested
ary has actually
The Brent court followed the logic of the majority view." The
court relied upon the distinctions made in Sproul-Bolton v. Sproul-Bolton 78 between a beneficiary's right to possess the corpus and his or
her actual possession of it. 79 The court then noted that once the

beneficiary has full access to the corpus of the trust, the beneficiary
is "considered at this point to be the sole owner of the corpus " s
and the "fact that [she] did not choose to. exercise the power is
'wholly immaterial.' ""l The court agreed with the intermediate appellate court and concluded that if the beneficiary has the right to
terminate the trust at will upon fulfillment of the trust's contingencies, the trust is "terminated insofar as the creditors are
concerned." 2
In discussing the minority view, that creditors may reach the
corpus of a trust only if the beneficiary has actually received its distribution, the court dismissed as illusory the underlying condition
requiring the beneficiary to make a written demand.8 " The court
cited eminent authority on the point:
75. Ullman, 186 N.Y. at 346, 78 N.E. at 1078 (reaffirming policy considerations expressed in Williams v. Thorn, 70 N.Y. 270, 273 (1877)).
76. See Warner v. Rice, 66 Md. 436, 440, 8 A. 84, 86 (1887) ("It is wholly against the
policy of the law to allow property, whether legal or equitable, to be fettered by restraints upon alienation, and generally whenever property is subject to alienation by the
owner it is also subject to his debts."). See also cases cited supra note 72; RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS, supra note 60, at § 153(2) comment c (restraint invalid when right to corpus
vests in beneficiary); E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 447, at 528 (2d ed. 1947) (if
beneficiary has righ*t to demand payment of principal, the property may be alienated by
the creditors); A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, Scornr ON TRUSTS § 153, at 133 n.7 (4th ed.
1987) ("It has been held that where . . .a beneficiary is entitled . . . to receive the
principal of the trust ... but the trustee has not yet paid the principal to him, a restraint
on the alienation of his interest .. .ceases to be effective.").
77. 311 Md. at 634-39, 537 A.2d at 230-33.
78. 383 Pa. 85, 117 A.2d 688 (1955).
79. Id. at 94, 117 A.2d at 692.
80. 311 Md. at 635, 537 A.2d at 231; see Estate of Blardone v. McConnico, 604
S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
81. 311 Md. at 635, 537 A.2d at 231. See Morgan's Estate (No. 1), 223 Pa. 228, 72 A.
498 (1909). In that case, a wife's will established a spendthrift trust for her husband for
a three-year period. After the three years expired, the husband had a power of appointment that he chose not to exercise. The court found his failure to act "wholly immaterial" to the continuation of the trust. Id. at 231, 72 A. at 499.
82. 71 Md. App. at 271, 525 A.2d at 241.
83. 311 Md. at 638, 537 A.2d at 233. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 76, § 447, at 529
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Property may be given on trust for a person subject to a
condition precedent which is entirely dependent on his
own will. Thus the trustee may be directed to hold the
property until the beneficiary demands it. Such a condition
is quite illusory. It is really no condition at all. .... 4
Simply put, the beneficiary cannot shield the trust by simply failing
to demand physical transfer of the corpus.8 5 The court therefore
concluded that the beneficiary's choice not to submit a written demand is immaterial.8 6
The court also found that incompetency does not extend the
life of a spendthrift trust beyond the settlor's intention."' The court
reasoned that the validity of the spendthrift trust depends on the
right, not the ability, of the individual to convey the corpus.8 8 Because an incompetency declaration does not affect the rights of the
beneficiary, the spendthrift provision in Brent was no longer effectual and the property was subject to attachment.8 9 The court inferred that the settlor, if he had chosen, could have included an
incompetency provision but did not.9 ° The court therefore concluded that the beneficiary's incompetency under the circumstances
in Brent was irrelevant. 9
The general rule in the law of trusts regarding creditors' rights
is that "creditors of the beneficiary of a trust can by appropriate
proceedings reach [the beneficiary's] interest and thereby subject it
to the satisfaction of their claims against him." 9 2 Maryland courts
early began following this policy.9 3 Further, the policy is not inconsistent with the court's ruling in Smith v. Towers, in which the validity
of spendthrift provisions was first recognized. 9 4 In Smith the testator had devised real property to a friend in trust." The trustee was
to collect the rents from the property and pay them over "into [the
testator's son's] own hands, and not into another, whether claiming by his
84.
528).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

311 Md. at 639, 537 A.2d at 233 (citing E. GRISWOLD, supra note 76, § 447, at
Id. at 636, 537 A.2d at 232.
Id.
Id. at 640, 537 A.2d at 233-34.
Id. at 641, 537 A.2d at 234.
Id.
id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, supra note 60, at § 147.
Warner v. Rice, 66 Md. 436, 440, 8 A. 84, 84 (1887).
69 Md. 77, 82-83, 14 A. 497, 499 (1888).
Id. at 83, 14 A. at 497.
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authority or otherwise .... "96 The trustee was to convey the real estate
7
to the living children of the testator's son upon the son's death.1
The Smith court affirmed the right of donors to dispose of their
property attaching whatever restrictions they desire, but only if the
language of the trust explicitly recited the intentions of the settlor in
clear, unambiguous terms.9 8 Finding that the testator had clearly
expressed his intention to give the income from the real estate to his
son and to no other, including the son's creditors, the court reasoned that the rights of creditors were not jeopardized because the
gift was a bounty to the son and therefore did not affect any assets to
which his creditors normally would have had access.9 9 Under the
court's application of the majority view to the facts of Brent, Laura's
creditors would have had access to the corpus of her trust when she
turned forty, unless the trust specified otherwise in the event of her
incompetency. 10 0
In Brent the court follows a trend of its earlier holdings by limiting the validity of a spendthrift provision to the clearly expressed
intention of the settlor.10 A settlor who wishes to safeguard a trust
against creditors in the event the beneficiary is adjudicated incompetent should specifically address that matter when creating the
trust. Chief Judge Gilbert, author of the Court of Special Appeals
opinion in Brent, suggested that this could be done in two ways:
by creating a discretionary trust, i.e., conferring uncontrolled discretion upon the trustee as to the manner and
terms of payment to the beneficiary of all or part of the
principal or income of the trust [or by providing] in the
trust that in the event that a [beneficiary] became incompetent, the trust would not terminate as to that particular
0 2
beneficiary during the period of incompetency.1
Practitioners engaged in estate planning would be prudent to follow
this advice in light of the high court's ruling in Brent.
3. Innocent Owner Defense.-The Court of Appeals held in State
v. One 1984 Toyota Truck 103 that property owned as a tenancy by the
entirety is exempt from the forfeiture provisions of the Uniform
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 89-90, 14 A. 497, 500 (1888).
Id. at 85-86, 14 A. at 498.
See supra text accompanying note 90.
311 Md. at 632, 537 A.2d at 229-30.
71 Md. App. at 272, 525 A.2d at 244-45.
311 Md. 171, 533 A.2d 659 (1987), aff 69 Md. App. 235, 517 A.2d 103 (1986).
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Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (the Act) " upon an innocent owner's showing of nonculpability.10 5 The court construed the
exclusionary language of the relevant section of the Act to include
not only the lienholder but also the actual owner, thereby enabling
the innocent spouse to retain the couple's full interest in the property. 0 6 The court also refused to impute the guilty knowledge 0of7
one spouse to the other to overcome the innocent owner defense.1
In so holding, the court in effect reaffirmed its strict interpretation
of and adherence to the legal privileges that a tenancy by the entirety creates.t°8
Craig and Debra Kessler owned a 1984 Toyota truck as tenants
by the entirety."0 9 On June 15, 1985, a police officer observed what
he suspected to be cocaine in the truck and arrested the vehicle's
occupants, Craig Kessler and Edward Lindsey."10 A search of the
vehicle revealed quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and related drug
paraphernalia."' I The State charged Kessler with violation of the
Act and after his conviction began proceedings for Kessler's forfei2
ture of the vehicle." 1
The circuit court found as a matter of fact that Debra Kessler,
Craig Kessler's wife, had a real interest in the vehicle as an owner
and that "she neither knew, nor should she have known that the
conveyance was used, . . . or was to be used in violation of the [Act]
....
,"'
The court ruled that she therefore was entitled to the innocent owner defense." 14 Moreover, the court found that because the
104.

MD. ANN. CODE

art. 27, § 297 (1987 & Supp. 1988). Section 297 includes provi-

sions for an "innocent owner" defense, which prohibits seizure and forfeiture when "the
registered owner neither knew nor should have known" that controlled dangerous substances or paraphernalia had been brought into the vehicle. Id. at (O(2)(i).
105. 311 Md. at 176, 183-84, 533 A.2d at 661,665.
106. Id. at 182, 533 A.2d at 664.
107. Id. at 183, 533 A.2d at 665.
108. See id. at 187, 533 A.2d at 666 (noting "Maryland's staunch adherence to the
common law view of tenancy by the entirety").
109. Id. at 175, 533 A.2d at 661.
110. Id.
Il.
Id.
112. Id. The State and the Kesslers agreed at the hearing in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City that the procedural requirements for the forfeiture of the vehicle were
met. Id. at 176, 533 A.2d at 661.
113. Id. (quoting the circuit court judge's finding of fact from the record in the case).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(b)(l)(iv), (f)(2)(i), (h) (1987 & Supp. 1988) (indicating
the need for actual or constructive knowledge for forfeiture to be permissible).
114. 311 Md. at 176, 533 A.2d at 661. For the text of the portion of the statute creating the defense, see supra note 104. The State did not question the trial judge's conclusion that Mrs. Kessler was "innocent" or an "owner." The State argued that as a matter
of statutory interpretation (i) the term "owner" should be restrictively interpreted to
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Kesslers owned the property as a tenancy by the entirety, the vehicle
was exempt from forfeiture under the Act because the wife's interest
could not be severed involuntarily." 5 The State appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court judge's
ruling." 6 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine
whether property owned as tenancy by the entirety is forfeitable
under section 297 of the Act when only one spouse is aware of the
property's use to engage in illegal drug activities. 7
In holding that an innocent spouse can retain a couple's interest in property otherwise subject to forfeiture, the Court of Appeals
broadly defined the term "owner"" ' and strictly adhered to the
traditional nature of tenancy by the entirety." 9 The Court of Appeals examined the legislative history of the Act,' the Act's current
construction, and the current state of the law concerning a tenancy
by the entirety' 2 ' before determining whether the innocent owner
22
defense could preclude the wife's forfeiture of the vehicle.'
The court stated that although the Act originally contained
neither an innocent owner defense nor express protection for
lienholders, subsequent amendments to the statute relaxed the
harsh, uncompromising forfeiture provisions by creating the innocent owner defense.' 23 Adopting a statutory construction analysis,
include only lienholders; (2) the innocent owner defense should only pertain to noncommercial transactions; (3) for the purposes of the Act, guilt should be imputable to
any other owners of personal property; and (4) tenancy by the entirety should not be
allowed to act effectively as a bar to forfeiture. 311 Md. at 176, 533 A.2d at 661.
115. 311 Md. at 176, 533 A.2d at 661.
116. 69 Md. App. at 244, 517 A.2d at 107.
117. 311 Md. at 175, 533 A.2d at 661.
118. Id. at 181-82, 533 A.2d at 664.
119. Id. at 187, 533 A.2d at 666-67.
120. Id. at 177-80, 533 A.2d at 661-63. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 28, 1970, ch. 403, 1970
Md. Laws 881 (promulgation of the Act); Act of May 31, 1972, ch. 659, 1972 Md. Laws
1696 (adding provisions to protect security holders of forfeited assets); Act of May 29,
1984, ch. 549, 1984 Md. Laws 2858 (adding provisions to protect lienholders). See also
State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 330-33, 524 A.2d 51, 52-54 (1987)
(discussing the Act's legislative history).
121. 311 Md. at 186-89, 533 A.2d at 666-68. See Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 426, 524
A.2d 777, 780 (1987) (recently retaining the tenancy by the entirety estate in its traditional common-law form even though other states have abolished or significantly altered
it).
122. 311 Md. at 186, 533 A.2d at 666.
123. Id. at 177-80, 190, 533 A.2d at 661-63,668. In State v. One 1967 Ford Mustang,
266 Md. 275, 292 A.2d 64 (1972), the Court of Appeals noted that although prior to the
adoption of the Maryland Act the courts recognized owner innocence as a defense, the
legislature elected to narrow the exemptions and offered fewer immunities than the proposed federal legislation. The legislature relegated the court to the task of applying a
strict statutory formula: if a violation of the Act occurred, and if due process was fol-
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the Court of Appeals determined that section 297(a)(4)(iii) of the
Act includes innocent owners because.the express words of the statute do not indicate any intention to limit the meaning of the ownership to lienholders:
The word "owner" is certainly broad enough to include
"lienholder" and prior to Ch. 549 was so defined.. . , but
in ordinary parlance one would not give it only the restrictive meaning suggested by the State. Moreover, it is apparent that when it wrote Ch. 549, the General Assembly knew
how to describe a lienholder, and how to distinguish a
lienholder
from an owner in general, when it intended to
24
do so.'

Moreover, the court noted that the legislature created the innocent
owner defense in the 1972 revisions of the Act.' 25 That revision
provided that if an owner convinced the court that the owner
"neither knew nor should have known" that the vehicle was being
used to violate the Act, the vehicle would be released to the
owner.' 2 6 Further amendments made in 1984 did not repeal
the in27
nocent owner defense; they merely restated it slightly.'
The State attempted to show that Mr. Kessler's guilty knowledge should have been imputed to his wife.' 2 ' The court found no
merit to this argument in its prior case law' 2 9 and noted that if such
lowed, then the forfeiture was valid unless one of the specific exemptions enumerated in
the Act applied. Id. at 277-78, 292 A.2d at 66. See Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-970 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
124. 311 Md. at 181, 533 A.2d at 663-64. The court recalled the legislature's adept
descriptions of various classes of owners: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(8) (1987 &
Supp. 1988) ("holder of an installment sale agreement"), id. at (0(3) ("registered owners and secured parties"), id. at (j) ("security interest and a secured party"). 311 Md. at
181, 533 A.2d at 663-64.
125. 311 Md. at 178, 533 A.2d at 662. Act of May 31, 1972, ch. 659, 1972 Md. Laws
1696. The defense appeared in sections specifying how a court should conduct a forfeiture hearing:
At the scheduled Uudiciall hearing, any owner . . . may show by competent
evidence that the motor vehicle was not in fact used in violation of [the Act] or
that he neither knew nor should have known that the motor vehicle was being, or was to be
so used. Upon the determination that the motor vehicle was not so used, the court shall order
that the motor vehicle be released to the owner.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 9 7 (p) (1972), amended by MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 297(a)(4)(iii) (1987) (emphasis added).
126. See supra note 125.
127. 311 Md. at 181-82, 533 A.2d at 664-65. For the relevant text of the amended
statute, see supra note 104.
128. 311 Md. at 183-84, 533 A.2d at 665.
129. Id. at 186, 533 A.2d at 666. See, e.g., Arbesman v. Winer, 298 Md. 282, 291-92,
468 A.2d 633, 637-38 (1983) (tenancy by entirety does not alone make one spouse the
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a rule were to be accepted "[i]t would seem just as reasonable to
hold that the 'irinocent' tenant's non-knowledge should be imputed
3s
to the guilty one.""'
Next, the court reviewed and reaffirmed Maryland's strict adherence to the basic concepts of tenancy by the entirety. 3 1 The
court noted that under tenancy by the entirety, each owner has a
right to the whole, which may be real property or personalty;
neither holds a separate interest and there are no divisible parts.'
In order to sever a tenancy by the entirety, both owners ordinarily
must agree to do so and to acquiesce to the changes.'3 3 The property is not attachable by one spouse's individual creditors, and nothing short of an absolute divorce or4 the death of one spouse will
3
involuntarily dissolve the tenancy.
The State unsuccessfully argued that statutory forfeiture should
sever a tenancy by the entirety because forfeiture should be analogized to a divorce, an equitable remedy of partition, or a "wrongdoing.""'s The court rejected the divorce analogy because forfeiture
does not terminate the marriage, and absent a termination the court
does not have the authority to destroy the tenancy.'3 6 The State's
partition argument also was unconvincing, the court said, because
cited case law was "inapposite." 137 Finally, the court found the
'wrongful doing" argument unavailing because the concept applies
other spouse's agent in termination of lease on the property); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Molloy, 291 Md. 139, 153, 433 A.2d 1135, 1142 (1981) (husband's act of arson
not imputed to wife to bar her recovery under insurance contract); Routzahn v. Cromer,
220 Md. 65, 70, 150 A.2d 912, 915 (1959) (tenancy by entirety does not alone make one
spouse the other spouse's agent); William Penn Supply Corp. v. Watterson, 218 Md.
291, 296-97, 146 A.2d 420, 422-23 (1958) (notice of mechanic's lien to one spouse not
sufficient as notice to the other absent proof of agency).
130. 311 Md. at 186, 533 A.2d at 666.
131. Id. at 187-89, 533 A.2d at 666-68.
132. Id. at 187, 533 A.2d at 667. See also 69 Md. App. at 242-44, 517 A.2d at 105-07.
133. 311 Md. at 187, 533 A.2d at 667.
134. Id. The Court of Special Appeals listed the usual methods of terminating an
estate of tenancy by the entirety: (1) the death of one of the spouses; (2) an absolute
divorce or an annulment of the marriage; (3) a judicial sale arising from a jointly incurred debt or obligation; (4) a jointly agreed sale of the property; (5) abandonment,
consumption, or destruction of the property; (6) a jointly. agreed change in title; (7) a
taking by eminent domain; (8) ajoint gift of the property to another; or (9) a joint bankruptcy. 69 Md. App. at 242, 517 A.2d at 106.
135. 311 Md. at 186-90, 533 A.2d at 666-68.
136. Id. at 188, 533 A.2d at 667.
137. Id. at 189, 533 A.2d at 667. The State had cited Masterson v. Masterson, 129
Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916), in which the court had been asked how a specific situation
regarding spousal rights should be interpreted and handled under the Married Women's Property Act. Id. at 177, 98 A. at 540-41.
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only in a situation where the wrongdoing itself destroys the tenancy,
citing as an example a situation where one spouse causes the other's
death.' 3 8 Here, the court noted, the wife was guilty of no wrongful
act that would independently sever the tenancy.'39
In upholding the innocent owner defense in a situation involving property held as tenants by the entirety, the Court of Appeals
applied a traditional view of the property interest and used that view
to interpret narrowly the power of the forfeiture provisions of the
Act. In doing so, the court once again reiterated Maryland's
"staunch adherence to the common law view of tenancy by the entirety"" 4 and refused to apply the Act's forfeiture provisions in a
manner that the legislature did not expressly intend.' 4 ' Although
three judges dissented,' 4 2 believing that the general language of the
statute "may be interpreted to give full effect to the legislative intent"' 4 3 of using the forfeiture mechanism as a weapon in the war
on drugs, One 1984 Toyota Truck indicates that a majority of the
Court of Appeals will not interpret a statutory provision in derogation of the common law unless the legislature clearly and expressly
provides for such change in the statute's language. The effect of
adopting this approach in the instant case is to mitigate the harshness of the forfeiture provisions. As the majority noted, however,
"we read the law as harshly as the General Assembly writes it; the
'innocent owner' defense is obviously intended to mitigate
harshness.""'
B.

Real Property

1. Adjoining Landowners.-In Melnick v. C.S.X. Corp. 145 the Court
of Appeals held that a landowner does not have a cause of action
against an adjoining landowner for damage to property caused by
encroaching trees, vines, roots and other plant debris from the adjoining property. 4 6 The court consequently limited the complaining landowner's remedy to self-help." 7 In so doing, the court
138. 311 Md. at 189-90, 533 A.2d at 668.
139. Id. at 190, 533 A.2d at 668.
140. Id. at 187, 533 A.2d at 666.
141. Id. at 183, 186, 533 A.2d at 665-66.
142. Chief Judge Murphy and Judges McAuliffe and Rodowsky dissented. See id. at
190-92, 533 A.2d at 668-69 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 191, 533 A.2d at 669 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 190, 533 A.2d at 668.
145. 312 Md. 511,540 A.2d 1133 (1988), aff g 68 Md. App. 107,510 A.2d 597 (1986).
146. Id. at 511-12, 540 A.2d at 1135.
147. Id. at 514, 540 A.2d at 1135.
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adopted the remedial theory known as the Massachusetts rule 1 48
and rejected the theories espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement of Torts) 14 9 and the states of Virginia and Hawaii. °
Landowner Jonathan Melnick shares a common boundary with
a railroad right-of-way owned by Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.' 5 ' Melnick's warehouse, located near the common boundary,
experienced constant clogged drains, standing water, roof deterioration, and water damage to merchandise as a result of fallen leaves
and limbs from the railroad's trees and from vines and other plant
life encroaching on his property from the right-of-way. Melnick attempted to remedy the situation but complained that these methods
of self-help failed as5 2 the railroad's plants and trees required constant maintenance.1
Melnick sued the railroad in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, seeking damages for the injury to his property resulting from
the fallen branches and encroaching vegetation. He asserted theories of trespass, negligence, and nuisance.' 5 3 The railroad moved
for summary judgment contending that it had no duty to prevent
harm to another's property caused by encroaching vegetation.' 5 4
The circuit court granted the railroad's motion, holding that the
landowner's remedy was limited to self-help.' 5 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the remedy of self-help was generally the most efficient 56
way to prevent injury to property due to
encroaching vegetation. 1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and held that landowners do not have a cause of action for property damage caused by
encroaching vegetation from neighboring property, but that they
5
generally have a right to use self-help to protect their property. 1 1
148. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 839-40 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS]. See infra text accompanying notes 170-173.

150. 312 Md. at 520, 540 A.2d at 1138.
151. While the C.S.X. Corporation also was named as a defendant, the parties stipulated at trial that C.S.X. Corporation does not own the right-of-way in question and that
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was the real party in interest. Id. at 513 n.2, 540
A.2d at 1134 n.2.
152. Id. at 513, 540 A.2d at 1134.
153. Id. at 514, 540 A.2d at 1134.
154. Id.
155. Id., 540 A.2d at 1134-35.
156. 68 Md. App. at 116, 510 A.2d at 597.
157. 312 Md. at 514, 540 A.2d at 1135. See 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 603, at 550 (3d ed. 1970) (stating that adjoining landowner may remove roots and
branches of trees which extend over land of which he or she is proprietor). The land-
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The court adopted the Massachusetts rule that self-help is "generally limited to cutting back (encroaching] growth to the property
line."' 5 8 The court rejected the Restatement of Torts rule,' 5 9 which
limits the owner to self-help only when the encroaching vegetation
is "natural," reasoning that the distinction between "artificial" and
"natural" vegetation, is "unworkable."' t6 0 The court. similarly declined to follow the Virginia rule, 6 ' which recognizes an action at
law only when the injury has been "inflicted by the protrusion of
roots from a noxious tree or plant" and after notice to the defendant.' 62 Noting the difficulty in determining what is a noxious tree or
plant, the court stated that the Virginia rule, as well as the Restatement of Torts rule, "depend on distinctions which are vague, difficult
to apply and largely arbitrary.', 63 According to the court, this is
also true of the Hawaii rule,' 6 4 which imposes liability upon the adjoining landowner only if the encroaching vegetation causes "harm
. .in ways other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers,
or fruit." 6 '
The court reasoned that the Massachusetts rule is preferable
because it simply disallows the landowner from bringing a cause of
*

owner may not enter the adjoining property to cut away growth without that owner's
consent. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 5-409(a) (1983).
158. 312 Md. at 515, 540 A.2d at 1135. Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 233-34,
175 N.E. 490, 490 (1931) (stating that adjoining landowner has right to cut off intruding
boughs and roots).
159. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 149, at §§ 839-40. A few states follow this
rule. See, e.g., Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v. Corts, 112 Mich. App. 570, 573, 316
N.W.2d 259, 261 (1982) (holding that damage caused by natural condition of neighboring land will not render owner liable); Holmberg v. Bergin, 285 Minn. 250. 257-58, 172
N.W.2d 739, 744 (1969). The court in Holmberg held that an adjoining landowner may
resort to self-help by cutting overhanging branches back to property line. The court
also stated that the weight of authority in the United States also permits suit to be
brought to abate the nuisance and to recover for damages done to property by overreaching vegetation. Id.
160. 312 Md. at 518, 540 A.2d at 1136-37. But see Sterling v.Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144
(D.C. 1950), where the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted
the Massachusetts rule, noting: "The distinction between purely natural conditions and
conditions which in some degree are the result of man's activity may be practicable and
even necessary in rural areas, but in our opinion such distinction cannot reasonably be
made in our jurisdiction which is almost entirely urban." Id. at 147.
161. 312 Md. at 519, 540 A.2d at 1137. See Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 5 S.E.2d 492
(1939).
162. Smith, 174 Va. at 219, 5 S.E.2d at 495.
163. 312 Md. at 520, 540 A.2d at 1138.
164. Id. at 519, 540 A.2d at 1137. See Whitesell v. Houlton, 632 P.2d 1077 (Haw.
App. 1981).
165. Whitsell, 632 P.2d at 1079. The Court did not elaborate on why the Hawaii rule
was inappropriate, but only noted that the Massachusetts rule was preferable. 312 Md.
at 520, 540 A.2d at 1138.
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action for this type of injury and thus prevents lawsuits from becoming "innumerable and vexatious." 166 In addition, the court noted
the offsetting benefits of vegetation's "natural processes and cycles."' 16 7 "Such natural growth and shedding processes of trees are
inherent ...and to most people constitute a pleasurable reflection
of seasonal changes." 6 ' Indeed, rather than recognizing an adjoining landowner's duty to maintain vegetation, the court expressed
the belief that the aggrieved landowner has not only the right but a
duty to cut back encroaching vegetation. The court stated that
"[a]long with the benefits derived from property ownership come
certain obligations. Proper maintenance of one's own property is
' 69
one of these obligations.' 1
In adopting the Massachusetts rule, the court provided simplicity and certainty to an often complicated area of tort and property
law. Conversely, the Restatement of Torts, Virginia, and Hawaii rules,
all of which rest liability on either the nature of the encroaching vegetation or the manner in which it causes injury, leave landowners
unclear as to their rights and obligations.
The Restatement of Torts rule, in which liability depends upon
whether the nuisance is artificial or natural, yields awkward results
and is difficult to apply. For example, "natural condition" is defined
in section 840 as "a condition that is not in any way the result of
human activity."' 7 ° This section further provides that "vegetation
which grows on land only because it has been plowed ... although it
has not been planted or cultivated by anyone" is not natural and
thus a landowner is liable for damage caused by such vegetation. 7 '
Therefore, under the Restatement of Torts rule, a landowner who
makes an effort to improve his or her property by plowing or planting can be liable, but one who completely ignores his or her property and allows it to encroach onto the adjoining neighbor's
property is not.' 7 2 Certainly, public policy should not discourage
landowners from planting new vegetation. Also, the Restatement of
166. 312 Md. at 520, 540 A.2d at 1138. The court noted, "We have gotten along very
well in Maryland, for over 350 years, without authorizing legal actions of this type by
neighbor against neighbor." Id.
167. Id. at 521, 540 A.2d at 1138.
168. Turner v. Coppola, 102 Misc. 2d 1043, 1046, 424 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867 (1980),
quoted in 312 Md. at 521, 540 A.2d at 1138.
169. 312 Md. at 521, 540 A.2d at 1138. The court noted, however, that there may be
an exception to the Massachusetts rule for dangerous dead trees. Id. at 521 n.10, 540
A.2d at 1138 n.10.
170. RESTATFMENT OF TORTS, supra note 149, at § 840 comment a.
171. Id.
172. See Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144, 147 (D.C. 1950).
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Torts rule would require further judicial clarification as it is often
difficult to determine whether a tree or plant is of natural growth or
partly the result of human activity.' 7
Similarly, the Virginia rule 74 and its requirement that encroaching plants or trees be noxious creates ambiguity. Generally,
the tree or plant must be capable of inflicting "sensible injury. "175
As the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted in Sterling v. Weinstein:
There is some confusion
as to whether a tree or plant is
"noxious" merely because it does injury or whether it must
be inherently injurious or poisonous and there seems to be
a difference of opinion as to the extent of damages7 6 required to constitute sensible or substantial damages.'
The Hawaii rule,' 7 7 which is actually a modified Virginia
rule,'17 seems somewhat more logical. It holds that overhanging
branches or protruding roots constitute a nuisance only when they
actually cause, or there is imminent danger of them causing sensible
harm in ways other than by casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.'" 9 The rule appears to limit the landowner from recovering damages for those injuries that could have been easily
prevented by the use of self-help and was created by the Hawaii
court because the Massachusetts rule seemed "unrealistic and un173. Id. Activities such as "cultivating, fertilizing, trimming," are "human activity,"
yet the vegetation may still be "natural." The Restatement of Torts suggests that in these
situations, landowner liability exists. Comment a states that "[tihe term does not comprehend conditions that would not have risen but for the effect of human activity even
though the conditions immediately resulting from the activity . . . have arisen through
the subsequent operation of natural forces." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 149, at
§ 840 comment a. Moreover, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that, in these situations, the rule would be "difficult and perhaps impossible"
to apply. Sterling, 75 A.2d at 147.
174. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text. The Virginia rule derives from
Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296 (1884), where protruding roots of a mulberry tree
penetrated a neighbor's well and polluted its water, making it unfit for domestic use.
There, the court held that the protruding roots were a nuisance and the plaintiff was
entitled to damages. Id. at 300. The court stated that the fact that the trees destroyed
the wall "proves the noxious character of the trees." Id. at 301.
175. Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 219, 5 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1939). The term "sensible
injury" is not defined in detail. The Smith court appears to contradict itself when quoting a treatise on nuisances. "IlThe insignificance of the injury goes to the extent of the
recovery, and not to the right of action."

(1881).
176.
177.
178.
179.

H. Wooo, THE LAw OF NUiSANCES § 112

quoted in Smith, 174 Va. at 216, 5 S.E.2d at 493.
Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144, 147 (D.C. 1950).
See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
Whitesell v. Houton, 632 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Haw. App. 1981).
Id.
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fair."' 8 0 It is more useful in a tropical setting, however, and less so
for the urban and rural settings in Maryland.""'
The Massachusetts rule is simple and certain' 8 2 and, in the absence of statutory direction, most workable in Maryland. As much
of the foregoing suggests, the myriad of possible factual situations
may result in innumerable lawsuits and countless rules specifically
tailored to each factual scenario. A complex set of rules is especially
unnecessary because problems such as encroaching vegetation usually can be solved without the aid of the courts.'
This is the policy
underlying the Massachusetts rule. Because the Melnick court impliedly left open the question of dangerous dead trees, 8 4 however,
8 5
the issue may be ripe for legislation.
2. Fee Title.-In Windsor Resort Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City 186 the
Court of Special Appeals ruled that Ocean City (the City) has no
claim to certain buildings and property located in Ocean City between the boardwalk and the Atlantic Ocean and occupied by Windsor Resort, Inc. (Windsor)." 7 In so doing, the court rejected
numerous arguments asserted by the City that it was the owner in
fee of the contested property. In particular, the court determined
that the theory of submergence, which requires that land inundated
by water reverts to state ownership, does not apply because the land
was submerged suddenly by storm, not gradually by erosion.'
180. Id. at 1079 n.8.
181. See id. at 1078. Whitesell involved banyan trees which send out aerial roots that
grow down to the soil to form secondary trunks approximately 12 feet in diameter. In
this case, a secondary trunk was not formed and only dangling branches interfered with
the neighbor's property. Id. If the aerial roots had formed a secondary trunk, however,
the damage would likely have been greater. In all likelihood, the lVhitesell court tailored
this rule in part to deal with such a unique situation.
182. See Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144, 148 (D.C. 1950) (Cayton,J., dissenting).
183. Id. (CaytonJ., dissenting).
184. A few courts have dealt with the problem through state nuisance statutes. For
instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Holmberg v. Bergin, 285 Minn. 250, 172
N.W.2d 739 (1969), held that, under the Minnesota statute, encroaching vegetation
which causes injury to a neighbor constitutes a nuisance. Id. at 257-58, 172 N.W.2d at
744. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (West 1989). Therefore, an injured plaintiff is entitled to an injunction to force abatement as well as damages for injuries sustained by the
nuisance. Holmberg, 285 Minn. at 258-59, 172 N.W.2d at 744. Because Maryland does
not have a similar statute, the Massachusetts rule adopted by the Court of Appeals in
Melnick is appropriate.
185. See MD. ENV'TCODE ANN. §§ 10-103 to -105 (1987) (empowering the Secretary of
the Environment to control nuisances relating to sanitation).
186. 71 Md. App. 476, 526 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 311 Md. 145, 532 A.2d 1371 (1987).
187. Id. at 488, 526 A.2d at 108.
188. Id. at 483-84, 526 A.2d at 105. See also Department of Natural Resources v.
Mayor of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 14, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (1975) (holding that land inun-
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The court also held that construction of a jetty after the land was
submerged by storm did not cause reclamation of the land from the
ocean for the City. 18 9 Finally, the court ruled that an adverse possessor's acquisition of ownership rights can revoke an offer to dedicate
property, absent public acceptance of the offer.1 9 0
When Ocean City was developed in the late 1800s, the beach
between the easternmost parcels and the Atlantic Ocean became
known as Atlantic Avenue.' 9 ' In 1916 two buildings were constructed on Atlantic Avenue on the eastern side of the boardwalk
which ran along the western side of Atlantic Avenue. Windsor acquired these buildings in 1936.'9' In 1965 and 1966 the City issued
building permits to Windsor for reconstruction of the buildings.' 93
Windsor also paid property tax on the property in 1966, and declined an offer by the City to maintain the property under a license
94
franchise. 1
Eighteen years later, the City made a claim for the avenue and
demanded that Windsor vacate.'95 Windsor refused to vacate and
the City brought action under the theories of trespass, ejectment,
and nuisance claiming that the two buildings encroached and partially obstructed its interests in the avenue.' 9 6 The City argued, inter
alia, that it was the owner in fee of the avenue due to the submergence of the avenue after a hurricane in 1933 and the reclamation of
the avenue after the Army Corps of Engineers built a jetty
nearby. 9 7 Alternatively, the City contended that it was owner in fee
of the avenue because the avenue was dedicated to the public as a
dated by mean high water reverts to state ownership and remains property of State if
reclaimed by state efforts). Windsor Resort, Inc. (Windsor) also attempted to employ
the theory of avulsion in contending that it became the littoral owner when the 1933
hurricane caused the shoreline to encroach on its property along the western edge of the

boardwalk. The court, however, found the rule of avulsion inapplicable to either argument. 71 Md. App. at 484, 526 A.2d at 105. See I H. FARNHAM, LAw OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 74, at 331 (1904) (an avulsion will not alter boundaries and ownership

rights).
189. 71 Md. App. at 484, 526 A.2d at 106. The court inferred from the City's reclamation argument that the land should be "imbued with a public trust." Id. The court
immediately dismissed this argument because the City failed to provide sufficient evidence. Id.
190. Id. at 484-88, 526 A.2d at 106-08.
191. Id. at 480, 526 A.2d at 104.
192. Id. at 482, 526 A.2d at 105.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 479, 526 A.2d at 103.
197. Id. at 483, 526 A.2d at 105.
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roadway. '9 8
The circuit court found in favor of the City and ordered the
buildings removed.' 9 9 The court reasoned that the City's property
interest was superior to Windsor's because it had accepted dedication through legislation incorporating Ocean City and because the
City had assumed the responsibility for maintaining the boardwalk
on the avenue. 0 0
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. First, the court addressed the City's inundation argument. It determined that the
"general principle that land inundated by mean high water reverts
to state ownership" was inapplicable. 2 ' Although the court acknowledged that the avenue was below the mean low water mark
after the 1933 hurricane, it held that the principle applies only to
gradual erosion of land, not land submerged suddenly by storm.20 2
The court relied on Department of Natural.Resources v. Mayor of Ocean
City, 203 where the Court of Appeals held that title to certain land in
Ocean City was not affected by storm flooding; a sudden topograph204
ical change, the court declared, does not affect ownership rights.
The court also rejected the City's argument that the Army
Corps of Engineers' construction of a jetty caused the avenue to be
reclaimed from the ocean. The City cited CarolinaBeach Fishing Pier,
Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 0 5 which held that land formed as a
result of the seawall built by the Corps of Engineers belonged to the
town, not to the adjacent property owners.20 6 The Windsor court
ruled, however, that Carolina Beach was inapplicable because its
holding was "squarely based" on a North Carolina statute vesting
title in the town. 20 7 The court stated that there is no similar Maryland statute and dismissed the argument by concluding that the

198. Id.
199. Id. at 479, 526 A.2d at 103.
200. Id. The City contended that an offer of dedication was in an 1876 deed and plat,
an 1890 plat, and the Act incorporating the City. Id. See Act of Apr. 10, 1880, ch. 209.
1880 Md. Laws 338. The court notes, however, that the two plats were illegible. 71 Md.
App. at 479 n.l, 526 A.2d at 103 n.I.
201. 71 Md. App. at 483, 526 A.2d at 105.
202. Id.
203. 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975).
204. Id. at 15, 332 A.2d at 638.
205. 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
206. Id. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517.
207. 71 Md. App. at 484, 526 A.2d at 106. The statute granted title of land reclaimed
from the sea by the construction of a seawall to the town. Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. at
300, 177 S.E.2d at 514.
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"Carolina Beach case is inapposite. '"208
Finally, the court ruled that the City does not possess an interest in the property even though it was offered for dedication to the
City, because the public did not accept the dedication.20 9 In Town of
Glenarden v. Lewis"' 0 the Court of Appeals held that an offer of dedication must be accepted. 21 Acceptance is accomplished by deed,
long public use, legislative action or acts in pais.
In the present
case, the circuit court found the City accepted the dedication
through legislative action and acts in pais.21 3 The Court of Special
Appeals, however, viewed the lower court's finding as "not wholly
accurate. ' 214 It found that certain portions of Atlantic Avenue were
accepted by the General Assembly on behalf of Ocean City, but the
area of the avenue disputed in this case is outside the boundaries
described in that statute. 5
Moreover, the court said there was no evidence of acts in pais to
manifest acceptance because by the time the City assumed responsibility for the avenue by beginning maintenance, the property was
already vested by adverse possession in Windsor, thus revoking the
offer to dedicate the property.2 '6 This premise was articulated in
Mauck v. Bailey, 2 t 7 where the Court of Appeals stated that land could
not be dedicated to the public if the dedication had not been accepted within a reasonable time.218 The offer of dedication had
lapsed because it had been extended to the City for a reasonable
time. 1 9
The import of Windsor rests in the court's reluctance to find the
208. 71 Md. App. at 484, 526 A.2d at 106.
209. As is the case here, when a property owner prepares plats showing streets and

then sells lots adjacent to the streets, an offer to dedicate is presumed. Id. at 486, 526
A.2d at 106.
210. 261 Md. 1, 273 A.2d 140 (1971).
211. Id. at 4, 273 A.2d at 142.
212. Id.
213. 71 Md. App. at 487, 526 A.2d at 107. The court did not address the methods of
acceptance by deed or by long public use because of lack of evidence. Id. at 487 n.5, 526
A.2d at 107 n.5.
214. Id. at 487, 526 A.2d at 107.
215. Id.
216. id. at 488, 526 A.2d at 107. The City contended that adverse possession does
not apply to one of the buildings which was rebuilt in 1966. The court, however, held
that the City was estopped from demanding removal of the building because the earlier
reconstruction was at the City's request. Id., 526 A.2d at 108. Also, it is important to
note that adverse possession cannot run against the State. City of Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 572, 197 A.2d 821, 827 (1964).
217. 247 Md. 434, 231 A.2d 685 (1967).
218. Id. at 443, 231 A.2d at 691.
219. The court found two offers of dedication: one in 1876 and one in 1890. Accord-
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acceptance of the dedication. Adverse possessors challenged by
those asserting a superior interest in title should analyze both the
offer and acceptance of an alleged dedication. If no acceptance is
found, the adverse possessor will prevail.
3. Easements.-In Kiler v. Beam 220 the Court of Special Appeals
held that the purchase of property by a purchaser without actual or
constructive notice of a prescriptive easement on the property is sufficient to extinguish that easement. 22 ' Because the circuit court did
not address the question of notice, the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case for a determination of whether the owners of the
servient estate were aware of the prescriptive easement when they
222
purchased the property.
Kiler's lot had been in his family since 1921. Beam's lot was
purchased by her family in 1964. Several generations of Kiler's family had used a dirt road which crossed Beam's property once or
twice a year to get to Kiler's lot. 223 Significantly, Beam never gave
22 4
permission to anyone to use the contested roadway.
Kiler brought suit in 1976 to enjoin Beam from interfering with
his use of the roadway. Kiler subsequently amended his complaint,
claiming a prescriptive right to use the roadway. A hearing was held
before a master who found that Kiler had acquired a prescriptive
right-of-way in the roadway prior to Beam's acquisition of the property in 1964.225 Beam filed exceptions to the master's report and
recommendation and the Circuit Court for Carroll County found
that Kiler's use of the roadway was not sufficiently continuous for
Beam to be aware that it was made under any claim of right and
2 26
therefore no prescriptive right-of-way existed.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals began its analysis by
ing to the court, the first action by the City signifying acceptance of the dedication did
not occur until 1962. 71 Md. App. at 487-88, 526 A.2d at 107.
220. 74 Md. App. 636, 539 A.2d 1138 (1988).
221. Id. at 641, 539 A.2d at 1140.
222. Id. at 643, 539 A.2d at 1141. The court could not tell whether the circuit court
had determined that Kiler acquired a prescriptive easement over Beam's land prior to
the purchase of the land in 1964, as a master had initially determined. The court remanded the case for a determination of this question as well. Id. at 639, 539 A.2d at
1139.
223. Id. at 638, 539 A.2d at 1139. This roadway, however, was not the only way Kiler
could get to his property, negating any claim to an easement by necessity or implication.
Id. at 638 n.4, 539 A.2d at 1139 n.4.
224. Id. at 638, 539 A.2d at 1139.
225. Id. The master found that the required 20-year period for a prescriptive right-ofway to ripen was satisfied through the possession of successive ancestors. Id.
226. Id.
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noting that the party claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden to show an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted use of the way
for twenty years.2 2 7 The court held, however, that the circuit court
failed to refute the master's finding that Kiler sustained this burden
with respect to the period before Beam purchased the property. 22 s
Thus, the court remanded the case for a preliminary determination
of the existence of a prescriptive easement prior to 1964, and, if
such easement existed, whether the purchase of the property by
Beam extinguished the easement.2 2 9 The Court of Special Appeals
noted that the direct question of whether a prescriptive easement is
extinguished by a subsequent purchase has never been decided by a
Maryland court.2"'
Turning to this question, the court looked to decisions on point
in other jurisdictions. The court noted that an overwhelming majority of authorities agree that "an easement is not binding on a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the servient estate if he purchases
'2 3 1
without notice, either actual or constructive, of the easement.
The court quoted the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in
Fanti v. Welsh, 2 where it was held that a prescriptive easement established before the purchase of the servient estate was extinguished by the purchase.
[It] is a well established principle . . .that an easement is
extinguished unless the purchaser has either actual notice
of the existence of the easement, or constructive notice
from the recordation of the express grant or reservation
creating it, or from the fact that its use and enjoyment is
open and visible.
The grantee is bound where a reasonably careful inspection of the premises would disclose the existence of
the easement, or where the grantee has knowledge
of facts
23
sufficient to put a prudent buyer on inquiry.
While there is no Maryland case directly addressing this issue, the
227. Id. at 640, 539 A.2d at 1140. See Dalton v. Real Estate Improvement Co. of Baltimore City, 201 Md. 34, 40-41, 92 A.2d 585, 588 (1952).
228. 74 Md. App. at 640, 539 A.2d at 1140.
229. id. at 639-40, 539 A.2d at 1139.
230. Id. at 641, 539 A.2d at 1140.
231. Id. See 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 157, § 431, at 354; Otero v. Pacheo, 94 N.M.

524, 526, 612 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1980) (easement not binding on subsequent purchaser
absent actual or constructive knowledge but law will charge purchaser with notice of
facts which a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed).
232. 152 W. Va. 233, 161 S.E.2d 501 (1968).
233. Id. at 239-40, 161 S.E.2d at 505.
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court approvingly cited the general doctrine espoused in Fertittav.
Bay Shore Development Corp.23 4 There, the Court of Appeals held that
the purchase of certain property did not extinguish prior equities in
the property because the facts as known to the purchaser were
enough to put an "ordinarily prudent person upon inquiry. '1 2 15 The
Kiler court concluded that these principles should be applied by the
circuit court on remand to determine if Beam purchased the property with actual or constructive notice of the prescriptive
easement.23 6
In general, to establish a prescriptive easement it is necessary to
prove an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted use of the way for
twenty years. 23 7 In order for the use to be adverse, the user must
claim use of the property as a matter of right. 2 8 Similarly, the exclusivity element requires the user to establish that the claim exists
in his or her favor only, independent of others.2 3 9 Uninterrupted
use depends upon the nature of the use to which enjoyment of the
property is applied, but generally there must be "circumstances
which exclude the presumption of a voluntary abandonment on the
240
part of the person claiming it."
Possession for the requisite twenty-year period can be contiguous between two or more parties, provided there is privity of estate
between them.2 4 ' Privity of estate may be created by a sale and conveyance or by descent. 24 2 Once the prescriptive period has been
satisfied and the interest ripened into an easement, the character
and extent of the use thereafter must be consistent with the character and extent of the use during the prescriptive period.2 43
234. 266 Md. 59, 291 A.2d 662 (1972).
235. Id. at 74, 291 A.2d at 670.
236. 74 Md. App. at 643, 539 A.2d at 1141.
237. Furman E. Hendrix, Inc. v. Hanna, 250 Md. 443, 445, 243 A.2d 600, 601 (1968).
238. Zimmerman v. Summers, 24 Md. App. 100, 107, 330 A.2d 722, 727 (1975).
239. Id. See also Wilson v. Waters, 192 Md. 221,226, 64 A.2d 135, 137 (1949) (holding that user "must" claim right independent of all others).
240. Zimmerman, 24 Md. App. at 108, 330 A.2d at 728. See also Clayton v.Jensen, 240
Md. 337, 344-45, 214 A.2d 154, 159 (1965) (requiring that a cessation of use does not
indicate a voluntary abandonment).
241. Gore v. Hall, 206 Md. 485, 491, 112 A.2d 675, 678 (1955).
242. Id.
243. Bishields v. Campbell, 200 Md. 622, 625, 91 A.2d 922, 923 (1952). The Bishield
court, by way of example, explained that if the owner of land over which another had
acquired a prescriptive easement erected a gate, the court would protect the owner of
the easement if there was no gate during the prescriptive period. On the other hand, if
there was a gate there during the period, the owner of the prescriptive easement would
not be entitled to its removal. Id. See also Metaxas v.J.R.Jarrell Co., 164 Md. 180, 164
A. 232 (1933), where owners of land over which the plaintiff claimed a prescriptive ease-
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The question of whether the prescriptive easement was extinguished by the purchase for value of the servient estate has never
been directly addressed in Maryland. 4 4 Generally, a purchaser is
bound. by any prior equities or unrecorded interests on the land for
which the purchaser has actual or constructive notice. If the purchaser had knowledge of facts and circumstances which ought to
have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry notice, the purchaser will be presumed to have made such an inquiry and thus
charged with notice of all the facts which this inquiry likely would
have disclosed.2 4 Therefore, a purchaser of land without notice of
another adverse interest in the land is not bound by such an interest.2 4 6 Because a prescriptive easement is like any other interest,
the Court of Special Appeals correctly applied this reasoning in Kiler
v. Beam.
The effect of this holding is to place a duty on the owner of the
prescriptive easement to take steps that would provide actual or
constructive notice of the easement or risk having an easement extinguished by the purchase. These steps may include petitioning for
a declaratory judgment to quiet title.2 4 7 Indeed, this would give a
subsequent purchaser or a transferee record notice. In Kiler the
owner of the prescriptive easement did not do this. Furthermore,
he only used the roadway twice a year and it is doubtful that this use
would be sufficient to put a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
on inquiry notice. In addition, the decision imputes an obligation to
exercise ordinary diligence when purchasing property. From the
record, it is not clear whether Beam, when purchasing the property
in 1964, had knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable person
on notice or exercised diligence in uncovering such facts. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals correctly remanded the case for a
determination of these facts.

ment subsequently constructed a gate to reduce fire hazard. The court ruled that this
was not inconsistent with the plaintiff's claim and thus the gate could stand. Id. at 185,
164 A. at 236.

244. 74 Md. App. at 641, 539 A.2d at 1140. See also Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18,
25, 54 A.2d 137, 140 (1947) (easement reserved by implication not destroyed by
purchase of servient estate where purchasers were put on inquiry notice of easement
and thus had constructive notice).
245. Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 266 Md. 59, 72-73, 291 A.2d 662, 669 (1972).
246. See Libertini v. Schroeder, 149 Md. 484, 492, 132 A. 64, 67 (1926) (purchaser of
land not charged with notice of estoppel against vendor where private way was previously a public highway and claimant's use appeared to be consistent with that of the
general public).
247. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-108 (1988).
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4. Rule Against Perpetuities.-In Ferrero Construction Co. v. Dennis
Rourke Corp.24 8 the Court of Appeals applied the rule against perpetuities to void a right of first refusal in a land sales contract. 2 49 In so
doing, the Court of Appeals adopted the view of the majority of
American jurisdictions. 250 The court also held that the exercise of
the right of first refusal does not constitute an independent contract
because it would contravene the policies underlying the rule against
perpetuities. 2511
25 2
The rule against perpetuities has been adopted in Maryland,
subject to statutory modifications.25 3 In Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. the Court of Appeals adopted the following definition of the rule: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. ' 254 The court further noted that: "It is not a
rule that invalidates interests which last too long, but interests which
vest too remotely; in other words, the Rule is not concerned with
255
the duration of estates, but the time of their vesting.A right of first refusal, also referred to as a preemptive right, is
an exclusive right to have the first opportunity to purchase certain
property only if the owner decides to convey it. 25 6 The vast majority

of courts and commentators propound that these rights constitute
interests in property and are not merely contract rights. 25 7 A right
248. 311 Md. 560, 536 A.2d 1137 (1988), rev k64 Md. App. 694,498 A.2d 689 (1985).
249. Id. at 575, 536 A.2d at 1144.

250. Id. at 567, 536 A.2d at 1140.
251. Id. at 577, 536 A.2d at 1145.
252. See Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 541, 155
A.2d 702, 705 (1959) (adopting Gray's formulation of the rule against perpetuities); J.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
253. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 11-102 to -104 (1974). Section 11-102 lists

exceptions to the rule against perpetuities: cemetery perpetual care, transfers from a
charitable corporation on contingency, trusts for employees, and trusts for charitable
purposes. Id. § 11-102. Section 11-103(a) provides that an "interest which must terminate not later than the death of one or more persons is a 'life estate' even though it may
terminate at an earlier date." Id. § 11.103(a). Section 11-104(b) provides that in any
estate contingent upon a person's failing to attain an age in excess of 21, the age contingency shall be reduced to 21. Id. § 11-104(b).
254. Fitzpatrick, 220 Md. at 541, 155 A.2d at 705. See alsoJ. GRAY, supra note 252.
255. Fitzpatric, 220 Md. at 541, 155 A.2d at 705.
256. See VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter ALP].
257. See 5A R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 771[2] (1987). See also Westpark,
Inc. v. Seaton Land Co., 225 Md. 433, 449-50, 171 A.2d 736, 743 (1961) (holding right
of first refusal creates equitable property right in land). See generally Note, Real PropertyPreemptive Right or Right of First Refusal- Violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 Mo. L.
REV.

389 (1975).
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of first refusal is distinguished from an ordinary option in that it can
be exercised only in the event that the owner decides tb sell the
property. 5 8 In an ordinary option, the optionee has the power to
compel the owner to sell the property
at a stipulated price whether
25 9
or not the owner is willing to sell.
Rights of first refusal and options are not present vested estates
but are contingent upon the preemptioner giving notice that it will
exercise its option or right as well as any other requirements provided for in the creating instrument. 260 . If these rights potentially
may be exercised more than twenty-one years after the time the contract is formulated, their vesting potentially may exceed the twentyone-year time frame, a loophole which violates the rule against perpetuities and invalidates the interests.2 6 '
In general, there are-three variations of a preemptive right: (1)
the right to purchase at a fixed price, (2) the right to purchase at the
fair market value, or (3) the right to purchase at an amount equal to
the amount offered by a bona fide purchaser. 62 Under the minority
view, this distinction may determine whether the right violates the
rule against perpetuities. Proponents of this view argue that a right
to purchase at the market price or meet another offer does not restrain alienation of the property and does not violate the policy underlying the rule.2 63 Consequently, jurisdictions which subscribe to
the minority view will not apply the rule to these types of rights of
first refusal. Conversely, the majority view, adopted by the Restatement of Property, applies the rule against perpetuities to these rights,
regardless of the terms, because the preemptioner acquires an equitable interest which will vest only when the property owner decides
to sell.26 These contradictory viewpoints were at issue in Ferrero.
258.
259.
260.
(1971)

VI ALP, supra note 256.
Id.
See Commonwealth Realty v. Bowers, 261 Md. 285, 297-98, 274 A.2d 353, 359
(discussing vested rights under an ordinary option contract). The reasoning ap-

plied to options similarly can encompass a right of first refusal because it is a type of
option. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413 comment b (1944); 311 Md. at 567, 536

A.2d at 1140.
261. 311 Md. at 567-68, 536 A.2d at 1140-41.
262. Id. at 573-74, 536 A.2d at 1143-44.
263. See 64 Md. App. at 702, 498 A.2d at 693. See also VI ALP, supra note 256, 26.66,
at 510 ("pre-emption at the offeror's price is unobjectionable, though perpetual, since it
presents no impediment to alienation").
264. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 260, § 413 comment e. The Restate-

ment of Property, however, implies that promissory restraints which provide that the owner
shall not sell without first offering to a designated person the opportunity to meet another offer is not an invalid restraint on alienation. Id.
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On April 27, 1981, the Ferrero Construction Company (Ferrero) sold two lots on Mercy Court in Montgomery County, Maryland,. to the Dennis Rourke Corporation (Rourke).2 6 As part of the
contract of sale, Ferrero agreed to extend a right of first refusal to
Rourke on the future sale of any of the seven remaining lots on
Mercy Court.2 6 6 The contract was never recorded. Three years
later, Ferrero notified Rourke of a third-party offer to purchase one
of the lots. Rourke immediately exercised its right of first refusal by
submitting a contract essentially identical to the third party's offer.2 6 7 Ferrero responded that it had decided to reject both offers
and returned both, unsigned. 26 8 Rourke sued for specific performance claiming that it was entitled to the property by virtue of the
exercise of its right of first refusal. Furthermore, Rourke claimed
that, notwithstanding the right of first refusal, Ferrero and Rourke
had agreed upon an independent contract for the sale and purchase
of the lot. 269 The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted
Ferrero's motion for summary judgment ruling that Rourke's right
270
of first refusal violated the rule against perpetuities and was void.
The lower court also ruled that the contract was formed on the mistaken belief that a right of first refusal existed and this mutual mistake of law invalidated the contract. 2 7 '
272
The Court of Special Appeals, adopting the minority rule,
reversed on the ground that application of the rule in this case violated the rule's purpose: to facilitate alienation of land and prevent
clogging of titles. 2 7 3 The court also indicated that the parties had
entered into an independent contract for the purchase and sale of
Lot 27.274
Citing "policies favoring certainty and stability," the Court of
Appeals in Ferrero reversed the intermediate appellate court, expressly adopting the majority view by applying the rule against per265. 311 Md. at 562, 536 A.2d at 1138.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 563, 536 A.2d at 1138. Dennis Rourke Corporation's response was that
"[if you would be kind enough to provide me with a copy of your contract on Lot 27, I
will prepare my contract with exactly the same terms and conditions as the offer you now
have." Id. at 563 n.3, 536 A.2d at 1138 n.3.
268. Id. at 563, 536 A.2d at 1138.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 564, 536 A.2d at 1138.
272. 64 Md. App. at 705, 498 A.2d at 695. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
273. 64 Md. App. at 700, 498 A.2d at 692. See also 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 157,
§ 392, at 152-53.
274. 64 Md. App. at 706, 498 A.2d at 695.
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petuities to rights of first refusal. 2 75 Although the court recognized

instances where courts have developed exceptions to the rule for
certain options, 7 6 it distinguished these exceptions because they
yield social benefits offsetting the consequences of a violation of the
rule.Y The court noted that in this case, however, it was following
the majority rule by striking "the balance against creating the
exception.'278
The court attacked the minority view, which creates exceptions
for certain types of rights of first refusal. The court held that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the policy underlying the rule against perpetuities is the elimination of restraints on
alienation.279 The court reasoned that "certainty and stability are
important values," '2 80 and the purpose of the rule against perpetuities is to eliminate restrictions that render titles uncertain. An exception in this case, the court said, would contravene the purpose of
the rule. 28 ' Notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities, the court
expressly held that rights of first refusal restrain alienation and, depending upon the nature of the interest, may constitute unreasona282
ble restraints on alienation, thus rendering them invalid.
Finally, the Court rejected Rourke's claim that the parties had
formed an independent contract.28 3 According to the court, to hold
275. 311 Md. at 567, 536 A.2d at 1140. The court stated, "[v]ested rights and settled
expectations are at stake." Id.
276. Id. at 568, 536 A.2d at 1140-41. The court discussed three judicially created
exceptions to the rule against perpetuities: (i) a lessee's option to renew a lease, see
Bridges v. Hitchcock, 2 Eng. Rep. 498, 500 (1715); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, sUpra
note 260, at § 395(b), (2) a lessee's option to purchase all or part of a leased premises,
see id. at (a); R. POWELL, supra note 257; Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 109
Md. 131, 159, 71 A. 442, 447 (1908), and (3) a usufructuary's option to extend the scope
of an easement or profit provided agreement creates present rights, see RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, supra note 260, at § 393 comment j.
277. 311 Md. at 568, 536 A.2d at 1141.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 571-72, 536 A.2d at 1142.
280. Id. at 569, 536 A.2d at 1141. One example the court cited was Weber v. Texas
Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936). There, the Fifth Circuit held that a royalty interest
reserved under a royalty lease did not restrain alienation and thus did not violate the
rule against perpetuities. The Fifth Circuit, however, expressly limited the decision to
the facts in that case. Id. at 808-09.
281. 311 Md. at 570, 536 A.2d at 1142. See also 2 H. TIFFANY, sispra note 157, at § 392
(public policy is concerned that owners will not make effective use of their property if
title is not certain). The court also recognized a limited number of statutorily created
exceptions to the rule against perpetuities, MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 11-102 to
-103 (1974), and was reluctant to expand this with a judicially created exception. 311
Md. at 575, 536 A.2d at 1144.
282. 311 Md. at 575, 536 A.2d at 1144.
283. Id. at 577, 536 A.2d at 1145.
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that the mere initial implementation of an invalid right of first refusal creates a valid contract to sell the property would "negate the
Perpetuities and contravene the
applicability of the Rule Against
2 4
policy underlying the Rule."
In Maryland, the rule against perpetuities clearly applies to ordinary options to purchase, and the Ferrero court refused to distinguish between ordinary options and rights of first refusal in
applying the rule. In adopting the majority view, the Court of Appeals applied an arcane principle of property law to negate a modern business transaction and in so doing, unduly punished the
preemptioner by voiding a bargained-for property right. The minority view, which considers the actual restraint on alienation and
title problems, is better suited for modern business transactions between corporations.
First, assuming at least part of the rationale for the rule is to
facilitate alienation of property, it is difficult to perceive how a right
of first refusal which, as in the present case, gives the preemptioner
only the right to meet another offer, restrains alienation. The court
assumes that prospective purchasers may be dissuaded from investing the time and money necessary to make a bona fide offer if there
is a chance that the preemptioner will defeat their bids.2 85 This will,
in turn, hinder the marketability of the property. As the dissent
noted, however, prospective purchasers always face the risk that
their offers will be rejected. 28 6 Therefore, the actual restraint on
alienation caused by this type of right is de minimis. 2 7 Furthermore, many of the cases the court cited adopting the majority rule
involve rights of first refusal to purchase at a fixed price or situations
where the rule applied but was not violated.28 8
Second, "It]he Rule Against Perpetuities was first devised to
284. Id.

285. Id. at 585, 536 A.2d at 1149 (Cole, J., dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Id.

288. See Estate of Johnson v. Carr, 286 Ark. 369, 371, 691 S.W.2d 161, 162 (1985)
(option to repurchase did not violate rule because it was personal to grantors and did
not extend to heirs or assigns); Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver, 140
Cal. App. 3d 964,977, 190 Cal. Rpir. 38, 46 (1983) (conveyance is construed to indicate
grantor intended right of refusal to expire before period necessary to invoke rule);
Watergate Corp. v, Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. 1975) (instrument ambiguous as
to when estate must vest so court construed as not violative of rule); North Bay Council
v. Grinnell, 123 N.H. 321, 324, 461 A.2d 114, 116 (1983) (rule not violated because
grantor's heirs could not be determined at time of conveyance); Clark v. Shelton, 584
P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978) (rule not violated because grantees' preemptive right of refusal was not intended to extend beyond original grantees' lives).
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prevent families from tying up property for generations, thereby
creating unreasonable restraints upon the alienation of property. ' 28 9 Even if preventing restraints on alienability is not the
stated purpose of the rule in Maryland,2 9 . its references in the Estates and Trusts Article evidence that it is intended to apply to family gift transactions. 2 9 ' In addition, the United States Supreme
Court held in Fitchie v. Brown 2 92 that corporations do not constitute
lives in being for the purpose of applying the rule against perpetuities.29 s Clearly, the rule was not intended to be applied to commercial transactions between business entities. As the Supreme Court
2 94
of Kansas noted in Barnhart v. McKinney:
[t]o derive from a rule thus motivated and thus formulated
a general concept applicable to commercial transactions
was a step of doubtful wisdom. Lives in being have no significance in commercial transactions, nor has the period of
twenty-one years. Moreover, in accordance with standard
perpetuities doctrine, when an option is held to be too remote the entire option is struck down, instead of only the
excess beyond some permissible shorter period. 9 5
Finally, application of the rule often will unjustly enrich the
party asserting the rule against perpetuities and deprive the
preemptioner of a bargained-for property right. One authority has
stated that "Itihis is unduly punitive on one party to the advantage
of the other who may be equally at fault." '9 6 This unfairness is obvious in Ferrero since Ferrero asserted the rule only three years after
entering into the contract. It is difficult to see any remoteness in
this case. In Weber v. Texas Co.,297 the leading case supporting the
proposition that the rule against perpetuities should not apply to
void rights of first refusal, the Fifth Circuit concluded by stating that
"[hiaving expressly purchased subject to the lease, [the party assert289. Barnhart v. McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 517, 682 P.2d 112, 117 (1984).
290. Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 541. 155 A.2d
702, 705 (1959) (eliminating restrictions that render title uncertain is the underlying
purpose of the rule). But see Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 348, 64 A.2d 258, 260 (1948)
("The rule was established by courts to preserve freedom of alienation, and to prevent
restrictions on the circulation of property.").
291. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § I I-102 (1974).
292. 211 U.S. 321 (1908).
293. Id. at 334.
294. 235 Kan. 511, 682 P.2d 112 (1984).
295. Id. at 517, 682 P.2d at 117.
296. J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 217 (1956),
297. 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936).
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ing the Rule] cannot complain of its burdens ....',2'9 Application of
the rule against perpetuities to a right of first refusal to meet another offer is another example where "the Rule becomes a destroyer
2 99
of bargains which in all conscience ought to be performed.P
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298. Id. at 809.
299. J. MORRIS & W.

LEACH,

supra note 296.

IX.

STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

A.

Administrative Agencies

1. Regulations.-Waverly Press, Inc. v. State Department of Assessments & Taxation' arises from a rejection issued by the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (the Department) to proposed
articles of amendment submitted by Waverly Press, Inc. under
which it sought to change its name from "Waverly Press, Inc." to
"Waverly, Inc." 2 The Department rejected the proposal pursuant
to Corporations and Associations Article, section 2-106(b)(2)(i),5
which provides that "[t]he name of a corporation may not . .. [b]e
the same as or misleadingly similar to . . . [t]he name of any Maryland corporation or limited partnership .... ."' The Department's
rejection letter informed Waverly Press, Inc. that its proposed
name, Waverly, Inc., was not available because it was misleadingly
similar to the name of an existing Maryland limited partnership,
5
Waverly Limited Partnership.
In 1951 the General Assembly enacted a general incorporation
law that included a provision prohibiting the approval of a name for
a corporation that is the same as or misleadingly similar to the name
of a corporation that already exists in the State.6 In National Shoe
Store Co. v. National Shoes of New York, Inc.' the Court of Appeals
noted that the purpose of this provision was to "avoid confusion by
the general public and also by the [Department's predecessor
agency] in carrying out its administrative duties." 8 In 1975 this provision was codified at Corporations and Associations Article, section
2-106(b)(2). 9 A similar prohibition is found in section 8(c) of the
Model Business Corporation Act, which states that "[tihe corporate
name . . . [s]hall not be the same as, or deceptively similar to, the
name of any domestic corporation."' 0
In 1981 the Department for the first time promulgated and
1. 312 Md, 184. 539 A.2d 223 (1988).
2. Id. at 185-86, 539 A.2d at 224.
3. MD. CoRPs. & AsNS CODE ANN. § 2-106(b)(2)(i) (1985).

4. Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

312 Md. at 186, 539 A.2d at 225.
Id. at 187, 539 A.2d at 225.
213 Md. 328, 131 A.2d 909 (1956).
Id. at 335, 131 A.2d at 911-12.
312 Md. at 188, 539 A.2d at 225.
Id. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8(c) (1966).
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adopted regulations to determine corporate name availability." The
regulations became effective in January 1982 and are now codified
at title 18, section 18.04.02 of the Code of Maryland Regulations
(COMAR).' 2 The Department's regulations stated that a proposed
corporate name would be reviewed according to COMAR's criteria
to determine whether the name was acceptable to the Department
pursuant to the provisions of the Corporations and Associations Article, section 2-106(b)(2).' 3 Section 18.04.02.01 of COMAR states:
There are three categories of name availability: (1) [s]ame,
(2) [m]isleadingly similar, and (3) [n]ot similar ....Corporate names are the "same" if a comparison of the names...
reveals no difference . . . . Corporate names are "misleadingly similar" if, on comparison . . .there is an apparent
difference . . . of such character that the names are likely to
be confused .... 4

Subsection 18.04.02.O1E(1) was at issue in Waverly. That subsection states that "[a] proposed corporate name is considered to be
'misleadingly similar' to a name already on file if: (1) The difference
in the names consists in the use of different 'words of incorporation'
(example: 'Jones, Inc.' is considered to be misleadingly similar to
'Jones Corporation.')."'" To implement section 2-106 and the regulations, the Department developed a computer program which deleted words of incorporation when name availability proposals were
reviewed. 16 Consequently, a comparison between "Jones, Inc." and
"Jones Corporation" would be reduced to a comparison between
7
"Jones" and "Jones," and the proposed name would be rejected,
In 1982 the General Assembly revised laws relating to limited
partnerships and codified this legislation at title 10 of the Corporations and Associations Article."8 Pursuant to Corporations and Associations Article, section 10-102(a)(1), 9 a limited partnership was
required to file a certificate of limited partnership with the Departi1. 312 Md. at 188, 539 A.2d at 226.
12. The regulations provide in pertinent part that "t]he criteria . . . are used to
determine whether a proposed corporate name is acceptable to the Department pursuant to the provisions of Corporations and Associations Article, § 2-106..... MD.REGS.
CODE tit. 18, § 18.04.02.01 (1982).

13. 312 Md. at 188, 539 A.2d at 226.
14. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 18, § 18.04.02.01C, D (1982).
15. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 18, § 18.04.02.OIE(l) (1982).
16. 312 Md. at 189, 539 A.2d at 226.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 190, 539 A.2d at 226. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 10-10 1 to
-1105 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
19. The statute provides in relevant part that "[t]he name of each limited partner-
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ment as a prerequisite to its formation. 2" Under section 10102(a)(4)(i), 2 ' the name of each limited partnership as set forth in
the certificate could not be the same as or misleadingly similar to the
name of any limited partnership or corporation organized under
Maryland laws. 2 2
Faced with this additional legislation, the Department promulgated and adopted another regulation to determine name availability for limited partnerships.2 COMAR section 18.04.02.0224 states
that the criteria regarding corporate name availability as set forth in
COMAR section 18.04.02.0125 will be used to determine whether
proposed limited partnership names are in accord with Corporations and Associations Article, section 2-106.6 The new regulation
also would treat the term "limited partnership" as words of incorporation under COMAR section 18.04.02.O1E(1). 27 In short, the new
regulation requires that proposed limited partnership names would
be subject to the same criteria as those used for proposed corporate
28
names.
As a result, the Department operated under a two-step procedure to determine name availability for corporations and limited
partnerships.2 9 First, under sections 2-106(b)(2)(i) and 10102(a)(4)(i) of the Corporations and Associations Article, the Department prohibited the use of a proposed corporate or limited
partnership name when the name would be the same as or misleadingly similar to another corporation or limited partnership name
which already existed in the State.3 " Second, the Department
promulgated and adopted regulations to determine whether proposed corporate or limited partnership names were acceptable purship as set forth in its certificate: (I) [sihall contain without abbreviation the words 'limited partnership' ....
MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 10-102(a)(1) (1985).
20. 312 Md. at 190, 539 A.2d at 226.
21. The statute sets forth, in part, that "[tihe name of each limited partnership ...
[inlay not be the same as or misleadingly similar to: [t]he name of any corporation or
limited partnership ... " MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 10-102(a)(4)(i) (1985).
22. 312 Md. at 190, 539 A.2d at 226.
23. Id. at 191, 539 A.2d at 227.
24. "'The criteria set forth in COMAR 18.04.02.01 regarding corporate name availability shall also apply to limited partnerships ....

The words 'Limited Partnership' shall

be treated as 'words of incorporation...... MD. REGS. CODE tit. 18, § 18.04.02.02
(1982).
25. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
26. 312 Md. at 191, 539 A.2d at 227.
27. Id. See supra text accompanying note 15.
28. 312 Md. at 191, 539 A.2d at 227.
29. Id.
30. id.
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suant to sections 2-106 and 10-102 of the Corporations and
Associations Article."'
When Waverly Press, Inc. submitted the proposal to change its
name to Waverly, Inc., the Department entered the proposed name
into its computer and matched the new name with Waverly Limited
Partnership. 2 The Department compared the names with their
"tails" deleted as "Waverly" to "Waverly."" Consequently, the
Department concluded that the names were misleadingly similar
and rejected the proposal.3 4
Waverly Press, Inc. filed suit against the Department in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.3" The circuit court entered judgment
for Waverly declaring that it had a right to amend both its charter
and its name.3 6 The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit
court's judgment in an unreported opinion." The Court of Appeals
granted Waverly's petition for certiorari and subsequently reinstated the circuit court's declaratory judgment.3 8
Relying on Comptroller v. Rockhill, Inc. ,39 the Court of Appeals
noted that the rules promulgated and adopted by the Department
were interpretative rules and as such served "only [to] interpret the
statute [for] . . .the administrative agency in the performance of its
duties until directed otherwise by decisions of the courts." 4 The
court observed that no statute authorized the Department to promulgate and adopt any regulations pursuant to the Corporations
and Associations Article's restrictions on corporate and limited partnership name availability. 4 '
The Court of Appeals stated that COMAR section
18.04.02.02B1 2 suffered from the same defect that was evident in
31. id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 186, 539 A.2d at 224.
36. Id.
37. Id., 539 A.2d at 224-25.
38. Id., 539 A.2d at 225.
39. 205 Md. 226, 107 A.2d 93 (1954).
40. Id. at 234, 107 A.2d at 98. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10, at
54 (2d ed. 1979) ("rules are legislative when the agency is exercising delegated power to
make law through rules, and rules are interpretative when the agency is not exercising
such delegated power in issuing them").
41. 312 Md. at 191, 539 A.2d at 227. The source line in MD. REGS. CODE tit. 18,
§ 18.04.02 (1982), attributes authority to MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-201 (1986).
That section contains provisions relating only to the Department's taxation authority.
312 Md. at 192, 539 A.2d at 227.
42. "The words 'Limited Partnership' shall be treated as 'words of incorporation' as
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the regulation in Rockhill in that the "interpretation reflected in the
regulation was inconsistent with the statute." 4 The inconsistency
arose because the Department ignored the mandated distinction between corporations and limited partnerships.4 4 The court explained
that Corporations and Associations Article, section 2-106(a), requires that the name of the corporation "indicate its corporate status." '4 5 The court said that the Maryland corporation law has
contained a similar provision since 1908.46 The 1908 provision
stated that "[tihe name of the proposed corporation ...shall always
be such as to indicate that it is a corporation as distinguished from a
...partnership." '47 Similarly, the court pointed out that section 10102(a) (1) requires that the certificate of limited partnership set forth
the words "limited partnership" without abbreviation. 4' The purpose of this requirement is to convey to the public the limited liability of the limited partnership.4 9
Noting that the name designations in sections 2-106(a) and 10102(a)(1) are mandatory, the Court of Appeals stated that the General Assembly had reached the conclusion that the identification of a
business organization as a corporation or limited partnership has
"significance to members of the public dealing with one or the other
form of business organization."" 0 As a result, the Department's
comparison of corporation and limited partnership names pursuant
to COMAR section 18.04.02.02B disregarded the mandatory name
designations set forth in sections 2-106(a) and 10-102(a)(1). 5
The Court of Appeals rejected the Department's contention
that the court's interpretation would make section 2-106(b)(2)(i)
meaningless.5 2 The Department argued that if it were to include the
required words indicating corporate or limited partnership status in
described in Regulation [18.04.02.01E(1)] above." MD. REcs. CODE tit. 18,
§ 18.04.02.02B (1982).
43. 312 Md. at 192, 539 A.2d at 228. See Comptroller v. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226,
233, 107 A.2d 93, 97 (1954) ("[R]ules and regulations adopted by an administrative
agency, to be valid, must be reasonable and consistent with ... the statute under which
the agency acts.").

44. 312 Md. at 193, 539 A.2d at 228.
45. MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-106(a) (1985); 312 Md. at 192, 539 A.2d at

228.
46.
47.
48.
49.

312 Md. at 192, 539 A.2d at 228.
Act of Mar. 31, 1908, ch. 240, 1908 Md. Laws 23, 25.
312 Md. at 193, 539 A.2d at 228.
Id.

50. Id.

51. Id. at 193-94, 539 A.2d at 228. See supra notes 19 & 45 and accompanying text.
52. 312 Md. at 194, 539 A.2d at 229. For the pertinent text of § 2-106(b)(2)(i), see
supra text accompanying note 4.
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the name availability comparison, then a corporation and limited
partnership would never have the same name. 53 The court responded 5 4 that the Department ignored the use of alternatives in
section 2-106(b)(2)(i), which provides that "[t]he name of a corporation may not ... [ble the same as or misleadingly similar to ... [t]he
name of any Maryland corporation or limited partnership . . .,.
The court observed that section 2-106(b)(2) would apply primarily
to corporations and that section 10-102(a)(4) would apply primarily
to limited partnerships.5 6 The court nevertheless illustrated how its
interpretation of the reference to a limited partnership in section 2106(b)(2)(i) and the reference to corporations in section 10102(a)(4)(i) was consistent with section 2-106(b)(2)(i). The court
stated that "[i]t is possible that the Department would have to compare 'ABC Limited' with 'ABC Limited Partnership.' In that situation the Department might well conclude that there is a misleading
similarity between the true, full names.",5 7 At the same time, the
court indicated that section 2-106(b)(2)(i) may be satisfied if the corporation used the word "Limited" in its name.58
Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the Department's interpretative rules, requiring name availability comparisons to disregard the mandated portion of each entry's name, conflicted with
sections 2-106(a) and 10-102(a)(l) of the Corporations and Associations Article.5 " The name availability comparison, as intended by
the statutes, should have been between "Waverly, Inc." and
"Waverly Limited Partnership." This comparison would have indicated the respective status of the business entities, and the names
would not have been misleadingly similar.6 0 The court further
noted that its holding was limited to the comparison of a corporate
name with a limited partnership name.6 '
Waverly Press illustrates the proper role of the court in reviewing
an administrative agency's interpretative rules to insure that they
are in accord with the statutes. Waverly Press also demonstrates the
distinction in judicial analysis between interpretative and legislative
53. 312 Md. at 194, 539 A.2d at 229.
54. Id.
55. MD. CoRPs. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-106(b)(2)(i) (1985) (emphasis added).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

312 Md. at 194, 539 A.2d at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193-94, 539 A.2d at 228-29.
Id. at 195, 539 A.2d at 229.
Id. at 194 n.7, 539 A.2d at 228-29 n.7.
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rules.6 2 The court is free to substitute its own judgment when reviewing interpretative rules. Valid legislative rules, however, must
be reviewed with a degree of respect approaching that afforded to
statutes. The courts often will defer to an administrative agency's
particular. expertise and practice as long as it does not conflict with
statutory language or broaden the scope of the agency's power beyond the statutory delegation of authority.63
2. Jurisdiction.-In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Television Association"4 the Court of
Appeals considered whether the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) has the authority to regulate pole attachment agreements.6 5 Pole attachment agreements are leases negotiated
66
between cable television (TV) companies and utility companies.
Cable TV lines generally are attached to existing utility poles pursuant to these agreements. 7
In a 1978 effort to assure regulation of all pole attachment
agreements, 68 Congress enacted title 47, section 224 of the United
States Code,6 9 which provides for regulation by the Federal Com62. See K. DAVIS, supra note 40, § 7.8, at 36 ("A legislative rule is the product of an
exercise of delegated legislative power to make law through rules. An interpretative rule
is any rule an agency issues without exercising delegated legislative power."). Accord
Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 60, 492 A.2d
281, 289 (1985) ("The rule here was adopted pursuant to statutory authority. It has the
force and effect of law.").
63. See generally Howard County v. Davidsonville Civic Ass'n, 72 Md. App. 19, 34-35,
527 A.2d 772, 779 (1987) ("A reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the [administrative] agency."). For an in-depth analysis of Howard
County, see infra notes 116-166 and accompanying text. See also Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. of Md. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Television Ass'n, 310 Md. 553, 561, 530
A.2d 734, 738 (1987) (invalidating administrative agency's regulations where the agency
sought to broaden its scope of power without specific legislative authority). For an indepth analysis of Maryland/DelawareCable, see infra notes 64-115 and accompanying text.
64. 310 Md. 553, 530 A.2d 734 (1987).
65. Id. at 556, 530 A.2d at 735.
66. Id., 530 A.2d at 735-36.
67. Id. Cable television (TV) companies provide programming to their subscribers
by running coaxial cables from the company's transmission centers to their subscribers'
TV sets. Cable TV lines are attached to existing utility poles for practical, economic,
and aesthetic reasons. Id.
68. Id. Congress determined that regulation of pole attachment agreements was
necessary to ensure that cable TV companies would be permitted to attach their lines to
utility poles owned by utility companies. S. REP. No. 580, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 13-14,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN, NEws 109, 123.
69. "'The [Federal Communications] Commission shall regulate the rates, terms,
and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions
are just and reasonable ...." 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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70
munications Commission (FCC) in the absence of state regulation.
In June 1985 the PSC attempted to assert jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements by promulgating regulations to govern
them. 7 ' The PSC then certified to the FCC, pursuant to section

224(c),

72

that the PSC regulated the rates, terms, and conditions of

pole attachment agreements in Maryland. 7- The certification also
stated that the PSC had the authority to consider,
and would con74
sider, the interests of the cable TV subscribers.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the Maryland/Delaware Cable Television Association, Inc. (the Association)
brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of
the PSC's promulgation of pole attachment regulations. 75 The Association's complaint alleged that promulgation of the regulations
was beyond the statutory powers of the PSC and therefore did not
satisfy the FCC's requirements 76 for preempting federal jurisdiction. 77 The PSC answered by stating that article 78, section 56,
gave the PSC statutory authority to regulate pole attachment
agreements. 7 8
The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Association on two independent grounds. 79 First, the court concluded that
70. 310 Md. at 556-57, 530 A.2d at 736.
71. Id. The regulations had the following purpose: "[T]o provide for the regulation
of the rates, terms, and conditions for cable television use of existing electric or tele-

phone company rights-of-way, including the use of existing utility poles, in accordance
with Maryland law, federal law and, to the extent applicable, Federal Communications
Commission rules and regulations." MD.REGs. CODE tit. 20, § 20.51.01.01 (1985).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Each State which regulates the rates . . .for pole attachments shall
certify to the [Federal Communications] Commission that(A) it regulates such rates ....
(3) ... [A] State shall not be considered to regulate the rates ... for pole
attachments(A) unless the State has issued and made effective rules and regulations implementing the State's regulatory authority over pole attachments
Id.
73. 310 Md. at 557-58, 530 A.2d at 736-37.
74. Id. at 558, 530 A.2d at 737.
75. Id. at 558-59, 530 A.2d at 737.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
77. 310 Md. at 558-59, 530 A.2d at 737.
78. Id. at 559, 530 A.2d at 737. "The [Public Service] Commission shall supervise
and regulate all public service companies subject to its jurisdiction to assure their operation in the interest of the public and to promote ... economical, and efficient delivery of
utility services ... giving consideration to the public safety ....- MD. ANN. CODE art. 78,
§ 56 (1988).
79. 310 Md. at 559, 530 A.2d at 737.
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the PSC did not have the statutory power to regulate the rates,
terms, and conditions of pole attachment agreements.8 0 Second,
the court found that the PSC did not have the statutory power to
consider the interests of cable TV subscribers as required by title
47.81

The PSC appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but the
Court of Appeals granted certiorari before its consideration. 2 The
Court of Appeals held that the PSC exceeded its power in promulgating regulations which governed rates set in pole attachment
agreements and in certifying to the FCC that it had the authority to
regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of these agreements.8 "
Initially, the Court of Appeals observed that the PSC is a legislatively created body and, as such, its powers are limited to those
expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by statute. 4 Both parties
agreed that the PSC statute did not grant the PSC the direct authority to regulate cable TV companies nor did it give the PSC express
power to regulate pole attachment agreements.8 5 The PSC argued,
however, that article. 78, sections 56 and 68(a), gave it implicit
power to regulate pole attachment agreements.8 6
The PSC asserted, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the
PSC was empowered by section 56 to regulate the use of utility
poles to ensure reliable service and to protect the public safety. 7
The court concluded, however, that section 56 does not give the
PSC authority to promulgate regulations that govern pole attachment agreements, which affect neither service nor public safety.8 8
The court stated that it "fail[ed] to understand how the regulation
of rates of pole attachment agreements is necessary to ensure safe
and reliable utility service to the public."8 9 The court explained
that the regulations lacked a relation to the power granted to the
PSC under section 56 to promote "efficient delivery of utility services, public safety, and the preservation of environmental quality." 90
80. id.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 560, 530 A.2d at 737. See also Albert v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 209 Md. 27,
34, 120 A.2d 346, 349 (1956) ("it is ... well settled.. . that the [PSC] ... has only such

powers as have been specifically given it by the Legislature.").
85. 310 Md. at 560, 530 A.2d at 737.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 560-61, 530 A.2d at 738.
88. Id. at 561, 530 A.2d at 738.
89. Id.

90. Id.
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The court concluded, therefore, that section 56 did not authorize
the PSC to promulgate regulations governing the rates, terms, and
conditions in pole attachment agreements. 9 '
The Court of Appeals also rejected the PSC's contention that
article 78, section 68(a), empowered the PSC to regulate pole attachment agreements.92 The PSC argued that the rental of pole

space for cable TV wires is a public utility service and that a utility
company's practice of leasing pole space would affect the charges
assessed against the utility company's customers.9 3 Therefore, the
PSC believed it could regulate the rates charged for public utility
services under section 68(a). 94 The court characterized PSC's inter95
pretation of section 68(a) as being overly broad and expansive.
Relying on Public Service Commission v. Philadelphia, Baltimore &
Washington Railroad9 6 the court declared that the rental of pole space
for cable TV wires is not a public utility service over which the PSC
has ratemaking authority under section 68(a). 9 7 The court found
that public utility services are limited to those services that a utility
company provides under a franchise granted by the State to the utility company. 98 For example, "[e]lectric companies have franchises
to produce and deliver electricity [and] the telephone company has
a franchise to provide telephonic services." 99 The court explained
91. Id.
92. Id. at 562-63, 530 A.2d at 739. Section 68(a) provides in relevant part: "The
[Public Service] Commission shall have the power to determine just and reasonable
rates of public service companies .... MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 68(a) (1988).
93. 310 Md. at 561-62, 530 A.2d at 738.
94. id.
95. Id. at 562, 530 A.2d at 738.
96. 155 Md. 104, 141 A. 509 (1928). In resolving a conflict as to the powers, functions, and duties of the PSC, the Philadelphia court stated:
The welfare, safety, and convenience of the public depend[s] so closely upon
the fair and efficient administration of corporations engaged in furnishing transportation, light, power, water, sewage, and other sanitary facilities to the public, that it
became necessary to devise some agency by which they could be supervised and
controlled ... in the use of the privileges granted to them by the State, so as to insure
the highest quality of service ....
Id. at 115, 141 A. at 514 (emphasis added).
97. 310 Md. at 563, 530 A.2d at 739. Accord American Cable Television, Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co.. 143 Ariz. 273, 278, 693 P.2d 928, 933 (1983) ("We believe that the
clear purpose of [the Arizona Public Service Law) is to enable the Commission to review
for fairness the rates a public utility charges its customers for public utility ....However, we do not find that pole attachment licenses granted by a [utility company] are
public utility services."); Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
427 N.E.2d 1100, 1108-1i (Ind.App. 1981) (rental of excess pole space by utility company not a "service" that may be regulated by state public service commission).
98. 310 Md. at 562, 530 A.2d at 739.
99. Id.
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that the PSC must regulate services to protect the public where
those services are a primary function of the public utility company. 0 0 "Providing excess pole space . . .is not a 'public utility

service.' "'0 ' As a result, section 68(a) did not provide the PSC with
ratemaking authority over "ancillary or miscellaneous business activities" that are unrelated to the primary function of a public utility
company, namely, the "franchise right and duty to provide utility
service."' 0o
Finally, the Court of Appeals considered whether a second
source in section 68(a) provided the PSC the authority to promulgate regulations governing the rates charged in pole attachment
agreements. 10 3 Section 68(a) authorizes the PSC to determine tht
rates charged by public service companies and article 78, section
2(q),' 0 4 defines rates as, inter alia, the "practice of any public service
company affecting the amounts of such charges."' °5 Consequently,
the PSC contended that the practice of leasing pole space for cable
TV wires would affect the rates charged by the public utility companies if the pole attachment agreement price were less than the
amount of the "cost and maintenance" of the pole itself.'0 6 The
PSC explained that this scenario would increase rates charged to the
public utility company's utility customers.' 0 7 The court reiterated
its view that the PSC's statutory interpretation was too expansive.'0 8
Relying on Public Service Commission v. Sun Cab Co.,' ° the court explained that "the leasing of excess pole space for cable television
line attachments is not a 'practice' that may be regulated by the
PSC.""' The Sun Cab court defined "practice" and concluded that
its interpretation, as it related to the PSC, was limited to the public
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 562-63, 530 A.2d at 739.
Id. at 563, 530 A.2d at 739.
Id.
Id. at 564, 530 A.2d at 739.

104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 2(q) (1988). Section 2(q) defines rates as "tolls, fares,
tariffs, prices, and any other charges for public utility services . ..and any ... practice of

any public service company affecting the amount of such charges ...

Id.

105. Id.
106. 310 Md. at 564, 530 A.2d at 740.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 160 Md. 476, 154 A. 100 (1931). The Sun Cab court stated that 'practices' is
defined in the Oxford Dictionary as '... . something done constantly or usually ....'" Id.
at 482, 154 A. at 103. The Sun Cab court noted that it could not infer from the term
"practice" that the practices of a public utility company "have to do with anything except its physical operations which have been . . .customary and usual." Id.
110. 310 Md. at 565, 530 A.2d at 740.
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utility company's customary and usual physical operations."' Thus,
the Maryland/Delaware Cable court concluded: "Granting pole attachment rights is unrelated to the customary and usual physical operations of a utility plant."' 12
The PSC cited several cases from other states that had considered whether the public service commissions in their jurisdictions
had the authority to regulate pole attachment agreements., 3 The
Court of Appeals did not find these cases persuasive because each
was resolved by statutory interpretation.' 14 Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals held that the PSC had exceeded its power in promulgating regulations governing the rates, terms, and conditions in pole
attachment agreements and in certifying to the FCC that it had jurisdiction to govern pole attachment agreements." 5
Maryland/DelawareCable illustrates the proposition that administrative agencies may not promulgate regulations that go beyond the
agency's delegated authority. The Court of Appeals has the power
to substitute its own judgment on all questions of statutory interpretation and correctly held that the PSC's interpretation of its authority was too broad.
3. JudicialReview.-The Court of Special Appeals held in Howard County v. Davidsonville Civic Association 116 that there was substan-

11. Sun Cab, 160 Md. at 482, 154 A. at 103.
112. 310 Md. at 565, 530 A.2d at 740.
113. Id., 530 A.2d at 740.
114. Id. at 566, 530 A.2d at 740-4 1. Four state courts have declared their state public
service commissions lacked jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements under federal
and state law. See American Cable Television, Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 143 Ariz.
273, 279, 693 P.2d 928, 934 (1983); Teleprompter Corp. v. Hawkins, 384 So. 2d 648,
650 (Fla. 1980); Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 427
N.E.2d 1100, 1112 (Ind. App. 1981); In re New England Cable Television Ass'n, 126
N.H. 149, 153, 489 A.2d 124, 127 (1985). Seven state courts have affirmed thejurisdiction over pole attachment agreements by their state public service commissions. See
Cable Television Co. of Illinois v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 82 111. App. 3d 814, 820,
403 N.E.2d 287, 290 (1980); Kentucky CATV Ass'n v. Volz, 675 S.W.2d 393, 396-97
(Ky. App. 1983); Louisiana Cablevision %,.Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 493 So. 2d
555, 558-59 (La. 1986); Consumers Power Co. v. Telesystems, Inc., 96 Mich. App. I,45, 292 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1980); Las Cruces TV Cable v. New Mexico Corp. Comm'n,
102 N.M. 720, 722-23, 699 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (1985); General Tel. Co. of Upstate New
York, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 63 A.D.2d 93, 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (1978);
Utah Cable Television Operators Ass'n, Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398, 402
(Utah 1982).
115. 310 Md. at 566, 530 A.2d at 741. After resolving the issue of whether the PSC
had jurisdiction to promulgate regulations governing pole attachment agreements, the
court deemed it unnecessary to consider the circuit court's holding that the PSC lacked
the power to consider the interests of cable TV' subscribers. Id.
116. 72 Md. App. 19, 527 A.2d 772, cert.
denied, 310 Md. 129, 527 A.2d 50 (1987).
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tial evidence to support the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene's (DHMH) grant of the Little Patuxent Wastewater Treatment Plant's (Little Patuxent Plant's) discharge permit."17 The
court, therefore, reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for Calvert County, which held that DHMH acted arbitrarily in granting the
permit."' 8 The court found that the circuit court improperly substituted its judgment for that of DHMH and incorrectly remanded the
case for consideration of new evidence."1 9
On December 16, 1981, Howard County submitted an application to DHMH to renew its wastewater discharge permit pursuant to
the Environment Article, section 9-324."0 ° DHMH prepared a draft
permit for the Little Patuxent Plant that set forth effluent limitations
meeting state laws and regulations and based on reports prepared
by Howard County, the State, and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).1 2 ' The proposed permit also met federal
requirements for publicly owned treatment facilities' 2 2 and required
additional phosphorus treatment in an attempt to abate pollution
23
problems in the Little Patuxent River basin.
DHMH solicited comments from the EPA, the United States
Army Corps of Engineers, and the public on the proposed permit.'

24

Citizen groups-the Potomac River Association, Inc. and the

Davidsonville Area Civic Association, Inc.-from St. Mary's and
117. Id. at 50, 527 A.2d at 787.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 30, 527 A.2d at 777. According to the Environment Article, §§ 9-322 to
-324, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) must issue a discharge
permit before a facility may operate if its operation could increase the discharge of pollutants into the waters of Maryland. MD. ENvr. CODE ANN. §§ 9-322 to -324 (1987)
(replacing MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 9-322 to -324 (1982)).
121. 72 Md. App. at 30, 527 A.2d at 777. Effluent standards specify the levels of
certain pollutants that may be discharged into Maryland waters. See Mo. ENv-r. CODE
ANN. § 9-314(b)(2) (1987). Due to the decreased water quality of the Patuxent River
basin, the State and the EPA sponsored a study regarding nutrient reduction in order to
slow algal growth in the lower estuarine portion of the river. 72 Md. App. at 26-27, 527
A.2d at 775-76. The results of this study, as well as the county sewer and water plan,
were reviewed by DHMH in preparing the draft permit. Id. at 30, 527 A.2d at 777.
122. 72 Md. App. at 30, 527 A.2d at 777. Section 9-314(c) requires that effluent standards established under this section be at least as stringent as those specified by federal
statute. MD. ENVT. CODE ANN. § 9-314(c) (1987). In addition, wastewater from publicly
owned wastewater treatment facilities, such as the Little Patuxent Wastewater Treatment
Plant (Little Patuxent Plant), require "secondary treatment." See MD. RECS. CODE tit.
10, § 10.50.01.08J(3)(a) (1985).
123. 72 Md. App at 30, 527 A.2d at 777.
124. Id. In addition to soliciting comments, DHMH distributed a fact sheet and a
notice of public hearing to all interested parties, pursuant to MD. ENVT. CODE ANN. § 9324(b), (d) (1987).
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Anne Arundel Counties, respectively, requested an adjudicatory
hearing. 2 5 These groups did not quarrel with the limits established
in the permit for the fresh water and upper estuarine portions of the
river, but rather contended that advanced nitrogen removal also was
needed to prevent the wastewater treatment plant's effluent from
adversely
affecting the lower estuary portion of the Patuxent
26
River. 1
The water quality of the Patuxent River has deteriorated over
the years, and studies have determined that phosphorus and nitrogen removal treatments can reduce the pollutant load in the river
basin.' 2 r At the adjudicatory hearing, the citizen groups attempted
to demonstrate the need for a more restrictive permit that corresponded to the findings of these studies.' 28 The hearing examiner,
however, found that the evidence did not establish with reasonable
certainty that nitrogen removal would have a positive effect on the
lower estuary portion of the Patuxent River.' 2 9 Accordingly, the
hearing examiner recommended that the permit be issued as proposed, and DHMH ratified the decision.' 30 The citizen groups appealed to the Circuit Court for Calvert County where DHMH's
decision was reversed and remanded for consideration of new information.' 3 ' Howard County then appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals.
At the outset, the Court of Special Appeals clarified the standard of review of administrative agency decisions.1 3 2 In Mayor &
Aldermen v. Annapolis Waterfront Co. '" the Court of Appeals stated
125. 72 Md. App. at 30, 527 A.2d at 777. The citizen groups requested that specific

nitrogen limits be included in the permit in order to decrease algal growth in the river.
Id.
126. Id. at 30-31, 527 A.2d at 777. After the State/EPA study was completed, DHMH
held a three-day meeting for interested parties. The meeting concluded by recommending that both nitrogen and phosphorus removal be implemented in order to reduce the pollutant load in the river. Id. at 28, 527 A.2d at 776.
127. Id. at 28, 527 A.2d at 776.
128. Id. at 30, 527 A.2d at 777.
129. Id. at 31, 527 A.2d at 777-78.
130. Id.
131. Id., 527 A.2d at 778.
132. Id. at 34, 527 A.2d at 779. Before the court began its discussion of the issues, it
set forth its reasons for refusing to consider the citizen groups' brief and for prohibiting
the appellees from participating in oral argument. The citizen groups had moved to
extend the deadline for submitting briefs, but the court denied the motion. Despite the
order, the citizen groups filed their brief substantially past the deadline. Howard
County moved that the brief be struck, and the court granted the motion. As a result,
the Court of Special Appeals examined only Howard County's brief when reaching its
decision in this case. Id. at 31-34, 527 A.2d at 778-79.
133. 284 Md. 383, 396 A.2d 1080 (1979).
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that judicial review of administrative board decisions was narrow in
scope due to the "recognized expertise of the board in the particular. field of concern."' 3 4 In Howard County the court relied primarily
on the recent decision in Citizensfor Rewastico Creek v. Commissioners of
Hebron'S where DHMH's issuance of a sewage treatment plant's
discharge permit was upheld.-3 6 The Rewastico court stated: "In this
appeal we must apply the very limited standard of review applicable
to the decisions of administrative agencies. Cognizance must be
taken of the agency's expertise and the administrative decision
therefore carries a presumption of correctness."'' 3 7 Limited judicial
review of agency decisions is clearly the law of the state; Rewastico
demonstrates the application of this rule in environmental cases. 138
The court proceeded to examine the administrative record to
determine whether there was substantial evidence to support
DHMH's decision.tS9 Due to the narrow scope of review, the circuit
court would have been correct in reversing DHMH's decision only if
"reasoning minds" could not reasonably have reached the agency's
conclusion. 4 ' The Court of Special Appeals held that, contrary to
this test, the circuit court merely substituted its judgment for that of
the agency. 14' In Eger v. Stone"'4 the Court of Appeals stated: "We
have made it quite clear that if the issue before the administrative
body is 'fairly debatable'. . . the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the administrative body ....
134. Id. at 395, 396 A.2d at 1087.
135. 67 Md. App. 466, 508 A.2d 493 (1986).
136. Id. at 470, 508 A.2d at 495.
137. Id.
138. Environmentalists have argued that courts should use a "hard look" approach, as
opposed to the substantial evidence test, when reviewing agency environmental decisions. This standard would require agencies to keep a complete evidentiary record demonstrating that "adequate consideration" was given to the analyses submitted by all
parties. Although the court would not make the final decision, it would insist that the
agency take a "hard look" at all relevant factors; the decisionmaking process would be
the focus. The agency would have the discretion to choose among the alternatives, but
the alternative chosen would not have to be outrageous in order to be reversed. See
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509,
511-15 (1974).
139. 72 Md. App. at 40, 527 A.2d at 782.
140. See Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 43, 506 A.2d 263, 265
(1986) (scope of judicial review of administrative agencies is well settled in Maryland;
the agency's decision has a presumption of correctness). Accord State Comm'n on
Human Relations v. Washington County Community Action Council. Inc., 59 Md. App.
451, 455, 476 A.2d 222, 223 (1984).
141. 72 Md. App. at 40, 527 A.2d at 782.
142. 253 Md. 533, 253 A.2d 372 (1969).
143. Id. at 542, 253 A.2d at 377.
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Upon review of the record, the court found substantial evidence
favoring DHMH's issuance of the permit without nitrogen removal
requirements. "I Experts from the State and EPA testified that (1) it
was technically difficult to implement both phosphorus and nitrogen
removal at the same time, (2) removing nitrogen might stimulate
growth of nitrogen-fixing algae, (3) there was disagreement and uncertainty in the scientific community about the most effective control of algal growth, and (4) there was no scientific evidence that
nitrogen discharged many miles upstream would have a significant
impact on the lower estuary.' 4 5 Although the citizen groups also
presented experts, the evidence presented by Howard County was
more than sufficient to allow DHMH's decision to stand. 1 46 The issue of nitrogen removal was, according to the court, at the very least
debatable. 4' 7
The circuit court held that sections 9-101, 9-302, and 9-314 of
the Environment Article 48 required that, if nitrogen was suspected
of having an adverse effect on downstream water quality, then advanced nitrogen removal was required. ' 49 The Court of Special Appeals held, however, that nothing in these sections required
nitrogen treatment; furthermore, the statute neither required that
effluent standards be adopted for every discharge nor that every
possible control be utilized to abate pollution.' 5 °
Although the court was correct in finding that the evidence
before DHMH was debatable, and that the circuit court substituted
its judgment for that of DHMH, a review of the statute does provide
support for the circuit court's position. Section 9-302 states that the
purpose of the subtitle is to establish effective remedies to prevent
water pollution.' 5 ' Sections 9-302(b)(3) and (4) specifically provide
that it is the policy of the State:
(3)

.

.

. that no waste is discharged into the waters of

this State without first receiving necessary treatment or
other corrective action to protect the legitimate beneficial
uses of the waters of this State; and
144. 72 Md. App. at 39, 527 A.2d at 782.
145. Id. at 36-38, 527 A.2d at 780-81.
146. Id. at 40, 527 A.2d at 782.
147. Id. at 43, 527 A.2d at 783.
148. MD. ENVT. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101, -302, -314 (1987).
149. 72 Md. App. at 41, 527 A.2d at 782.
150. Id. at 41-42, 527 A.2d at 783.
151. MD. ENvr. CODE ANN. § 9-302(a) (1987). "The purpose of this subtitle is to establish effective programs and to provide additional and cumulative remedies to prevent, abate, and control pollution of the waters of the State." Id.
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(4) Through innovative and alternative methods of
wastewater treatment, to provide ... prevention
and control of new or existing water pollution.' 5 2
This language could be read as requiring the State to eliminate
excess nitrogen discharges through innovative wastewater treatment
technologies, such as advanced nitrogen removal, in order to protect state waters.
In addition to finding DHMH's decision arbitrary, the circuit
court remanded the case to DHMH to consider additional evidence.'" 3 A court has the authority to remand to an agency to consider additional evidence, pursuant to State Government Article,
section 10-215(e),' 5 4 if it determines that the evidence is material
and good cause existed for its omission at the hearing.' 5 5 Although
the circuit court did declare the new evidence "highly relevant," the
Court of Special Appeals stated that it was clear from the circuit
court's order that no specific finding of materiality of the evidence
or good cause for its omission had been made at the time of the
adjudicatory hearing.1 56
Nonetheless, the Court of Special Appeals refused to remand
the case for such findings.' 5 7 According to the court, a remand
would have been futile and fruitless because the permit under consideration was due to expire shortly; by the time the circuit court
152. d. at (b)(3), (4).
153. 72 Md. App. at 45, 527 A.2d at 785. The evidence under consideration included
a report by the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee (STAC) to the Chesapeake
Bay Program, and two articles in the Environment Reporter (BNA) concerning nitrogen's
impact on the Chesapeake Bay cleanup. Id. See Thomas Announces New Chesapeake Strategy,
May Push Nitrogen Removal for Bay Cleanup, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 257 (June 27,
1986); Maryland Plans Nitrogen Removal Projects: EPA Seeks Answers on Chesapeake Pollution,
17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 407 (July 11, 1986). The STAC report was issued one
and one-half years after the adjudicatory hearing. The report concluded that nitrogen,
as well as phosphorus, played an important role in the Bay's nutrient balance, and
"strategy for water cleanup should focus on reducing nutrient inputs from wastewater
treatment plants." 72 Md. App. at 45 n.25, 527 A.2d at 785 n.25. To summarize, the
articles published in the Environment Reporter stated that the EPA may allow nitrogen
removal processes at municipal treatment plants to be eligible for federal funding. Id. at
46 n.26, 527 A.2d at 785 n. 2 6.
154. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215(e) (1984).
155. Id.
156. 72 Md. App. at 47, 527 A.2d at 786. Black's Law Dictionay defines material evidence as "that quality of evidence which tends to influence the trier of fact because of its
logical connection with the issue." B.AcK's LAw DicTIONARY 881 (5th ed. 1979). Clearly
the STAC report would be material evidence. In Breedon v. Maryland Dep't of Educ.,
45 Md. App. 73, 411 A.2d 1073 (1980), the court stated that any evidence that reasonably may influence a tribunal's decision is material. Id. at 84, 411 A.2d at 1079.
157. 72 Md. App. at 47, 527 A.2d at 786.
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made the appropriate findings and DHMH reviewed the evidence,
"any modification in the decision the agency might make would be
mooted shortly by the expiration of the permit."' 5 8 The court cited
three cases as providing precedent for its refusal to remand.' 5 9 Two
of these cases, however, involved Montgomery County zoning questions in which the remand would have involved the lower courts
simply documenting their findings of fact as required by statute, a
procedural rather than a substantive issue.' 6 0 The third case merely
cited the two zoning cases to restate the same proposition. 6'
In Howard County, however, if the circuit court were allowed to
document the materiality of the new evidence,' 6 2 and then remand
to DHMH for review, DHMH might change its decision. The court
conceded as much when it stated that DHMH certainly would review
the new evidence when evaluating a subsequent permit renewal.' 63
This concession, however, does not ease the harshness of the
decision.
In Howard County the Court of Special Appeals followed established law in holding that judicial review of administrative decisions
is limited, and that based on the evidence before DHMH at the time
of the decision, the circuit court should not have substituted its
judgment for that .ofDHMH.'" The court found that substantial
evidence favored DHMH's decision to exclude nitrogen removal
65
treatment from the sewage treatment plant's discharge permit.'
As a result, the court found that the circuit court exceeded its authority when it.reviewed the evidence and practiced broad statutory
interpretation. 166
The court was unduly harsh, however, in not allowing the circuit court to make its findings regarding the new information.
158. Id. at 48, 527 A.2d at 786.
159. Id.
160. See Hooper v. Mayor & City Council of Gaithersburg, 270 Md. 628, 637-38, 313
A.2d 491, 496 (1974) (the court stated it would not remand because there was no evidence of a sufficient character to affect the decision); Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Council, 258 Md. 27, 40, 264 A.2d 861, 867-68 (1970) (court stated that
ordinarily it would remand to lower court to make the "necessary written findings of
facts and conclusions from the evidence," but that the hearing examiner was clearly
correct in this case).
161. Consumer Protection Div. v. Consumer Publishing Co., 304 Md. 731, 748, 501
A.2d 48, 57 (1985).
162.. See supra note 156.
163. 72 Md. App. at 48, 527 A.2d at 786.
164. Id. at 50, 527 A.2d at 787.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 40-43, 527 A.2d at 782-84. The court elaborated in detail its rejection of
the circuit court's interpretation of the Environment Article sections. See id.
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Although true that the permit would expire soon, a decision regarding nitrogen removal perhaps would allow DHMH to expedite the
permit renewal and more quickly implement nitrogen treatment if
appropriate.
B.

Governmental Functions

1. Sovereign Immunity.-State v. Hogg' 6 7 arose from the 1985
Maryland savings and loan crisis' 6 8 and the State's attempt to reduce its potential obligation for the resulting deficit.' 6 9 The State
incurred this obligation when it assumed the insurance liabilities of
the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation (MSSIC) when
MSSIC merged with the State of Maryland Deposit
Insurance Fund
70
Corporation (MDIF) in response to the crisis.
167. 311 Md. 446, 535 A.2d 923 (1988).
168. Id. at 451, 535 A.2d at 925. An extensive history of the 1985 savings and loan
crisis is presented in MARYLAND EXECUrIVE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL ON
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS (Jan. 1986) (hereinafter PRESTON REPORT].
169. 311 Md. at 452, 535 A.2d at 926.
170. Id. Chapter 6 of the Acts of the First Special Session, approved May 18, 1985,
ch. 6, 1985 Md. Laws 4118, repealed former MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to

-117 (1980), relating to the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation (MSSIC),
and enacted present MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -119 (1980 & Supp. 1988),
which codified statutes relating to the Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund (MDIF). Act of
May 18, 1985, ch. 6, 1985 Md. Laws 4118. In 1962 the General Assembly passed legislation which created MSSIC. Act of Apr. 6, 1962, ch. 131, 1962 Md. Laws 450. Its primary purposes were to promote the elasticity and flexibility of the resources of
members, provide liquidity of members through a central reserve fund, and insure the
savings accounts of members through the creation of a central insurance fund. Id. at
451. Notably, MSSIC was not- given the power to pledge the full faith and credit of
Maryland in any of MSSIC's activities. Id. at 455. On May 13, 1985, $116 million was
withdrawn by depositors when two large associations insured by MSSIC were placed in
conservatorship. 311 Md. at 451, 535 A.2d at 925. During the first three months of
1985, approximately $630 million had been withdrawn from MSSIC insured accounts.
Id. On May 14, 1985, Governor Harry Hughes issued a proclamation declaring a state
of public crisis and emergency and imposed a $1000-per-month limit on depositor withdrawals from MSSIC institutions. PRESTON REPORT, supra note 168, at 452. At that time,
a consensus had been reached that the State should not declare a bank holiday, but
should hold harmless all depositors in MSSIC associations. Id. at 453. Legislation to
accomplish this followed at a special session of the General Assembly which commenced
on May 17, 1985. Id. At the same session, the General Assembly statutorily merged
MSSIC with MDIF, which resulted in MDIF assuming all the rights and responsibilities
formerly held by MSSIC. 311 Md. at 451-52, 535 A.2d at 925. As a result, the State
incurred a potential obligation of $172.4 million by assuming MSSIC's insurance liabilities. Id. at 452, 535 A.2d at 926. Act of May 18, 1985, ch. 6, § 4, 1985 Md. Laws 4118,
uncodified § 4 states in pertinent part: "[A]ll of the assets ... [and] all of the liabilities,
including . . . insurance liabilities . . . of '[MSSICI' are hereby transferred to [MDIF]'
.... " Id. at 4127. MSSIC had previously insured I I savings and loan associations which
had a combined assets/liability deficit of over $400 million. 311 Md. at 452, 535 A.2d at

804

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:785

As of January 1986 eleven savings and loan associations previously insured by MSSIC were in receivership, conservatorship, or
were subject to withdrawal limits.' 7 ' The combined assets/liability
deficit of these associations, credited with the MSSIC insurance fund
and money from one recovery, created a potential state obligation
of $172.4 million. 172 In an effort to reduce the State's liability MDIF
brought suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against
twenty-six former directors and officers of MSSIC, alleging that the
directors negligently breached duties they owed to MSSIC and that
MSSIC's rights arising from the violations were acquired by MDIF
when MSSIC merged with MDIF. t7 s MDIF's first amended complaint specifically alleged that the directors failed to utilize their
power and positions to correct unsafe and unsound practices of
74
MSSIC associations. 1

The directors subsequently filed a counterclaim naming the
Maryland Department of Licensing and Regulation (DLR),' 7 5 MDIF,
and the State of Maryland as counterdefendants."16 The counterclaim alleged that DLR negligently breached a "duty to obtain all
material information about MSSIC's member associations and to
share with MSSIC all [of this] material information ..... '7 The
counterclaim further alleged that DLR "[b]y virtue of its regular
practice of transmitting information to MSSIC . . .about MSSIC's

member associations assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care
to obtain and transmit to MSSIC all material information about
MSSIC's members."' 7 8 Essentially, the counterclaim alleged that
the DLR's negligence was a concurrent proximate cause of the harm
79
to MSSIC that was the subject of MDIF's claim.1
926. The State's potential obligation for the $172.4 million deficit was ascertained by
crediting MSSIC's insurance fund and $60 million from an unrelated recovery against
the $400 million deficit. Id.
171. 311 Md. at 452, 535 A.2d at 926.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 452-53, 535 A.2d at 926.
175. MDIF is a unit of the Department of Licensing and Regulation (DLR). Id. at 450,
535 A.2d at 925.
176. Id. at 453, 535 A.2d at 926.
177. Id.
178. Id. In their counterclaim the directors also requested indemnification on the basis that the alleged negligent breach of the asserted duties was primary and active, or in
the alternative, contribution if the counterdefendants were adjudged liable for the harm
to MSSIC alleged in the complaint. Id. In light of the request for contribution and
indemnification, the court questioned, but did not decide, whether contributory negligence could bar the State's claim. Id. at 454-55 & n.6, 535 A.2d at 926-27 & n.6.
179. Id. at 453-54, 535 A.2d at 926.

1989]

STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

805

The DLR, the State, and MDIF moved to dismiss the counterclaim, claiming sovereign immunity 8 0 as a bar to the counterclaim
against the State and its agents.' 8 The circuit court found that the
counterclaim was defensive, "in the nature of recoupment," and as
such would not bar the counterclaim.' 8 2 The circuit court also held
that the State was the real party in interest with respect to MDIF's
claim; it refused to dismiss the State and MDIF, but did order DLR
dismissed.'8 3
The State and MDIF appealed the circuit court's order and a
petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the Court of Special Appeals. 8 4 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.' 8 5
The State and MDIF argued that the circuit court's order was
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.' 8 6 The requirements of the collateral order doctrine are: "[Tihe order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important
issue, be completely separate from the merits of the action, and be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."' 8 7 The
Court of Appeals found that the circuit court conclusively determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the directors' counterclaim, thus deciding an important issue.' 8 8 Further, the court
concluded that the sovereign immunity issue was completely separate from the issue of whether the State and MDIF or the directors
89
were negligent or breached any fiduciary duties.
The court then found that the circuit court's denial of the
State's motion to dismiss the counterclaim would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment because the doctrine of sovereign
immunity protects the State from standing trial.' 90 This protection
180. Id. at 454, 535 A.2d at 926-27. The statutes relating to sovereign immunity were
most recently codified at MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -110 (1985 & Supp.

1988). Seegenerally Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 33033, 260 A.2d 295, 297-99 (1970) (discussing history of doctrine of sovereign immunity).
181. 311 Md. at 454, 535 A.2d at 926-27.
182. Id., 535 A.2d at 927. See generally Lee v. Rutledge, 51 Md. 311, 318 (1879) ("Recoupment is a species of common law set-off for damages due the defendant, growing
out of the same transaction. It has been allowed in [Maryland] to . . . avoid circuitry of
action.").
183. 311 Md. at 454, 535 A.2d at 927.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 454-55, 535 A.2d at 927.
186. Id. at 455, 535 A.2d at 927.
187. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
188. 311 Md. at 455, 535 A.2d at 927.
189. Id.
190. Id. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) ("The entitlement is an
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would be lost if the State were forced to stand trial and later appeal
the circuit court's order. Consequently, the court concluded that
the collateral order doctrine permitted immediate review to determine whether the circuit court's denial of the motion to dismiss the
counterclaim impermissibly deprived the State and MDIF of sovereign immunity protection.''
The Court of Appeals then turned to an analysis of the directors' counterclaim.' 9 2 The court emphasized that the term "counterclaim" is not the controlling factor when considering whether to
dismiss a claim against the State.' 9 3 The court stated that "[o]ne
must analyze the issues raised by the directors' counterclaim to determine if it is effectively a suit against the sovereign rather than a
matter of defense."' 94 The court noted that the counterclaim did
not claim monetary relief in excess of that which would be awarded
to MDIF.' 95 The directors contended that if the-State initiates an
action for monetary damages, then the State consents to a reduction
of its claim for any amount payable to them which arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence sued upon, whether the State has
waived its immunity or not. 196 The court agreed with this argument
and stated: "This principle, which we shall call 'recoupment,' does
97
not offend Maryland's sovereign immunity."'1
Relying on State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,198 the Hogg
court declared that, absent a statutory waiver, recoupment could be
used as a defense against a State claim.' 9 9 In Baltimore & Ohio the
court considered whether a special plea of setoff could withstand the
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ... and it is effectively lost, if a
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." (emphasis in original)).
191. 311 Md. at 457, 535 A.2d at 928. Cf. Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472, 540 A.2d
805 (1988) (per curiam). The Bunting court stated that issues that are effectively unreviewable should be limited to double jeopardy claims and a very few other extraordinary
situations. Id. at 481, 540 A.2d at 809. It explained that to expand the collateral order
doctrine would be contrary to the court's "long-established and sound public policy
against piecemeal appeals." Id. at 482, 540 A.2d at 809. The court further stated that
the decision in Hogg was consistent with this policy because of the context of the case
before the court. Id. at 482 n.9, 540 A.2d at 809 n.9. Judge Eldridge asserted, however,
-that the court's narrow approach in Bunting could not be reconciled with the broad view
of sovereign immunity in Hogg and stated that Hogg should be overruled. Id. at 482, 540
A.2d at 809 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
192. 311 Md. at 457, 535 A.2d at 928.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 34 Md. 344 (1871).
199. 311 Md. at 458, 535 A.2d at 928.
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State's demurrer. 200 The court rejected the plea of setoff on the
basis of sovereign immunity and reasoned:
This immunity belongs to the State by reason of her prerogative as a sovereign, and on grounds of public policy.
Parties having claims or demands against [the State], must
present them through . . . the Legislature ... and cannot
assert them by suit in the Courts. For the same reason a
right of set-off against the State does not exist. This is in
the nature of a cross-suit ... and it does not exist where the
subject matter of the set-off could not form the ground of
an independent suit. It is a remedy conferred by statutes,
which do not [expressly] apply to the State ....
The Baltimore & Ohio court also stated that the plea of setoff could
not be construed as a basis for recoupment because "the alleged
cross-claim does not arise . . . out of the contract or transaction
which constitutes the cause of action ....The Hogg court noted
that although the recoupment defense had not been expressly accepted by the court, it was implicitly declared in Baltimore & Ohio.2 0 3
The Hogg court stated that this implication has been supported
by several commentators on Maryland common-law pleading.2 °4
The commentators agree that Baltimore & Ohio supports the proposition that defendants alleging a plea of setoff must have the ability to
bring the claim as if it were an independent claim which they could
sue for and recover on in a court of law. Accordingly, if the setoff
has the nature of a claim which could be sued upon, then it could
not be alleged against the State because the State cannot be sued. 0 5
The commentators further agree that setoff differs from recoupment
because recoupment arises out of the same transaction upon which
the plaintiff bases a claim, and its purpose is to reduce the plaintiff's
demand for monetary damages.2 0 Combining the commentators'
propositions with its own analysis of the directors' counterclaim,2 °7
the Hogg court reasoned: "The clear implication of [Baltimore &
Ohio's] reasoning is that, had the defense been one of recoupment,
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Baltimore & Ohio, 34 Md. at 344.
Id. at 374.
Id.
311 Md. at 459, 535 A.2d at 929.
Id.
Id. See A. FISHER, ESSENTIALS OF MARYLAND PLEADING 64 (2d ed. 1922); J. POE,
PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 613, at 641 (5th ed. 1925).
206. 311 Md. at 459, 535 A.2d at 929. See A. FISHER, supra note 205, at 63; H. GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, PLEADING AT LAW IN MARYLAND 122-23 (2d ed. 1937);J. POE, supra

note 205, § 615, at 643.
207. See supra notes 192-197 and accompanying text.
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sovereign immunity would not have prevented the defendant from
asserting it." 2 ° In short, the plea of setoff cannot be alleged against
the State because it is immune from suit; yet recoupment, unlike
setoff, is a claim raised as a defense against the State's claim and as
such is not barred by the State's sovereign immunity.
The Court of Appeals rejected the State's contention that D.E.
Foote & Co. v. Stanley2 °9 demonstrated that sovereign immunity in
Maryland precludes recoupment.2 10 In Foote the court considered
whether the plaintiffs could recover payments made under an invalid statute to offset related claims asserted by the State. 2 '' The Foote
court stated: "The claim . . . to set off, or recoup, against the
amount claimed by the State . . . can not be allowed, not being
provided for by any statute. To allow such a claim would infringe
upon the immunity of the State from suit in its own Courts.1 2 , 2 The
Hogg court observed that Foote involved the attempted recovery of
voluntary payments, which are not recoverable under Maryland
common law. 21 3 "[T]o the extent that D.E. Foote &Co. ... employed
a sovereign immunity rationale to reject recoupment .
2 14

.

.

it is

disapproved. 1
The Court of Appeals in Hogg noted that recoupment against
the State was allowed by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland in Maryland PortAdministration v. SS American Leg-

end. 2 5 The court also pointed out that the principle of allowing recoupment in defense of a sovereign's claim, without regard to any
208. 311 Md. at 459, 535 A.2d at 929.
209. 117 Md. 335,82 A. 380 (1911).
210. 311 Md. at 461, 535 A.2d at 930.
211. Foote, 117 Md. at 335, 82 A. at 380.
212. Id. at 337, 82 A. at 384.
213. 311 Md. at 460, 535 A.2d at 930. See Rapley v. Montgomery County, 261 Md. 98,
110-11, 274 A.2d 124, 130 (1971) ("[T]he common law ... precludes the recovery of
taxes paid voluntarily under a mistake of law ... even if the statute under which the tax
is paid is later determined to be unconstitutional or invalid. The only possible escape
from this harsh rule is found in the case where the taxing statute itself provides for a
refund.").
214. 311 Md. at 460-61, 535 A.2d at 930. See generally Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n v. C.I. Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. 544, 495 A.2d 30 (1985) (listing Maryland
voluntary payment cases since 1846).
215. 453 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md. 1978). The Maryland Port Administration (MPA), a
state agency, filed a suit in admiralty for property damage against several defendants. Id.
at 586. The defendants then filed counterclaims against the State. d. MPA moved for
summary judgment claiming that the defendants' counterclaims were barred by the
state's sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment. Id. at 587. Judge Harvey denied MPA's motion for summary judgment and reasoned that, when a state files suit as a
plaintiff, it waives its sovereign immunity and eleventh amendment protection to claims
against the state that arise out of the subject matter of the state's suit. Id. at 590. Judge
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statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, is recognized when the
United States is a plaintiff asserting a claim in federal court.2" 6 Finally, the court observed that recoupment is allowed in defense of a
2 7
sovereign's claim in jurisdictions other than Maryland.
First, the State argued that the opinions from other jurisdictions were inapposite with respect to Maryland's sovereign immunity. 21 8 The State maintained that its sovereign immunity was
repealed by the Acts of 1786219 and then reinstated by the Acts of
1820.220 The Court of Appeals often has cited the legislative history
as support that any abrogation of sovereign immunity must be pursued through the General Assembly and not in the courts.2 2 1 The
State contended that this history requires a statutory waiver of immunity before recoupment can be asserted in defense against the

Harvey noted that this waiver is limited to counterclaims asserted defensively which reduce a state's recovery, such as a counterclaim for recoupment. Id.
216. 311 Md. at 461, 535 A.2d at 930. The court stated that Bull v. United States, 295
U.S. 247 (1935), illustrated the rationale of the federal cases. 311 Md. at 462, 535 A.2d
at 930. In Bull the Supreme Court stated that when the United States brings an action
for monetary damages against a defendant who has a claim against the United States,
and the defendant's claim can be set up as a defense to the United States' claim, then
both claims can be heard by the courts of the United States. Bull, 295 U.S. at 262.
Relying on United States v. Ringgold, 26 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150 (1834), the Bull Court reasoned: " 'This is because recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some
feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded. Such a defense
is never barred by the statute of limitations so long as the main action itself is timely.'
Bull, 295 U.S. at 262 (quoting Ringgold, 26 U.S. at 163-64).
217. 311 Md. at 463, 535 A.2d at 931. The court noted that the earliest state case to
allow recoupment in defense of a sovereign's claim was McCandlish v. Commonwealth,
76 Va. 1002, 1005-06 (1882), which relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in The
Siren. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868). In The Siren the Court considered whether the
United States waived its immunity when it instituted a suit. Id. at 153-54. The United
States argued that if its immunity were waived it would be subject to direct suits. Id. at
154. Justice Field, in answering for the Court, said that when the United States brings a
suit, it waives its immunity to a claim that is limited to the amount of the claim instituted
by the United States. Id. Justice Field reasoned that the national sovereign stands in
such actions as private suitors, except that the national sovereign is exempt from affirmative relief. Id. See also Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Holt, 659 P.2d 836, 837 (Kan. App.
1983) ("It appears the general rule applied in foreign jurisdictions is that a defendant
who has a claim that is unenforceable because of governmental immunity may assert it
by way of setoff or recoupment if the claim arises out of the same transaction giving rise
to the claim upon which the defendant is sued.").
218. 311 Md. at 463-64,535 A.2d at 931.
219. Id. See Act ofJan. 20, 1787, ch. 53, 1786 Md. Laws.
220. 311 Md. at 463-64, 535 A.2d at 931. See Act of Feb. 17, 1821, ch. 210, 1820 Md.
Laws.
221. 311 Md. at 463-64, 535 A.2d at 931. See Calvert Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Employment & Social Servs., 277 Md. 372, 376-77, 357 A.2d 839, 841
(1976).
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State's claims. 2 2 The court rejected this argument, stating that the
federal and state cases were based upon the principle that whenever
the sovereign institutes a claim, a defendant may seek reduction of
the sovereign's claim by way of recoupment, 2 2without
regard to
3

whether the sovereign has waived its immunity.

Second, the State asserted that the Financial Institutions Article, section 10-121(a), 4 precluded recoupment defenses against
MDIF. 22 ' That section states: "[MDIF] retains and may raise the
defense of sovereign immunity in any action. 2 2 6 The State contended that recoupment defenses would infringe upon MDIF's sovereign immunity. 2 " The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
consider whether MDIF's statutory sovereign immunity was broader
than the State's or whether section 10-121(a) barred recoupment
defenses. 22 ' The court explained that the directors' recoupment defense was based upon the acts or omissions of DLR employees, not
upon the acts or omissions of MDIF employees.2 29 Further, section
10-121(a) does not prevent the directors from asserting a recoupment defense based upon the acts or omissions of employees in a
state agency other than MDIF occurring prior to the creation of
MDIF.2 °
Third, the State maintained that the directors' counterclaim did
not support the use of a recoupment defense because the transaction and the parties involved in the claim were different from those
involved in the recoupment. 23 ' The court initially noted that the
sovereign's claim determines the scope of recoupment, because recoupment against a sovereign is limited to the same transaction on
which the sovereign sues. 2 2 MDIF's suit utilized Maryland Rule 2212 which states in relevant part: "All persons may bejoined in one
action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief. . . arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences ...
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

."2"

The court found that the scope of MDIF's complaint

311 Md. at 464, 535 A.2d at 932.
Id.
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-121(a) (1986).
311 Md. at 464, 535 A.2d at 932.
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 10-121(a) (1986).
311 Md. at 464, 535 A.2d at 932.
Id.
Id. at 464-65, 535 A.2d at 932.
Id. at 465, 535 A.2d at 932.
Id.
Id.
MD. R. 2-212.
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involved a series of occurrences preceding. MSSIC's insolvency and
alleged that the directors' breach of duty caused the insolvency.4
Similarly, the court found that the directors' counterclaim covered
many of the same occurrences and asserted that the State's negli23 5
gent acts and omissions caused the insolvency, at least partially.
The court rejected the State's argument and held that the recoupment defense
arose out of the same transaction alleged in the State's
23 6
complaint.
Lastly, the State argued that the Court of Appeals must recognize and treat each of the different state agencies as separate legal
entities. 2 s The State contended, inter alia, that
the claim initially sued on is that of MSSIC which is innocent of any wrong. . . [and] because the action is brought
by MDIF, a counterclaim based on wrongs by the State cannot be a recoupment against MDIF; and MDIF is not liable
for the torts of its principal, the State. 8
The court noted that the State's creation of MDIF led it to conclude
that MDIF was an agent of the State. 23 9 Based upon this conclusion,
the court stated that the circuit court correctly held that the State
was the real party in interest in MDIF's claim against the
240
directors.
The Court of Appeals noted that this holding presented two
questions: "First, in an action by MDIF on the former MSSIC claim,
234. 311 Md. at 465, 535 A.2d at 932.
235. Id. at 465-66, 535 A.2d at 932.
236. Id. at 466, 535 A.2d at 932. The court noted that the rule it applied was similar
to the rule stated by the Supreme Court in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270
U.S. 593 (1926). In Moore the Court considered whether the defendant's counterclaim,
which sought an injunction against the practices of the plaintiff, could be sustained
under former Federal Equity Rule 30. Id. at 609-10. Former Federal Equity Rule 30
provided: "The answer must state ... any counterclaim arising out of the transaction
which is the subject-matter of the suit .... " FED. EQUTy R. 30. The Moore Court held
that the facts upon which the injunction was based arose out of the transaction which
was the basis of the plaintiff's suit. Moore, 270 U.S. at 609. The Court stated that "transaction" is a flexible term which may embrace a "series of many occurrences ... ""Id. at
610. The Court further explained that these occurrences arise out of the subject matter
of the suit because they have a logical relationship with the subject matter, and not so
much because they have an immediate connection with the subject matter of the suit. id.
See abso Rothensis v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 (1946)
("[R]ecoupment permit[s] a transaction which is made subject of suit by a plaintiff to be
examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the
one transaction as a whole.").
237. 311 Md. at 466, 535 A.2d at 933.
238. Id. at 466-67, 535 A.2d at 933.
239. Id. at 467, 535 A.2d at 933.
240. Id.
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is MDIF, as assignee, subject to defenses which are maintainable
against it but not against MSSIC? Second, is MDIF, as an agent,
subject to defenses which are based solely on the conduct of the
State, its principal?"'
The court initially noted that, when MDIF
acquired MSSIC's claim, it was not insulated from defenses that
could be asserted against MDIF as MSSIC's assignee. 4 ' The court
relied upon Professor Corbin's treatise on the law of contracts to
support its conclusion that, where MDIF was an agent for a disclosed principal, the State, the assignment from MSSIC did not insulate MDIF, the "assignee-plaintiff-agent," from defenses that
could be alleged against the State even though the defenses could
not be alleged against MSSIC as MDIF's assignor.243 Corbin stated
that recoupment may be raised as a defense to an assignee's claim in
situations where the recoupment arises "out of some transaction between the defendant and the assignor." 24 4 Consequently, the recoupment defense could be allowed because it arose out of a series
of transactions that occurred between the directors and the assignor, MSSIC. The court also referred to District Agency Co. v. Suburban Delivery Service, Inc.2 4 5 as illustrating the principle that a
recoupment defense could be raised against the State's agent,
MDIF, even though it could not be raised against MSSIC. 2 46 In
resolving whether recoupment could be pled by way of general issue, the Suburban Delivery court reasoned that the defendant could
plead recoupment for a debt due from the principal in a claim
24
brought by the principal's agent. 1
The Hogg court further considered whether the conduct of
MSSIC prior to its merger with MDIF could be used as a defense in
24
an action brought by MDIF on the claim it acquired from MSSIC. 1
The State relied upon FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Dempster 24 9 to
answer that question in the negative.2 5 0 The Court of Appeals
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id. at 468, 535 A.2d at 933.
Id.
4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 896, at 595 (1951).
224 Md. 364, 167 A.2d 874 (1961).
31 1 Md. at 468-69, 535 A.2d at 934.
Suburban Delivery, 224 Md. at 371-72, 167 A.2d at 878. See also RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY § 371 (1933) ("in an action on a contract brought by an agent for the benefit of
the principal, the other party to the contract may set off claims which [it] could set off"
in an action had the action been brought by the principal.).
248. 311 Md. at 469, 535 A.2d at 934.
249. 637 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
250. 311 Md. at 469, 535 A.2d at 934. The Dempster court had also considered
whether conduct that could not be used as a defense against the assignor could be used
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stated, however, that Dempster was unpersuasive
and contrary to the
25
"Restatement, Corbin and Williston." 1
The Court of Appeals finally addressed the issue of whether the
recoupment concept it had enunciated embraced contribution or indemnity.2 52 The court initially noted that its consideration of this
issue was limited to whether sovereign immunity prevented the directors from requesting a pro rata reduction of the State's claim if
the State was negligent.2 5 3 The court explained that, under the collateral order doctrine, the issues on appeal were limited to those
related to sovereign immunity and not the merits of the contribution or indemnity request. 2 54 The court explained that sovereign
immunity does not mean that negligent acts or omissions committed
by the State are not tortious, but that the doctrine simply prevents a
direct suit against the State.2 55 The court reasoned that where the
State brings an action on an assigned claim, it allows the defendant
to use the State's acts or omissions in a defensive manner, even
though the State's conduct could not be "affirmatively actionable." 25 6 Consequently, the court held that the directors could have a
pro rata reduction of the State's claim if the State were found
negligent. 5 :
Hogg stands for the proposition that when the State submits its
claim to the courts, the claim may be diminished by recoupment.
against the assignee. Dempster, 637 F. Supp. at 365-66. Dempster initially set forth the
generally accepted rule that "the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor upon the
assignment ... and takes the assignment subject to the defenses assertable against the
assignor." Id. The defendants in Denpster contended that section 336 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts provided for the assertion of defenses against an assignee based
upon the acts of the assignee prior to the assignment. Id. at 366. "An assignee's right
against the obligor is subject to any defense or claim arising from his conduct ...."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336(4) (1981). See also 3 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 432, at 191 (3d ed. 1960) ("A debtor is also entitled to set off against
an assignee claims due from the [assignee] and this is true even though the action is
brought in the name of the assignor."). The Dempster court stated that section 336 is
applicable only in situations where the defense to the assignee's claim is based upon the
conduct of the assignee after the assignment. Dempster, 637 F. Supp. at 366. Itreasoned
that if the defendant's contention was correct, then the principle that the assignee steps
into the shoes of the assignor would not hold true because the defendant was attempting
to raise a defense against the assignee which could not be raised against the assignor.
Id.
251. 311 Md. at 470, 535 A.2d at 935.
252. Id. at 471, 535 A.2d at 935.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 471 & n. 11,535 A.2d at 935 & n. i.
255. Id. at 471-72, 535 A.2d at 935.
256. Id. at 472, 535 A.2d at 935.
257. Id.
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Stated another way, directors and officers of savings and loan associations who find themselves defending a claim brought by the
State when the claim arises from actions preceding the savings and
loan crisis may wish to investigate the State's acts or omissions that
are related to the same transaction or occurrence upon which the
State bases its claim. In effect, the Hogg recoupment theory allows
the defendant to raise the State's negligent acts or omissions in a
defensive manner against the State when the State presents a claim
against the defendant. The court was correct in holding that the
recoupment defense did not offend-the State's sovereign immunity.
The State's contention that it could submit its claim to the courts,
yet the defendant who wishes to diminish the State's claim should be
prevented from asserting that right in the same forum, would have
been untenable and inequitable.
2. Administration of FederalFunds.-In L.J. By & Through Darr v.
Massinga2 58 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction requiring officials administering Maryland's federally funded foster care program to make broad
changes in the treatment of the children in the program. 2 5 9 The
court also upheld the district court's denial of partial summary judgment on the question of whether the officials were immune from
money damages for alleged failure to protect the foster children.2 60
In December 1984 a group of seven present and former foster
children under the custody of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services filed suit pursuant to title 42, section 1983 of the
United States Code, against twenty-one officials, caseworkers, and
supervisors involved with Maryland's foster care program.2 61 - The
children alleged "that as a result of [the officials'] maladministration
of the program, they were victims of physical and sexual abuse, as
258. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 816 (1989).
259. Id. at 120.
260. Id. at 122.

261. Id. at 119. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory .

. . .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitulion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The federal courts have original jurisdiction over any civil
action to secure relief "under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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well as medical neglect. '2 62 The children sought compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as interim injunctive relief to protect
themselves and all those similarly situated from harm while the suit
2
was pending. 26 - The State moved for partial summary judgment 6
based on good faith immunity for claims prior to 1980 under the
doctrine ofJensen v. Conrad.2 65
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
granted a preliminary injunction directing the State to ensure that
proper child care was provided by monitoring each child in a foster
home through monthly or, if necessary, weekly visits if there were
reports of maltreatment. 6 6 In addition the district court directed
the State to assign sufficient staff to ensure that records necessary
for preventive medical care were available and to report complaints
of maltreatment within a specified time to the juvenile court, the
children's attorney, and the district court.2 6 7 On the ground that
the officials' statutory duty was "clear and certain," the district court
2 68
also denied the officials' motion for partial summary judgment.
The officials filed an interlocutory appeal of both decisions.2 6 9
In evaluating the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit first examined the prevailing four-point
standard for a grant of interim relief: (1) has the petitioner made a
strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal,
(2) has the petitioner shown that without such relief it will be irreparably injured, (3) would the issuance of a stay substantially harm
other parties interested in the proceeding, and (4) where lies the
270
public interest?
The court interpreted previous applications of this standard as
holding that, where "grave or serious questions are presented for
ultimate decision ' 271 and the probability of irreparable injury to
262. 838 F.2d at 119.
263. Brief for Appellants at 3, L.J. By & Through Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118 (4th
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2156).
264. Id.
265. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
266. Appellants' Brief at 6, Massinga (No. 87-2156).
267. Id. at 7.
268. 838 F.2d at 122.
269. Id. at 120.
270. Airport Comm'n of Forsyth County v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 296 F.2d-95, 96
(4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam). See also Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v.
Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (1977).
271. 838 F.2d at 120. The court found "no doubt that plaintiffs' case presents a grave
and substantial question. Defendants do not seriously contend.., that if plaintiffs prove
their allegations, which they have already demonstrated have an arguably solid founda-
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either of the parties is high, the balance between the second and
third of these factors usually will be decisive. 7 2 The officials' chief
argument with respect to the second factor was that the foster children failed to show a high probability of irreparable injury because
the report on which the district court depended was statistically biased and unreliable.27 3 Moreover, the officials argued, the district
court's decision failed to identify "any particular child presently at
risk" or show how many of the children identified in the study were
still in the foster care system.27 4 Noting that the study was prepared
by "an expert in research methodology and child welfare services,"
documenting "systemic problems in Baltimore foster care" and
cases of abuse and neglect that were backed up by independent testimony, the court found "no abuse of discretion... in affording the
2 75
study substantial probative value."
With respect to the third factor of the preliminary injunction
standard, the potential harm to the city and State was limited to increased monetary outlays and the administrative inconvenience of
quickly setting up tighter controls over the foster care program.27 6
The court explained that while "the supply of money is finite, ...
against that is the emotional, psychological, and physical damage to
27
children, much of which will continue throughout their lives."
Balancing budget concerns against the children's health, the court
agreed with the district court's finding that the potential for irreparable injury to the children if relief were not granted outweighed the
fiscal difficulties the officials would experience under the
injunction.27 8
Relying on Rizzo v. Goode 1 79 the officials tried to invoke principles of federalism by maintaining that, absent convincing proof of
"deliberate indifference" to the federal rights of an identifiable
plaintiff, judicial interference in the administration of a state program through injunction is prohibited.2 8 ° While the court recognized that these considerations are "weighty," it found that the
tion, plaintiffs will have proven a violation of their due process rights under the Four-

teenth Amendment."

Id. at 122.

272. See Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195.
273. See Appellants' Brief at 6, Massinga (No. 87-2156).
274. Id. at 18-19.
275. 838 F.2d at 121.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 121-22.
279. 423 U.S. 362, 375-80 (1976). See also Appellants' Brief at 13-14, Mlassinga (No.
87-2156).
280. 838 F.2d at 121. See also Appellants' Brief at 13-16, Massinga (No. 87-2156).
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preliminary injunction standard implicitly insures that state interests
will be "overridden only in those instances in which the apparent
denial of a federal right is so egregious that the individual right to
interim relief outweighs the governmental interest to be free from
federal judicial interference." '2 8 ' Thus, the issue of deliberate indifference need be independently considered only in determining
whether damages are appropriate. 8 2 The court affirmed the district
court's preliminary injunction.28 3
The officials argued that the district court improperly denied
their motion for partial summary judgment on the immunity question because the constitutional obligation to protect persons other
than prisoners in the custody of the State had not been clearly established at the time the suit was filed or at least was not established
before 1980.24 The officials citedJensen v. Conrad2

5

for the propo-

sition that officials should not be held liable for violating constitutional rights that have not been clearly established or could not have
been anticipated given the state of the law at the time. 8 6 They argued that underJensen, none of the foster children's allegations, or
at least no pre-1980 allegations, should be actionable under title 42,
section 1983 of the United States Code. Furthermore, the officials
argued that those statutes which established the terms of the federal
program were funding statutes "which do not create private rights
enforceable under section 1983."287

The court avoided the issue of whether the officials could reasonably have anticipated that a failure to protect foster children in
state custody could violate the children's fourteenth amendment
rights.2 8 8 Instead, it focused on the officials' statutory duty to care
for and protect children in their custody, which was found to be
"clear and certain" ever since Title IV-A of the Social Security Act
281. 838 F.2d at 121.
282. id.
283. Id. at 122.
284. Id.
285. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).

286. 838 F.2d at 122. The Social Security Act of 1961 established clear duties for
states participating in the federally funded foster care program to assure that children
received proper care. Social Security Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 2, 75 Stat. 76
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 608() (repealed 1980)). The argument that these
rights did not vest until 1980 apparently is based on the fact that this section was repealed in 1980, and replaced with language that amplified those rights in a separate title
of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670. 671, 675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See
also 838 F.2d at 122-23.
287. Appellants' Brief at 47, Massinga (No. 87-2156).
288. 838 F.2d at 122.
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was enacted in 1961.289 Contrary arguments by the officials
notwithstanding, the court also reaffirmed that statutory rights are
privately enforceable under title 42, section 1983, even if the stat2 90
utes creating these rights relate primarily to appropriations.
Rather than inquiring into the officials' subjective good faith
beliefs,- the court based its decision about qualified immunity "on
the objective reasonableness of [the] official's conduct as measured
by reference to clearly established law." 2 9 ' It found that, to the extent that the officials exercised discretion in their duties, they would
not be justified in doing what the children alleged. 9 2 Therefore,
the court held that the district court correctly denied the officials'
motion for partial summary judgment on the ground of immunity. 29 3 The court noted, however, that its interlocutory holding did

not mean that the officials were necessarily liable for damages because proof of "actionable nonfeasance and malfeasance" had yet to
be adduced in the district court.2 94
Massinga is another example of the difficulties thejudiciary faces
when a federal civil rights law is used to redress ongoing problems
in state-administered social service programs involving highly
charged emotional issues. The case involves allegations that the
State has failed to protect a subset of the most vulnerable people in
our society from the most serious types of harm. The State's failure
occurred after it voluntarily accepted federal funding to institute a
program that vests an enforceable right to care in program participants. The underlying causes of the failure may lie not in "maladministration" by social workers and administrators but rather in
fiscal decisionmaking by state legislators that has resulted in a tightening of foster care resources and in societal problems that overload
the system.
Even under the best of circumstances, the maltreatment of children in foster homes "often is difficult, and at times impossible to
prevent by even a very highly skilled and well-tranied social
worker." 2 9 The Fourth Circuit's finding of a clearly established
duty to protect foster children does not reduce the difficulty of the
289. Id. See supra note 286.
290. 838 F.2d at 123.

291. Id. at 124. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (immunity claim in
suit for civil damages must be determined by objective test).
292. 838 F.2d at 124.

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of the National Association of Social Workers at 3, Massinga v. LJ., 109 S. Ct. 816 (1989) (No. 87-1796).
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role of social workers and administrators. Ultimately, it may increase the legal risks that these public servants face in a job that
already offers too few incentives and spur an exodus from the foster
care field.2 96 The interim injunctive relief temporarily may force the
State to spend more funds on foster care, but at a tremendous added cost in legal fees and the administrative expenses inherent in
the strict and immediate compliance mandated by the federal order.
Yet few courts would fail to set such fiscal concerns aside to see that
no "irreparable harm" is done to children presently in the system
and that past denials of "clear and certain" civil rights were not left
without remedy. If states accept federal funds to institute social
programs, they must ensure that the rights which attach under these
programs are respected. When states fail to make the political decisions required to meet their obligations under federal law to the
point that there are gross violations of public rights, the courts have
little choice but to intervene with whatever imperfect instruments
the law affords them.
3. City Council Meetings.-The Court of Appeals held in City of
College Park v. Cotter 9 7 that the City of College Park's municipal
charter provision concerning open city council meetings was more
stringent than the Maryland Sunshine Law, 2 9 8 and therefore the
charter provision controlled.2 9 9 The court concluded that all meetings of the College Park Mayor and city council must be open to the
public.3 0 0
Joseph Cotter, a member of the city council, filed suit in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County requesting a writ of mandamus to require city officials to hold open city council meetings. 30 '
He alleged that the city council had held at least twenty closed meet30 2
ings in violation of article 10, section 24 of the municipal charter.
The charter states that "all meetings of the Mayor and council
'30 3
herein provided for, shall be open to the citizens of the city."
The Mayor and city council contended that the closed meetings
296. Id. at 4.

297. 309 Md. 573, 525 A.2d 1059 (1987).
298. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. §§

10-501 to -510 (1984 & Supp. 1988).

299. 309 Md. at 578, 525 A.2d at 1061.
300. Id. at 595, 525 A.2d at 1069.
301. Id. at 576, 525 A.2d at 1060.
302. Id. at 577, 525 A.2d at 1060.

303. Id. at 576. 525 A.2d at 1060. One of the drafters of the original municipal charter of College Park filed an affidavit stating that it was the drafters' intention that err
meeting be open to the citizens. Id. at 576 n.2, 525 A.2d at 1060 n.2.
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were held in order to meet with the city attorney, and that such
meetings were permitted under the Sunshine Law."0 4 The Sunshine
Law specifies circumstances in which closed sessions are permitted,
and these include consulting with counsel.3 0 5
The trial court held that the charter provision's language was
clear and that no exceptions to the open meeting requirement were
enumerated. 0 6 Therefore, the trial court held that, due to the conflict of laws provision of the state Sunshine Law,3 0 7 the municipal
charter provision must be followed. 3 °8 The Mayor and city council
appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals, but before
review by that court the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.3 0 9
The federal Sunshine Act was enacted in 1976 and states that
"every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public
observation." '3 t0 The purpose of this statute was to provide increased confidence in government, "encourage higher quality work
by government officials, stimulate well-informed public debate
about government programs and policies, and promote cooperation
between citizens and government."'
This legislation was unprecedented in its mandate for government openness.3 t2
Maryland first enacted its Sunshine Law in 1977.' s State Government Article, subtitle 5 of title 10, requires that a "public body"
must meet in open session whenever it is carrying out an advisory,
legislative, or quasi-legislative function. 3 4 The Sunshine Law also
includes enforcement provisions and public notice requirements for
all meetings.3 s 5
304. Id. at 577, 525 A.2d at 1060-61.
305. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-508(7), (8) (1984).
306. 309 Md. at 578, 525 A.2d at 1061.
307. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-504 (1984). The statute states: "Whenever
this subtitle and another law that relates to meetings of public bodies conflict, this subtitle applies unless the other law is more stringent." Id.
308. 309 Md. at 595, 525 A.2d at 1069.
309. Id. at 578, 525 A.2d at 1061.
310. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
311. Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Common Cause was brought to enjoin the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from
holding closed budget meetings in violation of the federal Sunshine Act; the Commission failed to meet its burden of proving that the meetings were lawfully closed. Id. at
928-29.
312. Id. at 929-30. The Sunshine Act did not even exempt discussions among agency
heads at agency meetings; all "meetings" were subject to the open meetings provision.
Id.
313. MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, §§ 7-15 (1980 & Supp. 1987) (now codified at MD.
§§ 10-501 to -510 (1984 & Supp. 1988)).
314. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-505 (1984 & Supp. 1988).

STATE GOV'T CODE ANN.

315. Id. §§ 10-506, -507 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
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The Court of Appeals examined the Sunshine Law in City of New
Carrollton v. Rogers3 1 6 and stated that "the heart of the [Sunshine
Law] is found in the public policy declaration .. .that 'public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public
officials.' "'" The court stated that the Sunshine Law clearly apmade by a public body, and not just the
plied to all deliberations
3 18
body's final decisions.
Due to the strong policy implications underlying the formation
of the Sunshine acts, the situations in which closed sessions are allowed are minimal. The Sunshine Law specifies only fourteen situations in which a public body may meet in closed session or adjourn
an open session to a closed session. 1 ' Furthermore, when a closed
316. 287 Md. 56, 410 A.2d 1070 (1980).
317. Id. at 71-72, 410 A.2d at 1078 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 7 (1957 &
Supp. 1975)).
318. Id. at 72, 410 A.2d at 1078. The court acknowledged the breadth of the statute
by explaining that because the Act makes no distinction between formal and informal
meetings, it covers all meetings at which a quorum of the constituent membership attends. Id. (emphasis added).
319. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-508 (1984) states that a public body may meet
in closed session or adjourn an open session to a closed session only to
(1) discuss;
(i) the appointment, employment, assignment, promotion, discipline,
demotion, compensation, removal, or resignation of appointees, employees, or
officials over whom it has jurisdiction; or
(ii) any other personnel matter that affects 1 or more specific
individuals;
(2) protect the privacy or reputation of individuals with respect to a matter that is not related to public business;
(3) consider the acquisition of real property for a public purpose and
matters directly related thereto;
(4) consider a preliminary matter that concerns the proposal for a business or industrial organization to locate in the State;
(5) consider the investment of public funds;
(6) consider the marketing of public securities;
(7) consult with counsel;
(8) consult with staff, consultants, or other individuals about pending or
potential litigation;
(9) conduct collective bargaining negotiations or consider matters that
relate to the negotiations;
(10) discuss public security, including:
(i) the deployment of fire and police services and staff; and
(ii) the development and implementation of emergency plans;
(i i) prepare, administer, or grade a scholastic, licensing, or qualifying
examination;
(12) conduct an investigative proceeding on actual or possible criminal
conduct;
(I3) comply with a specific constitutional, statutory, or judicially imposed
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session is challenged, the agency must bear the burden of proving
3 20
that the closed session was justified.
In College Park the parties focused on State Government Article,
section 10-504, the conflict of laws provision.3 2 ' According to the
court, the existence of this provision demonstrates that the Sunshine Law provides only the minimum requirements for holding
open meetings; if another law is more stringent, i.e., allows for more
public participation, then it must be followed. 2 2
As a result, the court compared the open meeting provision of
the College Park municipal charter, article 10, section 24, to 3the
23
state statute in order to determine which was the more stringent.
In Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore3 2 4 the primary rule of statutory construction was delineated: the purpose or policy behind the statute
needs to be determined by analyzing the "plain meaning" of its
words.3 25 "[W]hat the legislature has written in an effort to achieve
' 326
a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.
According to the College Park court, the plain meaning of the statute
is clear: all meetings must be open.3 2 7 Kaczorowski stated that sometimes the language of the statute is so clearly consistent with its purrequirement that prevents public disclosures about a particular proceeding or

matter; or
(14)
satisfy an exceptional reason that, by two-thirds vote of the members
of the public body who are present at the session, the public body finds to be so
compelling that the reason overrides the general public policy in favor of open
sessions.
Id.
320. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 929
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (because there is a presumption that meetings will be open, if the
agency chooses to hold a closed meeting, it has the burden of proving that the subject of
the discussion is exempt).
321. 309 Md. at 585-86, 525 A.2d at 1065. For the text of MD. STATE GOV'T CODE

§ 10-504 (1984), see supra note 307. Prior to its analysis, however, the court dismissed Cotter's claim that the issue was moot because the open meetings provision of
the charter had been subject to vote subsequent to the original court decision. A change
in the charter had been rejected. The court reasoned that because the voters had not
amended the charter, the controversy remained and the appeal was not moot. 309 Md.
at 579-81, 525 A.2d at 1061-62.
322. 309 Md. at 586, 525 A.2d at 1065. The court noted that the Maryland Constitution establishes a municipality's right "to provide additional standards and safeguards in
harmony with concurrent state legislation." Id. Consequently, College Park was at liberty to make its charter more stringent than the state statute. Id. See MD.CONST. art. XlE, § 3.
323. 309 Md. at 587, 525 A.2d at 1065-66.
324. 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).
325. Id. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632.
326. Id.
327. 309 Md. at 588, 525 A.2d at 1066. The court stated that the charter language is a
"flat prohibition" against closed sessions due to the absence of qualifying language. Id.
ANN.
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pose that further interpretation is unnecessary.32 ' The intent of the
Sunshine Law is to provide the public with access to its governing
body,"2 9 and the broad language of the charter conforms to that
purpose.3 30 College Park's decision to phrase its charter in this
manner was an exercise of its right, in accordance with the Maryland
Constitution,"'
to expand the guarantees of the state Sunshine
2
Law.

33

The Mayor and city council argued that the city charter only
provides that the "citizens of the city" may attend the council meetings, whereas the state statute applies to the "general public." 3 3
They contended, therefore, that public participation is greater in the
state Sunshine Law, and it is the more stringent law.3 3 4 The court
dismissed this argument by claiming that the Mayor and city council
read the phrase "citizens of the city" too narrowly. 3 5 The court
relied on another rule of statutory construction: "if one of the proposed interpretations would render an enactment valid, while another would render it invalid or ineffective, the court will construe
the enactment to be valid whenever feasible. 3 3 6 In relying on this
rule, the court found that the phrase "citizens of the city" was consistent with "the general public" as used in section 10-507(a) of the
33 7
Sunshine Law.
The Mayor and city council asserted that it is imperative that
328. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987).
329. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-502 (1984).
330. 309 Md. at 588, 525 A.2d at 1066.
331. MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 3. For a discussion of this constitutional provision, see
supra note 322.
332. 309 Md. at 588, 525 A.2d at 1066; MD. STATE GoV'T CODE ANN. § 10-504 (1984).
333. 309 Md. at 589, 525 A.2d at 1066.
334. Id.
335. Id. In a dissenting opinion in which Judges Cole and Rodowsky concurred,
Judge Eldridge stated that the majority was incorrect in its comparison of the state law
and the municipal charter. Id. at 595-96, 525 A.2d at 1070 (Eldridge. J., dissenting).
According to the dissent, the entire state Sunshine Law must be compared with the
entire comparable charter provision in order to determine which law is more stringent.
Id. at 597, 525 A.2d at 1070. The dissent determined that the framers of the city charter
"deliberately chose to limit its meetings to 'citizens of the city,' " id. at 599, 525 A.2d at
1071, whereas the general public relates to "mankind in general." Id. at 598, 525 A.2d
at 1071. The dissent claimed that the majority had strained the language in order to
find the charter more stringent. Id. at 599, 525 A.2d at 1072.
336. Id. at 589, 525 A.2d at 1067. See also Pickett v. Prince George's County, 291 Md.
648, 661,436 A.2d 449, 456 (1981) (if there are two possible constructions that can be
placed upon a statute, one which would result in its legality, and the other in its illegality, then it must be construed "so as to render it effective").
337. 309 Md. at 589, 525 A.2d at 1067. The statute reads in relevant part: "Whenever a public body meets in open session, the general public is entitled to attend." MD.
STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-507(a) (1984).
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the court recognize an exception to the open meeting requirement
to provide for closed meetings between the council and the city attorney.'" s Without this exception, they claimed, the attorney-client
privilege would be impaired."' The attorney-client privilege is
rooted in common law and has been codified in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.3 4 0 The privilege, however, is based on the
need of the client to consult freely with his or her attorney and can
be waived by a client at any time; 3 4 ' the City of College Park waived
its privilege.3 42 The court concluded that even though the Sunshine
Law explicitly provides an exception to the open meeting requirement to consult with counsel or discuss litigation, College Park did
not choose to specify an exception in its charter.3 4 s
Finally, the Mayor and city council relied on federal cases in
which exceptions were made to the open meeting requirements for
attorney-client discussions despite the lack of an explicit exception. 4 4 In those cases, the courts held that the state legislatures did
not intend to remove the privilege when the sunshine laws were enacted. As a result, the common-law privilege remained in force 4 5
Maryland, however, did provide an explicit exception in its state
statute. 46 If the city wished to maintain the exception, it had to so
specify. In addition, the court determined that the presence of the
338. 309 Md. at 590, 525 A.2d at 1067.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 591, 525 A.2d at 1067. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-108
(1984). The statute states that "a person may not be compelled to testify in violation of
the attorney-client privilege." Id.
341. 309 Md. at 591, 525 A.2d at 1067.
342. Id., 525 A.2d at 1068. The dissent stated that to disallow private meetings with
the city attorney would be "unworkable and impracticable." Id. at 600, 525 A.2d at 1072
(Eldridge,J., dissenting). The majority's holding, according to the dissent, is not sensical. Id.
343. Id. at 591, 525 A.2d at 1068. The court stated that the city waived its privilege
pursuant to its authority under the conflict of laws provision, MD. STATE GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 10-504 (1984). 309 Md. at 591, 525 A.2d at 1068.
344. 309 Md. at 592, 525 A.2d at 1068. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v.
McKay, 590 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (D. Nev.), aff'd, 769 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1984) (planning
agency could meet privately with its attorney, if required, based on the common-law
exception to the open meetings law); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento
County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 58, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (1968) (injunction prohibiting the county board of supervisors from conferring privately with their
attorney was too broad); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redevelopment
Auth., 310 Minn. 313, 322, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1976) (open meeting law did not
require that a meeting between the agency and its attorney be open to the public).
345. 309 Md. at 592-93, 525 A.2d at 1068.
346. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-508(a)(7), (8) (1984). For the text of § 10508, see supra note 319.
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conflict of laws provision in this case was determinative. 4 7
The Court of Appeals acknowledged the strictness of its decision in College Park, and the difficulties inherent in allowing all meetings to be open to the public. The court clearly did not express an
opinion on the legislature's decision to allow all Mayor and city
council meetings to be open: "It is not our role to sit in judgment
on the wisdom of the legislature or the voters of College Park."3 4 8
The court was simply practicing strict statutory construction.
MARC
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GREIDINGER

GREG

D.

MACK

ANN BURKE SARNO

347. 309 Md. at 592-93, 525 A.2d at 1068. The court stated that the existence of the
provision demonstrated the legislature's intent that each jurisdiction have the freedom
to allow more public participation. Id.
348. Id, at 594-95, 525 A.2d at 1069.

X.

TAXATiON

A.

Road Tax

In American Trucking Associations v. Goldstein' the Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court's finding that a Maryland statute which
imposed a flat marker tax on commercial motor vehicles is unconstitutional. 2 The court determined, however, that the circuit court
erred in postponing the effective date of its decision invalidating the
statute 3 because the decision demanded immediate prospective ef4
fect due to the lack of extraordinary or unusual circumstances.
All motor carriers 5 operating commercial motor vehicles6 in
Maryland must pay the taxes and fees designated under the State's
Motor Carrier Tax statutes7 to support its highway system. Motor
carriers must register annually with the State Comptroller each vehicle to be operated in Maryland during that year. 8 Article 81, section
423(a), required every registered vehicle to display an identification
marker which cost a flat, yearly fee, regardless of the miles actually
traveled in Maryland.'
i. 312 Md. 583, 541 A.2d 955 (1988).
2. Id. at 589-90, 541 A.2d at 958.
3. Id. at 595-600, 541 A.2d at 961-63.
4. Id.
5. "Motor carrier" is defined as "any person who operates or causes to be operated
any commercial motor vehicle on any highway in this State." MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 412(c) (1980 & Supp. 1987) (recodified as amended at MD. TAx-GEN. CODE ANN. § 9201 (c) (1988)).
6. "Commercial motor vehicle" is defined as follows:
(b) The term "Commercial motor vehicle" means any of the following
vehicles that are propelled by motor fuel:
(1) A passenger vehicle that has seats for more than 15 passengers in
addition to the driver;
(2) A truck tractor as defined in § 11-172 of the Transportation Article;
(3) A truck having more than 2 axles;
(4) A truck with 2 axles operating in combination with a freight trailer or
semitrailer as defined in § 13-927(c) of the Transportation Article, that has registered or operating gross combination weight that exceeds 40,000 pounds ....
Id. at (b) (recodified as amended at MD. TAx-GEN. CODE ANN. § 9-201(b) (1988)).
7. Id. §§ 412-429 (recodified as amended at MD. TAx-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 to
-221 (1988)).
8. Id. § 423(a) (recodified as amended at MD. TAx-GEN. CODE ANN. § 9-219 (1988)).
9. Id. The relevant part of former § 4 23(a) reads as follows:
(a) Required; identification marker;fee.-(1) All motor carriers shall obtain an
identification marker for each of their commercial vehicles from the Comptroller on an annual basis for the period beginning January 1 of each year and
expiring December 31 of each year. The identification marker shall be displayed in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Comptroller ....
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In 1984 American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA),' 0 a national organization of motor carriers, brought its first action against
state officials" challenging the constitutionality of the fiat marker
tax.' 2 There, the court rejected ATA's argument that article 81, section 423(a), violated the commerce clause"3 by discriminating
against interstate commerce.' 4 The court reasoned that the statute
applied equally to both intrastate and interstate carriers and noted
that article 81, section 423(a), was intended to evenly distribute the
cost of supporting the highway system among all commercial users,
not to protect local carriers against interstate competition.' 5 The
court also rejected the argument that the statute's "practical effect"
was to discriminate'against interstate carriers who travel fewer miles
in Maryland and thereby pay a higher price per mile for the marker
than intrastate carriers.' 6 In doing so, the court relied on several
Supreme Court cases holding that fiat taxes
similar to section 423(a)
7
did not violate the commerce clause.1
When the Supreme Court overruled these cases in American
Trucking Associations v. Scheiner, 18 ATA filed the current action. The
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the fee for the issuance
of an identification marker is $25.00 per commercial motor vehicle.
Id. Under former § 423(a)(2), the annual marker fee for motor buses was $10.00 per
vehicle. Id. at (2).
10. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City certified American Trucking Associations,
Inc. (ATA), along with two individual trucking companies, as the class representative of
"all non-Maryland interstate motor carriers" which must pay the marker tax. 312 Md. at
587, 541 A.2d at 957.
I1. Id. State officials who collect and administer the marker tax were the original
defendants in this case. Id. In addition, Baltimore City and 17 counties intervened as
parties defendant because they received a percentage of the fees generated under former § 423(a). Id. Under Transportation Article, § 8-403, fees collected under § 423(a)
constitute "highway user fees" of which the State must distribute 30% to Baltimore City,
the counties, and municipalities within the counties. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 8-403
(1977 & Supp. 1988).
12. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Goldstein, 301 Md. 372, 483 A.2d 47 (1984).
13. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. 301 Md. at 386, 483 A.2d at 54-55.
15. Id.
•16. Id.
17. Id. See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 545 (1950) (2% flat tax
on fair market value of vehicles using state highways does not violate commerce clause);
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 505 (1947) (flat
taxes imposed on all vehicles operated in state are constitutional); Aero Mayflower
Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 289 (1935) (statute imposing
$25 annual license fee on out-of-state and domestic vehicles does not violate commerce
clause).
18. 107 S. Ct. 2829 (1987). In Scheiner the Supreme Court held a Pennsylvania
marker tax similar to former § 423(a) and an axle tax discriminated against interstate
carriers and thus were unconstitutional. Id. at 2847. From 1980 to 1982, Pennsylvania
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organization sought a declaration that article 81, section 423(a), was
unconstitutional, an injunction to prevent future imposition of the
tax, and refunds for markers purchased before and after the
Supreme Court's ruling in Scheiner. 9 ATA subsequently dropped its
claim for fees paid prior to the Schemer decision.2 0
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City declared article 81, section 423(a), unconstitutional, but set January 1, 1989, as the effective date of its decision so that the State, which had included the
anticipated revenue in the 1988 budget, would suffer no hardship.2 '
ATA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari before further proceedings at the intermediate level.2 2
First, the court examined whether article 81, section 423(a), unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate carriers . 2 ' Following Scheiner, it concluded that the privilege of unlimited use of the
Maryland highway system was more valuable to intrastate carriers
than to interstate carriers even though the privilege applied equally
to both groups.2 4 Consequently, the "unapportioned" twenty-five
dollar marker fee authorized under
section 423(a) was invalid be25
cause of its discriminatory effect.
Next, the court turned to the primary issue of whether the circharged a $25 annual fee for an identification marker required for motor vehicles traveling in the State. Id. at 2835-36. The fee was effectively waived for in-state vehicles
because the statute deemed it part of the annual registration fee. Id. at 2835. While the
out-of-state vehicles were paying the $25 marker fee, the statute increased registration
fees for out-of-state vehicles weighing over 17,000 pounds by more than $25. Id. The
State reduced the marker fee to $5 per vehicle in 1982 but enacted a statute requiring
intrastate and interstate motor vehicles of certain weight classes to pay $36 per axle
annually. Id. That statute reduced the vehicle registration fees for all Pennsylvaniaregistered vehicles subject to the axle tax by multiples of $36. Id.
19. 312 Md. at 588, 541 A.2d at 957.
20. Id.
2 I.ld. at 589, 541 A.2d at 958. The defendants urged that they relied to their detriment on the prior law. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. While the defendants did not dispute that former § 423(a) was unconstitutional after the decision in Scheiner, the Court of Appeals stated it would not hold a
statute unconstitutional based solely on a party's concession. Id.
24. Id. at 589-90, 541 A,2d at 958.
25. Id. Note that this case differs from Schmner, where the marker tax effectively applied only to vehicles registered in other states. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner,
107 S. Ct. 2829, 2847 (1987). Thus, the tax burden fell on nonresidents engaged in
interstate commerce. Id. Here, § 423(a) applies to all vehicles regardless of where they
are registered. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 423(a) (1980 & Supp. 1987) (recodified as
amended at MD. TAx-GEN. CODE ANN. § 9-219 (1988)). It is arguable whether the statute benefits intrastate carriers at the expense of interstate carriers because the tax is not
apportioned by the number of miles traveled for any one vehicle.
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cuit court had correctly delayed the effective date of its decision. 2 6
The state officials argued that ATA sought retroactive application of
Scheiner when it requested an immediate injunction against future
tax collections and that the lower court correctly applied relevant
legal standards when it concluded that Scheiner should only be applied prospectively." The Court of Appeals rejected this assertion2 8
and explained that "when a decision governs only operative events
occurring after the date of the decision, the decision is being applied prospectively only." 2 9 In a decision invalidating a tax statute,
the operative event is the actual imposition of tax liability, not the
development of the plan to spend anticipated revenues."0 Thus, the
operative event determining prospective or retrospective application of Scheiner was the time when ATA's tax liability arose rather
than when state officials prepared the 1988 budget. 3 ' Because its
tax liability arose six months after the Scheiner decision, ATA's request for an injunction against future enforcement of section 423(a)
was not one for retrospective relief.3 2 The court distinguished the
cases on which the state officials relied because in those instances
the obligations had accrued before the statutes were invalidated;"1
26. 312 Md. at 590, 541 A.2d at 958. The defendants agreed that the plaintiffs were
entitled to refunds for all marker fees collected after Scheiner if the circuit court erred
when it refused to grant an immediate injunction against enforcement of former
§ 423(a). Id.
27. Id. at 583, 590-95, 541 A.2d at 955, 958-61. Typically, there is no question as to
prospective applications because a judicial decision applies a rule of law that existed
both before and after the decision. Id. at 591, 541 A.2d at 958-59. A decision always
applies retroactively in cases where the court applied accepted precedent to new facts.
Id. Where the court gives a new interpretation to a constitutional or statutory provision
and overrules prior interpretations, it must decide whether the ruling should operate
retroactively or prospectively only. Id., 54 1 A.2d at 959. If it is to be given prospective
effect only, it generally applies to the case before the court and pending cases where the
question was preserved for appellate review. Id. at 592, 541 A.2d at 959. If the court
changes the common law, as opposed to a new interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision, that is fully prospective with the exception of the parties before the
court. Id. at 591-92, 541 A.2d at 959.
28. Id. at 590-95, 541 A.2d at 958-61.
29. Id. at 592, 541 A.2d at 959.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 593, 541 A.2d at 959-60.
32. Id., 541 A.2d at 960.
33. In each case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the obligation to pay arose
before the relevant statute was held invalid. Id. at 594-95, 541 A.2d at 960-61. See
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 194 (1973) (holding that state must reimburse private sectarian schools which provided secular educational services even after the statute
authorizing the payments was held unconstitutional); Ashland Oil Co. v. Rose, 350
S.E.2d 531, 536-37 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that taxes which were assessed before relevant
statute was held invalid must still be paid to the State).
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the courts simply decided not. to apply their decisions retroactively
to destroy those bbligations s4 In Goldstein the obligation to pay the
marker tax did not arise until after Scheiner, and ATA had dropped
its claim for the refund of taxes paid prior to that decision."5
The court further rejected the state officials' assertion that a
change in the delayed effective date would create administrative difficulties or fiscal hardship. 6 The court indicated such relief should
be given only in "the most extraordinary circumstances. ' s It noted
that under Supreme Court and state law precedent, implementation
of a decision was delayed infrequently and only in unusual situations
where giving it immediate effect would create enormous
problems.3 8 The Goldstein court did not find an immediate implementation problem. 39 Similarly, the fiscal and administrative difficulties in Goldstein were not of the same magnitude as those resulting
from other decisions in which tax laws had been invalidated without
delaying the effective date of the ruling.40
34. 312 Md. at 593-95, 541 A.2d at 960-61.
35. Id. at 588, 541 A.2d at 957.
36. Id. at 595, 541 A.2d at 961.
37. Id. at 596, 541 A.2d at 961. The court highlighted that "in over 200 years that
this Court has exercised jurisdiction under Maryland's Constitutions, we have never
postponed, in the manner requested by the defendants, the prospective effect of a decision invalidating a statute." Id.
38. The court cited Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as an example of
a Supreme Court decision where extraordinary circumstances required postponement of
the prospective effect of a decision invalidating a statute. 312 Md. at 596-97, 541 A.2d
at 961. In Brown the Court allowed an unspecified amount of time for desegregation to
proceed because of the enormously complex problems states would face in desegregating their schools. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n. 13. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955). Similarly, state court decisions show a delay of immediate implementation of a judicial decision only in unusual situations. 312 Md. at 597, 541 A.2d
at 961. In Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371
N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975), the Court of Appeals of New York held that state law required all
real property in New York to be assessed at full value. Id. at 13-14, 332 N.E.2d at 287,
371 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99. Because the previous practice had been to assess property at a
fraction of full value, the effect of the decision was to require assessment of all real
property in the State. Id. at 14, 332 N.E.2d at 287, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 399. The court
delayed the effective date of its decision for 18 months to allow an orderly transition. Id.
39. 312 Md. at 597, 541 A.2d at 962.
40. See, e.g., Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232 A.2d 891 (1967), where the
State lost $98,973,727 in revenues when the court invalidated a tax bill because it violated the state constitution. Id. at 505, 232 A.2d at 893. The decision was effective
immediately in spite of the money lost to the State. Id. at 515-16, 232 A.2d at 899. In
comparison, the Goldstein court found the $12,000,000 lost by invalidating the marker
tax was a substantially smaller amount which did not justify the circuit court's delay in
enjoining the enforcement of former § 423(a). 312 Md. at 599, 541 A.2d at 962-63.
The court also noted that the defendants' claims of hardship appeared overstated. Id.
At trial, a state official acknowledged an unexpected windfall of $10,000,000 to
$12,000,000 from titling taxes to the Transportation Trust Fund which supports high-
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Given the Supreme Court's decision in Scheiner, the court had
little choice but to find the flat marker tax unconstitutional. This
source of revenue can be re-opened if the State devises a system
apportioning a tax based on the number of miles a vehicle travels in
Maryland each year. Of interest in Goldstein, however, is the court's
position regarding the implementation ofjudicial decisions. All rulings have immediate effect unless the court is confronted with an
extraordinary situation in which immediate implementation would
create extreme hardship for those affected by the decision. The
court appears reluctant to stay its hand temporarily, at least in cases
involving the invalidation of tax statutes.
B.

Transfer Tax

In Dean v. Pinder4" the Court of Appeals held that the owners'
conveyance of real property to a corporation in which they were sole
shareholders was subject to transfer and recordation taxes.4 2 The
increased value of the corporation's stock as a result of the property
transfer constituted the actual consideration required by statute to
43
levy such taxes.
The State imposes two separate taxes on the transfer of real
property: a recordation tax for the privilege of recording the
instrument 4 4 and a transfer tax on the instrument conveying title.4 5
way projects. Id. at 599 n. 11, 541 A.2d at 962 n. 11. That amount offset the revenue lost
from the invalidation of § 423(a). Id. In addition, increased fuel revenues were likely to
result in a surplus of $100,000,000 in the Transportation Trust Fund. Id.
41. 312 Md. 154, 538 A.2d 1184 (1988), aff'g 70 Md. App. 252, 520 A.2d 1119
(1987).
42. Id. at 156, 538 A.2d at 1185-86.
43. Id.
44. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 277 (1980 & Supp. 1984) (recodified at MD. TAXPROP. CODE ANN. § § 12-102 to - 103 (1986 & Supp. 1988)). See 312 Md. at 156, 538 A.2d
at 1185. When the dispute arose, the pertinent part of § 277 read as follows:
(a) Written instruments.-(l) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a
tax is hereby imposed upon every instrument of writing conveying title to real
or personal property, or creating liens or encumbrances upon real or personal
property, offered for record and recorded in this State with the clerks of the
circuit courts of the respective counties ....
(b) Instruments conveying title or securing debts.-(l) In the case of instruments conveying title to property, the tax shall be at the rate of 55 cents for
each $500 or fractional part thereof of the actual consideration paid or to be
paid; in the case of instruments securing a debt, the tax shall be at the rate of 55
cents for each $500 of the principal amount of the debt secured.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 277 (1980 & Supp. 1984). The revisor's notes indicate that the
language of this section was substantially unchanged when recodified. 312 Md. at 16364, 538 A.2d at 1189. The only change pertinent to the Dean case was the deletion of
"actual" as a modifier for "consideration." See MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-103
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Kent County also imposes a local transfer tax on instruments conveying title to real property. 46 All taxes are assessed based on the
actual consideration paid to the owner for conveyance of the
property.47
In the spring of 1984 George and Jane Dean (the Deans)
bought two properties in Kent County, Maryland, on which they
paid transfer and recordation taxes.4 8 As sole shareholders, the
Deans created a Maryland corporation in May 1984 to develop and
(1986 & Supp. 1988). Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references hereinafter
refer to the Maryland Code as in effect in 1984.
45. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 278A (1980 & Supp. 1984) (recodified at MD. TAXPROP. CODE ANN. § § 13-202 to -203 (1986 & Supp. 1988)). See 312 Md. at 160, 538 A.2d
at 1188. The relevant portion of § 278A read as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a tax is hereby imposed
upon every written instrument conveying title to real property, or a leasehold
interest therein, offered for record and recorded among the land records in the
State, and on the transfer of title to real property or a leasehold interest therein
on the filing with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation of articles
of sale ....

(b)(l) The tax imposed by this section shall be levied at the rate of .5 percent of the actual consideration paid or to be paid for the conveyance of title
and shall be collected by the clerks of the circuit courts of the counties or the
Department of Assessments and Taxation.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 278A (1980 & Supp. 1984). For a discussion of the revisor's
notes, see supra note 44. As previously noted, the only pertinent change was the deletion of "actual" as a modifier for "consideration." See MD. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. § 13-

203 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
46. KEN - COUNTY, MD., CODE § 9-25 (1986). The relevant portion provides as
follows:
(a) The County Commissioners may impose a tax upon every instrument
of writing conveying title to real property offered for record and recorded in
Kent County with the Clerk of the Circuit Court ....
(b) The tax authorized by this section shall be levied at the rate of not
more than one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the actual consideration paid or to
be paid for the conveyance of title and shall be collected by the Clerk of the
Circuit Court prior to his accepting any such instrument for recordation.
Id. The discussion in the text focuses on MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 277, 278A (1980 &
Supp. 1984), although the court's conclusions regarding "actual consideration" also are
pertinent to the imposition of the tax under the Kent County ordinance.
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 277, 278A (1980 & Supp. 1984) (recodified at MD.
TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 12-103, 13-203 (1986 & Supp. 1988)); KENT COUNTY, MD.,
CODE § 9-25 (1986). For the text of the statutes and the ordinance, see supra notes 4446.
48. 312 Md. at 166, 538 A.2d at 1190-91 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). George andjane
Dean (the Deans) bought the two properties in Kent County as tenants by the entireties.
Id. at 156, 538 A.2d at 1186. This is a tenancy created between husband and wife by
which they hold title to the whole with right of survivorship. At the death of either, the
other takes the whole to the exclusion of the deceased's heirs. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1313-14 (5th ed. 1979). The Deans purchased the Bacchus House on January 2, 1984,
for $130,000 and the Imperial Hotel on April 15, 1984, for $175,000. 312 Md. at 156.
538 A.2d at 1186.
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manage the properties. 49 The corporation subsequently issued to
the Deans a total of fifty shares of stock which had no real value at
the time of issuance because the corporation owned no assets.5 0
The Deans conveyed both properties to the corporation in September 1984 without receiving payment or additional shares of stock. 5
The Deans submitted the deed for recordation along with an
affidavit stating the conveyance had been made without consideration. 5' The Clerk of the Court 53 refused to record the deed without
payment of recording-and transfer taxes as required by article 81,
sections 277 and 278A. 4 The Deans then revised the affidavit to
include $305,000, the total cost of the two properties, as the amount
paid for the property transfer. 5 The Clerk of the Court assessed
the state and county recordation and transfer taxes, which the Deans
paid under protest.5 6 The Deans appealed when the Clerk of the
Court denied their request for a refund.5 7
The only issue the court examined was whether the actual consideration statutorily required to impose transfer and recordation
taxes existed when the Deans conveyed the properties to their corporation.5" After defining the terms "actual" and "consideration,"5 9 the court rejected the Deans' contention that "actual
49.
50.
51.
52.

312 Md. at 156, 538 A.2d at 1186.
Id. at 156-57, 538 A.2d at 1186.
Id. at 157, 538 A.2d at 1186.
Id. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 277(b)(3), 278A(b)(3) (1980 & Supp. 1984), re-

quired the amount of actual consideration to be stated in the written instrument convey-

ing the property or in a separate affidavit accompanying the instrument. Id.
53. The Clerk of the Circuit Court for Kent County, Earl H. Pinder, was the respondent in this case. 312 Md. at 157, 538 A.2d at 1186.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Deans appealed the decision to the Maryland Tax Court, which affirmed the
assessment by the Clerk of the Court, finding that the increase in the value of the stock
was an economic benefit constituting the actual consideration on which to assess the
taxes. Id. at 157-58, 538 A.2d at 1186. The Circuit Court for Kent County reversed,
holding that the increased value of the stock was not consideration for the conveyance.
Id. at 158, 538 A.2d at 1186. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's
decision, and held that the increase in the stock's value was a "real and substantial benefit" constituting actual consideration for the conveyance. 70 Md. App. at 262-63, 520
A.2d at 1124.
58. 312 Md. at 156, 158, 538 A.2d at 1186-87.
59. Id. at 161-62, 538 A.2d at 1188. "Actual" is defined as "[existing in fact or
reality" and "[being, existing, acting at the present moment; current." THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 21 (2d ed. 1987). The legal definition is

similar: "[r]eal; substantial; existing presently in fact; having a valid objective existence
as opposed to that which is merely theoretical or possible." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY,
supra note 48, at 33. Black's Law Dictionary defines "consideration" as "[t]he inducement
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consideration" as used in the statutes should be restricted solely to
60 Relying on Pritchett v. Kidwell,6
money or other tangible property.
the court found that the actual consideration "paid or to be paid"
under the statutes should be determined by the economic facts of
the conveyance, that is, whether the grantor realized economic benefits as a result of the transfer. 62 The deletion of the term "actual"
when the statutes were recodified, 63 along with the revisor's statement that no substantive changes had been made in the new language from the prior provisions,64 provided further evidence that
the legislature never intended that the term "actual" be given the
limited meaning urged by the Deans. The legislative history also
supported the court's broad interpretation of "actual consideration." While neither statute originally required the amount of consideration to be included in the instrument conveying title,
amendments to both statutes later required that it be stated in every
instrument taxable under those provisions or in an affidavit accompanying the instrument. 6 5 The court interpreted these amendments
to mean that the legislature wanted taxes assessed on the real value
of a transfer rather than on a "formalistic recital" and that the term
was not to be narrowly construed.6 6
The court dismissed the argument that no consideration existed because the Deans were merely changing the title and form of
ownership rather than conveying their property to another party.6 7
The court explained that a corporation is a legal entity, distinct and
separate from its stockholders, that takes title to real property in its
own capacity." The court analogized the situation with that in Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia,6 9 where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the conveyance of
property from an unincorporated business trust to a limited partto a contract.... [A] right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party ...
Id. at
277.
60. 312 Md. at 162, 538 A.2d at 1188.
61. 55 Md. App. 206, 461 A.2d 57 (1983).
62. 312 Md. at 162, 538 A.2d at 1189.
63. id. See Mn. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 12-103, 13-203 (1986 & Supp. 1988); supra
notes 44-45.
64. 312 Md. at 162-63, 538 A.2d at 1189. The court traditionally relies on the revisor's notes when determining the legislature's purpose in enacting a statute. See Allers
v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 683, 309 A.2d 476, 480 (1973) (holding that it was proper to
consider a revision commission report for purposes of determining legislative intent).
65. Act ofJuly 1, 1978, ch. 462, 1978 Md. Laws 1624, 1625-26.
66. 312 Md. at 163, 538 A.2d at 1189.
67. Id. at 163-65, 538 A.2d at 1189-90.
68. Id. at 164, 538 A.2d at 1189.
69. 433 A.2d 1075 (D.C. 1981).
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nership (in which the principals of each were virtually the same) was
a transfer of real property between separate legal entities for consideration and therefore was subject to a recordation tax. 70 The court
indicated a property conveyance between distinct legal entities
would be subject to the recordation tax even if the individuals comprising the entities were one and the same. 7 Similarly, the conveyance from the Deans to the corporation was also a transfer between
distinct legal entities and thus a complete change in ownership, not
a simple change in a previously recorded title.72
Finally, the court rejected the Deans' contention that the Court
of Special Appeals had inappropriately taxed them on the consideration they might receive on a future sale of their stock. 7s The increased value of the stock due to increased corporate assets after the
transfer and the more limited personal liability for the mortgages,
liens, and encumbrances on the properties available to them as corporate shareholders was a present benefit.74 That benefit constituted the actual consideration statutorily required to impose
recordation and transfer taxes.
Judge Eldridge, writing for the dissent, objected to the resulting double taxation because it was inappropriate for what was essentially one transaction, a viewpoint consistent with the legislative
intent.15 In his view, the property transfer from the Deans to the
corporation was merely a change in ownership because, as sole
shareholders, the Deans effectively were the corporation. Had the
corporation existed earlier, it could have purchased the properties
directly, and transfer and recordation taxes would have been paid
only once. Instead, the Deans paid a double tax because they
bought the properties before creating the corporation.7 6 Other
courts have exempted similar transactions from transfer and recordation taxes. 7 7 The dissent further reasoned that it is well-settled
law that "tax statutes should not be construed and applied so as to
70. Id. at 1075.
71. Id. at 1080.
72. 312 Md. at 165, 538 A.2d at 1190.
73. Id.
74. Id. The dissent noted the record did not fully support the majority's contention
of the Deans' more limited personal liability because after the transfer, the lender required individual guarantees from the Deans. See id. at 168-69 n.3, 538 A.2d at 1192 n.3
(Eldridge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 166, 538 A.2d at 1190.
76. Id. at 167, 538 A.2d at 1191 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
77. Id. See, e.g., Senfour Inv. Co. v. King County, 66 Wash. 2d 67, 70, 401 P.2d 319,
321 (1965) (transfer of quitclaim deed to property owned before incorporation to subsequently created corporation did not constitute a conveyance for valuable consideration).
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result in double taxation. 781
The court's mechanical application of the transfer and recordation statutes demonstrates its desire to adhere to form rather than
substance. Apparently transfers between distinct legal entities will
be taxed unless exempt under a specific statutory exception,
although it is questionable whether the court will go to the lengths
described by the dissent.7 9 The court adopted an expansive meaning of the term "actual consideration" in the context of assessment
of transfer and recordation taxes for transfers between legal entities.
Indeed, any economic benefit realized by the grantor from a conveyance of property will be viewed as actual consideration for the assessment of these taxes regardless of the form it takes and
regardless of the parties' intentions.
C.

Intergovernmental Immunity

In State Department of Assessments & Taxation v. Maryland National
Bank ' 0 the Court of Appeals held that the State may include interest
received on Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) consolidated bonds
when calculating Maryland National Bank's (Bank's) net income for
the measurement of state franchise taxes."' The taxpayer Bank
challenged the taxation as violative of title 12, section 1433 of the
United States Code, 2 but the court concluded that the interest on
the FHLB bonds was an allowable inclusion for the calculation of a
nondiscriminatory franchise tax.8"
In particular, the taxpayer sought a refund of the franchise tax
imposed on $2,818,727.79 of interest received from FHLB bonds8 4
on the theory that section 1433 specifically bans such taxation. The
statute reads in part as follows: "Any and all notes, debentures,
See also Wetherbee v. State, 132 Vt. 165, 167, 315 A.2d 251. 253 (1974) (property
deeded to a corporation to secure a loan was exempt from transfer tax).
78. 312 Md. at 169-70, 538 A.2d at 1192 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrated the absurd result that could occur if the majority's mechanical application were
used in other situations. For example, if a married couple held property as tenants in
common and later conveyed the property to themselves as tenants by the entireties, they
would transfer the property not to themselves as individuals, but as a distinct legal entity, the marital unit. Under the majority's analysis, such a conveyance would be taxable
as a transfer from two individuals to a separate legal entity. Id. at 170, 538 A.2d at 1192.
79. See supra note 78.
80. 310 Md. 664, 531 A.2d 294 (1987), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 2812 (1988).
81. Id. at 671, 531 A.2d at 298.
82. 12 U.S.C. § 1433 (1982) (originally enacted as Federal Home Loan Bank Act of
July 22, 1932, ch. 522, § 13, 47 Stat. 735 (1932)).
83. 310 Md. at 672, 531 A.2d at 298.
84. Id.at 666. 531 A.2d at 295.
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bonds and other such obligations issued by any bank, and consolidated Federal Home Loan Bank bonds and debentures, shall be exempt both as to principal and interest from all taxation (except
surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) . .8.5." The taxpayer
argued that section 1433 not only states that the FHLB bonds are
exempt from taxation, but furthermore, because Congress did not
list franchise taxes as one of the specific exceptions to the ban on
taxation, the bonds and the interest on them are exempt.8 6
First, the taxpayer asserted that if the statutory language of the
bond interest exemption only applies to direct taxes, then it is mere
surplusage to parenthetically except certain indirect taxes."7
Although the court acknowledged that the mechanics of statutory
construction usually avoid construing words as surplusage, it reasoned that the history of the statute demands a flexible reading."8
The State claimed that the taxpayer incorrectly relied on title
12, section 1433, and that the controlling statute was title 31, section 3124(a)," 9 which provides:
Stocks and obligations of the United States government are
exempt from taxation by a State or political subdivision of
a State. The exemption applies to each form of taxation
that would require the obligation, the interest on the obligation, or both, to be considered in computing a tax, except(1)
a nondiscriminatory franchise tax or another
non-property tax instead of a franchise tax, imposed on a
corporation .... 90
While this statute appears to conflict directly with title 12, section 1433, the court interpreted both statutes so as to give full effect
to each."' That is, the court reconciled the statutes by reading section 1433 "in the light of the direct tax-indirect measurement distinction" which was prevalent in 1932, when section 1433 was
enacted." This distinction separates taxes imposed directly on the
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1433 (1982).
86. 310 Md. at 669, 531 A.2d at 297.
87. Id. at 672, 531 A.2d at 298.

88. Id.
89. 31 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (1982).
90. Id.

91. 310 Md. at 670, 531 A.2d at 297.
92. Id. "Title 31, § 3124(a) later abolished the long standing legal distinction in the
intergovernmental immunity context between direct tax and indirect measurement, but
the abolition was accompanied by an express federal consent to using interest on federal
obligations to compute a nondiscriminatory franchise tax." Id. at 671, 531 A.2d at 298.
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bonds' principal and interest, with those taxes which are simply
measured by income, such as franchise taxes on the privilege of doing business in a state.9" Accordingly, the court found that the Maryland franchise tax does not violate title 12, section 1433, because
neither the bonds nor the interest on them were directly taxed.9 4
Rather, "Maryland has taxed the privilege of doing business as a
financial institution in corporate form." 9 5 The State measured this
franchise tax by net income which, in this case, includes interest received on FHLB bonds. 9 6 The principal theory underlying the direct-indirect tax measurement concept is that the State has
conferred a privilege on the taxpayer which the State alone has the
power to withhold and, therefore, the power to tax. The court reagovernment
soned that the tax does not burden the United States
97
because the State is taxing a State-created privilege.
Next, the taxpayer argued that the FHLB bonds should not be
considered "obligations of the United States Government" within
the meaning of title 31, section 3124(a), because title 12, section
1435, requires that all FHLB obligations "shall plainly state that
such obligations are not obligations of the United States and are not
guaranteed by the United States.''98 The court found this argument
to be particularly weak. 9 9 Even if the FHLB bonds were not included as obligations of the United States government under title
31, section 3124, the State could include the income from "federal
obligations" in calculating the franchise tax. t10 After examining the
history of obligations producing tax-free interest, the court concluded that "section 3124(a) obligations include FHLB bonds."' 0 '
Finally, the court noted that its "analysis and interpretation of
12 U.S.C. section 1433 [was] shared by the [FHLB] Office of General Counsel."' 0 2 The court described several opinions of the
93. Id. at 670, 531 A.2d at 298.
94. Id., 531 A.2d at 297-98.
95. Id. at 670-71, 531 A.2d at 298.
96. Id. See also Commissioner of Revenue v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 384
Mass. 607, 617-18, 428 N.E.2d 297, 304 (1981) (holding that interest earned on federal
obligations should not be excluded when computing excise tax imposed for privilege of
doing business in state); Reuben L. Anderson-Cherne, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 303 Minn. 124, 130, 226 N.W.2d 611, 615, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 886 (1975)
(interest on federal securities held properly included in corporate net income for purposes of determining franchise tax).
97. 310 Md. at 668, 531 A.2d at 296.
98. Id. at 672, 531 A.2d at 298. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1435 (1982).
99. 310 Md. at 672-73, 531 A.2d at 298-99.
100. Id. at 673, 531 A.2d at 299.
101. ld. at 674, 531 A.2d at 299.
102. Id.
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FHLB board distinguishing a direct tax and a franchise tax measured by net income.' 0 3 Although these opinions concerned another sentence in section 1433,04 the court felt that the same
interpretation was persuasive in this instance.' 0 5 Thus, the court
concluded that, when calculating a nondiscriminatory franchise tax,
Maryland may include income received on FHLB consolidated
bonds, because the franchise tax is not a direct tax on the bond principal or interest but rather a tax based on income which includes the
bonds and the interest on them.
The court displayed its reluctance to adopt the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity to tax-exempt interest income received
by local franchises. State financial institutions must report their taxexempt income to the State so that the State may assess the true net
income for purposes of imposing state franchise taxes. Without this
investment income inclusion, the State would impose a franchise tax
based on low false net earnings, which would in effect reduce state
tax revenues.
D. Foreign Corporate Income Tax
In Random House, Inc. v. Comptrollerof the Treasury 106 the Court of
Appeals held that under article 81, section 316(c),' 0 ' the Comptroller of the Treasury may alter the standard method of calculating a
state tax apportionment of business income if the apportionment
produced meets constitutional standards. 0 8 In calculating the
Maryland percentage of apportionable basis for a unitary business,
103. Id. at 674-75, 531 A.2d at 299-300. In one such opinion, the General Counsel
concluded:
Since the tax immunity of Federal Home Loan Bank stock under § 13 of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act is no greater than that of the securities in
Tradesmens [National Bank of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n .. .] (Federal
Reserve Bank stock) or Werner (Machine Co. v. Dir. of Div. of Taxation] (United
States Treasury bonds), in our view there appears to be no legal impediment to
inclusion of Federal Home Loan Bank stock dividends in the income of savings
and loan associations for the purpose of determining the franchise tax imposed
by [the Florida statute].
Id. at 675, 531 A.2d at 300 (quoting Opinion of FHLB Gen. Counsel (Jan. 13, 1976)).
104. The second sentence of 12 U.S.C. § 1433 (1982) states in relevant part that "the
bank, including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus, its advances, and its income, shall be exempt from all taxation ....." Id.
105. 310 Md. at 675-76, 531 A.2d at 300.
106. 310 Md. 696, 531 A.2d 683 (1987).
107. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980 & Supp. 1987) (recodified at MD. TAXGEN. CODE ANN. § 10-402(d) (1988)). For the pertinent text of § 316(c), see infra text
accompanying note 120.
108. 310 Md. at 709, 531 A.2d at 689.
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the Comptroller used a three-factor formula that included tangible
property, payroll, and sales elements.' 0 9 This methodology for apportioning the amount of a foreign corporation's corporate income
that relates to its intrastate activities passed constitutional
muster.' 1o
Taxpayer Random House, a New York corporation whose general place of business is in that State, regularly contracts with authors to publish literary works and sell these works throughout the
United States."' The publishing contract ordinarily specifies "subsidiary rights," which are rights "granted to the publisher and not
reserved by the author."' " 12 These subsidiary rights encompass
magazine rights, newspaper syndication, dramatizations, special editions, translations, abridgments, and condensations.' 3
In calculating the tax assessment, the Comptroller "added into
the apportionable basis Random House's subsidiary rights income
and then applied to the increased basis the Maryland apportionment
' 4
percentage developed by Random House for use in its return." "
The taxpayer did not dispute that the income produced from the
subsidiary rights was part of the unitary business conducted by the
publisher in Maryland." 5 Indeed, in Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller"' 6 the
Court of Appeals held that article 81, section 316(c), which refers to
the allocation of corporate income, includes business income from
the intangible property of a unitary business to the extent constitutionally permissible." 7 Rather, the taxpayer contended "that if subsidiary rights income is to be included in the apportionable basis,
then both the sales factor and ...

the property factor must be ad-

109. Id. at 701, 531 A.2d at 685. The formula used to calculate the net business income apportioned to Maryland was: 1/3 X [(Md. tangible property + all tangible property) + (Md. payroll - all payroll) + (Md. sales - all sales)] = Md. % of basis
apportionable. Id.
110. Id. at 709, 531 A.2d at 689.
111. Id. at 698, 531 A.2d at 684.
112. Id.at 699, 531 A.2d at 684.
113. W. DERENBERG & A. LATMAN, CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN BOOK PUBLISHING,
MAGAZINE PUBLISHING AND ADVERTISING 36 (1970).

114. 310 Md. at 701, 531 A.2d at 685.
115. Id. In an earlier case regarding its Maryland returns for 1977 and 1978 the taxpayer argued that the subsidiary rights constituted a distinct and separate business from
the publishing of hardback editions. Because this separate business was not conducted
in Maryland, the taxpayer argued, the income earned from it should not be allocated to
Maryland. Id. at 700, 531 A.2d at 684. The Maryland Tax Court held "that the sale or
licensing of subsidiary rights was part of Random House's unitary business so that subsidiary rights income was apportionable to Maryland." Id., 531 A.2d at 685.
116. 290 Md. 126, 428 A.2d 1208 (1981).
117. Id. at 142, 428 A.2d at 1213.
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justed;' t8 otherwise, the publisher's Maryland income would be
distorted.' '9
Article 81, section 316(c), states in part:
The Comptroller of the Treasury shall have the right, in
those cases where circumstances warrant, to alter any of
the above rules as to the use of the separate accounting
method or the formula method, the weight to be given the
various factors in the formula, the manner of valuation of
rented property included in the property factor and the determination of the extent to which tangible personal
prop20
erty is permanently located within the State.'
Under this section, the Comptroller has the discretion to reflect the
value of the subsidiary rights in the property or sales factors.' 2 ' The
Comptroller, however, decided not to employ this methodology for
this particular taxpayer. 122 That is, the Comptroller felt it necessary
to adjust the property or sales factors of the standard assessment
formula to reflect the value placed on the intangible property,
namely the subsidiary rights. 121 Because the taxpayer carries no
balance sheet value for its subsidiary rights 1 2 4 "the numerical values
to be inserted into the statutory formula" would be based on "assumptions, analogies and other judgmental opinions." 125 The difficulty in valuing the subsidiary rights was aggravated by the fact that
"the sales life of a work can extend beyond the year in which rights,
including subsidiary rights, were acquired by the publisher."'1 26 It is

possible, however, to record a value for the sales factor of the
formula by calculating the gross income received from the subsidi118. 310 Md. at 701, 531 A.2d at 685.
119. Id.
120. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980 & Supp. 1987) (recodified at MD. TAXGEN. CODE ANN. § 10-402(d) (1988)).
121. Id.
122. 310 Md. at 705, 531 A.2d at 687.
123. Id. at 700, 531 A.2d at 685.
124. Id. at 702, 531 A.2d at 686.
125. Id. at 705, 531 A.2d at 687.
126. Id. at 702, 531 A.2d at 686. More specifically, the taxpayer does not value its
individual subsidiary rights, but instead employs a method that values all of the rights it
has acquired in works currently in print. Id. at 703, 531 A.2d at 686. The publisher
assumes that "70% of the sales from each adult division work will be produced in the
first year of publication and that the remaining 30% of sales will occur the following
year." Id. The future portion of the profit is reduced to present value to reflect the
current value of the subsidiary rights. Id. at 702-03, 531 A.2d at 686. The court stated,
however, that this methodology "fails to segregate the pretax profits produced by subsidiary rights from the pretax profits produced by all other unitary business sources." Id.
at 703, 531 A.2d at 686.
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ary rights to obtain a figure known as "addback royalty income. "127
Relying on its own calculations of the property value of the subsidiary rights and the addback royalty income, the taxpayer
presented the Maryland Tax Court with four possible methods for
computing the tax assessment and argued that the value of the subsidiary rights should be reflected in the denominator of the property
factor.' 2 ' The Tax Court was not convinced that the methodology
employed by Random House "produce[d] a more accurate appor29
tionment formula than the one calculated by the Comptroller."'1
Random House therefore had the burden of showing that the difference between its proposed assessments and the Comptroller's assessment was grossly disproportionate or, as stated in Hans Rees'
Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina,'s° "out of all appropriate proportion to
the business transacted ....
In Random House proving disproportionality was particularly difficult because no reliable reference point or guideline had been established. Accordingly, the court relied on ContainerCorp. of America
v. Franchise Tax Board' 2 for guidance. In that case, which involved
California's three-factor apportionment formula, the Supreme
Court held that a fourteen percent difference between the taxpayer's proposed assessment and that determined by the assessor
was "certainly within the substantial margin of error inherent in any
method of attributing income among the components of a unitary
business.'"" In Random House the Comptroller's assessment did
not exceed any of the publisher's proposals by more than 9.72 percent. ' 4 This amount, the court declared, was reasonable in light of
the existing Supreme Court precedent. 3 5 In Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
127. Id. at 704, 531 A.2d at 686-87.
128. Id., 531 A.2d at 687. The taxpayer also argued that no apportionment of
addback royalty income nor any value for intangible property should be made to Maryland because "New York is almost always the place of formation of the contracts to
publish under which Random House acquires subsidiary rights and because New York is
most often the place of formation of the contracts to sell or license subsidiary rights."
Id. at 705, 531 A.2d at 687.
129. id.at 705, 531 A.2d at 687.
130. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
131. Id. at 135.
132. 463 U.S. 159 (1982).
133. Id. at 184.
134. 310 Md. at 705, 531 A.2d at 687.
135. Id. at 706, 531 A.2d at 688. See also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207 (1980), where the Court held that the due process clause does not prevent
a state from applying its apportionment formula to a corporation's total income. Id. at
219-20. The Court stated that to satisfy the due process clause, both a "minimal connection" between the corporation's activities and the taxing state and "a rational rela-
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Department of Revenue,' 6 for example, the Court held that if a company is a unitary business, then a state may apply an apportionment
formula to the taxpayer's total income to obtain a rough approximation of the corporate income that is "reasonably
related to the activ' 37
State."'
taxing
the
within
ities conducted
Lastly, the Random House court found that including the income
from subsidiary rights in the basis without reflecting it in the property factor approximates the true corporate income and, therefore,
38
is within the margin of error established for unitary businesses.
Thus, because the publisher failed to prove "disproportionality to a
constitutionally significant degree,"' 3 9 the court rejected
the tax40
payer's arguments that the assessment was unfair.'
The decision in Random House is based on the Comptroller's
power to determine what apportionment formula will be used to calculate corporate income tax. The Comptroller may use any methodology as long as the result is within the constitutional limitations
established in the case law. The burden of proving disproportionality to a constitutionally significant degree rests with the taxpayer.
The court, however, did not clearly define the concept of gross disproportion, so it is uncertain exactly what burden a taxpayer must
meet in challenging the Comptroller's calculations.
ELAINE COSTELLO

ELLEN

E. GIBLIN

tionship between the income attributable to the state and the intrastate values of the
enterprise" must exist. Id.
136. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
137. Id. at 223.
138. 310 Md. at 706, 531 A.2d at 688.

139. Id. at 707, 531 A.2d at 688.
140. Id.

XI.
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TORTS

Negligence

1. Sexually Transmitted Diseases.-On certification, the Court of
Appeals in B.N. v. KK' held that a cause of action may lie in negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud resulting from the sexual transmission of genital herpes.' The Court of
Appeals applied traditional tort law concepts 3 to answer this question of first impression.4
BetweenJuly and October 1983, B.N. (Ms. N) and K.K. (Dr. K)
were involved in an intimate relationship and engaged in sexual intercourse.5 The two met while working at Johns Hopkins Hospital
in Baltimore.6 During the time of their involvement, Dr. K knew,
but never disclosed to Ms. N, that he had genital herpes.7 Ms. N had
no reason to suspect that Dr. K was a carrier. 8 Around October 1,
1983, the two had sexual intercourse at a time when Dr. K knew his
disease was active and thus transmittible.9 As a result, Ms. N contracted genital herpes.'" Ms. N maintained a monogamous lifestyle
throughout their relationship."
Ms. N filed suit in the United States District Court for the Dis1. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988). This case was certified to the Court of
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The question posed was as follows: "Does Maryland Recognize A Cause of Action for Either
Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Or Negligence Resulting From the
Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous, Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes?" Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176. For the purposes of answering this certified
question, the United States District Court instructed the Court of Appeals to assume the
sufficiency of the facts as stated in the complaint. Id., 538 A.2d at 1177.
2. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176.
3. Id. at 139, 538 A.2d at 1177. The Court of Appeals noted that a cause of action
in negligence has been recognized for the transmission of a contagious disease in several
states. Id. at 139 n.2, 538 A.2d at 1177 n.2. See Smith v. Baker, 20 F. Cas. 709, 710 (C.C.
S.D.N.Y. 1884) (whooping cough); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 210, 23 N.W. 632,
634 (1885) (smallpox); Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. App. 1910)
(smallpox); Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107, 108-09 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1953) (tuberculosis); Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 435, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (1896) (typhoid fever).
4. 312 Md. at 139, 538 A.2d at 1177.
5. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177.
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trict of Maryland"2 alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, and assault and battery.'" That court certified
the question of whether the first three counts against Dr. K were
cognizable causes of action in Maryland for the transmission of a
"dangerous, contagious, incurable disease, such as genital
herpes."' 4 The Court of Appeals held that, provided the complainant met the burden of factual proof, Maryland would recognize a
cause of action for each of the three counts.'" The Court of Appeals
addressed the viability of each cause of action,
albeit in reverse or6
der as presented to it by the district court.'
First, the Court of Appeals analyzed the negligence cause of action. The Maryland courts have identified four elements necessary
to maintain a cause of action in negligence: (1) a duty, (2) a breach
of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the breach of duty and
the subsequent injury, and (4) actual damage.' 7 The Court of Appeals ruled that a cause of action could be maintained in negligence
based on the facts in Ms. N's complaint.' 8
The concept of duty is premised on the "responsibility each of
us bears to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to
others.'" 9 Central to this notion of duty is the foreseeability of
harm2 ° to an identifiable plaintiff.2 ' Ms. N alleged that Dr. K knew
2 2
his genital herpes was active at the time of sexual intercourse; if
this was true, it would be reasonably foreseeable that Ms. N would
be harmed as a consequence of Dr. K's actions. s As a result of this
knowledge, Dr. K "had a duty to either refrain from sexual contact
with Ms. N or to warn her of his condition. 21 4 As Dr. K did neither,
12. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177.
13. Id. at 139, 538 A.2d at 1177. Due to a statute of limitations problem, the Court
of Appeals was not asked to address the viability of a cause of action for assault and
battery. Id. at 139 n.1, 538 A.2d at 1177 n.I.
14. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 139, 538 A.2d at 1177. The reason for this reversal is apparent in the
Court of Appeals' treatment of the fraud count. See infra note 50 and accompanying
text.
17. 312 Md. at 141, 538 A.2d at 1178 (citing W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)).

18. Id.at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179.
19. Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11,15 (1975) (products liability
case where court discusses manufacturer's duty to produce safe product).
20. 312 Md. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179.
21. Id. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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he breached his duty of care to Ms. N.2 5 This breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the herpes that Ms. N contracted. 2 6 Because Ms.
N's complaint alleged a duty and breach of that duty on the part of
Dr. K, which resulted in an injury to her, the Court of Appeals held
that Ms. N stated a cognizable cause of action for negligence.2 7
The court next considered the independent tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 8 In Maryland this tort is comprised
of four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct which is (2)
extreme and outrageous, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) severe emotional distress.2 9
The court found that Ms. N's complaint satisfied the first three elements of the tort, but that she would have to prove severity in order
to recover under this theory."0
If, as alleged, Dr. K engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms. N at
a time when his disease was contagious, then such conduct satisfies
the intentional or reckless conduct component of the tort. 3 ' It follows then that these actions were a result of extreme and outrageous
behavior 3 2 and that the transmission was causally related to Ms. N's
33
emotional distress.
Upon analyzing the fourth element of the tort, the Court of Appeals stated that Ms. N would have to demonstrate the severity of
her emotional distress at trial in order to recover under this cause of
action.3 4 The requisite severity, however, is not to be defined as
"total emotional or physical disablement." ' - 5 That is, to prove severity, Ms. N will be required to show that Dr. K's acts were "so
horrible, so atrocious and so barbaric that no civilized person could
be expected to endure them without suffering mental distress
.. . 36 Only then could a jury find that Ms. N has suffered the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1179. The independent tort of intentional infliction of

emotional distress was first recognized as a cause of action in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md.
560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977). 312 Md. at 144, 538A.2dat 1179.
29. 312 Md. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1179-80.
30. Id. at 148-49, 538 A.2d at 1182.
31. Id. at 146, 538 A.2d at 1181.
32. Id. at 147, 538 A.2d at 1181.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503, 511, 521 A.2d 1246, 1250 (1987) (stepdaughter brought action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her stepfather
for alleged long-term sexual abuse).
36. Id. at 513, 521 A.2d at 1251.
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distress sufficient to support recovery under the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress."
Next the court addressed the viability of Ms. N's allegation of
fraud."8 In Maryland a cause of action for fraud is comprised of the
following five elements: (1) a false representation (2) that is made
with knowledge of falsity or with a reckless indifference to the truth,
(3) the false representation was made with the purpose to defraud
another, (4) the person rightfully relied on the representation as
true, and (5) the person suffered a causally related injury.3 9 While
an action for fraud commonly arises in commercial settings, 40 there
are situations in which liability for physical harm is premised upon
fraudulent misrepresentation. 4 '
The court found persuasive the California case of Kathleen K. v.
Robert B.4 2 There, a cause of action in fraud was found to exist
where a husband affirmatively assured his wife that he was free of a
sexually transmittible disease when in fact he had genital herpes.4 3
Dr. K attempted to distinguish this case on two grounds: (1) Dr. K
claimed he did not affirmatively represent that he was free of genital
herpes, 44 and (2) he claimed there was no confidential relationship
which imposed a duty to speak.4 5 Further, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that a concealment of information by Dr. K would be
actionable only if he had a duty to speak.4 6
The issue of whether a confidential relationship exists is a question of fact.47 Indeed, such a relationship may be found outside the
37. 312 Md. at 149, 538 A.2d at 1182.
38. Id.
39. Suburban Management v.Johnson, 236 Md. 455,460,204 A.2d 326, 329 (1964).
40. 312 Md. at 149, 538 A.2d at 1182. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 525 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)] (fraudulent misrepresentation).
41. SeeJames & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part1, 37 MD. L. REv. 286, 286 (1977) (citing
examples of misrepresentation claims outside the commercial context).
42. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
43. Id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276. See also Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d
165, 170, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1986) (husband concealed from wife fact that he had
genital herpes).
44. 312 Md. at 151, 538 A.2d at 1183.
45. Id. Dr. K claimed "there was no duty to speak since there was no marital or other
confidential relationship between the parties." Id. But see Maharam, 123 A.D.2d at 168,
510 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (determining wife had established cause of action in fraud in part
because marriage relationship imposed a duty to speak). The court in B.., however,
stated that a confidential relationship exists whenever "one party justifiably placed confidence in the other and (when] the other accepted that placement .... " 312 Md. at 151,
538 A.2d at 1183.
46. 312 Md. at 151, 538 A.2d at 1183.
47. Id.
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marriage context. 48 The Court of Appeals, however, did not expressly hold that a duty to speak was imposed on Dr. K by reason of
the existence of a confidential relationship. 49 Despite this refrain,
the Court of Appeals did find a duty to speak by virtue of the general tort duty found in the negligence action against Dr. K.5 °
The Court of Appeals determined that Ms. N reasonably relied
on Dr. K's implied assurances of good health.5 Because Ms. N
would not have engaged in sexual intercourse and therefore would
not have contracted genital herpes had she known that Dr. K was a
carrier of the disease,52 the court found that Ms. N could maintain a
cause of action in fraud.5"
Given the manner in which the United States District Court
worded the certified question,5 4 it is clear that B.N. is not restricted
to those who fail to disclose they have genital herpes prior to engaging in sexual intercourse. The most obvious extension of the holding is to impose a duty on carriers of the acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus to refrain from sexual conduct or
warn partners prior to engaging in sexual relations.5 5 As the cumulative number of reported AIDS cases in Maryland is expected to
rise to over 3700 by 199 1,56 B.AN. represents a potentially important
vehicle for imposing civil liability against individuals who fail to disclose they are carriers of the AIDS virus prior to engaging in sexual
relations.
2. Negligent Misrepresentation.-In Weisman v. Connors5 7 the
Court of Appeals recognized that the relationship between businesspersons engaged in precontractual arm's length negotiations is suffi48. Id. at 152, 538 A.2d at 1183.
49. Id. at 153, 538 A.2d at 1184. The Court of Appeals expressly declined to hold
that a duty to disclose that one has a sexually transmittible disease is confined to a marital relationship. Id. at 152, 538 A.2d at 1184.
50. Id. Had the Court of Appeals addressed the viability of each cause of action in
the order presented to it by the United States District Court, it is uncertain whether the
Court of Appeals would have imposed a duty to speak upon Dr. K by virtue of the confidential relationship between Ms. N and him.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176. See supra note 1.
55. See Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 1016-17, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596-97 (1987)
(wife failed to state claim for either fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress as
wife did not allege that she actually contracted disease from husband or that husband
actually had disease).
56. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, AIDS AND MARYLAND 14 (1986).
57. 312 Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988), revg 69 Md. App. 732, 519 A.2d 795 (1987).
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cient to impose a duty of care on the parties to refrain from making
negligent misrepresentations. In doing so, the court rejected the
employer's contention that the court was creating "a new tort of
promissory negligence for statements of intention or expectation
honestly made" 5 9 and reaffirmed its prior holding in Martens Chevrolet v. Seney. 6 °
In April 1981 Arthur Connors met with Frederick Weisman to
discuss the possibility of Connors's employment with the Frederick
Weisman Company (FWC). 6 Connors, at the time, was a vice president with the Ford Motor Company (Ford), receiving substantial
nonsalary financial benefits in addition to his regular salary. 62 During their conversation, Weisman made a number of statements
which allegedly persuaded Connors to leave Ford and accept employment as a vice president with FWC.6" Four of Weisman's representations, concerning the nature of Connors's new position and
the benefits intended to compensate him for those he would lose by
64
leaving Ford, were included in Connors's employment contract.
Two other representations concerning the nature of the FWC position were not included. When the representations eventually failed
to occur as promised or simply turned out to be false,6 5 Connors
resigned 66 and filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County.6" Connors alleged (1) breach of a written contract by FWC,
(2) breach of an oral contract by Weisman individually, (3) negligent
misrepresentation by Weisman and FWC, and (4) fraud by Weisman
and FWC. 6 s
The trial court dismissed the count alleging a breach of an oral
contract. 69 The jury found in favor of the employee, Connors, on
both the written contract and negligent misrepresentation counts
and for the employers, Weisman and FWC, on the fraud count. 0
58. Id. at 448, 540 A.2d at 792.
59. Id. at 441, 540 A.2d at 789.
60. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
61. 312 Md. at 431, 541 A.2d at 784. Frederick Weisman was the sole owner of the
Frederick Weisman Company (FWC), a holding company whose primary focus was a
large Toyota distributorship, Mid-Atlantic Toyota. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 439, 540 A.2d at 783.
64, Id. at 434-35, 456, 540 A.2d at 786, 797.
65. Id. at 436-37, 540 A.2d at 787.
66. Id. at 438, 540 A.2d at 787.
67. Id. at 431, 540 A.2d at 784.
68, Id. at 431-32, 540 A.2d at 784.
69. Id. at 438, 540 A.2d at 787.
70. Id., 540 A.2d at 787-88. Damages for breach of contract were set at $221,900,
the total of the compensation Connors would have received had he finished the contract
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The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.7" It
rejected Weisman's contentions that (1) businesspersons who bargain at arm's length in a commercial transaction do not owe each
other a tort duty of care, (2) Weisman's representations to Connors
were statements of current intention to which the tort of negligent
misrepresentation does not apply, (3) it is not possible to represent
negligently one's own intentions, and (4) there is no such tort as
"promissory negligence," which at most was all that could be
alleged. 7 2 .
On further appeal, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed.that a duty
of care may, in fact, exist between businesspersons in an arm's
length transaction." The court, however, reversed thejudgment on
the verdict of negligent misrepresentation because four of the six
representations made by Weisman to Connors were submitted improperly to the jury for deliberation."4 The court found there was
insufficient evidence concerning the four statements for supporting
a verdict of negligent misrepresentation. 75 Because the court did
not know which of the six statements the jury relied on to find in
favor of Connors, the Court of Appeals directed the Court of Special Appeals to remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial in
which the evidence would be limited to the two properly submitted
representations. 71
In assessing the duty of care existing between Weisman and
Connors, the Court of Appeals found it necessary to trace the evolution of negligent misrepresentation under Maryland law. 77 The tort
of negligent misrepresentation was first recognized in Virginia Dare
Stores v. Schuman.7 8 In the subsequent case of Holt v. Kolker,7 9 the
negligent misrepresentation cause of action was limited to cases inwith Ford Motor Company (Ford) plus the cost of the benefits Weisman failed to provide. Damages for negligent misrepresentation included the present value of all compensation and benefits he would have received had he stayed with Ford until his
retirement less the compensation actually received from FWC, which totaled
$2,705,961. Counsel for both parties later agreed to reduce the negligent misrepresentation award by an amount equal to the breach of contract damages, resulting in a net
damage amount of $2,484,061. Id., 540 A.2d at 788.
71. 69 Md. App. 732, 755, 519 A.2d 795, 806 (1987).
72. Id. at 746, 519 A.2d at 801.
73. 312 Md. at 451, 540 A.2d at 794.
74. Id. at 460, 540 A.2d at 799.
75. Id. at 456, 540 A.2d at 797.
76. Id. at 460-61, 540 A.2d at 799.
77. For a thorough discussion of negligent misrepresentation in Maryland, see generally Comment, The Perimeters of Liability for Negligent Misrepresentationin Marland,48 MD.
L. REV. 384 (1989).
78. 175 Md. 287, 291-92, 1 A.2d 897, 899 (1938) (action for negligent misrepresen-
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volving personal injury."0 Fifteen years later, Brack v. Evans8 eliminated this restriction in holding that the action could lie in cases
where the only loss was economic in nature. 2
In 1982 the Court of Appeals decided Martens Chevrolet v.
Seney. .13 In Martens Chevrolet the seller of an automobile dealership
allegedly misrepresented the profitability of the enterprise to the
buyer during presale negotiations. The misrepresentation was
found in a negligently prepared accounting "trend sheet."'8 4 The
Martens Chevrolet decision is important because it clarified and listed
the elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. 5 More importantly, the decision asserted that an action in negligent misrepresentation could be sustained even where the parties' only
relationship was an arm's length transaction.8 6 Although the court
was unable to cite authority for its assertion, the court found no evidence to the contrary in prior Maryland case law.8 7
tation where a dress display case, upon which an individual was standing, collapsed after
manager's assurance it would support his weight).
79. 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948).
80. Id. at 639, 57 A.2d at 288.
81. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
82. Id. at 555, 187 A.2d at 883. See also 312 Md. at 444, 540 A.2d at 791-92.
83. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
84. Id. at 331-32, 439 A.2d at 536-37. The sheet failed to list certain costs that the
business had incurred, which, had they been included, would have shown the dealership
to be operating at a large loss rather than a slight profit as the purchaser was led to
believe. Id.
85. Id. at 337, 439 A.2d at 539. The Martens court stated the elements of the tort of
negligent misrepresentation as follows:
(1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a
false statement;
(2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the
plaintiff;
(3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the
statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
(4) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; and
(5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Id.
86. Id. at 338 n.7, 439 A.2d at 539-40 n.7.
87. Id. The court stated: "Appellees have also argued that ... negligent misrepresentation... can never be applied to statements made in connection with consummation of an arm's length transaction, as was involved in the present case. We find nothing
in Virginia Dare or its progeny to support such a sweeping assertion and we reject it." Id.
This was as close as the Martens Chevrolet court came to discussing the existence of a tort
duty of care between the parties. The court primarily was concerned with reaffirming
the viability of the tort of negligent misrepresentation, which had been cast into doubt
by Delmarva Drilling Co.v. Tuckahoe Shopping Center, Inc., 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37
(1973). Martens Chevrolet, 292 Md. at 336, 439 A.2d at 539. In Delmarva the plaintiff
prevailed at trial in a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 268 Md. at 422, 302 A.2d at
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Finally, in 1986 the court in Jacques v. First NationalBank"8 identified two major factors relevant in determining of whether a tort
duty of care exists between two parties: (1) the nature of the harm
likely to result from a failure to exercise due care and (2) the relationship that exists between the parties.8 9 The Jacques court also
noted that where the loss suffered is purely pecuniary, as opposed to
personal injury, courts generally have required an "intimate nexus"
between the parties before a tort duty of care arises. This nexus can
consist of either contractual privity or its equivalent.9"
The Weisman court also considered InternationalProducts Co. v.
Erie R.R. Co., ' which involved a suit for negligent misrepresentation brought by a bailor against his bailee. Weisman quoted the Erie
court's discussion of the issue of duty, which included among the list
of duty considerations (1) knowledge that the information was desired for a serious purpose, (2) the recipient intended to rely on the
information, and (3) harm was likely to result if the information was

39. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, reasoning that proof of scienter was lacking, id. at 427, 302 A.2d at 41-42, leaving the impression that it wished to eliminate the
tort of negligent misrepresentation. See Note, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation, 35
MD. L. REV. 651, 671-72 (1976). The Martens Chevrolet opinion expressly dispelled this
notion. Martens Chevrolet, 292 Md. at 336, 439 A.2d at 539.
88. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
89. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759. AlthoughJacques did not specifically involve negligent misrepresentation, the case addressed the negligent processing of a loan application by a bank. The WVeisman court found Jacques's general discussion of tort duty to be
relevant. 312 Md. at 445-46, 540 A.2d at 791.
90. Jacques, 307 Md. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60. The Jacques court clarified the
nature of intimate nexus by referring to the decisions in two economic loss cases. See
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); Utramares Corp. v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
In Glanzer the Court of Appeals of New York held that a public weigher of beans
owed a duty of care to the buyer of beans even though the weigher's contract was only
with the seller. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275. In Ultramares, however, the
same court held that public accountants who negligently certified a balance sheet for a
business could not be liable to a factor who relied on the sheet in deciding to extend
loans to the company. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. A factor is defined as
a "commercial agent, employed by a principal to sell merchandise consigned to him for
that purpose, for and in behalf of the principal, but usually in his own name .
Bt.ACK's LAw DICTrONARY 532 (5th ed. 1979).
The court in Ultramares distinguished Glanzer by noting that the weigher's services
primarily were intended for the buyer's benefit, creating a relationship "so close as to
approach that of privity, if not completely one with it," while the factor in Ultra mares was
only one of an "indeterminate class of persons" who might rely on the balance sheet.
Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 446. A duty between the factor and the accountants would expose the latter to "a liability in an indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class." Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
91. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
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false.9 2 The court in Erie continued:
Finally, the relationship of the parties, arising out of the
contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and
good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the
other for information, and the other giving the information
owes a duty to give it with care. An inquiry made of a
stranger is one thing; of a person with whom the inquirer
has entered, or is about to enter, into a contract concerning
the goods which are, or are to be, its subject, is another.9 3
Relying on the strength of these cases, the Weisman court concluded that the evidence before the jury was legally sufficient to allow its finding that Weisman owed Connors a duty of care during
the precontractual negotiation stage. 4 As evidence of the "intimate
nexus" between them, the court stated that the purpose of the meeting was to provide Connors with accurate information about his potential employment, that Connors had a great stake in its accuracy,
and that Weisman "had to realize" that faulty information could
cause significant economic harm to Connors. 5 The court likened
the relationship between the parties to that of the weigher of beans
and the buyer in Glanzer v. Shepard, not to the parties in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, because they both involved intimate, face-to-face
contractual discussions. 6
Finally, the court declared that evidence of a "special relationship" between Weisman and Connors was more compelling than in
Martens Chevrolet, which held that the requisite intimate nexus could
exist between businesspersons dealing at arm's length." In Martens
Chevrolet the court noted that the seller and purchaser of the automobile distributorship might have no further contact once the deal
was consummated. In contrast, Weisman and Connors were about
to form a continuing relationship as employer and employee. 98 Accordingly, the court reaffirmed its holding in Martens Chevrolet that a
tort duty of care can exist between participants in an arm's length
transaction. The court acknowledged that a jury might find an intimate nexus in the Weisman-Connors relationship more easily than
in the dealings between the buyer and seller in Martens Chevrolet.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 338, 155 N.E. at 664.
Id. (citation omitted).
312 Md. at 448, 540 A.2d at 793.
Id. at 449, 540 A.2d at 793.
Id. See supra note 90.
312 Md. at 450, 540 A.2d at 793.
Id.
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The decision in this case, therefore, does little to extend the scope
of liability for the tort of negligent misrepresentation in Maryland.
Weisman's significance.is that the court, for the first time, determined that sophisticated individuals acting in their own best interests 99 may not behave carelessly toward each other under any and
all circumstances. From the court's discussion, the duty appears to
arise when the negotiations between the parties are face to face and
serious economic harm foreseeably could result from negligent behavior. The court's apparent reliance on InternationalProducts Co. v.
Erie R.R. Co. 100 suggests that, if the negotiations are intended .to
lead to a contract, a requisite duty of care is applicable. Indeed, the
cases ofJacques, Glanzer and Martens Chevrolet involved precontractual
dealings. The Glanzer court, however, emphasized the "public calling" of the weigher's profession, a concern similarly echoed inJacques where the court described the public nature of the banking
business. '' While the dictum in Erie seems to support the existence
of a tort duty in Weisman, the relationship in Erie was between a
bailor and a bailee-arguably, a situation very different from the adversarial nature of most arm's length transactions.
Commentators have noted that courts generally have been slow
to extend a duty of care to arm's length situations where the potential harm is solely monetary.'" 2 This is attributed to the fear of uncircumscribed liability of the sort that was guarded against in
0
Ultramares."'
It also has been suggested that the duty will inhibit
99. Black's Law Dictionary defines "arm's length transaction" as one that is "negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self interest." BLACK'S LAw
DIC'IONARY,

supra note 90, at 100.

100. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
10 1. The law usually imposes. a duty of care on individuals who hold themselves out to
the public as having a specialized skill. This includes professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and architects. Jacques v. First Nat'i Bank, 307 Md. 527, 541, 515 A.2d 756, 763
(1986).
The Jacques court also considered other relevant factors to determine the existence
of a tort duty of care where the harm suffered was purely economic. First, the court
noted the vulnerability of the plaintiff-borrowers once the bank began to process their
loan application. The bank knew the borrowers would have to commit to a mortgage if
their loan was approved, even if the bank negligently offered them less than the amount
they needed. Id. at 540-41, 515 A.2d at 762-63. The court also considered whether a
standard of care could be imposed upon the bank. The bank argued that the subjective
nature of evaluating loan applications does not lend itself to the use of a uniform standard of care. The court rejected this argument, however, stating that an industry standard of care may serve as evidence of the standard to be chosen. Id. at 543, 515 A.2d at

764.
102. James & Gray, supra note 41, at 308.
103. Id.
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bargaining in the marketplace." ° Whether one chooses to view the
duty as beneficial or not, it is an indication that while "the law governing misrepresentation is largely business law and reflects the mores of the marketplace, .

.

. it is being tinged increasingly by notions

once thought paternalistic.' 0 5
The Weisman court apparently needed to qualify its holding in
Martens Chevrolet-a holding that offered no criteria to aid a jury in
its determination of whether a duty exists. Yet the intimate nexus
test may leave juries in a similar situation. That is, the nature of the
"special relationship" that will satisfy this test seems to be left open
to further interpretation. Indeed, in Erie, the court stated that "each
case must be decided on the peculiar facts presented." 0 6 Potential
defendants may take some comfort, however, in the fact that a duty
of care does not necessarily exist in all arm's length transactions.
3. Punitive Damages.-InNast v. Lockett10 7 the Court of Appeals
held that the question of punitive damages may be submitted to the
trier of fact in a civil automobile accident case involving an alcoholimpaired driver where the driver exhibited a "wanton or reckless
disregard for human life in the operation of an automobile."1 8 In
so holding, the Court of Appeals applied, for the first time, 0 9 the
standard for awarding punitive damages originally espoused in
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co. "'o

On February 17, 1984, Lois Ann Lockett was traveling southbound on York Road when she attempted to negotiate a U-turn."'
Unable to complete the U-turn, Lockett reversed her car to avoid
the curb. ' " Defendant Charles Carroll Houck, who was heading
northbound on York Road, struck Lockett's car1 1 3 and rebounded
104. Survey of Court of Appeals of Maryland Decisions--MartensChevrolet v. Seney-Extending
the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation, 42 MD. L. REV. 596, 605 (1983).
105. James & Gray, supra note 41, at 300.

106. International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664
(1927).
107. 312 Md. 343, 539 A.2d 1113 (1988).
108. Id. at 351, 539 A.2d at 1117.
109. Id at 352, 539 A.2d at 1117-18.
110. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). The questions addressed in Smith were certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 152,
297 A.2d at 723.
Il. 312 Md. at 347, 539 A.2d at 1115.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 347-48, 539 A.2d at 1115. Nast stated that Houck was approximately 300
feet from Lockett when she first started to make the U-turn. An off-duty policeman who
witnessed the accident, however, estimated the distance between Lockett and Houck at
15-20 feet when he first noticed their vehicles prior to the collision. Id.

856

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 48:844

backwards into an automobile driven by Edward P. Nast, who had
been trailing Lockett southbound on York Road.'" 4 Both Lockett
and Houck had been drinking." 5
. Nast and his passenger, now his wife, filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages from Lockett and Houck." 6 Compensatory damages were
awarded against both Lockett and Houck," 7 but the trial judge did
not permit the matter of punitive damages to go to the jury."i8 The
Nasts appealed the punitive damages ruling to the Court of Special
Appeals," 9 but before it was heard the Court of Appeals certified
the case for its review.' 2 ° The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the dismissal of punitive damages as to Lockett, but reversed
2
with respect to Houck.1 1
Prior to the decision in Smith, a showing of actual malice was a
strict prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.' 2 2 Actual malice
is characterized as "the performance of an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by
hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff.' ' 2 3 Smith, however, was the first case to approve an award for
punitive damages in the absence of actual malice.' 2 4 In Smith the
Court of Appeals held that behavior manifesting a " 'wanton or
reckless disregard for human life' in the operation of a motor vehicle, with the known dangers and risks attendant to such conduct, [is]
the legal equivalent of malice."' 2 5 Although this standard stops
"just short of wilful or intentional injury, [it] contemplates conduct
which is of an extraordinary or outrageous character." 26 In fashion114. Id. Nast was approximately 10 car lengths behind Lockett on York Road. Id. at

347, 539 A.2d at 1115.
115. Id. at 355-57, 539 A.2d at 1119-21.
116. Id. at 348, 539 A.2d at 1115.
117. Id., 539 A.2d at 1116. Judgment was entered for Edward Nast for $1300, and for
Sandye Nast for $1300, plus costs. Id. at 367-68, 539 A.2d at 1125.
118. Id. at 348, 539 A.2d at 1115-16.
119. Id., 539 A.2d at 1116.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 368, 539 A.2d at 1125.
122. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 149, 297 A.2d 721, 721 (1972).
To support a punitive damages award "there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or
evil intent, or oppression entering into and forming a part of the wrongful act." Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307 (1884). See also Davis v. Gordon,
183 Md. 129, 133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944).
123. H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 43, 338 A.2d 48, 52 (1975).
124. Id. at 46, 338 A.2d at 54.
125. Smith, 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731.
126. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168, 297 A.2d 721, 731 (1972).
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ing this test, the Court of Appeals invoked precedent from its decisions dealing with the crime of manslaughter by vehicle' 2 7 to
measure the propriety of awarding punitive damages in an automo28
bile tort. '

The Court of Appeals in Nast' 2 9 reiterated that the
test in a civil automobile accident action for the submission
of the award of punitive damages to the trier of fact is the
same as the test in a criminal prosecution of manslaughter
by automobile for the submission of the
question of the
30
guilt of the accused to the trier of fact.

In each instance the Court of Appeals made clear that "the evidence
must be sufficient . . .to establish that the defendant was grossly
negligent, that is, that he had a wanton or reckless disregard for
human life in the operation of an automobile."'' In determining
whether a defendant has the requisite state of mind to support an
award of punitive damages, 3 2 the Court of Appeals indicated that a
sliding scale must be employed.' 33 This scale balances the level of
voluntary alcohol consumptionS 4 with other "aggravating circumstances" on the part of the driver to determine whether a trier of
fact may infer that a defendant engaged in grossly negligent conduct
127. Id. at 167-68, 297 A.2d at 731-32. The manslaughter by automobile statute provides that "[elvery person causing the death of another as the result of the driving ...of
an automobile . . . in a grossly negligent manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
known as 'manslaughter by automobile ....
'" MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 388 (1987).
The Smith court noted that this statute has been interpreted as requiring a showing of
gross negligence, defined in Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 531, 132 A.2d 853, 855
(1957), as a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life or for the rights of others."
Smith, 267 Md. at 167, 297 A.2d at 731.
128. Smith, 267 Md. at 167, 297 A.2d at 732. The Court of Appeals reasoned that if
the manslaughter by automobile statute "has been regarded as adequately stringent to
serve as a basis for possible imprisonment. then, surely, there appears to be no valid
reason for deeming it too liberal for imposing civil sanctions." Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at
732.
129. 312 Md. at 343, 539 A.2d at 1113.
130. Id. at 351, 539 A.2d at 1117.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122.
134. id.at 354, 539 A.2d at 1118. If a driver's blood alcohol content by weight was
.13% or above at the time of the accident, this fact serves as prima facie evidence in
criminal prosecutions that the person was driving while intoxicated. Id. (citing MD. CTS.
&JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 10-307(e) (Supp. 1987)). If the driver's blood alcohol con-

tent by weight was .08% or more, such a finding serves as prima facie evidence that the
defendant was driving under the influence. 312 Md. at 354, 539 A.2d at 1118 (citing
MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(d) (Supp. 1987)). For the effect of such

evidence in a civil lawsuit, see infra note 137.
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meriting the imposition of punitive damages.'3 5 Consequently, as
the level of voluntary intoxication increases, the requisite level of
3 6
aggravating circumstances decreases.
Regarding a defendant's voluntary consumption of alcohol, the
Court of Appeals stated that a trier of fact may infer s7 a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life on the part of the defendant "from
the combined acts of voluntarily drinking until intoxicated and then
operating such a potentially dangerous instrumentality as an automobile."' 3 8 Thus a trial judge may submit the issue of damages to
the trier of fact and the trier of fact may award punitive damages
whenever a defendant drives an automobile while intoxicated.' 3 9
Additionally, a trier of fact may award punitive damages where
it can be inferred that a defendant was grossly negligent in the operation of a vehicle.' 40 When, however, a defendant was not legally
intoxicated (a question of degree) while driving or did not operate
the automobile in a "patently" reckless manner, conduct may still
rise to the level of a wanton and reckless disregard for human life
with the proper circumstances, thereby supporting an award of pu135. 312 Md. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122. "As the degree of impairment by the voluntary consumption of alcohol increases, the need for other aggravating circumstances
lessens, and vice versa." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.at 354-55, 539 A.2d at 1119. Unlike the criminal statutes, where a defendant's blood alcohol content serves as prima facie evidence of a driver's degree of impairment, it does not give rise to such presumptions or serve as prima facie evidence in a
civil setting. Id. See also State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 431, 435 A.2d 764, 768 (1981)
(construing MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(b)-(f) (Supp. 1987), which dis-

cusses using as evidence various amounts of alcohol in breath or blood). Expert testimony, however, may be introduced in a civil case concerning the effects produced by
various blood alcohol levels. 312 Md. at 354, 539 A.2d at 1119. See also Foche v. Masters, 47 Md. App. !1,21, 420 A.2d 1279, 1284 (1980) (action for damages sustained in
automobile accident in which court discusses presumptive effects of blood alcohol content evidence).
138. 312 Md. at 362-63, 539 A.2d at 1123.
139. Id. at 364, 539 A.2d at 1123-24. The court distinguished "driving while intoxicated" from "driving while under the influence" in considering whether conduct is outrageous enough to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. Id. at 366-67, 539 A.2d
at 1124-25. The Court of Appeals analogized the imposition of punitive damages
against the intoxicated driver to the culpability of the intoxicated driver under the manslaughter by automobile statute. Id. "When appellant voluntarily, if not intentionally,
drank himself into a state wherein his nervous system was numbed, adversely affecting
his reflexes, coordination, discretion and judgment, to drive an automobile thereafter
itself constituted a wanton or reckless disregard for human life." Blackwell v. State, 34
Md. App. 547, 565, 369 A.2d 153, 164 (1977). Prior to the assessment of punitive damages, however, the Court of Appeals clarified the requirement that the negligence of the
defendant must be established and compensatory damages awarded. 312 Md. at 349,
539 A.2d at 1116.
140. 312 Md. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122.
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nitive damages.) 4 ' The Court of Appeals cautioned that in all cases
a simple balancing test will not support an award of punitive damages where "the evidence as a whole does not permit a rational inference that the driver had a reckless indifference for human
life."' 4 2 In applying this rationale, the Court of Appeals found that
the lower court was correct in withholding from the trier of fact the
issue of punitive damages as to Lockett, 43 but erred with respect to
14 4
Houck.
At the hospital, Lockett consented to a blood specimen analysis
rather than a breathalyzer test.' 45 At trial, an expert testified that at
the time of the accident, Lockett's blood alcohol content was approximately .11 to .12 percent by weight. 4 6 The Court of Appeals
noted that such evidence could support a finding that Lockett was
47
driving under the influence at the time of the accident.'
Houck, however, refused to take either a breathalyzer or a
blood alcohol test. 4 " Houck also did not admit that he was the
driver of the car at the time of the accident until the next day. 49
Houck denied that he had been drinking prior to the collision.' 50 At
trial, an investigating police officer and paramedic at the accident
scene as well as a treating physician and nurse at the hospital emergency room testified that it was their belief that Houck had consumed alcohol prior to the accident.'
For the Court of Appeals,
such testimony was sufficient to support a finding that Houck was
within the contemplation of Maryland law at the time of the
52
accident. '
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 363, 539 A.2d at 1123.
at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125.
at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124.
at 356, 539 A.2d at 1119.

146. Id.
147. Id. 539 A.2d at 1120. For the distinction between driving while intoxicated and
driving under the influence of alcohol, see supra note 134.
148. 312 Md. at 356-57, 539 A.2d at 1120. Except where death results from the operation of an automobile, a person may not be compelled to submit to a breathalyzer. Id.
at 353, 539 A.2d at 1118. See, e.g., MD.CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a) (Supp.
1988) (the test is not compulsory). Such refusal does not give rise to any presumption
concerning guilt or innocence, but may be admitted into evidence. Id. Other evidence
bearing upon a defendant's level of alcohol consumption likewise may be admitted. 312
Md. at 353-54, 539 A.2d at 1119 (citing MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-308

(Supp. 1987)).
149.
150.
151.
152.

312 Md. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1120.
Id. at 357, 539 A.2d at 1120.
Id. at 357-58, 539 A.2d at 1120-21.
Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at 1121.

860

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

48:844

On the other hand, because evidence showed that Lockett was
not legally intoxi'cated at the time of the accident,'" 3 other aggravating circumstances were considered along with her level of alcohol
consumption to determine whether it was proper to withhold the
punitive damages count from the jury. 154 Given the nature of her
traffic violations' 5 5 and her blood alcohol content, 56 the Court of
Appeals concluded that more evidence of an "extraordinary and
outrageous nature" would have to be shown to elevate her "simple
negligence to gross negligence.' 5 7 Thus, it was not shown that
Lockett exhibited the requisite state of mind sufficient to submit to
the jury the count for punitive damages. 151
With Houck, however, evidence supported the finding that he
was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. 15' The independent fact that Houck was intoxicated while operating his vehicle
"would be sufficient for the jury to conclude that he had a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life."' 60 Therefore, the trial judge
should have allowed the jury to consider the count for punitive
damages. 161

The opinion in Nast suggests that when a driver is found to be
legally intoxicated at the time of an automobile accident, punitive
damages may be submitted to the factfinder who may, as a matter of
law, assess such damages. 16 2 When a defendant is found not to have
been legally intoxicated at the time of the accident, or found not to
have operated the automobile in an outrageously reckless manner,
evidence of drinking may be combined with evidence of negligence
in the imposition of punitive damages.' 63 In such instances, the
Court of Appeals cautioned that judicial recognition of the availability of punitive damages does not serve as an open invitation to claim
153. Id. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1120.
154. Id. at 366-67, 539 A.2d at 1124-25.
155. Id. at 359-60, 539 A.2d at 1121. In his instructions, the trial judge referred to
four traffic laws to assist the jury in its deliberations with respect to Lockett. See MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-301(c)(!)(i) (Supp. 1988) (illegally crossing centerline); id.
§ 21-402(b) (making a U-turn); id. § 21-604(b) (turning left in an unsafe manner); id.
§ 21-1102(a) (backing automobile in an unsafe manner). 312 Md. at 359-60, 539 A.2d at
1121.
156. 312 Md. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1119.
157. Id. at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124.
158. Id. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125.
159. Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at 1121.
160. Id. at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124. See also supra note 135.
161. 312 Md. at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124.
162. Id. at 370, 539 A.2d at 1127.
163. Id. at 363, 539 A.2d at 1123.
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such damages in all circumstances.' 64 Given that the General Assembly recently lowered the blood alcohol limit necessary to sustain
a conviction for driving while intoxicated, 65 it appears a greater
number of drinking drivers will be susceptible to counts of punitive
damages in civil automobile tort litigation.
B.

Insurance

In Pedersen v. Republic Insurance Co. 166 the Court of Special Appeals joined a majority ofjurisdictions 6 7 in holding that a claim for
negligent entrustment of an automobile is not covered under a
homeowners insurance policy which excludes claims arising out of
the ownership or use of a motor vehicle.1" 8 The Pedersen opinion implies that the court might have upheld the coverage had the policy
been worded to exclude liability coverage for "use" of automobiles,
69
rather than for injuries "arising out of" the use of automobiles.'
Pedersen was an appeal from a declaratory judgment action determining that Republic Insurance Company (Republic) had no duty
to defend its insureds, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas E. Pedersen, Jr.,
against a claim that they negligently entrusted their automobile to
their son. 170 The original suit against the Pedersens arose when
their son allegedly operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, causing injury to Miller, a passenger in the car. Miller sued the Pedersens in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging they had
entrusted the car to their son in spite of their knowledge of his reckless driving history that, on several occasions, had caused serious
164. Id. at 370-71,539 A.2d at 1127.
165. In the 1988 session, the General Assembly lowered the percentage of alcohol by
weight necessary to support a presumption that a driver was intoxicated or under the
influence while operating a motor vehicle from .13 to .10, and from .08 to .07, respectively. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307(d)-(e) (Supp. 1988).
166. 72 Md. App. 661, 532 A.2d 183 (1987).
167. Id. at 666, 532 A.2d at 186. See infra text accompanying note 192.
168. 72 Md. App. at 673, 532 A.2d at 189.
169. Id. at 671-73, 532 A.2d at 188-89. The Pedersens had a standard homeowner's
policy with the Republic Insurance Company, which contained the following exclusion:
SECTION II-EXCLUSIONS:
1. Coverage E-Personal Liability and Coverage F-Medical Payments to
Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
e. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading
of:
(2) a motor vehicle owned or operated by, or rented or loaned to any
insured ....
Id. at 663, 532 A.2d at 184.
170. Id. at 662-63, 532 A.2d at 184.
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injury to others.' 7 ' In response to Miller's suit, the Pedersens filed a
declaratoryjudgtment action to determine the insurer's obligation to
defend against the claim and to provide coverage for any liability.
When the lower court held the insurer had no
obligation to defend
72
against the claim, the Pedersens appealed.1
The court examined whether the action for negligent entrustment came within the exclusionary provision of the homeowners insurance policy.
If negligent entrustment was. within the
exclusionary provision, liability arising out of theuse of the automobile would be precluded. 173 Relying on Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Co., t174 the court explained that an insurer's obligation to
defend an insured depends upon the allegations in the tort action.' 75 A duty to defend exists if the claim clearly is covered by the
policy. If the claim does not fall within the policy's coverage, however, the insurer still must defend the action "if there is a potentiality
that the claim could be covered by the policy.' 76 "
The Pedersens asserted a potentiality of coverage existed because the Maryland appellate courts had never addressed the issue
of whether the exclusionary provisions in homeowners policies apply to claims ofnegligent entrustment. 7 7 In addition, they contended that the exclusionary language "must be ambiguous or there
'7
would not be such a split among jurisdictions."' 1
The Court of Special Appeals rejected both arguments. 1 79 The
court agreed with the trial court's finding based on the authority of
Kahlenberg v. Goldstein '80 that the "tort of negligent entrustment involves concurrent causation," thereby requiring that any passenger
injuries be caused by the use of the car by an insured.""' The Court
of Appeals described two separate "chains of causation," one of
17 1. Id. at 663-65, 532 A.2d at 184-85. Specifically, Miller alleged the Pedersens had
sold the car to their daughter, whom they knew would allow their son to use it. Mr.
Pedersen retained title to the vehicle, however. Id. at 664, 532 A.2d at 185. The court
did not discuss the effect of the sale on the Pedersens' potential liability because the
merits of the negligent entrustment claim were not at issue in the declaratory judgment

action.
172. Id. at 662-63, 532 A.2d at 183-84.
173. Id. at 662, 668, 532 A.2d at 184, 186.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

276 Md. 396, 407, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975).
72 Md. App. at 664-65, 532 A.2d at 184-85.
Id. at 664, 532 A.2d at 184.
Id. at 665, 532 A.2d at 185.
Id.
Id.
290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981).
72 Md. App. at 665, 532 A.2d at 185.
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which is set in motion when the entrustor allows the instrumentality
to fall into the hands of the entrustee and the other when the entrustee uses it. 1 2 If harm results to a foreseeable plaintiff, the two
chains are said to converge and only then does the entrustor be83
come liable.'
The court also considered two theories implemented by other
jurisdictions in denying homeowners policy coverage for negligent
entrustment of an automobile.' 8 4 Under the instrumentality theory,'8 5 the rationale of negligent entrustment is based on the entrustor's negligence in supplying the vehicle to the trustee.'8 6 It is
the entrustee's negligent use of the instrumentality that is the "essential triggering element" without which liability for negligent entrustment cannot attach.' 8 7 In this way, the tort arises out of that
use and thus falls within the language of the exclusion. 8 Although
the Pedersen court did not state so explicitly, the reasoning underlying the instrumentality theory is substantially the same as that used
by the court in Kahlenberg.
The second theory, the dovetail theory,8 9 states that the effect
of the automobile exclusion in a homeowners policy is to render the
coverage offered by homeowners policies and automobile policies
mutually exclusive.' 9 0 In other words, coverage by one policy begins only after the other policy's coverage is exhausted.
The court also addressed the Pedersens' assertion that the
182. Kahlenberg, 290 Md. at 489-90, 431 A.2d at 83-84.
183. Id.
184. 72 Md. at 668-70, 532 A.2d at 187-88.
185. For cases applying the instrumentality theory, see Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v.
Heard, 626 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (negligent entrustment "arises out of"
use of instrumentality); Cooter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 344 So. 2d 496, 499
(Ala. 1977) (negligent use of instrumentality by entrustee necessary for recovery); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Waterhouse, 424 A.2d 675, 682 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (exclusionary provision precluded coverage against claim of negligent entrustment against insured
where injuries arose out of son's negligent operation of automobile).
186. Cooter, 344 So. 2d at 497.
187. Southeastern Fire, 626 F. Supp. at 480.

188. 72 Md. App. at 668-69, 532 A.2d at 187. The Pedersen court never explicitly
states the dilemma it faces, which is whether the tort of negligent entrustment is an act
of such independent legal significance from the act of the entrustee that it cannot be said
to "arise out of the use of a motor vehicle," thereby falling outside the exclusionary
clause and requiring coverage by the policy. See generally Milliken, Coverage Under a Homeowner's Policy for Third-Party Claims Arising Out of an Automobile Accident, 53 INs. CoUNs. J.

146 (1986).
189. For a case applying the dovetail theory, see Erie Ins. Exchange v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 352 Pa. Super. 78, 88, 507 A.2d 389, 394 (1986) ("[A]ny one occurrence can
only be covered by either the automobile or the homeowner's policy-but not both.").
190. 72 Md. App. at 670-71, 532 A.2d at 188.

864

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:844

"split among jurisdictions" having considered the matter evidenced
ambiguity in the language of the policy.' 9 ' At least twenty-five jurisdictions had found similar language to exclude coverage for claims
of negligent entrustment.' 9 2 Further, the court noted that it had
found no ambiguities in the exclusion, nor had the Pedersens specifically alleged any.193
Next, the court set forth the established guidelines for insurance policy construction: "the intention of the parties is to be ascer=
tained if reasonably possible from the policy as a whole,"' 9 4 "words
are to be given their customary and normal meaning,"' 9 5 and
*"Maryland has not adopted the rule that an insurance policy is to be
most strongly construed against the insurer."' 9 6 The court concluded that the negligent entrustment claim against the insured
arose out of the use of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the
insured. 197
The court acknowledged that a few jurisdictions have chosen to
uphold coverage, but indicated that most were distinguishable from
the instant case.' 98 In the cases discussed, the exclusionary language provided that the policy did not apply to the use of
191. 72 Md. App. at 666-67, 532 A.2d at 186.
192. Id. at 666, 532 A.2d at 186. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d 1042,
1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (insurer not liable for injury resulting from negligent entrustment
of motorcycle by insureds to their son under a homeowners insurance policy which excluded coverage for liability arising out of use of any motor vehicle); Southeastern Fire
Ins. Co. v. Heard, 626 F. Supp. 476, 477, 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (language of homeowners
policy excluding coverage for watercraft greater than the length and horsepower specified also excluded coverage for negligent entrustment of watercraft not covered by the
policy); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap, 141 Cal. App. 3d 524, 532, 190 Cal. Rptr. 425, 431
(1983) (provision in homeowners policy excluding coverage for bodily injury arising out
of use of aircraft excluded coverage for claim against insured for negligently entrusting
plane to son).
193. 72 Md. App. at 666-67, 532 A.2d at 186.
194. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Shirer, 224 Md.
530, 536, 168 A.2d 525, 528 (1961).
195. 72 Md. App. at 667, 532 A.2d at 186.
196. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 720, 261 A.2d 747,
749 (1970).
197. 72 Md. App. at 668, 532 A.2d at 186.
198. Id. at 671, 532 A.2d at 188. Set Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn.
327, 333, 204 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (1973) (upholding coverage for negligent entrustment of vehicle to defendant's son where insurance policy did not apply to use of
automobiles); Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 63 A.D.2d 200, 202, 406 N.Y.S.2d 625,
627 (1978) (insurance policy excluding coverage for use of automobiles nevertheless
covered a claim for negligent entrustment, because that theory of action is not "directly
related" to the use of an automobile); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Chahalis, 72
Misc. 2d 207, 207, 338 N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (1972) (insurer obligated to defend against
claim for negligent entrustment where policy did not.apply to use of automobiles).
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automobiles. The court noted that these jurisdictions denied coverage when confronted with policy exclusions for liability arisingout of
the use of an automobile.' 9 9
The court adopted what it believed to be the majority view.
Maryland courts look at the four corners of the insurance policy to
determine the intent of the parties rather than simply construing
policies against the insurer.20 ° In this case, finding coverage under
the policy would require a strained construction of the insurance
20
contract. 1
The Pedersen court limited its holding to insurance policies ex20 2
cluding coverage for claims arising out of the use of automobiles.
Had the court been confronted with a policy excluding coverage for
liability resulting from the use of automobiles, however, the court
might have reached a different result. While it did not comment
extensively on cases involving this type of policy language, the court
did distinguish them from Pedersen. Given its practice of attributing
the customary and usual meaning to words when construing insurance contracts, the court might be compelled to grant coverage for
negligent entrustment of an automobile under a homeowners insurance policy that does not apply to the use of a motor vehicle.
C.

Defamation

In Arundel Corp. v. Green2 03 the Court of Special Appeals examined the scope of an attorney's absolute privilege to publish defamatory matter in connection with judicial proceedings in which
the attorney participates as counsel. The court extended that privi199. 72 Md. App. at 672, 532 A.2d at 188-89. See Fillmore v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.,
344 N.W.2d 875, 875 (Minn. App. 1984) (clause in homeowners policy excluding injuries arising out of use of automobile applied to negligent entrustment of vehicle to defendant's son); Faber v. Roelofs, 311 Minn. 428, 435, 250 N.W.2d 817, 821-22 (1977)
(injury to child run over by school bus arose out of use of bus and therefore fell within
provision of school district's insurance policy stating that policy does not apply to bodily
injury arising out of use of automobiles); Ruggiero v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 107
A.D.2d 744, 744, 484 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106 (1985) (negligent entrustment claim against
taxicab company, which entrusted intoxicated driver with cab, fell within liability policy
clause which excluded claims arising out of use of automobile).
200. See Rubins Contractors, Inc. v. Lumbermans Mut. Ins., 821 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir.
1987). The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals discussed why it believed
Maryland would adopt the majority view on liability coverage under a homeowners pol-

icy in a negligent entrustment claim. Id. at 677. The Pedersen court agreed with the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reasoning by using the statement in its
entirety to buttress its position. 72 Md. App. at 672-73, 532 A.2d at 189.
201. 72 Md. App. at 672-73, 532 A.2d at 189.
202. Id. at 673, 532 A.2d at 189.
203. 75 Md. App. 77, 540 A.2d 815 (1988).
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lege to communications made before a proceeding is initiated,204
provided that at the time the communication is made the attorney is
contemplating in good faith and seriously considering beginning
proceedings .205
It is well settled that an absolute privilege exists for defamatory
matters published by an attorney in conjunction with a judicial proceeding in which he or she was involved.20 6 The privilege is limited,
however. An attorney asserting the privilege as a defense in a defamatory action bears the burden of showing that the published
20 7
statements were related to the proceeding.
The Arundel Corporation (Arundel), a company dealing in concrete and crushed stone products, filed suit for defamation in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City against attorney James F. Green,
and Ashcraft and Gerel, the law firm in which he is a partner. 2 1
Arundel alleged that Green and his firm2 °9 defamed the corporation
when Green sent letters to Arundel's customers, informing them
that the firm of Ashcraft and Gerel was conducting an investigation
on behalf of clients allegedly injured by asbestos-containing products that might have been supplied by Arundel. 2 '0 Green and his
firm asserted absolute privilege as a defense, basing it on the fact
that the letters were distributed to prepare for potential litigation
against Arundel.2
On the basis of this privilege, the attorneys
moved for summary judgment. 2 2 The court granted the motion 21 1
and Arundel appealed.21 4
For the first time, the Court of Special Appeals was asked to
decide whether the absolute privilege applies to the publication of
defamatory statements made before formal judicial proceedings
204. Id. at 85, 540 A.2d at 819.
205. Id. at 84-86, 540 A.2d at 818-20.
206. Id. at 82-83, 540 A.2d at 818. See Maulsby v. Reitsnider, 69 Md. 143, 164, 14 A.
505, 511 (1888) (counsel's statement made during judicial proceeding in reference to
issues in that proceeding not actionable even if false and malicious).
207. 75 Md. App. at 83, 540 A.2d at 818. See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 97-99,
182 A.2d 54, 57-58 (1962) (defense attorney who defamed prosecution's witness could
not assert privilege where he was unable to show his statement bore any relation to the
pending judicial proceeding).
208. 75 Md. App. at 79, 540 A.2d at 816.
209. Id. at 79-81, 540 A.2d at 816-17.
210. Id. at 79-80, 540 A.2d at 816. The product was a crushed stone marketed under
the trade name "Delight Stone." Id. at 79, 540 A.2d at 816.
211. Id. at 81, 540 A.2d at 817.
212. Id. at 82, 540 A.2d at 818.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 79, 540 A.2d at 816.
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have begun. 2 ' 5 The court noted that other jurisdictions were split
on the issue, 21 6 and adopted the position taken by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (Restatement (Second)), by extending absolute privilege to cover preliminary communications to a proceeding. 2 ,7 The
Restatement (Second) relies on the public policy argument that immunity from defamation suits affords attorneys the unfettered freedom
they require in pursuit of justice for their clients.2 8 The court
found this reasoning persuasive, noting that it paralleled Maryland
public policy. 21 9 Because an attorney's pretrial investigation and
evaluation of the facts is so important, 22 1 the court expressed the
opinion that immunity was equally as essential in the preproceeding
stages as it was during a trial. For these reasons, the court held that
the mere fact that the suit had not yet been filed at the time the
alleged defamatory statement was made did not disqualify the attorneys from asserting their absolute privilege.2 2 '
The Restatement (Second), in its discussion of the issue, requires
that the communication be related to the judicial proceeding and
that the proceeding itself be "contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration" when the communication is made. 2 2
215. Id. at 83, 540 A.2d at 818.
216. Id. See Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108-09, 345 N.E.2d 882, 884 (1976)
(absolute privilege applies to statements made in preparation for judicial proceeding
which is contemplated in good faith); Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich. 355, 362-66, 89
N.W.2d 748, 751-53 (1958) (absolute privilege should not be extended to such statements, even if proposed litigation is contemplated in good faith). At the time Sriberg was
decided, the Massachusetts court had not yet explicitly adopted § 586 of the Restatement
of Torts. Sriberg, 370 Mass. at 108, 345 N.E.2d at 883. Stating that it "[found] the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 586 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974) persuasive," the court implicitly adopted the revised Restatement's position. Sriberg, 370 Mass. at
109, 345 N.E.2d at 884.
217. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 40, at § 586. Section 586 provides:
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial
proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the
proceeding.
Id.
218. Id., comment a.
219. 75 Md. App. at 84, 540 A.2d at 819.
220. Id. at 84-85, 540 A.2d at 819.
221. Id. at 85, 540 A.2d at 819.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 40, at § 586 comment e. The comment
provides:
As to communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding the rule
stated in this Section applies only when the communication has some relation
to a proceeding that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. The bare possibility that the proceeding might be instituted is not to be
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Although Green and his firm maintained that the defamatory statements were related to litigation they were "contemplating and in
good faith considering [instituting] against Arundel" at the time
they wrote the letters, the court found evidence in the record to the
contrary.2 23 At his deposition, Green disclosed that after sending
the letters to Arundel's customers, he did actually bring suit on behalf of a Mr. Linwood Cherry, who allegedly suffered from asbestosis. 2 24 While the complaint named Arundel as one of Cherry's
2 25
former employers, the company was not named as a defendant.
The complaint asserted that Cherry sustained injuries solely as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing products supplied by companies other than Arundel. 2 26 The attorneys did not disclose the
names of any other clients on whose behalf they were considering
2 27
filing suit.
Based upon the record before it, the court concluded that the
attorneys' assertions of relatedness and good faith were disputable
and that summary judgment therefore was improper. 22 8 The court
vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.29
Clearly, the extension of absolute privilege to communications
made preliminary to judicial proceedings will afford greater latitude
to attorneys engaged in investigating and preparing for trial. Protection such as that found in Arundel Corp. v. Green should encourage
vigorous pursuit of a client's interests. Counsel should exercise caution, however. A court will examine closely the evidence to determine whether counsel was, in good faith, contemplating filing suit
during the time of the alleged defamatory communications. Not
only will counsel bear the burden of proving the relationship of the
alleged defamatory statement to th e proposed proceeding, but
counsel also will have to prove a good faith contemplation and serious consideration of the litigation. This might not be accomplished
easily if the anticipated proceeding has not actually begun by the
date of the summary judgment hearing and there is insufficient writused as a cloak to provide immunity for defamation when the possibility is not
seriously considered.

Id.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

75 Md. App. at 86, 540 A.2d at 819.
Id. at 81, 540 A.2d at 817.
Id. at 81-82, 540 A.2d at 817.
Id. at 81, 540 A.2d at 817.
Id.
Id. at 86, 540 A.2d at 819-20.
Id., 540 A.2d at 820.

1989]

869

TORTS

ten record of anticipated litigation. The precaution is a necessary
one, however, so that the bare possibility that "the proceeding
might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity
for defamation when the possibility is not seriously considered.""3
GREGORY L. LOCKWOOD
MARILYN A. WENNES

230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 40, at § 586 comment e.
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